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ABSTRACT 
This study is a critical examination of  the complex search for peace, reconciliation and unity 
in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008, with a view to identify factors that have been 
blocking sustainable peace, national unity, reconciliation and development. It is a qualitative 
study which draws data from document analysis and oral interviews. The specific focus  of 
the study is an analysis of the four peace agreements signed in this period namely; the 1978 
Internal Settlement, the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, the 1987 Unity Accord and the 
2008 Global Political Agreement. Its central thesis is that coloniality in its multifaceted 
invisible forms is largely responsible for conflicts that have engulfed Zimbabwe and for 
compromising the chances of success of the four peace agreements. Coloniality has produced 
a ‘postcolonial’ leadership that has continued to practice politics in a violent, repressive, 
corrupt and unaccountable manner because of interpellation by the very immanent logic of 
colonialism that reproduces such inimical practices as racism, tribalism, regionalism and 
patriarchy. Theoretically, the study deploys de-colonial epistemic perspective in its 
endeavour to unmask and explain challenges to peace, unity, reconciliation and development 
in Zimbabwe. Finally, the thesis makes a strong case for pursuit of decoloniality as the 
panacea to conflicts and as an approach to conflict resolution and peace building that 
privileges decolonization and deimperialization so that Zimbabwe’s development goals could 
be achieved. 
Keywords 
 Peace; unity; reconciliation; peace agreements; unity governments; conflict; crisis; 
Zimbabwe; decoloniality; coloniality; coloniality of power; coloniality of knowledge; 
coloniality of being. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
1.1 INTRODUCTION  
After protracted struggles against British colonialism and a war of liberation against white 
settler minority rule Zimbabwe finally gained its independence in 1980. The end of conflict 
brought high hopes that the Zimbabwean society, which had been fissured by years of 
quarrel, would finally be reconciled and live in peace and harmony. However, three decades 
into independence Zimbabwe is mired in conflict and a socio-economic and political crisis 
whose roots can be traced to coloniality, an invisible global power matrix produced in the 
pursuit of modernity that has stagnated and reversed development.   
This thesis seeks to understand the politics of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity 
governments in Zimbabwe in the years between 1978 and 2013 from a de-colonial epistemic 
perspective. In particular, it is a study of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in 
Zimbabwe that locates the logic of violent conflict and the failure to achieve sustainable 
peace, unity reconciliation and development in coloniality. More specifically, it analyzes how 
coloniality pervaded by repetition without change in arrested transitional politics hampers 
Zimbabwe’s quest for peace, unity, reconciliation and development. The study systematically 
focuses on four specific attempts at conflict resolution, namely; the 3rd March Peace 
Agreement of 1978, the Lancaster House Agreement of 1979, the Unity Accord of 22 
December 1987 and the Global Political Agreement of 15 September 2008. These agreements 
were followed by the establishment of unity governments and reconciliation endeavours. The 
research then examines the problems that have arisen from peace agreements and unity 
governments in Zimbabwe and interrogates the efforts made to resolve them. It also assesses 
how successful peace agreements and unity governments have been in their efforts to solve 
Zimbabwe’s problems. The thesis does not attempt to rewrite the history of the four peace 
agreements signed among the people of Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008. This 
can be found in greater detail in other literature. Instead it uses the four peace agreements to 
illuminate events and processes that have shaped the quest for peace, reconciliation and unity 
in Zimbabwe from a decolonial perspective. 
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The research begins by examining the 3rd March 1978 Peace Agreement, an extraordinary 
and important event in the country’s political and conflict history. Starting with the 3 March 
Peace Agreement enabled the study to explain the deep-rooted and multi –layered nature of 
conflict in Zimbabwe. The agreement followed a phase when the war of liberation had 
reached its peak with damaging repercussions to belligerents in the conflict. The agreement 
was a determined attempt to halt hostilities after a realization that no one side could get 
outright victory. Both the white minority government and the Africans agreed to movement 
in the negotiation process. This was an acknowledgement that they were in what Zartman 
(2000) refers to as a mutually hurting stalemate. In that year, Ian Smith’s white minority 
government and a section of moderate African nationalists led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa 
managed to reach agreement on majority rule and the establishment of the state of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and the death of the state of Rhodesia. The concession reached in 1978 
marked the first time that whites and blacks actually agreed to share power in a government 
of national unity, albeit very problematically as other disputants refused to participate in what 
they considered to be an attempt by the colonial white regime to perpetuate its rule. 
Through the 1978 agreement, Africans were for the first time given the opportunity to 
exercise their right to elect a candidate of their choice based on the basis of one man, one 
vote. It marked the end of overt white rule and the beginning of black political rule in 
Zimbabwe. The agreement thus became a significant event in Zimbabwe’s history. Even 
though it was not acceptable to all, the 3rd March Peace Agreement managed to excite a 
significant number of the populace because for the first time the name “Zimbabwe” was 
officially used to refer to the land bounded by the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers that the 
minority whites and African nationalists were fighting to control.   
The 3rd March 1978 Peace Agreement gave Africans a semblance of political power but 
failed to address the inequitable distribution of resources between Africans and whites. It 
reflected how minimalist solutions can hamper peace prospects. That it did not give full 
legitimacy was apparent, yet the agreement was the first meaningful attempt to incorporate 
blacks into government; an important step in the search for peace, reconciliation and unity. 
Therefore acknowledging the above and the fact that in Zimbabwe peace, unity and 
reconciliation problems are complex and multi-faceted makes the 3rd March1978 peace 
agreement the most promising event to begin the study of the search for peace, reconciliation 
and unity in Zimbabwe. 
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1.2 PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT  
According to Suhrke and Chaudhary (2009:384) development in economic terms should be 
understood as sustained high growth rates or the transformation of agrarian economies into 
industrialized systems of production. Social development can be taken to mean poverty 
reduction and improving the socio-economic conditions of people by providing adequate 
food, livelihoods and employment and achieving other millennium development goals. In 
political terms development refers to a combined process of national integration, state and 
nation-building and social modernization embraces inclusivity in decision making and broad 
based citizen participation that are thought to produce effective institutions and political 
stability.   
The thesis acknowledges that development is relative and the conceptualization of 
development by Suhrke and Chaudhary (2009) cannot be universalized. There are indigenous 
concepts of development from the South that largely focus on humanity in development.  For 
instance the African philosophy of development is relational. It sees development as 
something that can be achieved through strengthening relationships not in the romantic sense 
but with regard to how we engage at various levels, be they power, economic or political 
relations so that mankind sees each other as human and as equals (Interview with a media 
practitioner and ZANU PF official : 10/9/2015). This perception of development is critical for 
the achievement of peace, reconciliation and unity as it seeks to fulfil humanity’s desire for 
harmonious living with fellow mankind. This view of development is different from the 
Western liberal conception that equates development with the increase in material and 
financial possession of society or individuals. The thesis therefore conveniently and 
reservedly elects to employ the Cartesian view of development in recognition of the fact that 
the politically and economically powerful and epistemologically dominant Europe and 
America have over the decades largely been successful in using their hegemonic positions to 
foist their view of development on other parts of the world.   
A strong co-relationship exists between peace and development on the one hand and conflict 
and underdevelopment on the other. Peace is a pre-requisite for development. Without peace, 
there cannot be development. Without development, there cannot be peace. This is 
Zimbabwe’s problem, if not a general problem of the ‘post-colony’ as defined by the leading 
Cameroonian postcolonial theorist Achille Mbembe (2001). Peace, unity and reconciliation 
propose to overcome underdevelopment. Thus the question of lack of development in 
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Zimbabwe prompted the researcher to embark on this study of the politics of peace 
agreements, reconciliation and unity governments in Zimbabwe. It is a study conducted 
within the realm of development studies in acknowledgement of the fact that the field of 
development studies is multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional and that development is 
heavily influenced by peace and conflict.  
It is a thesis of this study that where there is violence and destruction, it is impossible to 
attain any development, such as would meet the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to define and meet their own needs. This is because conflict 
situations draw resources away from development direly needed in the present and the future. 
Strong compatibilities exist between peace and development, in Sorensen’s (1985: 70) words, 
they are ‘structurally interlocked’; for development to be achieved, peace is sine qua non.  
A peaceful environment is essential as it provides a solid foundation for development. In 
societies ridden by conflict, vulnerability is high and the capacity to withstand stress and 
shocks is diminished, thus derailing the development process. Societal disharmony and 
disunity may result in wars which destroy infrastructure, threaten human security and create 
an atmosphere of insecurity which is not conducive to development.  No development can 
take place in conflict situations that hamper access to basics like health and education. In fact, 
in the absence of peace and human security the achievement of development is difficult.  
The study articulates some important relationships between peace and development. Intra-
state conflicts, communal conflicts and civil wars have prevented post-colonial Africa from 
attaining sustainable development by destroying or at least neglecting infrastructure during 
conflict. The disturbance of peace and reconciliation has had serious ramifications on peace 
and development as evidenced by the retardation and reversal of development in the Ivory 
Coast, the Maghreb and the Middle East in recent times to cite a few examples. These 
conflicts have suspended and in some cases, even reversed human and economic 
development. Ikejiaku (2009:18) argues that the absence of peace has significantly led to 
Africa’s poor development. Countries in Africa, particularly those in the Horn of Africa and 
East Africa, for example Somalia (1998), Sudan (since 2003), Rwanda (1990-94), Kenya 
(1991/92, 1997), Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000) and others have all been involved in civil 
wars. These conflicts wrecked economies. Collier (2004:1) estimates the cost of a typical 
civil war to be at least $50 billion, which tremendously inhibits Africa’s development. 
According to Ayissi (2008:22), at least half the countries in the West African sub region are 
5 
 
either in post-conflict recovery or significantly weakened by growing or endemic crisis 
situations and are now inclined towards peace and security as some of the pillars of their 
poverty reduction strategies and meeting of development goals. This is an acknowledgement 
of the centrality of peace to development. 
Peace, security and development are not only interlinked but are also mutually reinforcing. 
Developing countries embroiled in conflict and crisis like the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Burundi have made the delivery of development aid and services problematic. Being 
unable to address peace and security issues renders it hard for developing countries to attain 
the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. These are goals that United Nations 
member countries at the 2000 millennium summit agreed they would seek to achieve by the 
year 2015. For instance, the first Millennium Development Goal is to reduce poverty and the 
number of hungry people by half, by 2015. Violent conflict and insecurity in most rural areas 
of less developed countries undermines efforts to meet this target. In West Africa, agriculture 
has suffered with main routes for transporting agricultural produce to urban centres and 
markets experiencing attacks from criminal gangs or armed bandits.  During the 1991–2000 
civil wars in Sierra Leone some 500,000 farming families were displaced and production of 
rice, the main staple crop, fell to 20% of pre-war levels (Ibid). 
The importance of peace and security as a pre-condition for development cannot be 
overemphasized. A World Bank survey of sixty thousand people from sixty poor countries 
revealed that the first priority for the poor was security, even above other essential needs such 
as food and shelter. This makes human security fundamental to development. This is revealed 
by the United Nations Human Development Report of 1994 cited in Chandler (2007:366) 
which states that: 
Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent 
conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health 
care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her 
own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, 
achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. 
With regards to Zimbabwe, development has suffered the effects of conflict. The liberation 
war ravaged the economy compelling the new independence government in 1980 to turn to 
debilitating aid so as to carry out massive infrastructure development and post war 
reconstruction. According to Bond and Manyanya (2003:17), the conflict left the government 
with financial burden that included a multi-lateral debt of US$5.3billion, a bilateral debt of 
US$97.9 million and a private debt of US$593.9 million.   These debts weakened the state’s 
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capacity to resist international finance and aid, thus negating efforts at achieving 
development in the early years of independence.  
The violence in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the 1980s disrupted social 
life, derailed economic activities and the government’s development programmes. Dissidents 
operating in the area sabotaged government infrastructure and installations and investors 
shunned the area to the detriment of development. The civil war between the Mozambican 
government and the rebel Mozambique National Resistance Army (RENAMO) spilt into 
Zimbabwe disrupting the development projects in the country’s eastern districts. In another 
conflict, Zimbabwe spent US$200 million during its five years of military intervention in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (www.irinnews.org). The war of liberation, the disturbances 
in Matabeleland and Midlands, the involvement of the military in civil wars in Mozambique 
and the DRC all retarded Zimbabwe’s development by depriving it of much needed economic 
and social resources.  
Political contestations from the year 2000 onwards triggered conflict and a socio-economic 
crisis that to Clemens and Moss (2005:1) is so deep that it reversed the country’s 
development by more than half a century. They argue that in the Southern Rhodesia of 1953 
on average one had an income of $760 per year (in constant 1990 US$ at purchasing power 
parity rates). In mid-2005 the average Zimbabwean had fallen back to that level, wiping out 
the income gains of the past 52 years (ibid).  
This section explained the nexus between peace and development but it should be highlighted 
that peace does not automatically lead to development and conflict does not necessary result 
in underdevelopment. There are instances where conflict and insecurity can equally result in 
social and political changes that can spur development rather than retard it and there exist 
situations where the prevalence of peace has not been accompanied by growth and 
development. The study does not only advance frontiers of knowledge in the field of 
development studies by examining the nexus between peace and development but also 
endeavours to enrich the field of development studies by revealing how coloniality blocks 
prospects of genuine political transitions, peace and sustainable development. 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
The developmental trajectory of Zimbabwe can be posed in this revealing manner: from the 
‘Rhodesian problem’ to the ‘Zimbabwe crisis.’ While the ‘Rhodesian problem’ was 
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essentially that of colonialism and the attempt by the Rhodesian Front under Ian Smith to 
pursue ‘unilateral independence,’ the ‘postcolonial’ ‘Zimbabwe crisis’ is rooted in the same 
colonial legacy, hence it manifests itself as problems of incomplete decolonization as well as 
a governance and leadership question. Both in its ‘Rhodesian’ and ‘Zimbabwean’ 
incarnations and manifestations, global imperial designs have actively played a role and even 
imposed sanctions while at the same time positioning the Western powers as concerned peace 
brokers.   It is these complex imbrications of the ‘problem’ in complicated global imperial 
designs that make coloniality relevant in trying to unmask and reveal the structural and 
agential issues at place in the failures of peace, reconciliation and development in Zimbabwe. 
Peace, unity and reconciliation have remained elusive in Zimbabwe despite the signing of 
four peace agreements and the creation of four unity governments between the years 1978 
and 2008, and pronouncements of reconciliation. This is evidenced by ethnic, political, 
ideological and racial conflicts that have hindered Zimbabwe’s development prospects. 
Despite the pronouncement of reconciliation and the rolling out of various activities to 
promote national unity, peace has eluded Zimbabwe. The failure to achieve peace, unity, 
reconciliation and development can be traced to flawed peace agreements, ineffectual 
governments of national unity and feeble reconciliation programmes permeated by 
coloniality.  
Fanon (1968) argues that if peace agreements do not address fundamental issues they turn out 
to be just signatures on papers. Agreements should be revolutionary and transformative, new 
dispensations should emerge. They are expected to change the oppressive conditions and end 
injustice. Post –independence agreements have fallen short of providing that. They have not 
fostered unity. Achieving national unity entails the extinguishing of old quarrels and 
addressing grievances. Failure to resolve these leads to the re-emergence of conflict and the 
death of unity.  Zimbabwe’s experience with peace agreements between 1978 and 2008 lends 
credence to Fanon’s views.   
Peace agreements and unity governments inadequately addressed the problem of the unequal 
distribution of resources, especially economic, and the need to create an inclusive socio-
economic environment. Inter-racial and intra-racial economic disparities both in the colonial 
and post colonial periods have had a significant bearing on peace building. Economic 
resources have remained largely in the hands of settlers and former colonisers much to the 
disenchantment of the African population and to the detriment of development. The few 
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economic resources that came to be controlled by the post-independence black governments 
fell under the control of the black political elite to the exclusion of the majority. Unity 
governments have also been unsuccessful in bringing about meaningful socio-economic and 
political transformation. The socio-economic and political crisis that has haunted Zimbabwe 
since the year 2000 is indicative of the lack of peace and unity which are essential ingredients 
for development.   
A glance at Zimbabwe’s pursuit of peace after violent conflict reveals that justice has been 
the missing link in efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation.  There are two main forms of 
justice. There is restorative justice that concerns itself with questioning and seeing to it that 
deep structural injustices that cause problems are addressed. To Zehr (2001), delivering 
restorative justice basically means restoring property loss or personal injury, sense of 
security, dignity, sense of empowerment and restoring harmony based on the feeling that a 
situation or issue has been fairly handled. It is different from retributive justice that 
encourages tit-for-tat exchanges that are detrimental to sustainable peace and development. 
Restorative justice is thus more developmental as it seeks to promote psycho-social and 
spiritual healing.  
Convinced that justice was not served by the 1978 Internal Settlement which retained white 
control of land and the economy, African nationalists resolved to intensify the war against the 
newly established unity government.  The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement was essentially 
no different to the 1978 agreement. The Marxist scholar Andre Astrow (1983) is of the 
opinion that it was just a watered down version of the 1978 agreement and thus did not 
guarantee sustainable peace. The 1987 Unity Accord focused on ending violence in the south-
western parts of Zimbabwe but failed to address Zimbabwe’s land and wealth distribution 
issues at a time when Zimbabwe’s socio-economic problems were mounting. Given that land 
is the bedrock upon which any economic activity can take place, again justice was not served 
when the issue was overlooked. By the year 2000 the land issue had still not been resolved. 
This omission sparked land invasions by landless peasants and Zimbabwe African National 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) supporters who accused whites of perpetrating some form 
of violence on them by unjustly depriving them of land and other benefits that accrue from its 
ownership.  
The 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) was a product of negotiation and compromise 
intended to end violence in the post electoral period. This resulted in the land issue and 
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critical development challenges being put on the backburner by the power sharing 
government that emerged out of the agreement. The failure to address the land question and 
resolve the development crisis left a significant part of the Zimbabwean population restless.  
Stakeholders in the land issue yearn for justice; justice delayed is justice denied and 
development retarded.  Hence the failure to deliver justice, not only with regards to land but 
also with regards to a host of socio-economic issues has been at the core of Zimbabwe’s 
development crisis.  
1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
The main objective of the research is to examine the impact of coloniality on peace, 
reconciliation and unity from the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political 
Agreement.  
The specific objectives of this study are to: 
- present coloniality as an analytical framework for understanding the challenges of 
peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe; 
- examine the four peace agreements signed in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 
2008; 
- identify colonial factors that are barriers to sustainable  peace, reconciliation, unity 
and development in Zimbabwe; 
- make recommendations for moving Zimbabwe towards, peace, reconciliation, unity 
and development. 
The research questions are: 
1. What framework can be employed for an understanding of Zimbabwe’s challenges of 
peace, reconciliation, unity and development? 
 
2. How have the four peace agreements signed between the years 1978 and 2008 sought 
to achieve peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe? 
 
3. How has coloniality in its multi-faceted forms militated against the search for peace, 
reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe? 
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4. What can be done to achieve peace, reconciliation, unity and development in 
Zimbabwe?  
 
1.5 PEACE, UNITY AND RECONCILIATION – A DISCUSSION OF CONCEPTS  
For a better understanding of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe it is 
prudent to clarify concepts that are central to this study. The concepts of peace (agreements), 
unity (governments) and reconciliation are transient and abstract and therefore contested. An 
understanding of them depends on subscribed values and standpoint. In acknowledgement of 
the contention and ever changing perceptions surrounding the terms, the study uses them 
reservedly and conveniently.  
Peace is defined by Galtung (1990) as a political condition that ensures justice and social 
stability through formal and informal institutions, practices, and norms. Galtung (ibid) 
identifies several conditions that must be met for peace to be reached and maintained. These 
include a need for recognized and valued interdependent relationships among groups, thereby 
fostering long-term cooperation during periods of agreement, disagreement, normality and 
crisis. This definition of peace is apt for the research as it recognizes that social justice and 
interdependence are integral for peace to prevail. The absence of these conditions has 
compromised peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.  
Galtung (1989) further identifies two main notions of peace, negative peace and positive 
peace. He explains the distinction between the two. To him, negative peace refers to a 
situation when something undesirable has stopped happening such as when oppression ends. 
Imposed peace accords and the deployment of peace keeping troops are associated with this 
type of peace. Positive peace describes a situation where there is the building and restoration 
of healthy relationships amongst parties to the conflict and the creation of social systems that 
serve the needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution of conflict.  The 
Institute for Economics and Peace (2015: 6-7) defines positive peace as “the attitudes, 
institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.” It identifies the 
following positive peace factors: a well functioning government, equitable distribution of 
resources, acceptance of the rights of others, low levels of corruption, free flow of 
information, high levels of human capital, good relations with neighbours and a sound 
business environment (ibid). Positive peace implies a proactive process that deals with 
structural violence that underlies the conflict. It takes a long term view of conflict and 
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highlights the fact that peace is fundamentally aimed at transformation of the relationships 
and issues that underlie the conflict. 
The study thus conceptualizes peace beyond the classic understanding of peace as the mere 
absence of violence. This enables an exploration of other concepts that closely relate to the 
concept of peace such as structural violence.  Structural violence refers to violence that is 
embedded in social and political hierarchies that impose conditions which place people at 
high risk of negative repercussions, such as unemployment, landlessness, illiteracy, 
corruption, poverty, poor service delivery and marginalization (Cheru:2002). Structural 
violence is a process which can breed direct violence, thus becoming a clear manifestation of 
the absence of peace. Direct violence refers to the physical harm perpetrated on an individual. 
Structural violence thus breeds negative peace and direct violence although negative peace is 
a preferred option to direct violence. Unlike negative peace, positive peace seeks to eliminate 
structural violence and direct violence while fostering unity and development. It involves 
creating structures which provide increasing degrees of freedom and social justice.  
Peace agreements are another notion that is closely related to the idea of peace. According to 
Nita and Ouellet (2003) peace agreements are accords that aim to end a conflict, or to 
considerably alter a conflict, so that it can be more constructively addressed. Chinkin 
(2003:4) identifies three types of agreements.  There are ceasefire agreements which refer to 
a temporary suspension of war or any armed conflict for an agreed-upon time period or in a 
given area. There are also pre-negotiation agreements that define how peace will be 
negotiated.  These agreements determine the procedure for drafting later comprehensive 
agreements.  
The study however concerns itself with comprehensive peace agreements since they have 
dominated Zimbabwe’s political landscape. They address the substance of the underlying 
issues of a dispute. They broadly agree upon the principles and agenda upon which the 
substantive issues will be negotiated. Comprehensive agreements are usually accompanied by 
protracted negotiations. They seek to find the common ground between the interests and 
needs of the parties to the conflict, and resolve the substantive issues in dispute Their 
conclusion is often marked by a handshake, signifying an "historical moment" that ends a 
long-standing conflict (Chinkin: ibid).  
It should be highlighted that resolving a complex conflict is not a matter of appending 
signatures on documents. There may be need for later meetings to elaborate on the details of 
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a comprehensive agreement. These meetings discuss ways of putting into practice what 
would have been theoretically agreed upon in comprehensive agreements and are referred to 
as implementation agreements. Implementation agreements work out the details and 
mechanics that enable the facilitation and realization of the comprehensive agreement. The 
signing of peace agreements does not give birth to peace, reconciliation and unity. Four peace 
agreements were signed in Zimbabwe between the years1978 and 2008, but the signing of 
these peace agreements did not translate to peace. The peace agreements facilitated transition 
without fundamentally transforming conditions responsible for conflict in the first place and 
therefore failed to foster peace. 
Unity denotes merger, the coming together of elements to produce a single entity. However, 
our understanding of it must go beyond merely viewing it or referring to it as just the quality 
of oneness. It should also be conceptualized as denoting the feeling of being undivided or 
unbroken.  It implies that there is harmony and solidarity and that people are working 
together peacefully and united as a country with common aims, goals, visions and aspirations. 
According to Mugabe (1989:356); 
unity enhances the national spirit and creates the atmosphere for the reconciliation of 
divergent and sometimes antagonistic political and social outlooks and philosophies. 
Through its ennobling and elevating effect it destroys petty and divisive loyalties based 
upon tribe, region, race, sex and religion and in their place creates and nurtures a national 
ethos. Unity brings together the nation in the psychological, cultural, intellectual and 
spiritual sense.  Unity can yield the transformation and amelioration of material and 
social well-being of the people which is critical for human development. 
Peace agreements that have been signed in Zimbabwe have in one way or another genuinely 
intended or purportedly sought, with varying success, to bring not just a spirit of oneness to 
the Zimbabwean people during the search for peace, reconciliation and unity but to engender 
an atmosphere in which they can be achieved. 
A unity government is basically a coalition government, designed specifically to 
accommodate all participating political players in governmental structures (Mukoma: 2008). 
This includes the civil service, cabinet, diplomatic posts, the judiciary and in other instances, 
army, police and the intelligence arms. They are usually formed after violent conflict and 
negotiations that culminate in peace accords. The logic behind creating unity governments is 
that, equitable participation will diminish the potential for conflict and enhance prospects for 
national stability, integration and development. The assumption behind this logic is that 
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conflict arises from mere exclusion of key political players in structures and processes of 
national governance (Chigora and Guzura: 2009).  
Unity governments are in essence a form of conflict management through power-sharing. 
Levitt (2004:44) describes power sharing as an arrangement in which rival parties agree to 
co-exist in government and share power, both political and economic, in predetermined ways, 
often under the mediation of international community leaders. The joint exercise of power in 
principle enables conflicting groups to remedy long standing patterns of antagonism and 
discrimination, and to build a more just and stable society for all (O’Flynn and Russell: 
2005).  In addition unity governments as transition arrangements may provide the opportunity 
for the creation of constitutional review commissions, truth commissions and electoral reform 
which abet the search for peace. This form of managing conflict has gained currency in 21st 
century Africa as evidenced by the establishment of power-sharing governments in Kenya, 
Madagascar and Zimbabwe amongst others.    
Unity governments have been able to foster peace unity and reconciliation in many parts of 
the world but they also have their own weaknesses. What is conspicuously absent from them 
is the absence of broad based participation such that they end up serving elite interests and 
regime security interests while sacrificing democracy in the name of peace.  The underlying 
cause of the conflict is more often than not left unaddressed. This state of affairs hampers 
efforts to achieve sustainable peace. The creation of unity governments is attractive both to 
those elements whose power is waning and those whose power is rising. The sharing of 
power appeals to the former because it gives them a slice of power that they might not 
otherwise retain. Spears (1999:128)  argues that ruling minority groups, who feel the pressure 
to democratise, and yet recognise that under a democratic system they are likely to lose 
power, turn to power-sharing as the best possible long-term means of protecting their 
interests. To those whose power is on the ascent inclusion in government may offer the 
opportunity of international legitimacy that may be lost by opting against being part of a 
unity government. 
Unity governments may be formed with the promotion of peace as a goal but in some 
instances they are no panacea to conflict. Since unity governments are products of 
compromise they do not offer long term political stability. When agreements are reached to 
share power manifest conflict may be transformed into latent conflict which would perhaps 
re-emerge more virulently in the future.  The failure to find common ground in unity 
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governments may result in deadlock which may trigger conflict particularly where power is 
shared by parties with divergent ideologies, interests and visions as was the case in 
Zimbabwe’s 2009-2013 power-sharing government (Matyszak: 2010). 
The other concept central to this study is that of reconciliation. Reconciliation varies in 
meaning and significance. It can simply mean co-existence or it can mean dialogue, remorse, 
apology, forgiveness and healing. To Clark (2008) reconciliation is the rebuilding of 
fractured individual and communal relationships after conflict, with a view to encouraging 
meaningful interaction and cooperation between former antagonists. He contends that 
reconciliation entails much more than simple definition of reconciliation as peaceful 
coexistence. He argues that to achieve reconciliation there is also a need to reshape parties’ 
relationships, to lay the foundation for future engagement between them. Lederach 
(2001:842) quoted in Bloomfield (2006) perceives reconciliation as a “dynamic, adaptive 
process aimed at building and healing”. He views reconciliation as “a process of change and 
redefinition of relationships”. Bloomfield (2003:12) elaborates;  
Reconciliation is an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, 
justice, forgiveness, healing and so on. At its simplest, it means finding a way to 
live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or 
forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of 
cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better 
lives together than we have had separately.  
The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (2005:32-35) concurs with Bloomfield. It perceives 
reconciliation as finding a way to make two or more ideas, situations agree with each other, 
when actually they seem to be in opposition. It involves making parties to conflict establish 
amity after a period of quarrelling and to accept a situation because there is nothing that can 
be done to change it.  The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (ibid) identifies three stages 
in the process of reconciliation, namely acknowledgement; when perpetrators acknowledge 
wrongs committed, contrition; when perpetrators take responsibility for past actions to 
express regret and to directly request forgiveness from victims, and finally, forgiveness; 
which is the victim’s voluntary forgiveness of past injuries. 
There are three main forms of reconciliation. There is spiritual reconciliation that involves the 
rehabilitation of victims and restoration of previous harmonious relationships between 
victims and perpetrators. Then there is psycho-social reconciliation which centres on the 
social fabric of those affected by conflict, particularly their emotions with the intention of 
relationship adjustment.  The third type, structural reconciliation, is the concern of this thesis. 
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It gives priority to security, institutions, economy, political processes, elections, and 
constitutions as a way of fostering peace, unity and harmonious co-existence. The study finds 
it apt to focus on structural reconciliation because since 1978 peace-building and 
reconciliation efforts in Zimbabwe have been elite driven and barely ever attended to the 
psycho-social and spiritual health of victims and perpetrators of violence after conflict, 
electing to focus on structural issues such as power, constitutions and the economy. 
Reconciliation is critical in peacemaking. It is composed of various elements that include 
healing, justice, reparation and truth- telling. These lay the foundations for the creation of the 
various outcomes of the reconciliation process. Truth-telling creates objective opportunities 
for people to see the past in terms of shared suffering and collective responsibility. In 
addition, the acknowledgement of the past is a way of breaking the vicious cycle of impunity: 
silence and amnesia which are the enemies of justice.  
Huyse (2003: 97) argues that to achieve reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, justice must 
be delivered and past crimes acknowledged and punished.  Justice is a vital requirement for 
“healing wounds, making offenders accountable, and re-establishing a relationship of equity 
and respect” (Bloomfield, 2003: 22).  Justice has many faces; it can be retributive and based 
on prosecution. Truth commissions produce historical justice while reparation policies aim 
for compensatory justice. It can be restorative and based on mediation.  Restorative justice, if 
adequately organized, can heal the wounds of both victim and perpetrator since it is 
concerned far more with the restoration of the victim and victimized community than about 
punishing the offender. Besides, it also places greater emphasis on getting offenders to accept 
responsibility for their behaviour and make amendments, whenever possible.    
Reconciliation processes tend to be ineffective as long as the vicious cycle of impunity is not 
broken. Apparently in most post-conflict societies atrocities go unpunished, unacknowledged 
and without redress as has been the case with Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Forgiveness and 
forgetting are intrinsic and cannot be imposed. This is because they are not a result of 
cognitive processes but flow from the heart. Therefore, immunity through amnesty legislation 
if overused together with the inculcation of a culture of impunity may block reconciliation 
(Zehr: 2001). 
The researcher adopts Hauss's (2003) definition of reconciliation which refers to 
reconciliation as “a number of activities that help to turn the temporary peace or agreement 
which ends fighting into a lasting end to the conflict itself.” Various Zimbabwean 
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governments have put efforts aimed at reconciling Zimbabweans as was done through the 
signing of agreements to establish peace after periods of violent conflict. Efforts by past and 
the present governments to turn uneasy peace into durable peace have been deficient.  It is 
imperative for reconciliation to be a broad and inclusive process if it is to succeed. It should 
take into consideration the interests and experiences of society that was affected by conflict. 
As such reconciliation processes have to reach down to communities and individuals instead 
of being confined to politicians at national level. 
Closely linked to the concept of reconciliation and crucial to it is the notion of healing. 
Healing is defined by Hamber (2003:77) as “any strategy, process or activity that improves 
the psychological health of individuals following extensive violent conflict.” It concerns itself  
with processes or activities aimed at rehabilitating and reconstructing local and national 
communities implying the restoration of a normalized everyday life that can recreate and 
confirm people’s sense of being and belonging which is important for reconciliation (ibid). 
1.6 THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
The study focuses on four specific attempts at conflict resolution, peace building and 
reconciliation, namely: the 3rd March Peace Agreement of 1978, Lancaster House 
Agreement of 1979, the Unity Accord of 22 December 1987 and the Global Political 
Agreement of 15 September 2008.  These are some of the peace agreements that have been 
agreed upon among the people of Zimbabwe as part of their long search for peace, 
reconciliation and national unity.  
The four peace agreements ended violence and brought political transition but they failed to 
transform the existing economic, political and socio-cultural order because of coloniality and 
its concomitant role in facilitating repetition without change in arrested transitional politics. 
Transition is evolutionary; it is concerned with movement that does not lead to radical 
alteration. Transformation is revolutionary; it is concerned with drastic changes in the 
essence, basic nature and sum and substance of something.  The failure to bring about 
transformation peace agreements, reconciliation processes and unity governments did not 
only fail to engender an environment suitable for the fostering of peace, reconciliation and 
unity, but also failed to address the problem of the absence of development in Zimbabwe.  
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1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
The purpose of this qualitative study of The Search for Peace, Reconciliation and Unity:  
From the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement is to initiate 
debate on how coloniality both local and global, but with greater emphasis on the latter has 
impacted on peace, nation building and development in Zimbabwe. It would appear that there 
is a dearth of research on the interconnections between peace, unity and reconciliation and 
coloniality and development.  
Most scholars on Zimbabwe have studied and articulated the absence of development in 
Zimbabwe from a Eurocentric perspective that reduces the problem of underdevelopment to 
structural weaknesses or unequal global economic and power relations without interrogating 
the origins of the modern world that produces these relations (Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b).   
What this study demonstrates is that the colonial matrix of power is constituted by an array of 
factors ranging from the social, economic, cultural, ideological and epistemological amongst 
others. These combine to produce violence and underdevelopment in the non-Western world 
that in part explain Zimbabwe’s peace and reconciliation conundrums.  
As the Zimbabwean problem is deep- rooted and multi-layered, coloniality is able to provide 
a comprehensive exploration and deeper understanding of the dynamics of peace, unity and 
reconciliation. This study finds it prudent to employ conceptual and theoretical tools from the 
de/coloniality perspective as they provide a platform for a decolonisation of the search for 
peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe through their ability to unmask coloniality and 
to create space for the resolution of challenges to peace, reconciliation and development in 
Zimbabwe.  
The research challenges traditional theories on peace, unity and reconciliation that have 
skirted or ignored coloniality as a source of Zimbabwe’s conflict and development problems. 
It is inspired by the uniqueness of the Zimbabwean crisis where peace and reconciliation have 
been pursued in an atmosphere laden with continuing colonial influences that are to blame for 
conflict.  The study is ground-breaking as it is arguably the first comprehensive research to 
establish linkages between the persistence of colonial forms of domination that define power, 
economy, knowledge and being  long after the end of colonialism as explanations for the 
absence of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. This study of the politics of peace 
agreements, unity governments and reconciliation in Zimbabwe from the coloniality 
perspective reorients and revitalizes the discussion of peace, reconciliation and development. 
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The study brings to the fore the strong nexus that exists between coloniality and peace-
building, thus shedding light on an important element that has blocked development in 
Zimbabwe.  
The coloniality perspective is advanced by radical Latin American scholars such as Quijano, 
Mignolo, Grosfoguel, Maldonado- Torres and Escobar among others working under the 
Modernity/Coloniality Research Programme (Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b) . The study confronts 
and speaks directly to coloniality that has culminated in the creation of asymmetrical global 
power structures that allow the West to dominate and exploit the non- Western world via the 
control of power, knowledge and being to the detriment of peace, unity and development.  
The development crisis and conflict Zimbabwe continues to experience is a consequence of 
employing deficient conflict resolution mechanisms and epistemologies that spring from 
coloniality.  
This specific study of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments pushes 
forward the frontiers of knowledge in the field of development studies by examining the 
confluence of coloniality and development. It builds on the extensive literature around the 
domination and exploitation of the Global South by the hegemonic Europe and America.  It 
explains how the Global North created structures of power that allowed it to become 
hegemonic and how these structures of power continue to impinge on subalternised parts of 
the world through the colonial matrix of power produced by Western modernity (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2013b). Zimbabwe has not escaped these matrices of power; it has remained 
ensnared by them and its nationalist ruling elite has domesticated its. That explains why 
despite the celebration of decolonization it has remained politically, culturally, economically 
and epistemologically under the influence of the Global North. A more detailed discussion of 
the concept of coloniality will be conducted in the following chapter.  
The research hopes to benefit development practitioners, conflict managers, peace builders,  
students of politics, diplomats, political parties, international Organizations and institutions 
so that they appreciate the relationship between peace, unity, reconciliation on the one hand 
and development on the other hand.  The study hopes to add a new chapter to the discourse 
on peace, unity and reconciliation so that academics and politicians reconsider their 
perceptions of these phenomena alongside coloniality.  
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1.8 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
The study was based on a qualitative approach. Qualitative research can be defined as 
research that provides a general description of a phenomenon by words rather than by 
statistical explanations. It was mainly employed in this research for its ability to present a 
detailed picture of the phenomenon under study and its capacity to enable the researcher to 
learn, participate and be involved in the study (Hitchcock and Hughes: 1995). 
Qualitative research methods combining theory with fieldwork were employed to provide 
detailed accounts of the challenges to peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. The 
methodology was effective because it enabled the researcher to focus on facts and opinions 
about peace, unity and reconciliation. A quantitative approach would not have been suitable 
for research on peace, unity and reconciliation as these issues are not easy to quantify. In line 
with Creswell’s (2008:26) observation the researcher also employed the qualitative research 
method because “the researcher relies on the views of participants; asks broad, general 
questions and collects data consisting largely of words from participants.”  
One of the major distinguishing characteristic of the qualitative research methods is the fact 
that the researcher attempts to understand people in terms of their definition of their world. 
This makes qualitative research methods useful as they are adaptable to dealing with multiple 
realities. They are therefore also sensitive to the many mutually shaping influences that 
permeate peace, unity and reconciliation. Cognizant of the fact that reconciliation and the 
achievement of unity is a process and people have different conceptions and perceptions of 
the terms, it was envisaged that a qualitative research design would also further illuminate on 
the current status of Zimbabwe’s search for peace, unity and reconciliation.  
The starting point was a critical analysis of the text of the four peace agreements referred to 
above. The research sought to establish the essence of the agreements - their objectives, their 
terms, strengths, weaknesses, successes, failures and the consequences for peace, unity and 
reconciliation.  Thereafter the researcher engaged in document analysis of other related 
literature. Document analysis to Yin (1995) involves a systematic review of both primary and 
secondary documents.  Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that document analysis is a pivotal 
part of the research process that seeks to arrive at credible findings. Document analysis was 
vital as it gave the researcher ideas and insights into issues and questions to pose in the 
interviews. Documents that were consulted include published and unpublished books and 
research papers from academics, journalists and development workers, reports, journal 
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articles and peace agreements. Electronic sources, magazines, newspapers and information 
from the Internet were used to get as much as possible out of the on-going debates on the 
topic. Document analysis was mainly employed to generate background and contextual 
information on the peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe.   
The researcher followed this up by conducting individual unstructured face-to-face interviews 
in English. Where challenges with the use of English were encountered vernacular languages 
were used. Frey and Oishi (1995) define interviews as a face-to-face purposeful conversation 
in which one person asks prepared questions (interviewer) and another answers them 
(respondent). In the study eleven unstructured face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
informants from various backgrounds. Unstructured face-to-face interviews were chosen for 
the reason that they allowed the researcher to probe deeper and obtain greater detail (Wimmer 
and Dommick: 1997). Furthermore, Frey and Oishi (1995) highly recommend unstructured 
face-to-face interviews as a useful technique to gather particular data. In this case, 
unstructured face-to- face interviews were used to clarify and further probe into the insights 
which were drawn from document analysis. Unstructured face-to-face interviews also offered 
the researcher great latitude to draw data from conversational partners on their experiences of 
conflict and violence as well as peace, unity and reconciliation overtures confined to 
particular peace and conflict events or processes. The danger of obtaining strait-jacketed 
responses from informants discouraged the researcher from using structured interviews.   
Because the structural approach to achieve peace, reconciliation and unity has been employed 
in Zimbabwe, the researcher found it prudent to interview political analysts, academics, 
political parties’ conflict managers, development practitioners, civil society activists, 
survivors of violence and social actors representing the state. These informants were selected 
on the basis of their knowledge of the subject under investigation and/or their involvement as 
conflict actors or peace builders in Zimbabwe’s search for peace, unity and reconciliation. 
Data from such a wide spectrum of informants provided the researcher with a critical and 
balanced understanding of conflict and peace processes in Zimbabwe without falling into the 
trap of subjectivity.  In addition a broad range of informants were interviewed because for 
any reconciliation and peace building exercise to succeed thorough conflict analysis which 
identifies the source of the conflict, its nature, profile and the players is sine qua non to the 
attainment of peace, reconciliation and unity.  
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An official letter of the University identified me as a registered student and also explained the 
purpose of the study.  Interviews were generally audio-taped and permission obtained prior to 
conducting them. In cases where permission for recording was not granted extensive notes 
were taken. Personally conducting interviews gave the researcher an opportunity to explain 
issues that required clarification. These issues included the importance of anonymity and 
confidentiality of the informants. Personally conducting interviews also allowed the 
researcher an opportunity to allay fears of informants given the sensitivity of the topic within 
the Zimbabwean context.  Conducting interviews was useful as the researcher did not have 
the time and resources to employ and train research assistants capable of asking de-colonial 
questions. The researcher also relied on information from interviews previously conducted by 
other researchers. 
Interview data was analyzed using the approach advocated for by Rubin and Rubin 
(1995:226-227), who describe it as follows: 
data analysis begins while the interview is still underway. This preliminary 
analysis tells you how to redesign your questions to focus in on central themes as 
you continue interviewing. After interviewing is complete, you begin a more 
detailed and fine-grained analysis, you discover additional themes and concepts 
and build toward an overall explanation. To begin the final analysis, put into one 
category all the material from all your interviews and that speaks to one theme or 
concept. Compare materials within the categories to look for variations and 
nuances in meaning. Compare across categories to discover connections between 
themes and concepts into a theory that offers an accurate, detailed, yet subtle 
interpretation of your research arena. The analysis is complete when you feel that 
you can share with others what your interpretation means for policymaking, for 
theory, and for understanding the social and political world. 
Data obtained from documentary analysis and unstructured interviews were triangulated. 
Triangulation went a long way in enhancing the validity and reliability as it verified 
information obtained from different data- collection methods. This was invaluable to making 
the research more comprehensive and reliable.  The data collected was analyzed qualitatively 
and evaluated to determine its trustworthiness. The researcher intensively read literature, 
listened to informants and assimilated as much as possible the explicit and implicit meanings. 
Thereafter the researcher categorized the data in thematic areas and concepts, thoroughly 
weighed the data gathered, and interpreted it before drawing conclusions. 
Zimbabwe was the case in which an in-depth investigation of the search for peace, 
reconciliation and unity were conducted. It also provided the population of the study from 
which information was obtained and recorded. With regard to sampling, the sample 
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population was selected by the researcher through the purposive sampling technique that falls 
within the broad category of non-probabilistic sampling techniques. Chiromo (2006) defines 
a sample as a smaller group or subset of population selected from the entire population and 
describes sampling as a process of selecting a sub-unit from the entire population on which 
generalization of findings will be done. Patton (2002) refers to purposive sampling as a form 
of convenience sampling in which population elements are selected based on the judgment, 
experiences and prior knowledge of the researcher which he/she exerts in choosing the 
population he/she believes are true representatives of the entire population.  Although 
purposive sampling technique was in part chosen for leaving the inclusion and exclusion of 
informants to the discretion of the researcher the choice of informants was done in an 
objective manner that did not infringe on the credibility of the research process followed.  
The choice of purposive sampling was important given the flexibility, latitude and 
convenience it provided with regards to research on an open-ended topic such as this one. 
The researcher was able to identify and access specific informants who could provide 
relevant data on issues of peace, unity and reconciliation and other informants who provided 
related data and added on to what was obtained from other informants or filled gaps that were 
left the same informants.  The study sample comprised of eleven people from diverse 
backgrounds and from different regions of Zimbabwe. The various interviewees (political 
analysts, academics, political parties’ conflict managers, development practitioners, civil 
society activists and social actors representing the state) as has been alluded earlier were 
chosen on the basis of their acquaintance with and assumed understanding of the issues 
surrounding peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. Survivors of violence were 
selected to provide details of their experiences during the different conflict periods.  In 
general the interviewees were data rich informants whose contributions went a long way in 
achieving the study’s aims and objectives.  
The study was confined to Zimbabwe, a landlocked country located in the southern part of 
Africa, between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers. It is bordered by South Africa to the South, 
Botswana to the West, Zambia to the North and Mozambique to the East. It is about 390 757 
square km with a population of approximately 12,5million people (Central Statistics Office: 
2009). Zimbabwe has three official languages: English, Shona and Ndebele. The country is 
mainly populated by two dominant ethnic groups: the Shona and the Ndebele people. 
Administratively, the country is divided into ten provinces and characterised by various 
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government ministries, public institutions, parastatals, non-governmental and privately run 
Organizations.  
Cognizant of the challenge of covering the whole of Zimbabwe, the researcher conducted 
interviews in the major cities of Zimbabwe, namely Harare, Gweru and Bulawayo. This was 
because most people and agencies conversant with politics of peace agreements, unity 
agreements and reconciliation issues were more likely to be found there. The researcher 
found it worthwhile to conduct fieldwork in these provinces as he is familiar with the 
geography and local languages.  In addition these provinces provided a broad platform for the 
analysis of conflict, peace and reconciliation since they experienced different forms and 
levels of violence. They also granted a basis from which to understand how conflict processes 
experienced there have given shape to the trajectory of peace, unity and reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe.  
At the time of conducting the research Zimbabwe was in the throes of crisis and governed by 
a power sharing government of national unity constituted by two MDC formations and 
ZANU PF. The unity government was established after an unresolved 2008 presidential 
election that was marred by violence and allegations of rigging. Although tension and 
political polarisation that characterised the 2008 election period persisted it ebbed under the 
unity government therefore permitting the researcher to accomplish his task. 
1.9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
All interviewees and other informants were told that their knowledge was required for 
purposes of a thesis and were assured of their security and confidentiality. Those that chose to 
be anonymous were respected by the researcher. In instances where informants wanted their 
identities to be known despite the sensitivity of the information they were advised 
accordingly. Those who did not want to be informants had their rights respected. In short, the 
research heeded to confidentiality and maintained independence from possible attempts to 
manipulate the results during data collection and even after completion.   
1.10 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
The study is organized into eight chapters. Each chapter, save for Chapter 2 which grapples 
with theoretical and conceptual issues, presents a historical narrative that discusses issues 
thematically. As a result of having opted for a predominantly thematic approach the 
reappearance of some material has not only been unavoidable but necessary because events 
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that impinge on Zimbabwe’s politics, peace and conflict processes are multi-layered and cut 
across epochs. 
Chapter 1 – Introduction to the Study 
The chapter introduces the study and outlines how the research was done. Captured in this 
chapter is a presentation of the statement of the problem, the conceptual issues, the analytical 
framework, the aims of the study, the research questions, and the motivation of the study, the 
research methodology and data collection methods and ethical considerations of the research. 
Chapter 2 – Coloniality: Towards a Construction of a Theoretical Framework for 
Understanding the Zimbabwe Problem  
This chapter succinctly reviews literature on Zimbabwe’s peace and reconciliation 
conundrums. It presents coloniality as the conceptual framework of the study and examines 
its applicability to Zimbabwe. The chapter is of significance in that it discusses how the 
concept of coloniality illuminates this study of the politics of peace agreements, unity 
governments and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. 
Chapter 3 – A Brief History of Conflict and Peace Issues in Zimbabwe up to 1977   
The chapter chronicles Zimbabwe’s conflict history from the pre-colonial era right up to the 
eve of the signing of the Internal Settlement. It provides background information on the 
conflicts that have afflicted Zimbabwe and overtures that were made to try and resolve them. 
The issues looked at include pre-colonial raiding, colonial rule and violence, the UDI, 
nationalist violence, the war of liberation and negotiations to try and resolve the Rhodesian 
problem. This chapter is important as it traces and brings to the fore salient historical issues 
that characterize Zimbabwe’s deep-rooted, complex, multi-layered and multi-dimensional 
problems that the four peace agreements tried to resolve as part of efforts to foster 
development.  
Chapter 4 – The Internal Settlement– Towards Pseudo-Independence 
This chapter discusses attempts by the Rhodesian white minority government to resolve the 
Rhodesian question by negotiating and reaching agreement with moderate internal African 
nationalists to the exclusion of nationalist guerrilla leaders. The chapter exposes the devious 
means by which imperialist capitalist interests fronted by Smith’s Rhodesia Front 
government sought to perpetuate colonial rule by offering Africans a façade of independence 
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that was not accompanied by any developmental transformation. This attempt to offer 
Africans pseudo-independence was rejected by externally based guerrilla leaders who vowed 
to continue with the war in pursuit of complete decolonisation.  
Chapter 5 – The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement and the Aftermath  
In this chapter the research goes to great length to show that despite the end of formal 
colonial rule colonial situations persisted in the independence period to the detriment of the 
socio-economic development of the majority black population. The chapter critically 
analyzes how this was achieved via an agreement in London which to all intents and purposes 
was merely a watered down version of the 1978 Internal Settlement which had incompletely 
decolonised Zimbabwe resulting in the continuation of the guerrilla war. The chapter 
discusses how the failure of the 1979 agreement to resolve in particular the land question 
bequeathed to the country a future laden with tension and conflict that culminated in the 
Zimbabwe crisis. 
Chapter 6 – Post-Independence Violence in Matabeleland and Midlands and the 1987 
Unity Accord 
The chapter explains the 1980s conflict in Matabeleland and Midlands provinces with an 
emphasis on how global capitalist and imperialist interests contributed to the 1980s violence 
in Matabeleland and Midlands. It reveals collusion between Zimbabwe’s post independence 
ruling class and the capitalist West to crush and discipline perceived internally based 
opponents of global capitalism. It explains how coloniality is replicated by the new African 
ruling class that continued to use colonial modus operandi and methods of repression to 
suppress dissenters. This chapter reveals that peace agreements and unity agreements do not 
necessarily culminate in transformation, peace and national unity and development. 
Chapter 7 – The Zimbabwe Crisis and the 2008 Global Political Agreement  
This chapter explains how a combination of poor economic governance and authoritarian rule 
coupled with the overt meddling of triumphant global capitalist imperialist forces in 
Zimbabwe’s affairs gave birth to the Zimbabwe crisis. The chapter examines the role of the 
West in fomenting the Zimbabwe crisis by seeking to eject an authoritarian neo-nationalist 
ruling party hanging on to power through modes reminiscent of the colonial era and replacing 
it with one perceived to be compliant to the Western neo-liberal philosophy. It analyzes the 
Global Political Agreement, yet another attempt to resolve the challenges facing Zimbabwe.  
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion: Decoloniality as a Panacea for Peace, Reconciliation and Unity 
This chapter concludes the thesis with a brief summary of the findings of the study and makes 
recommendations for the achievement of peace, reconciliation, unity and development in 
Zimbabwe.  
1.11 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided the outline of the thesis.  It is an exposition of the research problem, 
the aims, objectives, significance and analytical framework of the study.  In pursuit of 
fulfilling the research objectives, the study elected to employ qualitative research methods so 
that an in-depth understanding of the various covert factors that impact on peace and 
development could be exposed. The chapter provides a bird’s eye view of the study.  The 
next chapter profits from this foundation that has been laid and discusses relevant literature 
and concepts that explain challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  
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CHAPTER 2 
COLONIALITY: TOWARDS A CONSTRUCTION OF A 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 
ZIMBABWE PROBLEM  
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework of the thesis. It analyses the concept of 
coloniality and its impact on the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. The 
first section discusses the notions of coloniality, colonialism and neo-colonialism. This is 
followed by an examination of the contours of coloniality- coloniality of power, being, and 
knowledge. Thereafter the chapter examines the applicability of coloniality in Zimbabwe 
before finally exploring the feasibility of the de-coloniality paradigm as a panacea to peace 
and reconciliation conundrums in Zimbabwe.  
This thesis stands on Anibal Quijano’s (2000) concept of coloniality to explain the challenges 
to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It sees colonial patterns of power that 
survived decolonization as the problematique in the quest for peace and reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe. It however acknowledges the importance of several theories that have been 
advanced to explain challenges to peace, reconciliation and unity on Zimbabwe’s political 
landscape.  
Hammer, Raftopoulos and Jensen (2003) locate the challenges of peace and reconciliation in 
the “unfinished business” of decolonization. They argue that contentious issues that should 
have been resolved at independence were shelved by African nationalists for resolution at a 
later date. These contentious issues they attest have presented obstacles to reconciliation and 
harmonious co-existence. They include unresolved controversial issues such as land, 
citizenship, property relations and governance. Bond and Manyanya (2003) place the 
challenges to peace in the country’s economic plunge arising from what they refer to as 
“exhausted nationalism” in the neo-liberal era.  Moyo and Yeros (2005, 2007) point to the 
radicalization of the state as it embarked on what Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2006) refers to as a 
“nativist revolution” that commenced at the turn of the new millennium.  Moore (2001, 2003) 
views peace and reconciliation challenges as embedded in elite primitive accumulation, while 
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Holland (2008) perceives Mugabe’s long incumbency and “dictatorial rule” as responsible for 
the challenges to peace and reconciliation.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a) views colonial violence, gukurahundi - 1980s violence in the 
Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces and other post colonial conflicts that have been 
experienced in Zimbabwe as symptomatic of failed peace and reconciliation following a 
continuum of a catalogue of violence spanning decades.  Eppel (2004) cites the culture of 
impunity that has accompanied violence and the continuous use of violence by the state 
against its citizenry as reasons for the failure to attain reconciliation. Mlambo (1998) and 
Muzondidya (2004; 2010) situate the problem of violence in race. They argue that whites are 
viewed by the ruling black regime as settler people without legitimate claims to Zimbabwean 
nationhood while whites argue that they are Zimbabwean as most of the current generation 
knows no other home other than the Zimbabwe in which they were born or emigrated to a 
long time ago.   
Munemo (2012a) sees challenges to peace and reconciliation as rooted in hegemonic political 
struggles. The struggle for hegemony is noted in battles for the control of state power by 
various Zimbabwean political parties, champions of neo-imperialism and remnants of the 
colonial settler state. Huyse (2003) cites inter-racial/intra-racial socio-economic inequities as 
the raison d'etre of conflict in Zimbabwe. She also views peace and reconciliation problems 
as products of the failure to decapitate settler and western influence which has obstinately 
refused to relinquish economic control of the country.  To Chigora (2012), the history factor 
(colonial legacy) and external factors best explain the root causes of the unending search for 
peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. 
The violence that engulfs Zimbabwe in the new millennium calls for a serious interrogation 
of the peace predicament. The scholars cited above have unsuccessfully tried to unlock 
complexities regarding the achievement of peace and unity. Despite the invaluable 
contributions they have made, they have not delved deep enough to uproot the fundamental 
source of peace problems.  They have only succeeded in discussing the symptoms while 
neglecting the underlying causes of conflict that can be traced to coloniality.  
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2.2 THE ESSENCE OF COLONIALITY 
This section explores the notion of coloniality. It provides the conceptual tools with which to 
understand the politics of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments in 
Zimbabwe. The turn of the new millennium marked a new era in Zimbabwe where it appears 
as if the state is radically delinking yet in actual fact what it is hiding is the continuity of 
colonial patterns of domination that have survived colonialism.  It is the contention of this 
study that coloniality has permeated its way into governance, politics, society, identity, 
epistemology and economy with the resultant effect of weakening institutions and processes 
that promote peace, unity and reconciliation.  
 Coloniality is an analytical concept developed by Anibal Quijano and other radical Latin 
American scholars such as Mignolo, Escobar, Maldonado-Torres and others to explain the 
origins of the contemporary capitalist world created by Western modernity that is based on 
the racial categorisation of the global population  (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012a). Their primary 
aim was to develop a new understanding of modernity based on colonial difference from the 
perspective of the ex-colonized that experienced its dark side (Mignolo:2011).  To Quijano 
(2000:1) coloniality is part of modernity, which to Escobar (2004:211) is essentially a 
European phenomenon that historically has its origins in the discovery of the so-called New 
World in 1492 that resulted in progress, civilization, modernization and development.  
Modernity to Escobar straddles the processes of Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French 
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, neo-
liberalism and globalisation.  It hides in the latter to perpetuate Western control of the global 
power structure and capitalist modernity. The pursuit of modernity is constituted by 
coloniality, a global power matrix that lies at the centre of the current racially hierarchised, 
imperialistic, colonialist, Euro-American-centric, Christian-centric, hetero-normative, 
patriarchal, violent and modern world order (Grosfoguel: 2007).  
According to Quijano (2000), with the conquest of the Americas in 1492, Europeans created 
a new global social structure in which humanity was ranked primarily on the basis of 
differences in race and also in the control of labour. The lighter skinned peoples were 
perceived to be closer to full humanity while the darker races had their humanity doubted. In 
the social realm the Christian, capitalist, patriarchal white race was ranked as superior to the 
darker races that were perceived to be inferior, primitive, uncivilized and thus placed at the 
bottom of the social ladder where they were virtually dehumanized. The construction of a 
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new way of classifying people based on the codification of differences between the 
conquerors and conquered that mainly centred on the idea of race was used to justify the 
slave trade, imperialism and colonialism, neo-colonialism and globalisation.  Maldonado-
Torres (2007) refers to the imperial attitude exhibited by the Europeans as a ‘racist/imperial 
Manichean misanthropic skepticism’. He argues that this attitude has sustained the imagined 
superiority of the imperial white being which today is hidden within structures of global 
coloniality where Westerners have remained at the top of racial hierarchies rooted in colonial 
modernity(Maldonado- Torres 2007: 245). The basis of classification and hierachization was 
to fragment and assume dominance over the other polities and societies. The consequences of 
stratification and hierachization at various levels have been conflict, division and 
underdevelopment amongst the marginalized and subalternized societies of the world. 
Maldonado-Torres (2007: 243) refers to coloniality as “long-standing patterns of power that 
emerged as a result of colonialism, that define culture, labour, inter-subjective relations, and 
knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations.” Coloniality 
allows the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of formal colonial 
administrations. Although colonial administrations have virtually been eradicated the world 
over, the majority of the developing world is still experiencing colonial situations as they are 
living under a racialized and ethnicised global hierarchy that privileges European people over 
non-European people, and embraces  Euro-American exploitation and control of the rest. 
Grosfoguel, (2007) quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a:14) succinctly explains 
coloniality: 
… although "colonial administrations" have been almost entirely eradicated and the 
majority of the periphery is politically organised into independent states, non-European 
people are still living under crude European/Euro-American exploitation and 
domination.  
Developing nations today live under the regime of global coloniality imposed by the Euro-
American alliance through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and their domination of the United Nations (UN) 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013a). Although these states are no longer under colonial rule they 
remain in a colonial situation because the life force of colonialism endured the end of 
colonial rule. Coloniality is found alive in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in 
cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so 
many other aspects of our modern experience (Quijano, 2001 cited in Maldonado –Torres: 
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2007: 243). Coloniality is constitutive of modernity; there can be no modernity without 
coloniality. Modernity deposited coloniality on its underside, the two are in effect opposite 
sides of the same coin with coloniality being the hidden and darker underside (Mignolo: 
2000). 
Santos (2007) contends that the stratification of society based on race concomitant with 
coloniality was accentuated by what he refers to as Western abyssal thinking. Abyssal 
thinking he argues is all about making distinctions between peoples. To him an imaginary 
abyssal line distinguishes the subalternized darker races from the privileged whites. Those 
considered to live above the abyssal line were said to belong to the zone of being, while those 
that live below the line to be in the zone of non-being. On the privileged side of the abyssal 
line he attests, one finds superiority, development, Christianity, knowledge, heterosexuals, 
humanity, peace and democracy, while on the oppressed side there is underdevelopment, 
violence, invisibility, darkness, heathens, inhuman practices, savages, dictatorship,  
homosexuals, inferiority and a host of other negations and deficiencies.  
As a result of these imagined radical differences whites of Western European descent 
assumed a higher social status while the darker indigenous races were placed at the bottom of 
the social ladder. This racial classification at the social level undergirds coloniality. It has led 
to the erection of a modern global social structure that associates the privileged white race 
with superiority while further truncating the status of the underprivileged subjects on the 
darker side of the abyssal line. By ascribing superiority to the ex-colonizer and “fairer” races 
and inferiority to people of colour and the ex-colonised coloniality accentuates racial and 
cultural differences. The ex-colonized darker races are treated as lesser beings; and little is 
done to protect them against violence.  The idea of race to Quijano (2000) became the most 
efficient instrument of social domination.  European peoples were privileged over non 
European people, culminating in the white race assuming dominance over the darker races of 
the world. To Mignolo (2009), the whole world gradually came to be seen in the light of this 
logic resulting in global coloniality. To Moya (2011), the situation described above has 
resulted in the differential treatment of races that explain the high number of resolution 
resistant identity-related conflicts engulfing many parts of the world today. 
 Owing to the elevated position whites occupied in the social hierarchy, they came to control 
four key elements of coloniality; control of authority, control of gender and sexuality, and 
control of subjectivity and knowledge. This dominance was not only restricted to race as 
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coloniality overflowed to cover ethnicity, gender, sexism and masculinity resulting in what 
Wynter (2003) refers to as multiple colonialities. The logic of perceiving the world in terms 
of a racially based hierarchy was perpetuated and entrenched in many parts of the colonised 
world. In spite of the end of formal colonial rule in most parts of the world colonial forms of 
domination that characterized colonial rule have persisted. This is evident in current 
oppressive structures and exclusionist relations both within independent states and between 
ex-colonizers and ex-colonized that bear similarities with the colonial past.  This has 
prompted Salvatore (2010) to refer to coloniality as the persistence of the colonial in the 
present.  
Quijano (2000) however conceptualises coloniality as being more than the residual form of 
colonial relations because coloniality also exists even where formal colonial administrations 
have not been established as domination and exploitation along cultural, political and 
economic lines may occur.  He argues that we should debunk the notion that humanity lives 
in a decolonised world because everywhere it is engulfed by political and economic systems 
shaped around a colonial capitalist world system. 
Grosfoguel (2007) lends his weight to the above when he argues that the notion of a 
decolonized world is one of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century because the 
end of juridical-political colonization did not result in the dismantling of a complex matrix of 
global structures. To buttress the argument of an illusion of  a decolonized world (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni: 2014 ) points to the persistence of  Western dominated post World War II and post 
Cold War orders produced by coloniality that have remained resistant to deimperialization. 
He argues that Euro-American dominance is still notable in various aspects of global life, 
politics, culture, labour, economy and knowledge. This to Grosfoguel (2007) explains 
underdevelopment and conflict in the exploited peripheral Global South and privileges 
enjoyed by the more peaceful and developed former colonial powers of Europe and America. 
Corollary to the above, this study is conscious of the controversies surrounding the use of the 
term “postcolonial” and elects to functionally use the term to refer to the period that followed 
the termination of juridical-political administrations in most parts of the world. This is in line 
with Maldonado-Torres’ (2007) conceptualization of coloniality as patterns of power that 
survived the end of colonialism.    
This state of affairs in which the West continues to dominate the Global South despite the end 
of juridical-political control prompts Mignolo (2000) to refer to coloniality as a new form of 
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colonialism: colonialism without territoriality, while Quijano (2000) alludes to it as 
“independence without decolonization”. Colonialism at a global scale was thus replaced by 
global coloniality, which refers to the continuities of colonial practices and imaginations 
across space and time (Grosfoguel: 2004).  Global coloniality is critical to the understanding 
of the asymmetrical world order that explains global power imbalances between the North 
and the South.  
Coloniality is not only found at the global level but also at the local level. Local rulers in the 
ex-colonized parts of the world have since independence developed a new understanding of 
modernity based not on colonial difference as in global coloniality but based on class 
difference from the viewpoint of the ruling elite that inherited colonial states. In domestic 
coloniality the power matrix is constituted by ethnicism, regionalism and the “Big Man 
syndrome” (Mutunga cited by Matinenga 1999 in Mandaza: 2016). The executive engages in 
the stratification and hierachization of society with the intention of fragmenting and assuming 
dominance over state citizens that that it calls “My People”.   
Coloniality is closely related to and interwoven with the concepts of colonialism and neo-
colonialism. According to Maldonado-Torres cited in Mignolo (2005:9) “colonialism denotes 
a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the 
power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire.” Colonialism is crude and 
essentially overt.  It is different from the covert, adroit and suave coloniality which does not 
require the existence of formal colonial administration systems to survive. Coloniality 
persists because of the continued existence of invisible tentacles of power that hook the ex-
colony to the former colonial power.  
Neo-colonialism is a policy of political and economic domination of a less powerful country 
by another without necessarily taking over territorial control. The central focus in neo-
colonialism is the economy and its relationship with the state (Mignolo: 2000). In neo-
colonialism like in colonialism the essential characteristic of imperialist domination remains 
the same: the negation of the historical process of the dominated people by means of violent 
usurpation of the freedom of development of the national productive forces (Saul: 1973:306).  
Nkrumah in his Neo-colonialism the Last Stage of Imperialism (1965) and Consciencism: 
Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonization (1970) perceives neo-colonialism as a greater 
danger to independent states than colonialism. He argues that colonialism is crude, essentially 
overt, and apt to be overcome by a purposeful concert of national effort. In contrast, in neo- 
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colonialism, the people are divided from their leaders and, instead of providing true 
leadership and guidance which is informed at every point by the ideal of the general welfare, 
leaders come to neglect the very people who put them in power and incautiously become 
instruments of suppression on behalf of neo-colonialists. 
Unlike colonialism and neo-colonialism, coloniality is deeper and goes beyond merely 
focusing on the continuing economic exploitation of the Global South by the industrialized 
North.  The difference between coloniality and neo-colonialism is that the latter makes the 
economy and its links with the state the central and only focus, while coloniality reorients and 
enlarges the analytic dimension, and touches on the imperial complicity between knowledge, 
racism, and patriarchy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013a:13). Coloniality recognizes that domination 
is not just economic; it also operates at all levels of interrelation between the different 
domains of coloniality; power, being and knowledge (Mignolo, 2011).  
Coloniality endeavours to concern itself with knowledge production, identity, race, sense of 
being and differential power hierarchies in the global system. It lies at the centre of the 
making of the modern/colonial world of yesterday and today, where Europe and North 
America are at the apex of the global power hierarchy and Africa is at the bottom (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni: 2013a). Thus coloniality is best understood as a matrix constituted by three main 
pillars; the coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and the coloniality of being.  
2.3 CONTOURS OF COLONIALITY 
There are three main contours of coloniality namely; coloniality of power, the coloniality of 
knowledge and the coloniality of being.   
2.3.1Coloniality of Power 
According to Martinot (undated) the coloniality of power is an expression coined by Peruvian 
sociologist Anibal Quijano to refer to the structures of power, control and hegemony whose 
source can be traced from the conquest of the Americas in the late 15th century to the current 
contemporary era.  It explains how the current global political order was constructed and 
constituted into the asymmetrical and modern power structure.  To Taylor (2013:598), the 
coloniality of power is a structuring process in the modern world system in which the US and 
Europe have created  a power structure that privileges the white race and  enables them to 
dominate not only the global political economy but to be epistemologically and culturally 
hegemonic. Quijano (2000) also refers to the coloniality of power as the colonial matrix of 
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power because a multifarious combination of elements constitutes the power structure. This is 
seen in the domination and exploitation of the rest of the world by the hegemonic Europe and 
America based on race, labour, state, knowledge, and production capitalism.  
The coloniality of power explains the asymmetrical global power structure that emerged from 
the quest for modernity. In the coloniality of power, global power structures that privilege the 
West and facilitate its dominance continue to exist despite decolonization in most parts of the 
world. Most power is located in the western hemisphere amongst the “fairer” races of the 
world. In this global power structure everything is considered from the point of view of the 
politics of constitution of a racially hierachized, Euro-America-centric, Christian-centric, 
patriarchal, capitalist, hetero-normative, hegemonic, asymmetrical, and modern global power 
structure (Grosfoguel:2007).  Britain and the United States control the global political system 
and use their economic, political and diplomatic muscle to dominate smaller and weaker 
nations (former colonies) that are dependent on them for various forms of assistance. Their 
dominance of the global political system has been responsible for conflict and the absence of 
development in most parts of the Global South and stable peace and development in Global 
North. 
Grosfoguel (2003:7) contends that the post World War II era was accompanied more by 
transition from global colonialism to global coloniality than by decolonization across the 
globe. What changed, he argues, were the global forms of domination, but not the structure of 
core-periphery relationships on a world scale. The consequence is that most peripheral states 
and subalternized peoples of the world are still colonial in relation to the hegemonic Europe 
and America.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) states that the coloniality of power articulates 
continuities not only of hard power between the North and the South but also continuities of 
colonial mentalities, psychologies and worldviews from centuries of colonialism into the so-
called ‘postcolonial era’. Therefore what is implied by the coloniality of power is incomplete 
decolonization of the world and the continuation of colonial power relations in post-
independence (Grosfoguel, 2003). Coloniality has ensured that most of the developing world 
has remained in colonial situations even though they are no longer under any particular 
juridical-political administration. This has been achieved through the Euro-American 
domination of multi-national bodies like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
the UN Security Council. These multi-lateral institutions have been financially and 
economically imperial in their relations with peripheral states on which they dictate terms and 
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conditions. For instance, the US and British invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the United Nations 
resolution 1973 that permitted NATO’s invasion of Libya in 2011 were unilateral actions 
opposed by most countries in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 
The control of these institutions has permitted the West to wield control over the global 
political-economy and to influence the trajectory of development processes in various parts of 
the world. In the UN decisions made by the Western dominated Security Council hold sway 
over those made by the rest of the Assembly as they enjoy veto powers. In the WTO the West 
champions terms of trade that promote the protection of markets yet at the same time forcing 
the South to liberalize. This creates a skewed balance of trade in favour of Europe and 
America. With regards to the Bretton Woods institutions voting powers in these bodies are 
greater for Europe and America, and they go on to formulate global financial and economic 
policies advantageous to them. Often powerful states like Britain and the US use their 
economic, political and diplomatic muscle to dictate terms to weaker nations (former 
colonies) that are dependent on them for aid.  Former colonies with little voice in these 
institutions have been forced to ally themselves to former colonizers in order to get decisions 
passed in their favour at international gatherings. 
The Global South has received aid, loans and grants with conditionalities from the multi-
lateral institutions controlled by the North. The assistance has come against the backdrop of 
structural, political and economic weaknesses inherent in the South, thus exacerbating an 
already dire situation for these states.  More often than not the former colonies have been 
unable to adhere to the conditions. The consequences have been debt crisis, aid, dependency 
and poverty in the South. This situation has entrenched unequal global power relations 
wherein former colonies are subordinate to former colonisers.  
Western control of power, economy and labour has allowed it to acquire riches which they 
are unwilling to share equitably with the rest of the developing world which provides the bulk 
of the raw materials and labour used to process high standards of living for the North. This 
exploitative practice at the global level has reproduced itself within states of the developing 
world where those who bear the burden of carrying the developmental process of the state do 
not get to eat the fruits of their labour, thus creating conditions for conflict.  
It can be noted that besides explaining the current global power structural hierarchies, the 
coloniality of power also cascades down to explain structural hierarchies at national level. In 
Zimbabwe these hierarchies are mainly economic, political, ethnic and racial in nature. These 
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hierarchies that existed under colonialism were accentuated during the nationalist struggles 
and liberation war. Independent Zimbabwe has retained almost similar structures that were 
the source of conflict under colonialism.  The ruling Shona-dominated ZANU PF party has 
placed itself at the apex of the power structures and has deployed resource control and 
political power to exclude and subordinate other ethnic and racial groups. This has served to 
generate and perpetuate conflicts. The study therefore aptly employs the concept of the 
coloniality of power to explain how global hierarchies have been reproduced at national level 
resulting in the “hierachization” of Zimbabwean society based on race, ethnicity, political 
persuasion/affiliation, class and gender, inter alia, that has served the purpose of dividing the 
country rather than promoting nation building. 
 Euro-American political and military strength has also enabled the West to control the ruling 
elite in other parts of the South that rely heavily on Western diplomatic and military support 
for regime survival. For a long time Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime in Zaire and Hosni 
Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and a number of South American countries have had their 
budgets subsidised by the Americans resulting in their pandering to the dictates of the 
American government (Weiner :1991). This prompts Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a:13) to agree 
with (Spivak: 1990) that as a consequence of the failure to completely decolonize the 
periphery the people of the Global South remain in a “postcolonial neocolonized world”. He 
argues that Africans live under the coloniality of power in which their leaders have no power 
and freedom to decide on the course of any development of their countries without approval 
from Washington, London, Paris and other Western capitals.  This is in spite of the fact that 
political colonialism has been eliminated. The relationship between the West and the 
developing world continues to be one of colonial domination. While Kwame Nkrumah would 
perceive this as neo-colonialism - the last stage of imperialism- it is the conviction of this 
study that such a situation depicts coloniality as yet another stage of Western hegemonic 
imperialism.   
The problems of peace, reconciliation and unity in the ex-colonized parts of the world are not 
only a consequence of machinations of foreigners and their local puppets but are also a 
reflection of the workings of local coloniality that created its own domestic power matrix. In 
this local power structure things are considered from the point of view of the politics of 
constitution of an ethnically hierachized, region- centric, elite-centric, “Bigman-centric” and 
patriarchal state power structure. Concomitant with end of empire was a transition from 
colonialism by foreigners to a capture of the state by local ruling elite that replaced the 
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retreating settler state. What fundamentally changed were the forms of domination, but not 
the structure of horse-and-rider relationships that characterized colonial rule. The 
consequence is that most ex-colonies and citizens of these states remain colonial in relation to 
the hegemonic elite nationalist bourgeoisie that filled the shoes of the former colonizers. The 
control of the state political system by the elite has been responsible for conflict and the 
absence of development in the countryside and for those living on the margins of society in 
urban areas while those in power live in affluence.  
Local coloniality has also ensured that most state citizens have remained in colonial 
situations even though they are no longer under any particular colonial juridical-political 
administration. This has been achieved through the nationalist elite domination of the 
political economy and securocratization of the state. Mandaza (2016) refers to a securocrat 
state as one in which the military-security apparatus is a dominant factor in the power 
complex and rules without or despite popular will.  In Zimbabwe apparently decisions made 
by the nationalist elite hold sway over those made by the rest of the populace. For instance 
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme was adopted in the early 1990s against the 
wishes of a significant proportion of the population and so was a 2005 slum clean-up 
campaign launched that violated over 700 000 citizens’ rights to habitation. 
2.3.2 Coloniality of Knowledge 
Closely linked to the coloniality of power is the concept of the coloniality of knowledge 
which is useful in any understanding of the modern/colonial world we live in. The coloniality 
of knowledge to Maldonado-Torres (2007: 242) is concerned with the impact of colonization 
on the different areas of knowledge production. It is a power structure that entails the control 
and monopolization of epistemology by the West. It privileges knowledge from Europe and 
holds in high esteem knowledge produced by the white race while undermining, ignoring, 
silencing, oppressing and marginalizing knowledge from the Global South (Grosfoguel 
2009). Eurocentric epistemologies have not only assumed preponderance but have also been 
presented as objective and universal knowledges (Escobar, 2007). Quijano (2000) concurs, 
pointing out that the Euro-American World concentrated all forms of the control of 
subjectivity, culture, especially knowledge and the production of knowledge, under its 
hegemony so as to further imperialism and maintain colonial situations in previously 
colonized territories. This has resulted in the West’s epistemic hegemony in the 
modern/colonial capitalist world-system we live in (Grosfoguel: 2009).  
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Coloniality of knowledge  territorialized epistemology; those born in the Global North came 
to be regarded as more knowledgeable than those born in the Global South, thus creating an 
unbalanced knowledge structure in the world (Mignolo: 2013). Coloniality of knowledge also 
concerns itself with who generates knowledge, from where and for what purpose, and who 
controls and monopolizes this knowledge.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a:11) notes that 
endogenous and indigenous knowledges were being pushed to the margins while privileging 
Western knowledges. Sylvia Wynter (2003) refers to this as epistemological “disregard” of 
epistemologies of the South.  
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) further argues that with the expansion of western modernity 
subaltern knowledges that were found not to be useful to the colonizers were either repressed 
or displaced only to be replaced by alien Eurocentric knowledges. He laments that Africa 
today is saddled with irrelevant knowledge that disempowers rather than empowers 
individuals and communities.  Western thinkers and scholars in the mould of Foucault, 
Gramsci, Zartmann and Galtung have been made to overshadow subaltern thinkers like Ali 
Mazrui, Claude Ake, Ghandi, Ngugi wa Thiongo and Mamdani whose ideas are more 
relevant to the subalternized. The darker races of the Global South are seen as incapable of 
producing knowledge worthy of consumption by the North. Not only have western thinkers 
supposedly eclipsed epistemologies of the South, but they have also largely barricaded 
themselves against them. This is indicative of the prevalence of both epistemic and 
ontological racism. 
 
Despite the end of formal colonial rule in many parts of the developing world epistemologies 
are still heavily Euro-American centric. The global knowledge industry is dominated by the 
western scholars. This state of affairs has allowed structures of knowledge production in an 
asymmetrical world order to continue to be dominated by the West. The use of what 
Valentine Mudimbe refers to as colonial libraries (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b) has restricted the 
Global South’s capacity to produce the alternatives knowledges advocated for by New 
Zealand scholar Linda Tuhiwai-Smith. The predominance of Euro-American epistemology is 
seen in the way Europe and America have gone to great lengths to try and make the western 
university system the global university system thus allowing the epistemic hierarchy created 
by colonialism to survive (Grosfoguel, 2009:19). 
 
The strong influence of Euro-American centric epistemologies has and continues to 
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tremendously affect the locus of enunciation of the subalternized population of the 
developing world. This is because the territories were formally decolonised but the minds of 
the people were not decolonized, they remained epistemologically colonized. Mignolo (2000) 
argues that we always speak from a particular location in power structures, be they class sex, 
spirituality, race, ethnicity, ideological.  Apparently, Africans enjoying the fruits of 
independence articulate issues from a Euro-centric perspective although they may physically 
be located in Africa. Some think like white Europeans in Paris although they may have been 
born to Mandingo peasant parents in Mali. The fact that one may be located geographically in 
Africa but think as though they are in Europe is what Argentinean-Mexican writer Enrique 
Dussel refers to as the geo-politics of knowledge, whereas  a scenario whereby one is black 
but thinks like a Whiteman is what is Grosfoguel (2009:14 ) calls  the body politics of 
knowledge. To Quijano (2000) this is a reflection of continued epistemological colonization 
of the South as a consequence of the persisting colonization of imagination bequeathed by 
colonialism. 
 
Colonial rule did not just confine itself to the control of power, authority and economy but 
also extended its tentacles to the domain of knowledge.  The epistemic effects of colonialism 
have been far-reaching, for instance under colonialism Africans were taught European culture 
and civilization which celebrated the achievements of Europeans at the expense of African 
great figures that were denigrated or ignored.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011a:5) has the following 
to say about the form of colonial education and its impact on the Africans.  
 
Schooling openly took the form of Westernization that resulted in Africans liking Europe 
and America that rejected them, and hating Africa that produced them.     African modes 
of knowing, of producing knowledge, and of producing perspectives became 
subordinated to Euro-American epistemology that assumed universal proportions and 
universal truth. Euro-American knowledge was placed far out of reach of the majority of 
Africans, and when it was made available and taught to Africans, it was done in a partial 
and selective manner, to those few who were wanted by colonial state to service some of 
its institutions as teachers, nurses and policemen. 
 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2014) in his book Epistemologies of the South refers to these 
acts as “epistemicide,” that is, the extermination of knowledge and ways of knowing. 
Africans were indoctrinated into thinking that they were an inferior backward racial group 
characterized by lacks and deficits that had to look up to the “superior” white man for 
enlightenment and progress. Africans were therefore not just territorially colonized but also 
cognitively colonized and their sense of being and identity was hugely impacted upon. 
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According to Alcoff (2007) the ex-colonized people exude what was planted in their minds 
by colonialism. Colonial subjects were schooled into believing that they were barbaric and 
savage. He argues that the violence that engulfs former colonies today is perhaps unleashed 
to fulfil that label.  
 
Independence in most African states did not change the mindset of the ex-colonized people. 
Their perception of things remained largely influenced by Euro-American worldviews; what 
one can refer to as the coloniality of imagination. One way through which the West has 
retained control of the African mind as has been mentioned was through what has been 
highlighted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) as Mudimbe’s colonial library. Most African 
educational institutions still consult books informed by methodologies and theories of the 
former colonizers. The effect of this situation is that the knowledge on conflict resolution and 
peace building that is produced in Zimbabwe /Africa is least likely to be effective as it is not 
suited to the context. Those scholars that refuse to pursue western epistemologies do not get 
published and neither is their work disseminated or recognized by the epistemologically 
hegemonic West. This is because to Escobar (2004:217) indigenous and traditional 
epistemologies of conflict resolution have been subalternized by coloniality. We thus have to 
recognize that the geo-politics of knowledge has carried the myth that Africa can develop and 
enjoy peace only if it follows a development path trodden by Europe.  
Coloniality of knowledge therefore exposes the influence that former colonizers still have 
with regards to methodologies and knowledge production. Although colonialism in many 
parts of the world has come to an end, its effects linger; western tools of analysis, methods 
and theories are still employed in the realm of knowledge. This has been noted in the domain 
of peace in the post-independence period of the ex-colonized world where European models 
of conflict resolution have been preferred ahead of indigenous modes of conflict resolution 
that have been sidelined. The ex-colonized peoples of the developing world have, because of 
the coloniality of knowledge, persisted with a mindset in which they feel that they are still 
colonized yet the shackles of colonialism have long since been removed. 
Zimbabwe’s education system still largely followed the curriculum of its former colonial 
master, Britain despite the end of colonial rule in 1980. By inheriting the British education 
system that was out of sync with the reality and experiences of the Africans meant that the 
African majority were compelled to persist with a colonial curriculum that celebrated 
European heroes and taught about the culture, of the ex-colonizers while ignoring to 
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underscore the achievements and lives of great African figures such as Mzilikazi, Lobengula, 
Mbuya Nehanda and Kaguvi.  The way Zimbabweans perceive the world despite the end of 
formal empire did not change much due to the persistence of colonial epistemologies. In the 
discipline of history for instance the country had to wait for more than a decade to radically 
change the Ordinary level syllabus that placed equal emphasis on European and central 
African history in a predominantly black country. It was only after the Nziramasanga 
Commission concluded that the educational system was 'both inappropriate and outdated' that 
a nationalist, Africa-centred and Marxist-inspired syllabus was introduced (Barnes: 2004).  
The knowledge Zimbabwe has continued to receive long after the end of colonial rule has 
served to weaken the socio-economic and political fabric of the country. It has not laid the 
foundations for establishing strong economic and political structures that promote sustainable 
peace and development. Zimbabwe was cajoled into accepting western generated IMF and 
World Bank sponsored programmes. This was surprising given the fact that Zimbabwe is a 
developing state trying to extricate itself from the after-effects of colonialism. The 
consequences were disastrous for Zimbabwe’s development as they led to serious socio-
economic ills which generated civil strife. This makes one doubtful of the suitability and 
sincerity of western development and economic models and development paradigms.  The 
political crisis and civil strife that have engulfed Zimbabwe since independence are indicative 
of troubled peace and reconciliation epistemologies derived from the Western powers. In fact 
coloniality of knowledge has determined strategies, theories and approaches that have been 
employed to try and resolve the Zimbabwean conflict.   
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012a:423) is skeptical of the appropriateness and sincerity of western 
driven conflict resolution pedagogies. He surmises that “powerful people benefitting from the 
lack of peace will not teach you how to be peaceful lest their power is eroded.” The liberation 
war could have been stopped by the British before it claimed many lives.  Since Britain was 
benefitting from the war it was not in a hurry to resolve the conflict in a way that was likely 
to compromise its political and economic interests. This did not make the British best placed 
to deliver pedagogies of peace in Zimbabwe.  Its resolution of the Zimbabwean conflict in  
the year 1979 did not produce durable peace but rather papered over the cracks as conflict re-
emerged not long after independence as evidenced by gukurahundi in Matabeleland in the 
1980s and farm invasions from the year 2000.  The above shows that rarely, if at all, do 
former erstwhile colonizers with massive economic interests in a particular region give sound 
and honest counsel of a political nature to liberated territories.  British actions were informed 
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more by imperial political and economic interests more than a desire to bring peace and 
stability to Zimbabwe (ibid).   
Zimbabwe has been a victim of externally generated pedagogies of peace and reconciliation 
that are not informed by any geo-biographical contextual understanding of its history and 
politics. Ostensibly ‘experts’ from the West or educated in the West are given space to 
deliver their pedagogy of development and governance to Zimbabwe. These experts have 
perceived the Zimbabwe conflict and analyzed it through foreign lenses. This has militated 
against the proper diagnosis and resolution of Zimbabwean conflicts as they lack the 
connectedness with everyday experiences of Zimbabweans.  Zimbabwe suffers from an 
epistemological crisis where its citizens have put aside their intellectual possessions and 
adopted colonizers’ forms of thought. They have also discarded indigenous modes of 
development, governance and conflict resolution that focused on community health and 
restoration in favour of western notions of resolving conflict which are alien to their culture 
(ibid).  
Peace processes have not been so successful on Zimbabwe’s political landscape because of a 
crisis in the loci of enunciation of facilitators and mediators to conflicts. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2012b:5) cites Mignolo (2009) who refers to the locus of enunciation as the geographical 
spaces from which academics and intellectuals speak, their ideological orientations, subject-
positions (racial, gender and class identifications), and the historical processes and events that 
inform their knowledge-claims. Since no fundamental change has occurred with regards to 
knowledge production and acquisition since decolonization, western epistemologies continue 
to pervade peace and reconciliation processes. The resultant effect has seen Zimbabwe 
/African conflict managers speaking geographically from the South but articulating ideas, 
beliefs and approaches on conflict resolution consistent with western thought and methods of 
conflict resolution. Thabo Mbeki, the Southern Africa Development Council (SADC) 
mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis, adopted quiet diplomacy. This conflict resolution 
philosophy is rooted in western diplomacy and thus alien and unsuitable for the Zimbabwean 
context as a conflict resolution strategy.  The consequences of employing it were an 
escalation and extension of the Zimbabwe crisis, the violent 2008 elections, a flawed Global 
Political Agreement, a polarized GNU and the contested 2013 elections which have not 
offered Zimbabwe prospects for sustainable peace.  
A glance at the coloniality of knowledge within the realm of domestic coloniality reveals that 
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inheritors of colonial states came to control and monopolize epistemology. Knowledge 
produced by the ruling nationalist elite has come to be held in high regard while that 
produced by the masses is neglected and ignored. Knowledge produced by the state ruling 
elite and its sympathizers is privileged and accorded space while that of civil society is 
marginalized or denied space. The masses are seen as tabula rasa and incapable of 
conceiving anything that can contribute to state development. As a result the knowledges of 
the subalternized state masses have over time been replaced by the ruling elites’ knowledge. 
Corollary to Wynter’s (2003) view one may refer to this as the disregard of epistemologies of 
the subalternized masses that have allowed epistemologies of the state to be dominant. State-
centric epistemologies do not only become dominant but are also seen as the “right” 
knowledge. This has accentuated the states’ epistemic hegemony in the ex-colonies.  
 
It is important to note that local coloniality does not only disregard alternative knowledges 
but also employs Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ (2014) “epistemicides” in the ex-colonies. 
The rural populace of ex-colonies has been taught the culture of the urbanites and told to 
forget their traditional way of life. Impoverished rural masses now speak from an urban-
centric perspective although they may physically be resident in the countryside. This loss of 
identity has eroded social cohesion among the rural population and triggered cultural conflict.  
The fact that masses located geographically in the countryside but think as though they are in 
the heart of the urban area is reflective of the existence of the geo-politics of knowledge, 
whereas a scenario where one is of peasantry stock but thinks like a suburbanite is evidence 
of the body politics of knowledge at play. The foregoing is indicative of the epistemological 
colonization of the rural by the urban. 
2.3.3 Coloniality of Being 
The coloniality of being is a useful analytical tool developed by Mignolo to analyze the 
relationship between power and knowledge in the framing of being. According to Maldonado 
–Torres (2007:242) while the coloniality of power concerns itself with the interrelation 
between modern forms of exploitation and domination and the coloniality of knowledge has 
to do with the impact of the different areas of knowledge production, the coloniality of being 
is primarily concerned with what Escobar (2004) refers to as the ontological dimension of 
coloniality that emphasizes ontological difference. It explains the processes of the dynamics 
of power that discriminate the different races of the world through the ranking of humanity 
according to ontological conceptions of the sense of being.  
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There is a social classification of the world’s population around the idea of race. Race is 
placed at the centre of the structuring of the global order where whites of western European 
descent are found in the higher echelons of the global social hierarchy and enjoy privileges 
over other racial groups. The ex-colonized people of the continents of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, darker races in general, are regarded as inferior to the Caucasian former colonizers 
from Europe and North America, who are perceived as superior. This determines the rights, 
privileges and levels of development that are enjoyed and accrued to these races. This has 
perpetuated colonial situations that ascribed inferiority to the conquered races and superiority 
to conquering race. Under coloniality the Cartesian “I think therefore I am (human)” was 
replaced by “I conquer therefore I am”. This provided the white race with the excuse to not 
only discriminate but also eliminate the conquered darker races that owing to their having 
been conquered were seen as a sub- human, non- thinking, dispensable population.  
In a world marked by the coloniality of being, the humanity of the darker races of the world 
is doubted. Fanon (1968) argues that the “damné” (the black race – the wretched, the 
condemned and the oppressed) emerges in the eyes of the white race as a race perceived to be 
distant from humanity when compared to light skinned persons. Whiteness in this world is 
considered to have greater ontological density than blackness. Lighter skinned races are 
regarded as closer to humanity (Maldonado –Torres 2007: 244).  To Fanon (1968) the blacks 
occupy the zone of non-being while the privileged white race endowed with full humanity is 
seen as occupying the zone of being. Mignolo (2007: 480) sees striking resemblances 
between racism and the coloniality of being. At the centre of the coloniality of being and 
racism is the discrimination of people in the pursuit of hegemony. To him, the two are 
groomed in the same stable and are cognitively aligned in the colonial matrix of power. 
Colonialism’s impact was not just confined to the political and economic realm; it 
transcended these to impact greatly on the conquered people’s conception of being. The 
conquering white race elevated and privileged its culture and imposed it on indigenous 
conquered people who had to endure cultural erosion resulting in them losing their identity 
and corrupting their sense of being. Having culturally dominated the conquered races the 
conquering white European race perceived itself as ontologically denser than the conquered 
darker races, thus accentuating colonial difference.  Grosfoguel (2009) argues that the 
domination of the darker races by the white race persists despite the end of colonialism. This 
is evident in today’s global power structures where we observe attitudes, traits and cultures 
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imposed and bequeathed by white European and American colonialists in most parts of the 
world. 
As an analytical concept the coloniality of being helps us to analyze and understand how the 
ontological structuring of society that accompanied modernity explains violence and 
underdevelopment in the zone of non-being and development and peace in the zone of being 
Fanon (1968).  The dehumanized Africans are regarded by the white race as being at the 
bottom of the human ontological ladder located in the domain of violence, war, rape, 
diseases, death and mourning. This realm is perceived to be characterized by lacks and 
deficits; lacking history, lacking civilization, lacking development, lacking good governance, 
lacking democracy, lacking human rights, and lacking ethical leadership (Mignolo 2007; 
Grosfoguel 2007; Maldonado-Torres 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b). 
According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b:4), under the coloniality of being Africans are  pushed  
to the lowest rank of human ontology where even their constitution as human is doubted and 
where they exist as objects  while the whites are regarded as subjects found higher up the 
ontological ladder.  He further argues that blacks were considered to be inferior under 
colonialism, and remain regarded as such today within structures of global coloniality where 
Westerners have remained at the top of racial hierarchies. 
People living in the zone of being or above what Boaventura de Sousa Santos  (2007) calls 
the abyssal line are recognized socially in their humanity as human beings and, thus, enjoy 
access to human rights and other rights that people living below the line of humanity are 
denied.  In the zone of non-being life is hellish. Conflicts are not managed before serious 
bloodshed. The Rwandan genocide of the 1990s and Zimbabwe’s gukurahundi of the 1980s 
are evidence of this. However, in the zone of being resources are availed to prevent and 
mitigate potential genocide as was the case in Serbia in the 1990s. Grosfoguel  et al (2014) 
cite Santos (2006) as arguing that conflict in the zone of being is managed through 
mechanisms of regulation and emancipation.“Regulation” refers to relations of civility that 
provide spaces of political negotiation and action between the oppressors and oppressed.  
“Emancipation” refers to discourses of liberty, autonomy, and equality that provide the 
crucial levers for the management of conflicts (Grosfoguel et al: 2014).  
 As a consequence of the absence of these regulatory and emancipation mechanisms, conflict 
in the zone of non-being is mainly resolved through violence but this is not to say that 
violence is not used in the zone of being to deal with conflict. It is also used as an exception 
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to the rule as it is not the primary conflict resolution approach. Grosfoguel et al (2014: 5) put 
it succinctly saying “conflicts in the zone of being are administered through perpetual peace 
with exceptional moments of war, while in the zone of non-being we have perpetual war with 
exceptional moments of peace”. It is important to note that Santos’ abyssal line  and Fanon’s 
zones do not just separate races;  they also exist in ethnicity, gender, political formations and 
other social groups where peoples within these groups also see each other as living either in 
the zone of being or non-being or above or below the abyssal line. There is thus the denial of 
rights and privileges based on perceptions of being or humanity of the other amongst these 
groups. 
The categorization of people as being or non-being generated conflict based on race that led 
to colonial conquest and colonial violence. The classification based on this idea overlapped 
colonialism. It explains racial and identity based conflicts that exist in the ex-colonies long 
after the end of formal colonial rule.  Despite the end of colonialism the ontology of whites 
and blacks is seen as different. The West was disgusted when pictures and stories of the 
violence against Zimbabwean white farmers at the hands of war veterans and landless black 
peasants were broadcast across the world in the year 2000.  It was quick to punish Zimbabwe 
through sanctions and other restrictions. The West did not react in the same manner when 
thousands of black refugees that included women and children were killed by Rhodesian 
forces at Chimoio in 1977 and when striking black miners were gunned down by the South 
African police at Marikana in 2012.  The difference in reaction perhaps reveals that the 
West/whites viewed black inhabitants of Zimbabwe as ontologically lighter than whites who 
they saw as ontologically denser. This failure to attach similar value to the lives of both black 
and white races in part explains the difficulty of achieving peace, unity and reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe. 
In 2013 a British parliamentarian, Labour MP Kate Hoey, condemned the shooting down of 
the Air Rhodesian Viscount RH 827 by ZIPRA forces during the liberation struggle and the 
House accepted the event as an atrocity that should be commemorated. This action was 
condemned by nationalist Zimbabweans who called it racial commemoration. They pointed 
out that no motion has ever been made in Britain to commemorate the massacres of black 
victims of the liberation war (Bulawayo24.com, 27 February 2013). Apparently, the white 
man’s life is given greater ontological density than that of the black whose humanity is 
questioned. This differential treatment of races stands in the way of peace and reconciliation 
in multi-racial societies like Zimbabwe.  
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In local coloniality unlike in global coloniality ontological differences go beyond race. They 
have been modified by the ruling elite of ex-colonies to socially classify of the country’s 
population around the idea of ethnicity and region. Ethnicity and region are placed at the 
centre of the structuring of the state order where those that come from the region where the 
executive hails and belong to his tribe enjoy privileges over other ethnic and regional groups.  
The dynamics of power discriminate the different ethnicities and regional groups and rank 
them.  The non-ruling ethnic groups are seen as less national and dispensable populations. 
The prime objective in all this is the quest to be hegemonic but it comes with dire 
consequences for peace, national unity and development. This is because the ontological 
hierarchization of society that accompanied the end of formal colonialism brought violence 
and underdevelopment in the zone uninhabited by the ruling ethnic group and development 
and peace in the zone where it resides. 
In domestic coloniality the ruling elite of ex-colonies have created national and community 
structures that associate the privileged ruling elite with superiority and the underprivileged 
marginalized groups with inferiority. In Zimbabwe they use the idea of class and history as an 
efficient instrument of social domination.  Liberators of the colonies are privileged over non-
liberators culminating in the liberators assuming dominance over the rest of the state 
citizenry. The situation has resulted in the differential treatment of national classes and this 
explains the high number of intractable conflicts that engulf the country. 
The ruling elite in the former colonized parts of the world have also created a new national 
social structure in which the sense of belonging to nation is primarily based on one having 
participated in the decolonization of the state and the degree to which one adopted the former 
colonizers way of life. Those with links to nationalist struggles and dress and pursue the 
hobbies of the colonizer, as well as speak the former colonizers language fluently have been 
perceived to be closer to full nationhood while those that do not have the same qualities have 
had their nationality doubted. The perception of the latter as lacking full nationality by the 
local ruling elite resonates with abyssal thinking.  In the eyes of the ruling elite an imaginary 
abyssal separates them from the subalternized commoners seen as living in the zone of non-
being.  
The ascription of superiority to the ruling elite based on the class categorisation of the 
national population while inferiorizing other social groups domestic coloniality accentuates 
national and historical differences and therefore hampers prospects of peace. Contributions of 
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the rural inhabitants and urban poor to issues of national development have been ignored and 
frowned upon as they are seen by the ruling elite as lesser beings lacking sophistication and 
ontological weight. They have thus been placed at the bottom of the social ladder. The 
consequences of this action at various levels have been to generate conflict, foment division 
and underdevelopment between and amongst the marginalized and exploited communities. 
The concepts discussed above help shed light on the challenges faced in the search for peace, 
unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  In summation coloniality should be understood as a 
global power matrix centred on race that explains the current racially hierarchized, 
patriarchal, Western-centric, Euro-American-centric, hetero-normative, Christian-centric, 
capitalist, contemporary modern/colonial world order that was born with the conquest of 
America in 1492 (Grosfoguel: 2007).  The power matrix has not just maintained race as the 
classifying element but race has hidden and undergone modification only to reappear as a 
classificatory system based on knowledge, power and being that engulfs different parts of the 
world with varying implications on peace and development ( Ndlovu-Gatsheni:2013b). The 
concept of coloniality therefore presents perhaps the most promising conceptual space to 
undertake a study of the politics of peace agreement, reconciliation and unity governments in 
Zimbabwe. 
2.4 THE APPLICABILITY OF COLONIALITY AS AN EXPLANATION FOR 
CHALLANGES TO PEACE, UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN ZIMBABWE 
This section discusses the applicability of coloniality as an explanation for problems of peace, 
unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It provides a glimpse of how coloniality helps unmask 
the challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwe was in the 1890s 
colonized violently by white British imperialists who regarded themselves as superior to the 
indigenous black people who inhabited the area. The colonialists created a racialized social 
structure that privileged the whites and oppressed the blacks. As a consequence of this there 
developed wide socio-economic disparities between the privileged whites and marginalized 
blacks.   
Under colonial rule the blacks were indoctrinated into believing that they were inferior to 
whites in various facets of life and thus accepted oppression and exploitation. The whites 
imposed on the blacks their culture, values, traditions and knowledge systems. For instance, 
the colonial education system was structured along British lines and indigenous languages 
were marginalized as the English language was made the official language for both the 
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colonizers and colonized. Many Africans abandoned their religions for Christianity brought 
by western missionaries and evangelists. The effect of this was to alter the Africans sense of 
identity and being. Their understanding of self was corrupted resulting in many Africans 
becoming mentally colonized and losing their identity. 
Global capitalist and imperialist powers presided over a flawed and incomplete 
decolonization process that resulted in the birth of Zimbabwe as a neo-colonial state. The 
state was forced to postpone critical issues such as land owing to capitalist/imperialist 
elements that interfered to safeguard capitalist and settler interests. Zimbabwe was sucked 
into the global capitalist system. It continued to be dependent on Western state support and 
assistance from western dominated institutions like the IMF and WB that facilitate the 
exploitation of resources from the marginalized parts of the world for the benefit of the 
industrialized countries.   
 
More than three decades after independence Zimbabwe finds itself in the clutches of 
coloniality. The country employs colonial templates and frameworks in various spheres of 
life. Its governance modus operandi is more British than it is African as it resembles the 
Westminster form of administration. The British culture, traditions and values dominate 
societal life. Christianity remains the dominant religion and the English language is still the 
official language of the country and is official medium of instruction in schools and 
universities that still make use of British curricula.  
Apparently, Zimbabwean society is epistemologically still mired in antique colonial thinking 
that is inimical to the development of a just society. The dark epistemic colonial cloud that 
hangs over the psychology and identity of Zimbabweans has had them entrapped in a colonial 
time warp that has driven citizens into the depths of the epistemic abyss from which escape 
has almost been impossible (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; Quijano 2000).  Through the concept 
of coloniality the thesis reveals that in an epistemologically unequal world the control of 
knowledge by the Global North in various domains of human existence has led to the 
development of weak, ineffectual strategies, theories and methodologies to deal with conflict 
and to build peace. What is also exposed is the continuation of colonized epistemologies that 
curtail the development of models likely to extricate the South from snares that hold back 
development and the attainment of peace. 
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Despite the attainment of independence the white settlers maintained ideas of colonial 
difference by continuing to live above the socio-ontological imaginary line accentuated by 
colonialism without giving much consideration to the realities of transition brought by 
independence (Mignolo, 2013; 2009).  The white former colonizers have remained a distinct 
group detached from the majority black population and still enjoy privileges akin to those 
they enjoyed under colonialism. As a social group they have elected to remain aloof from 
mainstream Zimbabwean society apparently still hanging on to the idea of colonial difference 
even though a new political and social arrangement came with the establishment of a new 
independent state in 1980.   
 
Attempts by the Zimbabwean government to unshackle itself from debilitating coloniality has 
incurred it the wrath of the West. It has been ostracized and punished through sanctions and 
other measures for embarking on a land redistribution exercise that in part seeks to eradicate 
remnants of colonialism.  The thesis contends that it is because of coloniality that a subaltern 
state like Zimbabwe is being punished for attempting to break ranks with global capitalist 
powers. The consequences of defying the West have been hunger, economic decline, 
sanctions and civil strife. It should be noted that coloniality is a relevant concept with which 
to analyse the search for peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe as it provides the lenses 
through which we can examine how the inheritors of the colonial state developed their own 
variant of coloniality (domestic coloniality) that has fissured Zimbabwean society and 
triggered conflicts that have negated the quest to achieve peace, unity, reconciliation and 
development. 
 
This section took a glance at the relevance of the concept of coloniality in attempts to explain 
the obstacles to peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. It highlighted that the country’s 
conflict problems and the lack of peace, unity and reconciliation are traceable to the 
persistence of colonial forms of domination within the realms of power, knowledge and being 
that survived decolonization. Essentially, it is a harbinger for more detailed discussions of the 
part played by coloniality in Zimbabwe’s peace, unity and reconciliation challenges. 
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2.5 WHY DE –COLONIALITY IN ZIMBABWE 
The study finds it prudent to stand on a decoloniality epistemic framework to unmask and 
analyze the problems of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe rooted in coloniality.  
Grosfoguel (2007:19) has the following to say about coloniality 
One of the most powerful myths of the twentieth century was the notion that the 
elimination of colonial administrations amounted to the decolonization of the world. This 
led to the myth of a ‘postcolonial’ world. The heterogeneous and multiple global 
structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-
political decolonization of the periphery over the past 50 years. We continue to live 
under the same ‘colonial power matrix.’ With juridical-political decolonization we 
moved from a period of ‘global colonialism’ to the current period of ‘global coloniality.’ 
Although ‘colonial administrations’ have been almost entirely eradicated and the 
majority of the periphery is politically organized into independent states, non-European 
people are still living under crude European/ Euro-American exploitation and 
domination. The old colonial hierarchies of European versus non- Europeans remain in 
place and are entangled with the ‘international division of labour’ and accumulation of 
capital at a world-scale (Grosfoguel, 2007:19).  
In light of what Grosfoguel reveals about coloniality it is important that liberated territories 
do not allow colonial patterns of power that survived the end of colonialism to continue to 
bind them to the former colony to the detriment of peace and development. Coloniality 
should be dismantled through the pursuit of decoloniality for peace, unity and reconciliation 
to be achieved among ex-colonized peoples. Decoloniality responds to Fanon (1968) who 
challenges independent African states to look for a way out from the modern/colonial hell as 
they pursue peace and development.  
Decoloniality should be conceptualized as any action or thought from the subalternized, 
colonized and marginalized that understands colonial difference. It is directed at dismantling 
the modern colonial world which created the present system of coloniality and manufactured 
an asymmetrical world order that privileges the global capitalist North while exploiting the 
Global South. To Mignolo (2013) it is different from imperialist modern colonial thinking 
that conceptualizes issues from a western liberal perspective.  It is concerned with the 
dismantling of relations of power and conceptions of knowledge that foment the reproduction 
of racial, gender, and geo-political hierarchies that came into being or found new and more 
powerful forms of expression in the modern/colonial world (Maldonado-Torres: 2007). 
Decoloniality operates in the realms of power, knowledge, and being. The starting shot in the 
battle for de-coloniality is to overthrow hegemonic modern/colonial Euro-centred 
epistemologies so as to achieve cognitive justice.  Grosfoguel (2013:89) argues that 
decolonizing structures of knowledge can be made possible by acknowledging the prevalence 
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of epistemic racism and universalism in the current global epistemic structures. He suggests 
the introduction of epistemic diversity as a way of liberalizing knowledge and producing 
pluriversality within the knowledge domain. There is a need to shift the geography of 
knowledge, to switch angles from which we rationalize, idealize, conceptualize and perceive 
things from the hegemonic Western Europe and America to the Global South (Maldonado –
Torres 2007:262). This may be achieved through epistemic disobedience (Mignolo 2013) and 
what Ngugi wa Thiong’o (1986) refers to as the decolonization of the mind. They argue that 
there is a need to reject imperial epistemologies and to turn away from the colonial epistemic 
path.  This is after a realization that the colonized subaltern is still trapped in a cocoon of 
colonialism and colonial/modernity as a result of partly and persistently referring to 
Mudimbe’s colonial library.  
Departing from the imperial colonial epistemology liberates the subalternized from 
Eurocentric knowledge.  It allows the underprivileged marginalized peoples of the Global 
South to comprehend articulate and address issues from a subaltern perspective. Alcoff 
(2007) argues that it is because of a lack of understanding of the subaltern’s way of life and 
thinking that has culminated in the West employing what Mills calls  “epistemologies of 
ignorance” to deal with problems in the Global South. The West’s failure to understand the 
nature and dynamics of conflict among the subalternized peoples has resulted in them 
prescribing peace and reconciliation models unsuited to the context.  
It is because of epistemologies of ignorance that the US failed to resolve the crisis in Somalia 
in the 1990s and fuelled the Zimbabwean crisis in the new millennium. Decoloniality permits 
the employment of epistemologies of the subaltern to address challenges faced by peoples in 
the marginalized parts of the world as they are more likely to understand the context and 
realities of problems experienced in the South. It also allows for the deployment of decolonial 
epistemicides to kill persisting colonial/modern knowledges that obliterated indigenous 
knowledge values that were crucial to societal unity and peace (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012a). It 
is therefore critical for the marginalized to employ decolonial epistemicides to abolish the 
persisting colonial/modern knowledges. 
In an article entitled Nathaniel Manheru: A Lowbrow Bedside Operator, semiotician 
Dinuzulu Mbikokayise Macaphulana argues that when colonialists came to Africa, they 
found the indigenous people with their many gods and they replaced the many gods with one 
God. They found them with many languages and they sought to replace the languages with 
54 
 
one language. He goes on to cite Lewis R. Gordon who has written that when colonialists 
came to Africa they found many knowledges and sought to replace the knowledges with 
Eurocentric knowledge.  Where colonialism found multiplicity it replaced it with an imperial 
singularity. In light of this logic it is critical that we decolonize knowledge to preserve 
multiplicity of our cultures, identities and indeed languages (Newzimbabwe.com. 5 January 
2015). 
 Concomitant with epistemic disobedience that Mignolo and Ngugi wa Thiongo advocate for 
is the crucial need to decolonize language in decoloniality because it is in language that space 
is created for the development of thought. According to Mignolo (2007) coloniality 
privileged the languages of the conquering European races while marginalizing indigenous 
languages of the conquered. Today the subalternized ex-colonized subjects are viewed as 
incapable of producing anything pedagogically worthwhile as long as they are not producing 
it in European languages. Adopting and employing decolonial language is crucial to the 
transformation of relations and the production of a more just global epistemic structure as it 
permits the subalternized to penetrate and contribute to the production of knowledge, to 
critical thinking and to the resolution of conflict. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011a) highlights the importance of decolonizing knowledge when he 
argues that it privileges insights and knowledges cascading from the Global South without 
necessarily throwing away progressive aspects of Euro-American epistemology and the best 
of modernity. This allows the subalternized parts of the world to be rational generators of 
knowledge rather than mere consumers of global knowledge. He sees the decolonization of 
knowledge allowing the subalternized to speak from the vantage point of ‘colonial difference’ 
and to think from a subaltern epistemic location. To him, this allows for a clear subaltern 
locus of enunciation that enables conflict managers and peace builders to think from Global 
South  
It should be noted that decolonizing knowledge is merely the beginning of a long process that 
seeks complete decolonization which also entails decolonizing power and being.  The 
decolonization of epistemology precedes decolonization of the being. Decolonization of the 
being to Maldonado-Torres (2014: 30) is the liberation from the dominance of the euro-
centred being, knowledge, power and politics.  Maldonado-Torres (2004) argues that an 
ontological turn is required so that a rehumanization process can occur for the subalternized 
so that they perceive themselves as human and not what imperial powers ascribed to them. 
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The ontological turn allows for the restructuring of the topology of being in which the white 
race and the darker races of the world see each other as equals. This is invaluable to the 
establishment of a world that allows for the proper recognition of human difference and the 
rejection of exploitation, alienization, marginalization and oppression which is critical for 
peace, unity and development. 
Grosfoguel (2007) argues that to decolonize the being, focus must fall on the locus of 
enunciation that is the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. The 
subalternized people of the world who despite having gained political independence  but 
continue to articulate issues and think as though they are in Europe and belong to the white 
race must learn to speak from where they are situated both physiologically and 
geographically. Doing this does not only free the subaltern but also emancipates them. They 
are able to articulate issues from the perspective of the marginalized on the underprivileged 
darker side of colonial difference. This enables them to make effective interventions in peace-
building, conflict resolution and development. 
Such interventions to Mignolo (2007) do not only raise the doubted ontology of the 
subalternized but are also envisaged to result in the redrawing of the global cartography of 
power in pursuit of global justice and dismantling the existing coloniality of power matrix 
that privileges the North and under develops the South.  They also have the potential to not 
only alter the terms but also content of conversation within global power relations, thus 
possibly paving the way for the racially inferiorized to push for the decolonization of the 
exploitative and oppressive metropolitan centre.  
The current global political and economic relations between the North and the South are still 
imperial. The US, Britain and the EU dictate terms to the rest of the world via multi-lateral 
institutions they dominate. Their activities have choked the development process in much of 
the developing world and furthermore, their interference in the internal affairs of independent 
sovereign subaltern states has been the root of conflict. Thus the need to deimperialize prior 
to decolonizing power becomes imperative. The decolonization of power is in essence 
concerned with the pursuit of global political and economic justice and equality (Mignolo: 
2013). It therefore behoves the Global South to exert pressure on Euro-American hegemony 
in an endeavour to check imperialism and loosen its grip on the global political and economic 
power structure that explains the absence of development and peace in the subalternized parts 
of the world. 
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Decolonizing the colonial matrix of power enables a view of the modern/colonial world that 
goes beyond the capitalist/ socialist binary. Alternatives to the hegemonic capitalist world 
system that has deposited underdevelopment and violence in many parts of the Global South 
appear in our field of vision.  In the words of the Mexican Zapatista Liberation Movement, 
decoloniality seeks to eradicate imperialism by fighting for a world where other worlds are 
possible (Mignolo: 2007).  In their world the Zapatistas notion of democracy is that "we are 
all equals because we are all different”. This struggle by the Zapatistas is born out of the 
realization that there exist diverse alternatives to the modern/colonial world and there are 
many other ways of thinking other than the ones imposed on the world by Europe and 
America. The existence of alternatives to the modern/colonial world makes the 
decolonization of the colonial matrix of power a possibility.   
Decoloniality should be perceived as an antithetical political and epistemological liberating 
project that seeks to unmask and resist coloniality (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013b). It calls for the 
ex-colonized peoples of the world to start perceiving themselves and the world in a different 
light. The ex-colonized are challenged and encouraged to reorder the world in a fashion that 
enables them to speak, think and act as equals in global interactions so that colonial matrices 
of power that define labour, power, culture and race are shaken to the ground. For this to be 
achieved, Mpofu (2013a:115) advocates for the deployment of attitudes and activities of 
rebellion against and refusal of coloniality in all its technologies of power, knowledge and 
being. 
Decoloniality seeks to shake the very foundations of global imperial designs. Its mission is 
the decolonization of knowledge, power and being as well as those institutions that create the 
contemporary asymmetrical world order.  Through decoloniality it is possible to explain how 
the coloniality of power, knowledge and being has contributed to conflict and violence in 
Zimbabwe. Decoloniality unravels how the global power structure has allowed colonial forms 
of domination to persist long after the end of colonialism in Zimbabwe.  
Decoloniality allows us to understand that the authoritarian modes of governance employed 
in Zimbabwe are a continuation of oppressive colonial rule.  Many amongst the current 
political leadership that is at the centre of generating political conflict in Zimbabwe are 
products of coloniality. They were born under colonial rule, schooled by it, oppressed by it, 
were brutalized by it and even fought against it. This militates against their effectively 
combating coloniality. They, by commission or omission, find themselves working in the 
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service of coloniality. A decolonial turn in Zimbabwe is therefore important if peace, unity 
and reconciliation are to be achieved.  
Decoloniality also facilitates the unmasking of racism/ethnicism, oppression, and economic, 
knowledge and power inequities as global peace problems. As a thinking and perspective 
decoloniality inculcates ontological egalitarianism despite differences in race, religion, 
gender, wealth and power. It is in this space that the underlying causes of the Zimbabwean 
conflict can be addressed. Peace, unity and reconciliation stand a better chance of being 
achieved through decoloniality because it advocates for redistributive justice and the respect 
of human rights as key ingredients for the cultivation of a deeper form of democracy. 
Decoloniality should be seen as having the potential to establish a new economic and political 
system/order rooted in Zimbabwe’s own culture, history, tradition and orientation that allow 
Zimbabwean subjects to cut the surviving colonial tentacles that are still clutching the 
country and thereby preventing it from attaining genuine and full independence (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2013b).  Mignolo (2007) buttresses this view by arguing that decoloniality advances 
the agenda of achieving peace, unity and reconciliation since it advocates for delinking from 
the colonial matrix of power. Delinking is to Mignolo decolonial epistemic shift that allows 
the marginalized to detach from the prevailing global matrix of power.   
Mignolo (2007) identifies a process referred to as border thinking that closely relates to the 
concept of delinking. Border thinking is a product of the encounter between traditional 
communal thinking and modern global imperial designs (2011a).  According to Escobar 
(2007:187) it entails thinking from the subalternized and peripheralized zones produced by 
western hegemony. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011a) articulates that border thinking springs from 
the experiences of those exploited and marginalized people living in the purlieus of the 
capitalist world order and who are at the mercy of its oppressive tendencies. It aims to de-
subalternize knowledge by exposing how the subaltern perspective of the world is ignored 
and marginalized and how some epistemologies of the south have been contaminated by 
Eurocentric knowledge.  
To purify this knowledge it is critical that we adopt border thinking as an epistemic 
perspective. That way we can be able to critique the structures of power from a decolonial 
epistemic perspective that acknowledges colonial difference since our knowledges, as argued 
by feminist thinker Donna Haraway as well as Mignolo (2000), are always situated in the 
geo-biographical politics of knowledge. The adoption of border thinking as an epistemic 
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perspective is valuable in the cleansing of this knowledge. The feminist thinker, Donna 
Haraway (1988), and Mignolo (2000), aver that our knowledges are always situated in the 
geo-biographical politics of knowledge. There is therefore a need to acknowledge our 
colonial differences and evaluate structures of power with such an appreciation in mind. The 
border thinking perspective thus enables such recognition. 
Border thinking’s main concern is harnessing and releasing epistemological energy generated 
in the South and directing it toward the transformation of the prevailing western dominated 
global capitalist system produced by modernity.  This, Mignolo (2000) argues, can be 
achieved if a powerful epistemic response comes from the subaltern challenging the current 
global power structure that privileges the Global North and white race.  Through border 
thinking the oppressed and marginalized can query hegemonic forms of knowledge from the 
subaltern. This in a way privileges new ways of thinking that can alter the terrain of our 
understanding and interpretation of the world around us so that we can develop innovative 
ways of dealing with problems. For instance, we could transform and reorient the subject of 
conflict and its resolution in Zimbabwe and the rest of Africa by encouraging the discussion 
of the issues from the perspective of the citizens experiencing the oppression and injustice 
and not from the perspective of the elite ruling class that inherited instruments of oppression, 
or that of the former colonial masters that seek ways of retaining control of former colonies. 
Border thinking is enriched by Ubuntu/hunhu an African indigenous philosophy that 
emphasizes humanness and conceptualizes the life of the being as defined by relationships 
with other beings and that happiness and fulfilment is found in relations between individuals 
(Nabudere, 2008). The ubuntu/hunhu philosophy acknowledges the existence of one as a 
consequence of relations with others around them. This philosophy allows for knowledge 
nurtured and developed by relationships to be used for the betterment of society. In the 
ubuntu/hunhu philosophy one finds humanity’s desire to share knowledge and use it for the 
development of mankind which is different from the Western liberal conception of 
knowledge as an imperial instrument of power, domination and control.  
Ubuntu/hunhu is an anti-colonial paradigm that promotes epistemological liberation, 
epistemological parity and the restoration of African ways of knowing and producing 
knowledge that have suffered oppression and marginalization by the imperial western 
knowledge. The Ubuntu/hunhu philosophy provides space for African knowledge systems 
to seek solutions to problems that are peculiar to Africa and Africans therefore making it 
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critical for the achievement of peace, unity and reconciliation.  All in all border thinking 
challenges imperial Euro-American epistemologies and versions that seek to explain and 
understand modernity.  
In close association with the concept of border thinking is the notion of transmodernity that 
Dussel (2001) refers to as the establishment of a horizontal global system that corrects the 
evils of domination and exploitation found in the vertical modern colonial global power 
structure.  According to Escobar (2007) transmodernity is a term coined by Dussel to refer to 
a project for overcoming modernity not simply by negating it but by thinking about it from its 
underside, from the perspective of the excluded other. Transmodernity imagines a fully 
decolonized world beyond the current Euro-American centred modernity. Like border 
thinking transmodernity encourages subaltern thinking as a route towards the rejection of 
universalism and the promotion of diversality and equality of races. It argues that if the 
different races of the world were to interact on an even global political and economic 
landscape then a more peaceful world could be created through overthrowing capitalism, 
patriarchy, imperialism and coloniality which have been the bane of the quest for world 
peace.  
According to Grosfoguel (2013, 2009) solutions to the plethora of problems bedeviling peace 
and reconciliation can be found in a transmodernity that calls for the pluriverse and rejects 
universality of solutions where only one prescribes solutions for the rest.  To him, diverse 
subalterns must speak and provide solutions to the European centred modernity and 
coloniality. He illustrates his point by advancing the argument that western women cannot 
impose their notion of liberation on Islamic women. Westerners cannot impose their notion of 
democracy on non western peoples (ibid). Embracing transmodernity in the Zimbabwe 
situation can go a long way in educating conflict managers that solutions to the crisis can be 
found beyond the euro-centric prescriptions imposed by the British, Americans and the EU.  
It has been noted that the failure to engage in border thinking, to shift the geography of 
reason and adopt transmodernity and epistemologies of the South among other decolonial 
actions explains conflict and the absence of peace in Zimbabwe and most of the ex-colonized 
Global South. The study of the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe 
strengthens calls for the adoption of decoloniality as it enables us to erase and cross the 
abyssal line, engage in border thinking, promote epistemologies of the South, reject 
universalism and adopt diversality and pluriversality, highlight colonial difference, 
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decolonize the mind and epistemologies, embrace transmodernism, engage in epistemic 
disobedience and shift the geography of reason. These are some of the pathways through 
which Zimbabwe’s peace and development could be achieved. 
 
 Decoloniality also permits us to visualise and identify the invisible matrix of coloniality and 
to plot ways of extrication from its entanglement and entrapment. It does not only expose the 
negative ramifications of a western dominated order that subalternized the population of the 
Global South but also unmasks the consequences of replicating and modifying coloniality 
despite the end of juridical-political rule within independent states of the developing world. 
This way we are able to analyse challenges to peace and development not only from without 
but also from within. This makes decoloniality critical to understanding obstacles to peace, 
unity and reconciliation.   
2.6 CONCLUSION  
This section discussed the concept of coloniality, its contours, and its appropriateness as 
lenses though which to examine Zimbabwe’s search for peace, unity and reconciliation. It 
also examined the applicability of coloniality and reasons why decoloniality should be used 
to analyze the obstacles to peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  Through a range of 
examples the chapter tried to explain how coloniality is a source of conflict in Zimbabwe and 
lies at the centre of the challenges to peace, unity and reconciliation. Our concern should be 
about how peace and reconciliation processes could be designed to surmount obstacles placed 
by coloniality. These problems include domination, the lack of social peace, economic 
inequity, political instability and ethnicity and racism.  It remains to be seen how far the 
concept of coloniality can illuminate peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe The next 
chapter provides the historical background to the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in 
Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND PEACE ISSUES IN 
ZIMBABWE – 1830s to 1977 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter uses decolonial epistemic perspective to provide a historical brief on Zimbabwe. 
It surveys pre-colonial conflict, the colonial wars of conquest and the establishment of 
colonial administration. It discusses structural violence experienced by Africans under 
colonial rule which gave rise to the African nationalist movement. Thereafter it discusses 
confrontation between the African nationalists and radical white nationalism that culminated 
in the war of liberation. Finally, the chapter examines the series of negotiations held in 
attempts to resolve the Rhodesian Question up to 1977. It should be highlighted that the 
chapter is not merely a narrative of historical facts but uses them to explain historical events 
that impact on the search for peace, unity and reconciliation through the lenses of coloniality. 
3.2 CONQUEST AND DOMINATION  
The search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe comes against the backdrop of a 
long history of violence that dates back to the pre-colonial period. In the 1830s, Zimbabwe 
experienced violence when the Ndebele fleeing the mfecane (violence in Nguniland, South 
Africa) crossed the Limpopo River onto the Zimbabwean plateau where they fought and 
defeated various Shona chiefdoms. They established a powerful military state in the south-
western part of Zimbabwe and assumed supremacy over other polities. Relations between the 
Ndebele and Shona were largely cordial but occasional Ndebele raids for cattle, women, 
grain and children brought tension between the two groups that continues to manifest in 
various forms in post-independence Zimbabwe. 
On the 12th of September 1890, the British South Africa Company (BSAC) occupied 
Mashonaland in the north of Zimbabwe. In the psyche of European imperialists a non 
European region was regarded as empty or nearly empty of people, hence conquest and 
settlement by Europeans. Those living there were seen as barbarians or lesser beings and 
therefore without rights to own the land (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012a). British imperialism was 
accompanied by the shift from the Cartesian notion of cogito ego sum (I think, therefore I 
am) to the paradigm of war informed ego coquiro/ego conquistus (I conquer, therefore I am) 
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which legitimized conquest and violence against Africans (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 245).  
The occupation of Mashonaland was followed by victory in the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893. 
The BSAC occupied Matabeleland and acquired full control of the country which it named 
Rhodesia. To ensure that Matabeleland was completely overrun each member of the invading 
force was promised  six thousand  acres of land anywhere in Matabeleland, twenty claims in 
the goldfields and a share of the booty, half of which would go to the company and the 
remainder to be divided among the officers and men (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 46). The 
resort to violence by the settlers meant that the African masses would have to regain their 
land by using similar methods at a later time. To him, the question of land distribution was to 
become one of the thorniest single issues in Zimbabwean politics (Moyana, 1984:66). 
The violent colonization of Zimbabwe in the 1890s was part of British imperialist plans 
driven by a conviction that they were epistemologically and ontologically superior. The 
British saw themselves as the “first race” in the world, duty bound to colonize the territory 
and bring “civilization”, Christianity and light to a “dark” continent inhabited by “barbaric 
savages”. They were inspired by the pseudo-scientific doctrine of Social Darwinism that 
espouses survival of the fittest and differences between races. The white conquerors viewed 
themselves as stronger and saw the conquered Africans as weak and therefore meant to be 
colonized by the strong.  
The Africans were unable to fathom the loss of land as well as the loss of political and 
economic independence and decided to revolt against settler rule between 1896 and 1897 in 
rebellions known as the Chimurenga I /Umvukela I. They were in fact decolonial uprisings 
against nascent colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b).  The first to rise were the Ndebele in 
March of 1896; they were incensed by the presence, arrogance and brutality of the Shona 
police who were stationed in Matabeleland to preside over them. The Ndebele regarded the 
Shona as their former slaves and thus treated the Shona police with contempt. The 
deployment of Shona police amongst the Ndebele population apparently gave the Shona the 
impression that they were a superior social/ethnic group.  The stationing of Shona police in 
Ndebele country was not only designed by settlers to divide and rule the Africans but to also 
socially classify them in line with the coloniality of being. The effect of these colonial actions 
was the souring of relations between the Shona and the Ndebele, therefore sowing seeds of 
future conflict between the two ethnic groups.  
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The revolts were brutally crushed by the Britain in operations characterized by a 
disproportionate employment of force against Africans.   The Ndebele were the first to be 
defeated. A peace settlement was reached at the Matopos Hills in October of 1896 between 
the Ndebele chiefs and Cecil John Rhodes who represented the British. Under the agreement 
that was in fact dictated, the Ndebele were given assurances that they would be given security 
and adequate land to grow their crops and graze their cattle, and a fair and dignified 
dispensation in the peace. Rhodes promised to buy all the land in the vicinity of the Matopos 
for Ndebele settlement and promised that none of the land would ever be disposed. In return 
the Ndebele pledged their loyalty and to end the war. The terms of the agreement were 
however violated by the settlers leading to the expropriation of Ndebele land (Ranger: 1999).   
The Shona insurrection came in June of 1896 and by the end of 1897 the rebellion had been 
crushed. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b), overcoming African resistance was perceived as 
pacifying savage tribes resisting modernity. Unlike with the Ndebele, the Shona were not 
offered peace terms. Most defeated Shona chiefs and warriors in the north-east of the country 
were not even offered the indignity of surrender but were instead hunted down like animals 
and killed. The hunting of African chiefs and warriors like animals was informed by the 
coloniality of being that made violence on the African appear as sport.  
The pacification of the Shona and Ndebele groups permitted the British to establish a brutal, 
oppressive, exploitative colonial system of administration that discriminated against blacks. It 
taxed them, forced them to work and also coerced them into lowly paid contract labour. To 
the settlers, the defeated Africans were Manichean and had to be placed at the bottom of the 
colonial socio-economic and political hierarchy. They were seen as an ontologically inferior 
race constituted by lacks and deficits. The coloniality of being sought to keep the colonized 
Africans cowered and subjugated. They were indoctrinated into believing that they were an 
inferior and unwanted racial group.  In essence a racialized colonial administration that 
unleashed violence on blacks was established. Racialization to Grosfoguel (2004:326-327) is 
the process through which groups, particularly the hegemonic self group, use cultural and/or 
biological features/criteria to create a hierarchy of superiority and inferiority among 
collective social actors.  Not only was society racialized but also structured based on 
Christianity, Western education; ethnicity, patriarchy, gender and economy.  
Santos (2010) and Fanon (1968) view the colonized blacks as having been classified in the 
zone of non-being at the bottom of the social structures and thus targets of racism. To 
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Grosfoguel et al (2014), global coloniality was being reproduced at the periphery. European 
settlers regarded Africans as primitive objects who had not developed any writing system and 
with no history, and therefore were not worthy of human rights.  It can thus be noted that 
coloniality arises from the colonial encounter from which colonial society is then structured 
and classified on the basis of race, ethnicity and labour in pursuit of strengthening and 
advancing modernity.  
In Africa, prior to colonization land was conceptualized as something inseparable to 
existence but after colonization the white race introduced the concept of land as a commodity 
(Martinot: undated). This led to the indiscriminate expropriation of land by the settlers.  
Across the length and breadth of Zimbabwe Africans were pushed through legislative reform 
or force into poor lands with infertile soils and insufficient rainfall, which came to be known 
as reserves while the whites, took the best lands. The Africans that were disenfranchised of 
their land and living in the reserves created a large pool of cheap labour for the settlers’ 
farms, mines and developing urban centres.   
Various pieces of legislation were passed to deny Africans rights and freedoms that could 
permit them to contest for economic and political power. Of particular note in this respect 
was the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. This led to a further loss of land and serious poverty 
amongst Africans who were peasantized and proletarianized while the whites basked in 
affluence. The result of this was the development of socio-economic and political disparities 
between whites and Africans which became a source of conflict both under colonial rule and 
in independent Zimbabwe.  It should be highlighted that some of the European colonizers had 
been deemed undesirable elements in Europe but upon conquering the indigenous people of 
Zimbabwe they assumed an important status and began to dispossess Africans, some of noble 
status, of their land. The new social class that the whites occupied reflected shifting 
designations associated with the coloniality of being and power that accompanied 
colonialism.  
In colonialist discourse and thinking dispossessing Africans of their land and designating it as 
private property of white settlers and the opening up of Zimbabwe for economic exploitation 
and settlement for whites was seen as development. In the mindset of the white settler 
colonialist it was development to deprive Africans of their modes of life and production and 
to force them into joining the evolving capitalist one in which they were viewed as subaltern 
persons compelled to participate primarily as sources of cheap labour (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 
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2012b). According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) coloniality and racism were driving forces of 
the colonial state that enabled colonialism to produce what Mamdani (1996) termed 
bifurcated social formations inhabited by ‘citizens and subjects.’ Settlers were regarded as 
citizens and included in the imagination of the colonial state while the indigenous Africans 
were seen as subjects or natives and excluded. The “settler” and “native” binaries were later 
inherited as relations of difference and became sources of conflict (Mpofu: 2013a).  
Rhodesian colonialists denied the Africans an opportunity to unite into a majority identity by 
fragmenting them into various antagonistic tribes and minorities (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2012b). 
Where and when it was convenient the settler bandied together various fragmented tribal 
groups such as the Kalanga, Tonga, Ndebele and Shona amongst others and called them 
natives through a process one can term “tribal reductionism”. By depriving these groups of 
their different historical identities seeds of future identity-based conflict were sown in 
Zimbabwe. 
 
For thirty three years, Africans were ruled by the BSAC until 1923 when the country became 
a self-governing colony of the British crown known as Southern Rhodesia. Southern 
Rhodesians were given limited self government, they could elect a legislative assembly from 
which a prime minister and cabinet would be chosen but the British retained a veto on matters 
affecting local Africans and controlled foreign relations. Southern Rhodesia was therefore 
conferred with quasi –dominion status under the dominions office and not the colonial office 
in London (Martin and Johnson: 1981).  
After being granted self- government the European settlers ensured that the African would 
remain tied to the colonizer through various pieces of legislation such as the 1895 law on 
Compulsory Identity Cards, Registration of Labour Act 1896, Private Location Act 1908, 
African Labourers’ Act 1911, the Land Apportionment Act 1930, Industrial Conciliation Act 
1934 and Native Passes Act 1937(Moyana, 1984; 66). These pieces of legislation were all 
instruments of oppression meant to entrench settler domination and intensify the exploitation 
of the African. In line with notions of coloniality of power and being these pieces of 
legislation placed the European in a position of privilege and power over the African and 
produced an aura that the white race was superior. Colonial legislation subalternized and 
dehumanized the African. For instance, the African’s humanity was questioned by legislation 
that demanded the compulsory carrying of identity documents. His identity and being would 
only be acknowledged upon production of identity documents. Failure by the African to have 
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his identity documents on his person resulted in degrading and inhuman punishment such as 
sjamboking (whipping). According to Grosfoguel (2007:214), denial of the humanity of 
Africans was based on misreading the African being as lacking souls, rationality, writing, 
history, civilization, development, democracy, human rights and ethics. Differential treatment 
of whites and blacks by the colonial rule fostered racial conflict in Zimbabwe.   
According to Ranger (1985: 66) the Land Apportionment Act became the most important law 
governing land distribution in Rhodesia. It established the principle of possessory segregation 
between black and white and paved the way for differential agricultural production. The Act 
did not only keep the African population in a state of serfdom but also retarded economic 
development by preventing the majority of its citizens from active participation in the 
exploitation of its resources.  Bhebe (1989:65) argues that this Act more than any other 
disenfranchised Africans, and to nationalists the Land Apportionment Act became the root of 
racial misunderstanding between Africans and Europeans. In 1969 the Land Tenure Act was 
passed. It entrenched the 1930 legislation by formally dividing the country’s land into two 
equal portions: 45 million acres each for the Africans and the whites yet there were 
approximately 5 million blacks and 250,000 whites. The enactment of the Land Tenure Act 
was part of a hard-line shift in Southern Rhodesian politics that further strained relations 
between nationalists and the white minority government (Moyana :1984).  
In 1953, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland combining three British territories of 
Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia was formed. The latter had the largest 
white population and came to dominate the Federation. Salisbury the capital of Southern 
Rhodesia also became the capital of the Federation. Economically, Southern Rhodesia 
benefitted immensely as most industries and infrastructure were built there. The Federation 
fell apart in 1963 partly as a result of nationalist agitation for independence in Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Soon after its collapse the northern territories were granted 
independence under black majority rule as the “winds of change were blowing across 
Africa”. Southern Rhodesia was denied independence and reverted to a relationship with 
Britain which had existed earlier.  This agitated African nationalists who increasingly became 
militant calling for black majority rule. Alarmed by this, white nationalism in Southern 
Rhodesia grew and white perceptions of rights to independence became stronger with the 
effect of blocking African aspirations for independence and thus setting the stage for future 
conflict (Sibanda: 1989).  
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3.3 COLONIAL STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE 
Direct violence was used by the settlers to conquer, suppress and pacify Africans.  This type 
of violence alone was not going to be the best means by which to get the Africans to 
participate in the colonial political-economy. For the settlers to obtain the co-operation of the 
Africans indirect violence or structural violence was employed. Africans were dispossessed 
of their fertile land in areas of good rainfall and pushed into reserves.  Not only were reserves 
characterized by infertile soils and poor rainfall, they were also far from transport and other 
forms of communication making it difficult for Africans to market their products and 
compete with white farmers. Relatively successful African farmers who had provided 
supplies to the early European settlers were pushed out of business. They faced competition 
from settler agriculture that was supported by government subsidies and loans obtained at 
favourable rates from commercial banks and other financial institutions. This kind of support 
was denied to African farmers by the colonial government. The success of African agriculture 
was also hampered by various pieces of legislation such as the Maize Control Act of 1934 
that forced African farmers to sell their produce to the settlers cheaply while maize from 
white farmers was bought at lucrative rates (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 55). The loss of land 
and the creation of reserves economically disempowered the Africans. By 1961, a third of the 
land in Southern Rhodesia was held by Europeans who constituted a mere seventeenth of the 
population. Africans who could not leave the land expropriated by whites either became 
squatters, rent paying tenants or providers of labour for the settlers. Often the rents were 
unaffordable for most Africans who were forced to provide labour to the whites as the only 
alternative to avoid eviction from land (ibid).  
The settlers imposed taxes as a way of obtaining African labour to work on the land. In order 
for the African to pay tax he had to find employment. Those that did not want to be recruited 
as forced labour were required to pay the tax.  Africans that did not heed colonial advice to be 
monogamous had to pay a tax of ten shillings for each wife exceeding one (Arrighi: 1970). 
This was an assault on African cultural rights and a form of cultural imperialism.  The 
plethora of taxes Africans had to pay drained African resources. Their failure to raise taxes 
created a large reservoir of cheap labour that was forced to take up contract work on white 
farms, railways or mines. Contract work terms were written in English which was not easily 
understood by semi-literate Africans resulting in them being exploited by white employers. 
Often the working conditions were harsh and characterized by long hours, poor conditions, 
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flogging and low pay. The consequences of breaching contracts were as severe as life 
imprisonment.   
Wherever they went Africans were expected by colonial authorities to carry ‘passes’, specific 
identification documents for Africans.  This pass system was used to control African labour 
and migration. The pass contained details of the district of origin of the African, the employer 
and length of employment.  The pass system curtailed the Africans’ freedom of movement 
and association.  In 1973 the African registration and Identification Act and the Vagrancy Act 
were enacted to control African job seekers and small traders in urban areas (Martin and 
Johnson, 1981:61). If an African left employment without the permission of a white employer 
they were to be arrested and returned to the employer. Africans who refused to engage in 
contract labour or could not pay taxes were forcefully driven into forced labour camps by 
colonial authorities. The difficult existential conditions created for inferiorized Africans was 
actually the coloniality of being naturalized through the pass system, forced labour, taxation 
and other pieces of legislation that objectified the African.  
To bolster labour supplies native commissioners and the police often raided villages for 
young men. Chiefs and headmen were expected to co-operate with colonial officials in this 
exercise (Moyana: 1984). Those that failed to assist were humiliated by being subjected to 
public flogging before their subjects. This action diminished the authority of chiefs and 
headmen. The beating of chiefs and headmen not only devalued the ontology of the 
traditional leaders but also denied the African humanity as they were treated like animals.  In 
the psyche of the bigoted colonizer the only language that the dehumanized and racialized 
African understood was that of the sjambok.  The being of the African was seen as detached 
from the body. The infliction of pain on the body was justified on this basis. Through the 
coloniality of power the colonizing whites became a law unto them and unleashed various 
forms of violence on the African.   Santos’ (2007) concept of abyssal thinking is useful for an 
understanding of colonial violence. Africans were labeled savages in the zone below the 
abyssal line and therefore deserved to be treated in the most brutish way by the human 
whites. Designation of animal-hood to Africans made it easy for the colonizing whites to 
unleash violence on them. This was in furtherance of the coloniality of being. 
White supremacy was at the core of colonial society and culture. Traditional African 
authority was either supplanted or eroded by colonial authority which was modeled along 
western undemocratic lines of domination and subjugation. No longer could chiefs allocate 
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land. Judicial power previously held by the chiefs was taken away by the colonial legal 
system. Chiefs and headman were barred from trying serious criminal cases like murder. 
Gradually Africans disregarded the authority of traditional leaders. They began to perceive 
traditional law and customs as primitive and to treat traditional leaders with disdain to the 
detriment of social cohesion and peace (Moyana: 1984).  
 
African custom and achievements were denigrated while celebrating and glorifying exploits 
by the whites. African culture was frowned upon, polygamy was discouraged and considered 
unchristian. Traditional African religion came to be regarded as superstition and diabolical, in 
its place Christianity was promoted. Colonialism allowed the assault on African culture to 
leave the European in a position of social and cultural superiority. Apparently under colonial 
rule the whites measured the African’s proximity to humanity based on levels of education 
and depth of Christianity. An African rich in the above was considered to be ontologically 
denser than one without, thus closer to humanity but was never considered to be in the zone 
of being; the ultimate marker of humanity to the whites remained race. 
 
Africans that could not stomach the oppressive conditions in the reserves fled to towns or 
other urban centres where they found conditions were no better; wages were low and working 
conditions poor. Employment was scarce in urban areas as evidenced by the fact that by 1977 
only 15 % of Africans were in wage employment (Martin and Johnson: 1981). Legislation 
such as the Masters and Servants Act of 1901, the Public Services Act 1931 and the Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1934 placed a number of restrictions on Africans in employment and 
privileges on whites. Racial segregation in employment assigned office jobs to whites while 
the tough menial jobs were mainly left for the blacks. The few office jobs that were given to 
blacks were only meant to serve the colonial system such as clerical work, teaching and 
nursing. There was a huge wage gap between Africans and Europeans, where whites and 
blacks did the same job the whites were paid more. The assumed racial inferiority of the 
colonized driven by the coloniality of being, implied that they were not worthy of equivalent 
wages.  
African workers had no social security and they also worked long hours for small wages 
under unhealthy conditions with little or no safety devices or protective clothing. There was 
no minimum wage for Africans while employment in agriculture, mining and domestic 
service for Africans meant exclusion from trade union activity (Martin and Johnson, 
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1981:59). Exclusion from trade union activity made it difficult for Africans to organize 
themselves to fight labour injustice. The Law and Order Maintenance and Emergency Powers 
Act (LOMA) (1960) worsened the situation as it made it an offence to incite strike action in 
essential services. Such action could result in imprisonment for life or death. This Act did not 
only restrict the African labour movement but also the African nationalist movement. A 
number of African trade unionists and nationalists were incarcerated under this law which 
remained in existence until Zimbabwe’s independence (ibid). Under this Act it was difficult 
to communicate and broadcast African grievances against the colonial system because 
African political work was prohibited. Colonial structural violence masked and normalized 
the abominable existential conditions Africans were exposed to. 
Urban life for the African was difficult as it was associated with crime, prostitution and other 
social ills while whites lived in luxurious, spacious and safe suburban environs. After work 
the Africans went home where they lived in squalid conditions of overcrowding and poor 
sanitation and ventilation. They were often harassed in their living quarters with frequent 
night inspections by the police who checked on the miscellaneous such as levels of 
cleanliness and “illegal’ visitors, often relatives. Under colonialism one notes that the 
existential conditions for Africans living in the zone of non-being was hellish (Fanon, 1968).  
They were subjected to such appalling working and living conditions because they were seen 
as a subaltern group undeserving of the privileges that were enjoyed by the colonizing white 
race. The fear produced by colonialism was a mode of violence intended to cow the African 
into docility and thus made it easy for the Europeans to dominate and oppress them.  
The post-World War Two boom that transformed socio-economic life in Rhodesia did not 
extend benefits to the Africans who remained marginalized and poor. So stratified and 
hierachized was society under colonial rule that to Mlambo (2013:241) there were, in fact, 
two Rhodesias made up of citizens, white Rhodesian – politically and economically powerful, 
and enjoying full rights of citizenship and subjects, and those derogatively known as natives 
who were subject to a special type of jurisprudence known as “customary law” which was not 
applicable to whites. Drawing from Maldonado-Torres (2008), in these two Rhodesias the 
white colonizers or community of masters had absolute power over the life of the colonized 
African. Their abuse of the African was not accounted for since they were considered to be 
outside the realm of the human. 
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To Mignolo (2009:72), race lies at the centre of coloniality as an epistemic structure dividing 
and ranking human beings according to their ontology. In Rhodesia, like in other European 
colonial territories, race legitimized the structuring of society along language and colour. The 
most influential social and economic positions were reserved for white English speaking 
persons while dark skinned non English speaking persons were marginalized. European 
immigrants were ranked at the top of the social order, coloureds and Asians occupied the 
middle order while the indigenous dark skinned people were placed at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy. Fanon (1952:83) amplifies on this classification by stating that ‘the black 
man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man’. It was the dark skinned 
African who bore the rough side of colonial marginalization more than any other race. The 
lives of the blacks were to Mignolo dispensable. Their ontology was devalued under 
colonialism and this justified their engagement as forced labour.  It is the nature of coloniality 
to reproduce itself at various levels. Among the indigenous ethnic groups in Rhodesia the 
Shona and Ndebele were given pre-eminence while other African groups such as the Chewa, 
Nambya and Tonga were marginalized.   
In the health sector the colonial system favoured whites ahead of blacks. Separate healthcare 
facilities were established to take care of the different racial groups. The best health care 
comparable to that provided in Europe and America was reserved for whites while Africans 
had to endure poor health services. There were more doctors and health institutions for the 
minority whites than they were for Africans. According to Martin and Johnson (1981:63) in 
1971 there was one doctor for 45 556 Africans in rural areas, and in 1976 there was one 
hospital bed for every 1261 Africans compared to one bed for every 255 whites. The national 
health budget was skewed towards providing more services for the minority whites at the 
expense of blacks. Blacks often had to seek curative treatment for preventable conditions and 
diseases like malnutrition, infections in the respiratory system, the gastrointestinal system, 
skin, eyes, and scurvy; diseases associated with low standards of living and poverty (ibid). 
There was also discrimination in education where separate schools for whites and blacks 
were established. Educational institutions for blacks were underfunded and under equipped. 
White education was well funded but only ten pounds per child was allocated to African 
education.  Under the 1907 Native Education Ordinance, education for the blacks was mainly 
left to missionaries and Africans themselves. It was meant to create an African that would be 
a humble and subservient subject to serve the colonial system. In 1930 education was made 
compulsory for white children but these rights were not extended to blacks till 1980. There 
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was also a bottleneck system where a limited number of Africans were allowed to advance 
into tertiary institutions (ibid: 57). This system of education did not create equal opportunities 
for blacks and whites. The white race came to possess better qualifications which enabled 
them to obtain better and higher paying jobs ahead of Africans. In addition, the educational 
curriculum was designed to enable Europeans to control the African. 
Still in education, knowledge and knowledge production came to be dominated by the whites. 
Colonialists employed what Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2010) calls “epistemicide,” that is, 
the extermination of knowledge and ways of knowing. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012b) argues that 
the teaching of history from a Eurocentric perspective were epistemicides meant to obliterate 
Africa’s glorious past. The generations- long and trusted indigenous knowledge was 
discarded, marginalized and eradicated and replaced by colonial western oriented knowledge 
through a process Mignolo (2009) refers to as epistemic colonialism.  
Politically, under colonial rule Africans were not effectively represented because of the 
existence of a qualified franchise system and restrictions on voters. There existed a separate 
voters rolls, “A” for whites and “B” for blacks.  Africans did not earn much, had little 
education and owned little in property and thus could not be effectively represented. This 
forestalled many from running for political office or qualifying as voters.  The white race was 
given greater representation in parliament because they were a better educated and propertied 
group. The structurally uneven nature of colonial society bred and incubated violence. The 
African, who was othered, impugned and discriminated, itched to hit back at the colonial 
system that denied him space for growth and development. 
It has thus been demonstrated that the hellish existential conditions Africans experienced 
under colonialism cannot be understood outside structural violence. The structural violence 
the Africans had to endure under colonialism falls neatly within the realm of the three pillars 
of coloniality.  Patterns of power between the colonizer/white race on the one hand and the 
colonized/black race on the other hand allowed the former to permeate and order the lives of 
the latter economically, culturally, socially and politically, thus sowing seeds of conflict. 
Although there was no war between blacks and whites at the time, there was not any unity 
and sustainable peace; what prevailed was negative peace. The oppressive and discriminatory 
existential conditions Africans had to experience were a form of violence. There might have 
been no fighting but the relations between Africans and whites were laden with latent conflict 
on the verge of rapture. The exploitation, poverty, land alienation, socio-economic inequities 
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and political injustice experienced by Africans under colonial rule were forms of violence. 
Injustice with regards to land more than any other issue became responsible for generating 
political consciousness among the African population that realized the futility of attempting 
to better their lives without political power. The land issue led to political awakening of every 
class and came to be the dominant theme in the 1960s and 1970s war of liberation, the 
Second Chimurenga/Umvukela. By responding to structural violence through direct violence 
the African nationalists denied claims by the Rhodesian premier Ian Smith that he had “the 
happiest Africans in the world” (Martin and Johnson).  
3.4 NATIONALIST STRUGGLES 
The 1950s and 1960s were a period of mass mobilization beginning with the formation of the 
Southern Rhodesia African Nationalist Congress (SRANC) and ending with the formation of 
ZANU in 1963(Bhebe: 1989). Earlier masses had been mobilized to protest against colonial 
injustices such as the Land Apportionment Act which legalized white seizure of African land. 
The attitude of these movements ceased to be protest against the government. Sibanda 
(1989:47) states that a more qualitative change in the goals, organization and strategy 
occurred for the first time in the SRANC that included Joshua Nkomo, James Chikerema and 
Joseph Msika amongst its leadership. They challenged the repressive colonial superstructure 
and its supportive discriminatory legislation. Africans now sought to replace the white 
minority government with majority rule.  This was unlike in the 1920s and 1930s when the 
African struggle was reformist in character. Africans had not sought to change the regime but 
had sought participation, respectability and representation within the overall framework of a 
racially hierachized colonial political economy.  
In 1960 the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formed and its leadership was almost 
similar to that of the SRANC. The NDP was militant. It engaged in civil disobedience and 
demonstrations which were a manifestation of nationalist anger and violence rooted in the 
difficult existential conditions of Africans created by coloniality. The Rhodesian government 
banned the NDP on December 8, 1961. By 1962, the NDP had been reconstituted under the 
name Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and was led by Joshua Nkomo, Leopold 
Takawira, Robert Mugabe and Ndabaningi Sithole among others. Its goal was to include 
fighting for the removal of the racist Rhodesian state and establish a democratic state based 
on one man one vote. 
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In 1963 ZAPU split, resulting in the formation of Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU) in 1963. Various theories and explanations have been advanced to account for the 
1963 ZAPU split. Meredith (2002:28) is of the opinion that the roots of the ZAPU split were 
located in Nkomo’s alleged political blundering and inept leadership. The NDP under 
Nkomo’s leadership was in 1961 invited by the British to a constitutional review conference 
in Salisbury. Under the proposed constitutional deal nationalists were to get 15 seats out 65 
parliamentary seats and majority representation was expected in the distant future.  Instead of 
out rightly rejecting the proposals that would have postponed majority rule for several 
decades Nkomo initially accepted them before having a change of heart (Martin and Johnson: 
1981). The white minority government took advantage of Nkomo’s apparent initial 
acceptance and slow action to repudiate conference resolutions and adopted the proposed 
constitution as law. Through this action Nkomo lost the confidence of his colleagues who 
perceived him as indecisive and inept.   
Confidence in Nkomo further plummeted when he made a decision to travel the world 
seeking international support at the expense of organizing his party. Some of his colleagues 
in ZAPU criticized him for adopting a political strategy of paying much attention to 
international diplomacy and constitutional change while neglecting the need to build a mass 
organization. They also accused him of being extravagant, opting for the luxury of foreign 
travel while leaving the party in disarray at home. To his critics, the plan to establish a 
government in exile instead of pursuing the struggle within was cowardly, ineffective and 
futile. Some members of the ZAPU executive like Sithole, Mugabe and Malianga also 
accused him of dictatorially running the party and thus plotted leadership change (ibid). 
Joshua Nkomo in his (1984) autobiography accuses his subordinates of scheming against him 
because he was from the minority Ndebele tribe. He argues that Shona speaking members of 
ZAPU led by Leopold Takawira were uncomfortable with a person from the small Ndebele 
tribe leading the nationalist struggle in a country where the Shona are the dominant ethnic 
group. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a:97) buttresses Nkomo’s tribalism argument by arguing that 
nationalism just like colonialism re-tribalized politics and fragmented its supporters along 
ethnic lines. Independent Zimbabwe, he laments, has had to pay a huge price for this failure 
of nationalism.  
When ZAPU broke up, initially the split was not along tribal lines, it had more to do with 
power dynamics as both Ndebele and Shona members were found on either side of the divide 
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and both drew supporters from the same Shona areas. One of the main plotters of the 
rebellion was Enos Nkala of the Ndebele tribe who Nkomo accuses of personally disliking 
him and holding a vendetta against him. Upon the formation of ZANU in 1963, Nkala 
remarked at a press conference “now I am going to see to it that Joshua Nkomo is crushed,” 
thus vindicating Nkomo’s assertion (Meredith 2002:32). Nkomo (1984) also alleges that the 
ZAPU fissure was externally influenced by Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere who wanted 
the ZAPU leadership to be more active within Rhodesia. 
The 1960s ZAPU split was therefore a result of a confluence of factors. It had to do with 
administrative differences, tribalism, ambition, personality clashes, tactical differences, 
power politics and ideological divergences among others.  The bottom line is that the split 
was acrimonious. The ZAPU fissure became a source of conflict during the liberation 
struggle and in the immediate post-independence period with the effect of negating peace, 
reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe.  
From its inception, ZANU distinguished itself from ZAPU and political parties before it by 
intensifying the use of violence against rivals. In his inaugural address, ZANU President 
Sithole stated that, “time for speeches has gone. This is now time for action in order to solve 
the problem facing us.” Quoting the Algerian nationalist leader Ben Bella, he stated that, “we 
must be prepared to die a little if need be” (Nyangoni and Nyandoro, 1979:65).  The party 
implemented military training programmes which were firmly associated with the Chinese 
model and intensified the use of violence against the enemy. The party was also committed to 
a non racial, democratic, socialist, and Pan-Africanist state. The major goal was to liquidate 
elements of coloniality such as colonialism, settler rule, neo-colonialism and imperialism. 
 Ideologically, ZANU and ZAPU differed; the latter was influenced by the Africanist ideas of 
the Pan Africanist Congress in South Africa and Maoism while ZAPU was a disciple of 
Marxist Soviet philosophies. As the two groups competed for political high ground conflict 
became inevitable as armed youths began to roam the townships canvassing for support. 
Whenever party youths encountered each other violence would erupt characterized by petrol 
bombings of property and the burning of houses in both urban and rural areas. Sithole (1979: 
38-39) states that a commissioner of police is reported to have described the violence as 
“almost a state of civil war”. This violence was motivated by the coloniality of power. 
Sachikonye (2011:3) amplifies this view by pointing out that the violence was a 
manifestation of latent aggression built into the colonial system. It was tutored to the 
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nationalists and masses by the colonialists who employed violence as a mode of governance. 
The resort to the paradigm of violence as a way of addressing political questions and 
attaining power became ingrained in the population and was to haunt Zimbabwean society in 
the future. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:4) opines that an understanding of how Zimbabwean 
nationalism emerged in opposition to a fundamentally undemocratic and violent colonial rule 
is critical for an understanding of the post-independence violence engulfing Zimbabwe. 
The Rhodesia Front government responded to nationalist violence by banning ZAPU and 
ZANU as well as arresting the political leaders. Nkomo and other ZAPU figures were 
detained at Gonakudzingwa, a remote detention unit in the south-east of the country, while 
the leaders of ZANU were briefly held in turn at two similar units near Gweru, before being 
transferred permanently to Salisbury Prison on 8 November 1965 (Martin and Johnson: 
1984).   
From the above discussion it has been shown that the ZAPU split had a profound and lasting 
effect on the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. The fissure planted 
seeds of conflict for future generations beginning with violence between supporters of ZAPU 
and those of the newly created ZANU party in the 1960s. It precipitated conflict between the 
military wings of both parties in the 1970s and was one of the principal reasons for the post-
independence civil war in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. The split also 
bequeathed a culture of violence where political parties have employed coercion in struggles 
for power.  
3.5 THE RHODESIA FRONT AND UDI 
The banning of ZAPU and ZANU did not stop African nationalists from expressing their 
disapproval of the white minority regime. They went underground and continued to demand 
self rule and the uprooting of racially structured colonial settler systems. They caused unrest 
by engaging in acts of sabotage on government property, white mines, farms and settlements. 
African nationalist activities coincided with a slump in economic growth in the 1960s. The 
economic crisis was so profound that there was even white unemployment for the first time 
since the1930`s (Bowman, 1973:35). These factors gave whites every reason to unite to 
ensure the permanent establishment of the Europeans in Southern Rhodesia. The factors 
actually radicalized white politics and nationalism. This unity was demonstrated by the 
formation of the right wing Rhodesia Front (RF) in 1962. To Grann and Gelfand (1964:234) 
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the RF was the first Rhodesian political party to mobilize whites into an effective political 
organization and to involve them in public policy decisions.  
At its inception, the RF named itself a Front in an attempt to underline its interest in 
embracing as many participants as possible. The result was that the RF experienced rapid 
growth from an initial foundation membership of less than a thousand to nine thousand by 
December 1962 and eighteen thousand by December 1968 (Bowman, 1973:35).The reasons 
for its success include the fact that from the beginning the RF articulated issues, explicitly 
guaranteeing that it would ensure the permanent establishment of Europeans in Southern 
Rhodesia. As testimony to this, Smith, the RF leader, bluntly stated in the Rhodesia Herald 
(1964) that, ‘If in my lifetime we have an African nationalist in power in Southern Rhodesia 
then we would have failed in the policy I believe in’.  
In a bid to ensure that no African nationalist government assumed power in Southern 
Rhodesia, Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front went on to undermine all of the 1964  
principles laid down by the British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home; 
1. Unimpeded progress to majority rule.  
2. Guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the Constitution of 1961.  
3. Progress towards improving the political status of Africans.  
4. Progress towards ending racial discrimination.  
5. Guarantees against oppression of one section of the population by another. (Hull 1978: 39). 
The RF managed to establish solid linkages with a significant proportion of the white 
community. The success of the party was a result of it successfully managing to unite whites 
in Southern Rhodesia by promising the preservation of the Land Apportionment Act and the 
rejection of forced integration (Martin and Johnson: 1981:69). These promises were 
embellished in the coloniality of being as they sought to maintain the assumed racial 
superiority of the white race over the darker races. 
The RF was determined to block African progression and majority rule that it saw as a threat 
to the racialized colonial structure that privileged the whites. One RF official commented;  
We in Rhodesia ….are determined to control the rule of African political advancement to 
power till time and education has made it a safe possibility to do so. Moreover we wish 
to have power to retard it, should that advancement outstrip the capability of the African 
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to govern wisely and fairly. We could not say 5,10,50 or a thousand years. It cannot be 
forced; it has to develop in accordance with the character and the nature of the African 
and his hitherto unapproved qualities of democratic behaviour (Skeen, 1966:59). 
Another objective of the RF was to crush African Nationalist movements to ensure white 
survival in Southern Rhodesia. Smith remarked that, 
If for a normal span of life for a man my age we can stave this thing off [nationalist calls 
for majority rule], then I believe we may stave it forever. And if as a government we fail 
to do this, then I don’t think we deserve to be charged with the responsibility of handling 
the affairs of Southern Rhodesia (Rhodesia Herald: 1964). 
The RF was therefore very clear about its long-term commitment to perpetual white rule.  
The RF objective of maintaining white rule in Southern Rhodesia was threatened by the 
“winds of change” sweeping across Africa in the 1960s that were bringing with them new 
independent African led governments. It was alarmed and feared that if blacks, that it 
associated with a series of lacks and negatives such as corruption, dictatorial tendencies, one 
party state systems, incompetence and nepotism, would assume power in Rhodesia then 
advances made by the European race would be reversed. To prevent the establishment of 
African majority rule in Rhodesia the RF first banned African nationalist parties. Smith then 
decided to go against the “winds of change”.  He vowed that “never in a thousand years 
would there be black majority rule in Rhodesia” and then on the 11th of November 1965 he 
announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). UDI meant that Rhodesia was 
no longer accountable to Britain as the colonial power with ultimate legislative responsibility 
for Rhodesia (Smith, 2001:65).  
Smith and the RF represented a section of white supremacists intoxicated by the coloniality 
of power that believed that only whites possessed the necessary qualities to rule Rhodesia and 
were thus supposed to rule it. To them, quality leadership was associated with race. 
University education and Christianity were not enough for African nationalists to rule; race 
was the determinant. The African race was said to lack the requisite political acumen, 
knowledge and ontological weight to form and run a government. To the white supremacist 
RF party the blacks had not evolved far enough for them to govern a modern political 
economy. It argued that blacks had to be educated and prepared for governance before 
independence as if whites monopolized knowledge and knowledge production. To the RF, 
only the whites had evolved farthest to become beings fit for political leadership and the rule 
of Rhodesia. The ability to govern was seen as a quality possessed only by the white race and 
the rule of Southern Rhodesia was perceived to be the preserve of the white race. These 
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notions on governance and race reflect that Southern Rhodesian society was engulfed in 
coloniality. 
According to Meredith (2002:36), apparently the British government had no qualms with 
granting independence to the white minority government in Rhodesia. Its misgivings were 
that African representation was not substantial enough for it to be granted independence. This 
reveals that even the British did not believe Africans were best suited to rule themselves. This 
task they were convinced belonged to the whites in Rhodesia who were however unwilling to 
make minimal concessions to Africans. The belief that the white race alone was ordained to 
rule was to set ablaze the flames of conflict in Rhodesia as Africans fought for their rights. 
The rise of the RF and UDI set the stage for war with Africans, particularly after the RF 
introduced a new system of governance akin to South Africa’s system of apartheid. ZAPU 
had in 1962 noted the radicalization of white politics and resolved that the only way to 
liberate the country against obstinate white rule was to use force (Martin and Johnson, 
1981:69). It brought arms and ammunition into the country and sent out young men for 
military training and sabotage in preparation for war with the intransigent white minority 
regime.  
In order to bring about the collapse of the Rhodesia Front government, Harold Wilson, the 
British Prime Minister, declared UDI an act of rebellion, thus illegal and imposed selective 
sanctions. On 19 November 1965, the UN Security Council Resolution followed suit, 
declaring UDI unlawful and passed a resolution to apply economic sanctions against 
Rhodesia as well as calling on Britain to end the rebellion. There were attempts to impose full 
sanctions on Rhodesia in the Commonwealth which were however thwarted by Britain, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand (ibid). Their actions strengthened Smith’s position and 
increased the likelihood of war.  Despite being fewer in number these states were 
ontologically denser than the African, Caribbean and Asian states that outnumbered them in 
the Commonwealth. The sanctions which Rhodesia had to face turned out to be feeble given 
that some states like South Africa, Portugal, the US and British companies like BP Shell  
continued to trade with Rhodesia, frustrating efforts aimed at bringing peace in the country 
through economic processes. Besides, Britain stated that it would not use force against white 
Rhodesia for UDI. The British unwillingness to use force to bring Rhodesia to legality could 
also be interpreted as a sign that Britain did not think the cause of Africans was worth the 
sacrifice of white blood. 
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Besides, to Britain Smith’s rebellion was not considered a threat as long as it did not shake 
the capitalist imperialist interests based on plunder, control and exploitation. The British 
decision not to use force in Rhodesia essentially gave Smith the blank cheque and set the 
stage for war between African nationalists and the white minority regime that was to span 
fifteen years. Only when Africans waged the liberation struggle did Smith’s rebellion 
threaten capitalist interests that Britain determinedly began to seek a lasting solution to the 
Rhodesian question. 
3.6 THE SECOND WAR OF LIBERATION  
The Rhodesia Front’s unilateral declaration of independence spurred ZAPU and ZANU to 
take up arms against the white minority government to reverse the illegal act and submit to 
the demand for majority rule based on one man one vote.  Scholars are generally agreed that 
the nationalist armed struggle against white minority rule began in earnest in 1966, but from 
1964 military preparations against the Rhodesian regime had already began by both ZANU 
and ZAPU military wings. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b),  the Second Chimurenga/Umvukela 
or Second War of Liberation was a decolonial revolt against an obstinate colonial 
administration bent on perpetuating settler rule at a time most African states were being 
granted independence. 
The existence of chasms between and within African political formations was a harbinger of 
tensions and conflict that was to bedevil the nationalist movement in the struggle for 
independence.  Intense distrust and hostility characterized the relationship between ZAPU 
and ZANU military wings even as they prosecuted the liberation war. The antagonism 
between the two parties extended to their military wings, ZAPU’s Zimbabwe People’s 
Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and ZANU’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA).  The two espoused different political strategies and military tactics and often 
criticized each other’s modus operandi, thus compromising unity between the two. The two 
parties largely de-campaigned and spread divisive propaganda about each other with the 
resultant effect of polarizing relations between supporters. Save for a brief moment when the 
two armies fought as a united front as Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA), the two forces 
executed the war separately and at times even fought each other. This state of affairs created 
fertile ground for the political rivalry to develop into ethnic conflict, thus retarding peace, 
unity and reconciliation prospects for Zimbabwe. 
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ZANLA operated mainly in the north and east of the country making use of the bases in 
Mozambique. Its strategy was based on Mao’s guerrilla tactics. They believed in winning 
peasants’ “hearts and minds” in areas they occupied. The area from which ZANLA operated 
and recruited was mainly Shona speaking and this explained the large Shona support that 
ZANU extracted. ZIPRA on the other hand preferred conventional warfare although at times 
guerrilla tactics were employed. It operated mainly from the Ndebele speaking south and 
western parts of Zimbabwe from which it drew most of its support (Martin and Johnson, 
1981). Apparently, more than anything the patterns of recruitment and areas of operation of 
the two military wings determined the volume and nature of ethnic support given to the two 
parties. The war of liberation against colonial white minority rule re-enhanced tribal 
identities. The post-independence tribal schism that gripped Zimbabwe in the early years of 
independence is in part traceable to the form that nationalism took in its fight against 
injustices of colonial rule (Ndlovu-Gatsheni : 2009b). 
The liberation war was pervaded by what Sithole (1979:1) refers to as “struggles within the 
struggle”. He explains internal contradictions, disunity and divisions within and amongst 
nationalist movements as they fought to control the direction of the liberation struggle and 
positioned themselves for political office in an independent Zimbabwe. He begins by 
exploring the ZAPU-ZANU split discussed in the previous section. Thereafter he then 
generally discusses infighting within and between Zimbabwe liberation organizations, 
namely ZAPU, ZANU, and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLOZI), the 
African National Council (ANC) and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. Contradictions within the 
Zimbabwe liberation movement fomented further disunity and conflict amongst Africans 
both in the pre-independence and post-independence.  
Violence and untold suffering characterized the war of liberation. Sachikonye (2011) 
discusses in detail the different types of liberation violence. He explains how guerrillas 
unleashed violence against the colonial forces, the white community and even the African 
population including headmen and chiefs they suspected of collaborating with the white 
minority government. Guerrilla methods of coercion caused fear and trauma in the 
population. One could be killed for not conforming to guerrilla instructions. Apparently the 
violence on the white public was racial and strategic. It was meant as a form of revenge and 
to instill fear in the settler government that had for a long time devalued African lives that 
Mignolo (2009) argues were seen by white settlers as bare and dispensable.  
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 An atmosphere of insecurity pervaded rural society during the war as the civil population 
found itself caught between Rhodesian force brutality and guerrilla coercion. Guerrilla on 
guerrilla violence was also experienced within liberation movements. The 1970-71 ZAPU 
mutiny led by Mtimkhulu and the1975 Nhari-Badza rebellion in ZANU unleashed 
considerable violence and led to the deaths of hundreds of guerrillas (Sachikonye: 2011). 
Sachikonye also discusses colonial regime violence where in seeking to contain guerrilla 
violence the regime forces used violence against guerrillas themselves and their collaborators. 
It collectively punished the civilian population for morally or materially supporting them.  
The war of liberation divided Zimbabwean society along race, ethnicity, settlement and 
ideology. The war laid the bases for the adoption of and institutionalization of a culture of 
violence as the mode through which to resolve disputes. There was little accommodation and 
tolerance of divergence. Dialogue had no place in the resolution of conflict, the war situation 
created conditions in which brute force replaced systems of justice. The culture of violence 
nurtured during the struggle against colonialism war survived and has continued to be the 
way of resolving contradictions in the post-independence period.  
For almost a decade and a half the war of liberation raged in Rhodesia. Despite brave 
guerrilla attacks the white minority government persisted partly because the coloniality of 
power ensured that the Rhodesia Front government received substantial funding from 
capitalist Portugal, South Africa, and multi-national corporations based in the USA and even 
Britain itself. These countries defied UN sanctions on Rhodesia as punishment for declaring 
UDI. Their intention was to protect capitalist interests in Rhodesia by ensuring that the white 
race remained in power.  
On the whole the liberation war hurt both the African and the white community. As the war 
raged African nationalists and the Ian Smith’s white minority regime decided to engage in 
negotiations to resolve the conflict. The next section discusses attempts at settlement between 
various parties to the conflict. It explains why they failed to reach agreement on problems 
bedeviling Rhodesia, and ultimately to end the war.  
3.7 TALKING WITHOUT NEGOTIATING   
Smith’s white minority government used various strategies to resist regime change and 
frustrate transitional politics in the face of opposition from nationalist guerrillas, Britain, and 
the wider international community. Coercion was not the only instrument Smith used to 
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remain in power. The Rhodesian government’s long survival in power also depended on 
skilful employment of divide and rule tactics, false promises, propaganda, devious diplomacy 
and political dexterity. Smith outmanoeuvred his opponents at the bargaining table, enabling 
him to maintain the illegal white minority regime in power.  
The white minority regime managed to remain in power by courting the support of right wing 
governments and the local white community. It told them that that if Africans were to be 
given independence then the country would become a corrupt undemocratic one party 
communist dictatorship lacking skills, professionalism and expertise (Smith: 2001). Giving 
Africans power, he argued, would reverse advances made by western civilization through 
colonial rule. Some western governments and multinational companies believed Smith and 
decided to render him assistance. This enabled the Rhodesian Government to bust sanctions 
and other restrictions placed on it by the UN. The Rhodesia Front government also 
successfully rallied together the local white community against sanctions which it was able to 
withstand for almost a decade and a half.  
Dialogue with various opponents was the other tactic employed by the RF to keep the white 
minority in power.  To Mathews (1979:91), the RF engaged in talks with the intention of not 
reaching an agreement. Time and time again Smith gave the appearance of bowing to the 
necessity of reaching a compromise through negotiations with the British government (alone 
or in conjunction with the United States) and with African nationalists (collectively or 
separately). In each instance, however, Smith’s negotiators disengaged from the talks at the 
last moment but without killing hopes for success in future negotiations.  
The Rhodesia Front government tried to hoodwink Africans and the international community 
by engaging traditional chiefs. The government convened the 1964 Domboshawa indaba 
where it presented Chiefs and not African nationalist leaders as the legitimate representatives 
of the African people. This was not the case as the power and authority of the chiefs was 
exaggerated. Chiefs under Ian Smith were essentially salaried government agents. In 
exchange for their co-operation Smith rewarded chiefs handsomely, thus preserving his 
regime.  
In 1965, Smith held talks with officials of the British Premier, Wilson. He managed to secure 
guarantees that Britain would not intervene militarily in Rhodesia in the event of the RF 
unilaterally declaring independence (ibid). The British decision against the use of military 
force to compel Smith to rescind UDI was in contrast with the British decision to send its 
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troops to bolster settler forces that ruthlessly crushed the 1896-97 Ndebele-Shona uprisings in 
Rhodesia. What this implied was that Britain valued the lives of the white race more than 
those of the blacks.  
After Smith declared UDI, Britain imposed selective sanctions. In December it imposed full 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia which were to be renewed annually. Although Wilson 
had vowed not to talk to an illegal regime he changed his stance in 1966 under pressure from 
Commonwealth leaders who demanded British military intervention to settle the Rhodesian 
question. Wilson met Smith on the HMS Tiger off the coast of Gibraltar.  In the talks, Smith 
rejected proposals to dissolve parliament, meaningfully review the constitution and surrender 
independence to Britain. Instead he maintained a qualified franchise and separate voters roll 
for Africans and whites banking on the fact that it was unthinkable for Britain to use force 
against its own kith and kin to force compliance. He also managed to get the British 
government to ignore a significant cause of the armed struggle, the absence of majority rule 
based on one man, one vote (ibid).  
The 1968 HMS Fearless talks focused on Rhodesia’s return to legality and the renunciation 
of the 1961constitution. At the talks Wilson laid down the policy of No Independence Before 
Majority Rule (NIBMAR) which Smith rejected, thus ending the talks with no agreement on 
fundamental issues. Smith was under little pressure to cave in to Wilson’s demands because 
during the talks Rhodesia was surprisingly coping with sanctions better than most had 
anticipated. It managed to do well because of import substitution and trade with South Africa 
and Portugal and with French, US, German, Japanese and Italian companies that defied UN 
sanctions.  In addition, the RF government was containing nationalist guerrillas whose 
structures were in shambles (Smith 2001:145). Wilson and Smith were unable to end the war 
and foster peace and unity because the two perceived UDI as a problem between Rhodesia 
and Britain and had engaged in talks to the exclusion of African nationalists. Their decision 
to leave out African nationalists, an important stakeholder in peace process, militated against 
the chances of finding a solution to the Rhodesian question.   
When Wilson failed to get Smith to reverse UDI, he abandoned the Rhodesian problem to 
focus on constitutional issues at home. In 1969, Sir Humphrey Gibbs resigned as Governor of 
Rhodesia just before a new constitution was brought into existence. The new governance 
charter was followed by a proclamation of a Republic in 1970. The RF was victorious in the 
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elections that year, sweeping all fifty roll “A” seats for the second time since UDI (Smith, 
2003:152).  
In 1971, Wilson revisited the Rhodesian issue. He dispatched his Foreign Secretary Alec 
Douglas-Home to iron out an agreement with Smith which they reached in November. 
According to Hull (1978:40) this time the British proposals were accepted because they 
represented virtually total capitulation to Rhodesian demands. Under the agreement, the 1969 
Rhodesian Constitution (which permanently denied Africans a majority in the House of 
Assembly) was to be modified. The African franchise was to be considerably widened, and 
provision for unimpeded progress towards majority rule made. A justifiable Declaration of 
Rights, to reduce discrimination and promote racial harmony, was also proposed, and a 
commission of enquiry was to be set up to look at the question of discriminatory legislation. 
In addition, British aid of £50m over 10 years was to be made available for economic and 
educational development in African areas and this was to be matched by the Rhodesian 
Government. The package was to be submitted to the Rhodesian people for approval, with a 
test of acceptability to be conducted by a commission appointed by the British government 
and led by Lord Pearce (Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Information Office, 1979:3). 
Essentially, what the agreement stated was that there was to be increased representation for 
Africans in parliament but the Rhodesian government would not assent to majority rule based 
on one man, one vote.  The agreement confirmed white minority rule indefinitely. The 
agreement revealed Smith’s political astuteness as it served to entrench white supremacy, 
while delaying immediate majority rule based on one man, one vote. Smith’s genius was that 
he could give the appearance of movement and momentum in negotiations without conceding 
anything of substance (Martin and Johnson, 1981:239).  
The agreement reached by Home and Smith was put to the population to test acceptability via 
a commission established under Lord Pearce, a British judge. The Rhodesian government 
encouraged the population to accept the proposals while the African nationalists who had 
reorganized themselves and formed the African National Council (ANC) campaigned against 
the proposals. This was a temporal non political body headed by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, an 
African nationalist clergy man who had been requested by detained African nationalists under 
the banner of the ANC to negotiate with Smith on their behalf. Muzorewa however, had little 
influence over other nationalists and no control over guerrillas. When Pearce’s Commission 
finished its work in March of the year 1972 it published a report to the effect that the African 
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people had rejected the proposals. The proposals were turned down because fundamentally 
they did not alter the constitution as white privileges were protected and also because the 
principle of majority rule based on one man one vote was rejected. The Rhodesia government 
argued that the proposals were good and had been declined because nationalists and guerrillas 
had employed intimidation and violence on the people (Hull: 1978). 
Muzorewa transformed the ANC into a political organization and approached Smith with a 
proposal to review the 1972 proposals. This action played well into Smith’s strategy. He 
preferred to talk to nationalist leaders separately; this enabled him to sow seeds of division 
and to play one nationalist against another thus intensifying intra-nationalist conflict and 
dashing prospects of peace. In 1974, Smith signed an agreement with Muzorewa. The 
agreement signed in private merely granted an increase of African seats in the legislative 
assembly from 16 to 22 (Martin and Johnson: 1981). African nationalists were disappointed 
by the settlement as it fell short of guaranteeing majority rule based on one man, one vote as 
the basis of independence. The agreement was therefore rejected by the ANC central 
committee.  
The Rhodesian government continued to talk to opponents separately, creating more discord 
within their ranks. In October 1974, Rhodesia and Zambia reached an agreement without the 
participation of African nationalist leaders. It was agreed that Zambia would freeze all 
guerilla activity in its territory and in return Smith would release nationalists who were in 
detention. The agreement between Lusaka and Salisbury was meant to discourage nationalist 
armies from continuing with the struggle. It intended to get the guerrilla leaders to abandon 
their calls for majority rule “here and now’ as this was viewed by Zambia as blocking Smith 
from coming to the negotiating table. ZANU rejected this call outright therefore frustrating 
efforts at peace. The exclusion of African nationalist leaders in the agreement between 
Zambia and Rhodesia caused misunderstandings between the nationalist leaders and the 
Zambian President, particularly ZANU which at the time was very active militarily and had 
ignored the ceasefire agreement (Sithole, 1978:17).  
The 1974 agreement was followed by the Zimbabwe Declaration of Unity signed in Lusaka at 
the behest of President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. The objective was to unite the various 
Rhodesian African nationalist organizations. Leaders of African nationalist movements, 
namely ZAPU, ZANU, FROLIZI and ANC agreed to unite under the United African 
National Council (UANC) and chairmanship of Bishop Muzorewa. The year 1974 is 
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significant in the discussion of the history of peace agreements and the search for peace in 
Zimbabwe as that was the year in which nationalist leaders were released from prison and 
joined their guerrilla armies in Zambia and Tanzania. It is also the year in which ZAPU, 
ZANU and the ANC agreed to form a broad umbrella body, the UANC.  It was also the year 
in which there was an escalation in the war that prompted Britain and the US to push for a 
more plausible solution to the Rhodesian question in the form of the 1976 Kissinger 
proposals. 
In 1975, Smith and Kaunda managed to get the Rhodesian government and an enlarged ANC 
to talk culminating in the Victoria Falls conference of 1975. The talks were not successful 
because of divisions within and between nationalist ranks. ZAPU refused to unite under the 
leadership of Muzorewa while Mugabe and Sithole were squabbling over the leadership of 
ZANU.  As a result the nationalists were not able to wring anything from Smith who stuck to 
his stand of no majority rule. Muzorewa’s UANC managed to get an audience with Smith. It 
requested that there be a constitutional conference attended by Britain and nationalist leaders 
but the talks did not take place after deadlock over the venue for the conference (Martin and 
Johnson: 1981).   
Late in 1975, the British launched a new initiative to get the Rhodesian government to yield. 
Through the Zambian and South African governments the British alerted Smith that Nkomo 
was willing to negotiate. In 1976, Smith held talks with Nkomo to the exclusion of other 
African nationalist leaders. The understanding was to get some African nationalists to 
positions in the Rhodesian government, with Nkomo as Foreign Minister. Smith conceded to 
Nkomo what only a few months before he had refused to grant the ANC as a whole.  Smith 
wanted to achieve a settlement, but only with Joshua Nkomo, whom he considered more 
moderate than the other ANC leaders. By dealing with Nkomo alone Smith divided the 
enemy camp and thus strengthened his own hand at the bargaining table (Mathews, 
1979:104). Nkomo was accused of being a sell-out and was denounced by African nationalist 
rivals for agreeing to engage in talks which would not bring about majority rule based on 
“one man, one vote” and thus dismantle the racially hierachized colonial state system. 
 Apparently, Smith would meet nationalists separately so that he would know what they were 
thinking.  His tactics according to Martin and Johnson (1981:98-99) were to “seek alternative 
groups to the fighters to negotiate with, and over the years, Muzorewa, the Chiefs, Nkomo, 
Sithole, Chikerema and others were lured into this trap, with the result that their political 
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reputations suffered.”  By dealing separately with African nationalists Smith was able to take 
advantage of the schism between his opponents to sow divisions among them so as to prolong 
the survival of his regime.  
In 1976, an agreement was reached between the US represented by its Secretary of State, 
Henry Kissinger and the leaders of the Rhodesian, South African and Zambian government.  
Smith broadcasted to the Rhodesian nation that he had accepted the Kissinger proposals of 
January 1977. The proposals made provisions for majority rule in two years, conditional upon 
the removal of sanctions and an end to the insurgency. Smith announced that the Kissinger 
proposals also provided for representatives of the Rhodesian Government and African leaders 
‘to meet immediately at a mutually agreed place’ to organize an interim government. The 
government was to be comprised of a Council of State with equal numbers of black and white 
members, nominated by their respective sides, and a white chairman without a special vote; 
and a Council of Ministers with a majority of African members taking decisions by a two-
thirds majority.  For the period of the interim government, the Minister of Defence and Law 
and Order was to be white and Britain was to provide the legislation for the process to 
majority rule. The establishment of the interim government was to lead to the lifting of 
sanctions and an end to all acts of war including guerrilla warfare. Substantial economic 
support was to be made available by the international community to stimulate the Rhodesian 
economy (Muzorewa: 1978;  Zimbabwe Rhodesian Information Office, 1979:8, Martin and 
Johnson: 1981). In the talks, Smith managed to keep the fundamental problem of majority 
rule based on one man, one vote in the shadows. As a result, the African nationalists who had 
not been party to the talks rejected the Kissinger Agreement.  
A few days after Smith’s announcement the Front Line States issued a statement calling upon 
Britain to convene a conference to work out the modalities for restoring peace and 
independence in Rhodesia. Britain responded positively to the call by the Front Line States 
and summoned stakeholders to a conference in Geneva. The commencement of the 1976 
Geneva Conference raised hopes that a solution would be found to the Rhodesian problem. 
Massive support was given to these talks by many governments that included the US, Britain, 
South Africa and the Frontline states. There was dissension, competition and disunity within 
the Zimbabwe Liberation Movement, but the elements in it remained focused. They 
demanded majority rule based on one man, one vote and asked that the specific date for the 
final grant of independence be written into the agreement.  
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The Geneva document provided for; 
a transitional government to be headed by an Interim Commissioner appointed by 
Britain, and a Council of Ministers with a substantial African majority. The Council of 
Ministers would have full executive and legislative competence, subject to the Interim 
Commissioner's reserve powers in certain matters (primarily external affairs, defence, 
internal security and the implementation of the independence programme.) These powers 
would enable the Commissioner to ensure a smooth transition to majority rule and 
independence. A National Security Council, presided over by the Interim Commissioner, 
would be responsible for defence and security and for ensuring effective government 
control of the defence and security forces. The Council of Ministers would implement 
the independence programme and work out a constitution. For this purpose it would 
appoint a constitutional committee presided over by the Interim Commissioner, and 
representative of the political groupings (Zimbabwe Rhodesian Information Office, 
1979:9). 
The proposals were accepted as a basis for negotiation by the Front Line States and by all the 
nationalist leaders. However, as the negotiations were being held the Rhodesian Government 
scuttled the process by including in the negotiations non essential detail and making claims 
that it had been misled by the governments of the US and Britain. It argued that it was 
rejecting British proposals on the grounds that they differed considerably from the Anglo- 
American proposals as presented by Kissinger. As an alternative, Smith hinted at the 
possibility of an 'internal' solution. 
At the Geneva conference, just like at the Victoria Falls talks, Smith played on nationalist 
ambitions and rivalries. He was able to keep nationalists divided and continued to rule while 
undermining the efforts of the guerrillas by raising false hopes of a settlement (Martin and 
Johnson, 1981:99). Smith once again managed to wriggle his way out of an agreement that 
could perhaps have resulted in majority rule based on one man, one vote. He had once again 
managed to raise the hopes of the nationalists and the international community only to dash 
them at the last moment. 
Revised Anglo-American proposals were tabled in September 1977. The Rhodesian 
government accepted the basic principle of Anglo-American proposals that enunciated the 
need for majority rule based on one man, one vote and independence in Zimbabwe in 1978. 
However, in order to save his regime, Smith rejected the mechanics for the proposed interim 
government that would have handed power to a British Resident Commissioner who would 
form a one man legislative authority for the interim period between agreement and the 
democratic election of a majority rule government based on universal suffrage 
(Sithole,1978:21). The African nationalists accepted the proposals save for the Patriotic Front 
(ZAPU and ZANU) that had misgivings with transitional processes.  
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Talks held in Malta from 30 January to 1 February 1978 between the Patriotic Front and 
British and American governments tried to reconcile the position of the Patriotic Front to the 
Anglo-American proposals. This drove Smith into trying to correct the failed mechanics of 
the Anglo-American proposals. He moved with speed and came up with a variant of his own 
that he wanted endorsed.  He invited moderate African nationalists to participate in internal 
talks.  
It has been observed that for the most part whenever Smith engaged in negotiations nothing 
of substance ever came out of them. He would agree to talks with the intention of scuttling 
them before the end in pursuit of his “never in a thousand years” declaration. The British told 
the US Secretary of State, Kissinger, that a lasting settlement was impossible with the 
Rhodesian government as long as Smith remained in office because he (Smith) was 
congenitally unable to settle (Martin and Johnson, 1981:239).  It should be noted that Smith 
neither expected nor wanted the talks to succeed, unless he could obtain a favourable 
settlement, as he did in 1971 and in 1978, which assured the whites a dominant position.  For 
the most part, he entered into negotiations to gain time, to deflect hostile action or secure 
positive support from outside, and to divide his enemies (Mathews, 1979:92). Smith 
employed delaying tactics with the hope that there might be a shift in the balance of power as 
that might aid the persistence of the white minority regime.  
The RF’s intransigent and stubborn hold on to power was perhaps informed by the belief that 
the white race had brought “civilization and light” to the dark people of the African continent. 
To them surrendering governance to the African nationalists was tantamount to taking 
Rhodesia and white civilization back to the “dark ages”.  Talks collapsed frequently because 
the white race would not allow blacks to take a position of power and dominance. Smith’s 
government would not accept proposals from the South on how to fix the Rhodesian problem 
as he viewed it as a constellation of societies that had embraced communism, dictatorship, the 
one party state systems, corruption and nepotism that threatened white interests and way of 
life and thus without the capacity and knowledge to bring peace to Rhodesia. Only when 
America actively involved itself in the Rhodesian crisis from the mid 1970s was the search 
for peace catalyzed. This reflected global coloniality’s great influence and leverage in 
decolonization. Kissinger managed to coax Smith into accepting the principle of majority rule 
based on one man, one vote which the latter had rejected for a long time.  
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This section discussed the various initiatives taken to resolve the Rhodesian crisis. It exposed 
Smith as a witty and wily negotiator who despite economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure 
managed to keep the nationalists, Frontline states, South Africa and Britain talking to him but 
without breaking through. It was more of talking without negotiation because there was no 
movement on Smith’s part who for twelve years did not concede to the fundamental of 
majority rule based on one man, one vote. Smith’s intransigence ensured that the white 
minority regime was able to prolong its stay in power albeit at the cost of peace and unity 
because while they were talking the war was raging.  On the whole, the initiatives were 
important in that they kept the pressure on the Rhodesian Government and paved the way for 
a final break through that eventually came at the close of the decade. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
The chapter provided the basis from which an in-depth exploration of the search for peace, 
reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe can begin. A brief history chronicling pre-colonial 
conflict and European conquest was given. This was followed by a discussion of how settler 
rule and domination exploited blacks while promoting white interests.  The chapter also 
discussed the structural violence Africans had to endure which led to the rise of African 
nationalist movement that challenged the racially structured colonial system. To resist the 
Black Nationalist wave radical white nationalism developed, culminating in UDI. The failure 
by African nationalists to obtain meaningful concessions from the white minority regime 
forced the Africans to engage in an armed struggle against the RF government. Finally, the 
chapter discussed the various initiatives that were taken to end the war up to 1977.  The next 
chapter examines the 3rd March, 1978 Internal Settlement. Under this agreement Smith 
yielded for the first time to majority rule based on one man, one vote that lead to the creation 
of the “independent” state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT: TOWARDS PSEUDO-
INDEPENDENCE 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter broadly and critically examines the Internal Settlement of March 3, 1978, one of 
the modalities through which Zimbabweans sought to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation. 
It explains how coloniality permeated the peace agreement and the implications on the quest 
for sustainable peace and unity in Zimbabwe. The chapter begins by providing the 
background to the settlement. It explains how in the mid-1970s, the American Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger and the South African Premier, Vorster, coaxed Ian Smith into 
accepting the principle of majority rule after applying economic and diplomatic pressure on 
his white minority government.  This was despite Smith prevaricating and procrastinating on 
the issue of granting black majority rule for over a decade. The chapter examines nationalist 
bifurcation and fragmentation that resulted in Sithole of a ZANU faction, Chirau of the 
Zimbabwe United Peoples’ Organisation (ZUPO) and Muzorewa of the UANC breaking 
ranks with externally based African nationalists like Nkomo and Mugabe while closing ranks 
with Ian Smith to negotiate what they considered to be a less painful decolonisation.  The 
chapter then explores the motivations and aims of the various parties that eventually signed 
the 3 March Peace Agreement with Smith. Thereafter the chapter analyses the terms of the 
agreement, the work of the transitional government and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government 
that emerged from the concession.   
4.2 BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT 
The Rhodesian Internal Settlement came against a backdrop of a history of failed peace 
overtures that tried to find a solution to the Rhodesian impasse dating back to the mid 1960s. 
Involved in the talks were various players in the Rhodesian conflict that included the African 
nationalists, the Front Line States, Ian Smith’s white minority government and the 
governments of Britain, America and South Africa. 
The  3 March 1978 Peace Agreement can however be immediately traced to Smith’s loss of 
political leverage following the diplomatic onslaught on his regime by Vorster and Kissinger 
in the years 1974 -1977, a deepening socio-economic crisis generated by the war and an 
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escalation of the war by guerrilla armies. According to Day (1978:268-272) in 1976, 
Kissinger anxious to prevent the Rhodesian guerrillas setting up another Marxist state like 
Angola and Mozambique in Southern Africa, exploited South Africa's reliance on American 
economic and diplomatic support by cajoling Vorster into pushing the Rhodesian 
Government to grant majority rule.  Although Vorster enjoyed power over the blacks in 
Africa, his powers in the coloniality of power were subservient to the powers of metropolitan 
states. 
South Africa exerted great pressure on the Rhodesian Government to reach a political 
agreement with the country's African nationalist leaders.  Under pressure from Vorster, Smith 
reversed his policy of the previous ten years of treating the nationalist leaders as dangerous 
criminals and released many from prison, Nkomo and Mugabe among others.  Smith had no 
choice but to comply with South Africa’s commands because of the demands of the 
coloniality of power. Rhodesia relied on South Africa for political and economic support.  
Since UDI in 1965, South Africa was Rhodesia's main ally in beating sanctions.  Rhodesia's 
trade with the outside world was through South Africa. From early 1976 the only two 
unblocked rail routes from land-locked Rhodesia ran into South Africa. South Africa also 
helped pay about half of Rhodesia's defence bill, thus Pretoria could easily throttle the 
Rhodesian economy and war effort (ibid). 
Vorster withdrew South African forces from Rhodesia in 1976, a time when the guerrilla war 
had become much more intense as one of the African nationalist parties, ZANU, was 
effectively making use of the vast border of recently independent Mozambique to 
significantly intensify the war against the Rhodesian security forces that lost twice as many 
men in 1976 as in the previous three years together (Hull: 1978). ZAPU, which operated from 
Zambia, had built up a well- equipped army of, possibly, 10,000 men, which, if fully 
committed to action, would have greatly increased the Rhodesian army's difficulties in 
defending the country. This danger to the white minority government persuaded Smith to 
move towards a formal commitment to black rule at the end of 1977 (Day: 1978).  
According to (Hull, 1978:36), economically Rhodesia’s GDP fell by 3.4% in 1976 with the 
government spending a quarter of its budget on defence. White emigration reached alarming 
proportions with a net outflow of over 10,000 whites in 1977, which was the worst since 
1964. Against this backdrop, in September of 1977 Smith bowed down to pressure and 
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accepted the basic principle of the 1976 Anglo-American proposals that enunciated the need 
for majority rule based on one man, one vote and independence within two years.   
Smith was however uncomfortable with sections of the Anglo-American proposals  
(discussed in chapter 3)  that would have given authority to a British Resident Commissioner 
to possess legislative authority in the transition period. Radical African nationalists rejected 
the Anglo-American proposals and so did Smith who had misgivings about transitional 
issues. He took advantage of the rejection of the proposals by radical African nationalists and 
proceeded to persuade moderate African nationalists into negotiating a home grown solution 
with him.  
In his solution Smith proposed the elimination of an outsider to oversee the transition. Instead 
of having a British Resident Commissioner in charge of the transition he proposed the 
establishment of a ruling council in which power would be shared on a rotational basis until 
black majority rule based on one man, one vote would be granted. Influenced by the 
coloniality of knowledge and power internal African nationalist leaders began talks for an 
internal deal at the end of 1977. They also agreed to an internal settlement to save their 
political careers in view of the fact that they had over the years been sullied, marginalized 
and compromised in the struggle for independence.  
Mitchell (1992) views internal settlements as power sharing arrangements which involve 
internal leaders amenable to compromise reaching an agreement with the former oppressor 
while bypassing radical external leaders connected with the armed struggle and less amenable 
to compromise. These arrangements fall far short of providing a solid foundation upon which 
to produce true majority rule.  Equally important, Mitchell identifies four main political roles 
for blacks seeking majority rule and independence, namely: armed struggle advocate; 
conciliator; nationalist proxy; and traditional collaborator. By the end of the 1970s decade 
Sithole and Muzorewa were seen by guerrillas and revolutionaries as fitting the profile of 
nationalist proxies, while Chirau was viewed as a traditional collaborator.  
These personalities (Sithole, Muzorewa, and Chirau) were to Smith ideal candidates for an 
internally driven solution to the Rhodesia question. Smith was opposed to Marxist leaning 
armed struggle advocates, Mugabe and Nkomo, that he regarded as ontologically debased and 
therefore to be excluded from the internal talks. Smith was aware of the differences in policy 
and strategy that existed between internal and external leaders of the nationalist struggle and 
the tension that came with it. He was able to get the internal nationalist leadership at the table 
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by virtue of exploiting the differences between the two groups. The moderates preferred a 
negotiated settlement to end the war, unlike the nationalist revolutionaries that favoured a 
military solution to the conflict. To Smith, it was imperative to reach a settlement with 
moderates to the exclusion of radical nationalist leaders that sought to overhaul the colonial 
governance system. Moreover, settling with western oriented internal leaders was ideal in 
light of the Frontline states’ decision to support only the pro- Marxist Patriotic Front. This 
decision was crucial in driving internal African leaders into Smith’s hands. 
Zartman in Preston (2004:65-66) emphasizes the significance of a mutually hurting stalemate 
and a mutually enticing opportunity for exit from conflict, also referred to as a “ripe 
moment”, as important for the achievement of a peace settlement.  He argues that 
“escalation” and “turning points” are crucial components for the generation of a mutually 
hurting stalemate. He defines escalation as a “significant change in the nature of the conflict 
in the direction of increased violence as distinct from a gradual intensification of conflict with 
no definable change in its nature.” The turning point to him serves to reinforce belligerents’ 
awareness of the futility of continued fighting. The sources of turning points can include an 
inconclusive defeat, a bloody stand-off that suddenly brings costs home, a loss of foreign 
support or an increase in foreign pressure and a shift in fortunes that weakens the stronger 
side or strengthens the weaker.  
The above mentioned conditions prevailed in Rhodesia from the mid 1970s. The war was 
escalating and became undesirable to both Smith and the internal leaders of the nationalists. 
For Smith, it was economically costly while for the internal nationalist leaders it was 
politically taxing. The latter were losing political legitimacy and mileage to external leaders 
whose armies were gaining ground. The turning point in the war was when Vorster at the 
behest of America decided to abandon Smith. The loss of foreign support and increase in 
foreign pressure coupled with the intensification of the war by nationalist guerrillas served to 
reinforce Smith’s awareness of the futility of continued fighting in view of huge costs the 
bloody stand-off was bringing at home. On the whole, by the end of 1977 Smith had grown 
weaker while the nationalists were growing stronger but could still not secure victory which 
compelled both parties to seek a settlement informed by Kissinger’s package.   
An internal settlement had by this time also become attractive for various players in the 
Rhodesian crisis as those involved in Rhodesian affairs had thus far proven incapable of 
resolving the problem. According to Sithole (1978:31) Britain was unqualified to negotiate 
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for the African people because she was external to the fundamental problem affecting 
Rhodesia and besides her authority for Rhodesia had been effectively liquidated by UDI.  The 
South African government was also not the appropriate actor as it presided over an apartheid 
system inconsistent with democracy. Frontline states were guilty of bias in the struggle for 
independence as each state advanced its own interests. For instance, Zambia tried to impose 
Nkomo as the future leader of an independent Zimbabwe. Mozambique preferred Mugabe 
with whom it shared Marxist principles. Tanzania at first supported Sithole because in his 
early days of nationalism he had admired the philosophy of Ujamaa but shifted support to 
Mugabe for his radical Marxist thinking. The OAU saw the Rhodesian problem through the 
eyes of the Frontline states while the United Nations’ take on Zimbabwe was influenced by 
the general interest of its member states rather than those of Zimbabweans. To Sithole 
(1978:33), these forces acted in their own interests and according to their own prejudices and 
suggested conflicting solutions to the problem. These contradictions in the colonial matrix of 
power left the local players in the Rhodesian conflict convinced that they were ideally placed 
to resolve the Rhodesian problem.  
4.3 INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION IN THE 3 MARCH PEACE AGREEMENT  
For a long time Britain, South Africa and the America had been trying to settle the Rhodesian 
problem in a manner that suited their own interests and not necessarily those of the Rhodesia 
Front. Smith realized this and concluded that the time had come for him to settle the 
Rhodesian question in a manner that suited Rhodesia Front.  He facilitated the return of 
exiled moderate African nationalists and, after three months of negotiations, Muzorewa of the 
UANC, Sithole of the ANC and Chirau of ZUPO and Smith agreed to an internal deal to 
resolve the Rhodesian problem.  The 3 March Peace Agreement, also referred to as the 
Internal Settlement, the Rhodesian compromise or the Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement, 
marked the first time that whites and blacks agreed to establish a power sharing government.  
The main objectives of the settlement were to discuss constitutional arrangements for the 
transfer of power to an interim government and the creation of the state of Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia based on the principle of one man, one vote and majority rule.  
Ngara (1978) sees internal settlements as generally motivated by the desire to retain power 
and protect the interest of the ruling regime before losing more ground to their rivals. To him, 
they usually exclude radical elements preferring to engage moderate unpopular elements with 
more to gain than to lose. For Ian Smith and the Rhodesia Front the Internal Settlement was 
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designed to blunt the power of the nationalist cause and to put a halt to the war by offering 
Africans self-rule in a transitional government. It was a political counter insurgency strategy 
by the Rhodesia Front government that saw what it had perceived as a ‘no win’ war turning 
into a losing war as it was suffering increasing reversals to the guerrilla forces. Smith decided 
to hold talks with nationalists before more ground was lost so that he could negotiate from a 
position of strength and resist revolutionary political change that may have entailed having to 
completely handover control of government and the army to African nationalists, thus 
threatening the continuity of the colonial in the new arrangement. The Rhodesian internal 
settlement was therefore an ingenious plan by Smith calculated to abort decolonization by 
shielding the interests of the ruling white minority by seemingly handing over power to a 
black dominated government before guerrilla forces could sweep everything away. 
To Mitchell (1992), the settlers had three broad objectives in agreeing to surrender political 
power to blacks. Diplomatically they hoped that by creating a coalition government with 
moderate African nationalists they would receive external recognition that would result in the 
lifting of sanctions and gain both domestic and international legitimacy. Politically, through 
the Internal Settlement, Smith sought to garner support from the African population that was 
experiencing severe hardships by bringing the war to an end. An internal settlement also gave 
Smith the opportunity to play blacks against each other and also intensify political and ethnic 
divisions that were blighting the struggle for independence. By bringing moderate blacks into 
government Smith intended not only to widen the gulf between guerrilla leaders and the 
moderate nationalists but also to blunt revolutionary changes to the status quo. To do this, 
Smith identified nationalist factions that had lost favour with either the Frontline states or 
guerrilla forces and lured them into a political deal with the hope of undercutting the Patriotic 
Front and at the same time have the political outcome securely under the control of whites 
(Sithole: 1999:151). Lastly, according to Mitchell (1992) an internal settlement with 
Muzorewa and others was to Smith also intended to strike a blow at the guerrilla war effort 
by causing disaffection and defection in and amongst guerrilla ranks. He hoped that when 
news of the 3 March Peace Agreement was to filter across Rhodesia guerrillas would be 
disenchanted and mortified leading to the termination of the war. While talks on an internal 
settlement were underway the Rhodesian army raided refugee camps in Chimoio and 
Tembwe, Mozambique, killing 3000 people (Martin and Johnson: 1981). The raid sought to 
create the impression that the Rhodesian army could crush the guerrilla forces. It aimed at 
giving Smith the leverage to negotiate from a position of strength. 
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An internal agreement with internal black leaders in favour of majority rule but against the 
guerrilla war was to Smith also a strategy of circumventing the British Government that had 
since UDI refused to grant Rhodesia independence. Through securing an internal settlement 
Smith wanted to send a message to the British that Rhodesians could settle their own affairs 
without British interference and input.  In addition, to Day (1978: 272) an internal settlement 
to Smith offered better prospects of maintaining white supremacy in Rhodesia than the 
Anglo-American proposals. In their plan, the Rhodesian whites were to give up control of the 
government and the army to a transitional authority as soon as a cease-fire was to be agreed. 
However, in Smith’s internal package General Peter Walls of the Rhodesian Army would 
virtually retain control of the military forces, thus safeguarding white settler power in 
Rhodesia. The RF also sought an internal arrangement that included but was not limited to; a 
justiciable Bill of Rights; an independent judiciary; neutral Public Service Board; a public 
administration free from political interference; guarantees relating to the payment and 
transmission of pensions abroad;  dual citizenship; white representation in parliament. This to 
Sithole (1978:48) was merely the relinquishing of the shadow rather than the substance of 
power.  In summation Smith and the Rhodesia Front saw in an internal settlement an avenue 
through which to retain the presence of the colonial after the accord.  
Settling internally was attractive to the Rhodesia Front which was beginning to have doubts 
about the future of white rule against the backdrop of the rising guerrilla war and 
international isolation and condemnation of the UDI. An internal settlement was an 
opportunity to salvage something for the white minority. Smith was under the impression that 
Sithole and Muzorewa still had guerrilla allegiance and could convince the guerrillas to lay 
down arms. This was after Muzorewa had made Smith believe that he could stop the war 
once he was in power. Apparently Muzorewa was under the illusion that guerrillas would 
obey him since most guerrillas that had been recruited from 1974 onwards had been drafted 
with him as leader of ANC. 
According to Hull (1978), by the end of the 1970’s Smith’s government notion of power had 
metamorphosed from the traditional political, economic and military control to the 
conception of power in terms of social class. It therefore sought through an internal 
settlement an alliance between the ruling whites and the more affluent Africans against the 
communist leaning emerging African working class. The whites were comfortable with an 
internal settlement because they knew that internal black leaders dominated by an intellectual 
bourgeoisie favoured the retention of the basic structure of capitalism. They saw them as 
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representing values acceptable to the white community and as a group more reasonable than 
the external African leaders that sought to establish communist/ socialist states.  
The whites had little faith in Africans as custodians of future peace, democracy, stability and 
balanced economic progress and thus felt that only under strong white involvement in the 
future governance of the country could their interests be safeguarded. A deal with moderate 
black leaders was to the RF expected to lead to the placement of African nationalist leaders in 
the higher echelons of national governance while retaining a strong white influence in key 
institutions. It was to the RF the only way to maintain settler privileges while providing a 
solid buffer against nationalist liberation forces (Hull, 1978:37; Astrow, 1983:109; Smith, 
1997:224).  
Smith’s main negotiation partner in pursuit of an internal deal was UANC’s Muzorewa. He 
had from the early 1970s always favoured the transfer of power after negotiations as opposed 
to violent confrontation.  The clergyman is on record as having said that “I will fight as a 
Christian and by Christian methods of non-violence … I do not subscribe to the romantic and 
unhistorical view that the liberation struggle is won by armed clashes between forces of 
liberation and the colonial army”(Muzorewa, 1978:82). He was of the conviction that 
settlements arrived at through negotiations and mutual understanding were more stable than 
settlements reached after military confrontation. To him, the latter approach would leave a 
legacy of distrust on both sides, and feelings of injustice among the losers which could be a 
source of future conflict. In light of this Muzorewa preferred non-violent resistance as the 
principal avenue by which to achieve peace and decolonization.  
Despite the rejection of the UANC by the guerrillas, the Frontline States and the OAU that 
elected to back the Patriotic Front (PF), Muzorewa still enjoyed substantial support within 
Rhodesia. Muzorewa was aware that Smith saw him as the key person with who to reach an 
internal deal as his UANC enjoyed a huge African following within Rhodesia. The internal 
settlement was therefore to Muzorewa an opportunity to outflank external nationalists and 
secure the preeminent position for the UANC in the future governance of the country.   He 
even argued that by participating in the talks he was fulfilling the desires of ZAPU and 
ZANU that in 1972 had mandated him with uniting the people and bringing about majority 
rule (Muzorewa, 1978:94).  
 The UANC was composed of educated African intellectuals who held little wealth but saw 
an opportunity of acquiring wealth by filling the shoes of the retreating settler state. UANC 
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negotiators were restricted from making radical demands upon the Rhodesia Front by 
opportunities they saw to acquire economic and political power. According to Ngara 
(1978:344), during the time of the talks James Chikerema had just bought a £20,000 farm in 
the Zvimba area and was therefore perceived as having joined the white class which was 
exploiting the African masses, particularly the peasants.  It appears as though the African 
intellectuals that negotiated the Internal Settlement were more interested in an elite transition 
instead of seeking radical changes to the socio-economic and political order.  
The other party that was involved in internal talks was Sithole’s ZANU. Sithole was deposed 
from the leadership of the main ZANU in a power struggle. He was accused of having 
denounced the liberation struggle and the commission of a number of political blunders. 
African nationalists and the Front line states turned against him. Upon his return to Rhodesia 
in 1977, Sithole abandoned the path of trying to achieve independence through armed 
struggle in favour of constitutional means. He turned away from the articulation of radical 
views and declared the war wholly abhorrent to him.  Sithole as leader of ZANU thought that 
since he had commanded the war to start he could thus order it to stop (Flower: 1987).  
Although Sithole claimed to be the true leader of ZANU it was apparent that he had lost the 
support of the guerrillas and control of the party to his more radical colleagues, Zvobgo, 
Tekere, Mugabe and others. Like Muzorewa he had not realized that political dynamics had 
since changed; only Nkomo and Mugabe of the Patriotic Front had the mettle to stop the war 
in the late 1970s. He was barred from seeing guerrillas in Zambia and Mozambique and was 
also rejected by the OAU.  To Mufuka (1979: 440), Sithole was therefore no longer relevant 
outside Rhodesia which forced him to seek political relevance in Rhodesia via an internal 
settlement.  His participation in the internal settlement talks was driven by the desire to 
reinvent himself and regain political importance and position himself for the leadership of an 
independent Zimbabwe. In light of having been rejected and humiliated by former partners 
and allies, he was prepared to co-operate with imperialism to advance his political career. 
As has been cursorily highlighted above, Muzorewa and Sithole were not necessarily sell-
outs that the Patriotic Front leaders perceived them to be and portrayed them as. The negative 
labeling of Muzorewa and Sithole was part of nationalist rivalries and ideological differences 
concerning the prosecution of the liberation struggle. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2008a:88-89) the rivalry was not only rooted in philosophical differences but also strategic 
divergence. Moderate African nationalists saw in an internal settlement an opportunity to out-
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manoeuvre the exiled nationalists led by Nkomo and Mugabe and not a chance to betray the 
nationalist struggle He further argues that Sithole and Muzorewa were certainly not mere 
‘sell-outs’ and ‘neo-colonial puppets’ any more than Mugabe and Nkomo were not mere 
‘puppets’ of Frontline States, China, Cuba, or Soviet Union that combined to impose the 
Patriotic Front on them. 
The other party that participated in internal settlement talks was Chief Jeremiah Chirau’s  
ZUPO, an organization led by traditional leaders.  The white minority government had from 
the 1964 Domboshawa Chiefs indaba managed to co-opt chiefs into political governance on 
the pretext that they were the legitimate representatives of the African people. The 
government managed to obtain co-operation from traditional leaders by making chiefs paid 
employees of the state and also by rewarding them with other benefits.  ZUPO incurred the 
wrath of African nationalists and guerrillas who accused it of selling out because of this close 
relationship and collaboration with the minority white government. For instance, Chirau from 
April to December 1976 held the following posts; senator-chief in the Rhodesian senate, 
deputy minister and head of ZUPO. The latter post was gifted to him by the Rhodesian 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (Mufuka: 1979).  Chirau was instrumental in the formation of 
ZUPO so that it could act as a pawn for Smith’s regime as it dealt with radical nationalists. 
As a consequence of this ZUPO found itself maintaining a difficult existence and therefore 
sought legitimacy through the internal talks.  Other than seeking legitimacy, ZUPO leaders 
were apparently interested in benefits that would come with being part of the envisaged 
interim government and rewards for agreeing to be used by Smith as a lever against Sithole 
and Muzorewa in the internal talks. 
It is important to highlight that the personalities that led internal talks were products of 
coloniality or entrapped in coloniality. Smith was the son of a Scottish settler farmer who was 
apparently indoctrinated into believing that Rhodesians were a superior race, in fact more 
British than the British. Smith believed in a hierachized and racialized society with whites at 
the top and blacks at the bottom. He declared that “never in a thousand years would there be 
black rule in Rhodesia” (Martin and Johnson, 1981). In spite of the oppression and racism in 
Rhodesia, Smith boasted that he had “the happiest Africans in the world” (Ibid).  Chirau had 
a strong inclination towards cooperation with Europeans. He was awarded a medal for service 
in World War Two by the British and his ZUPO party owed its existence to settler interests. 
Sithole and Muzorewa were both Christian clergymen educated in the United States of 
America.  This had a strong influence in the way they perceived the decolonization process 
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and dealt with western influence.  In short, Smith, Sithole, Chirau and Muzorewa as subjects 
of coloniality were not likely to engage in decolonial talks to produce a decolonial settlement 
that Rhodesia direly needed to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation. 
Although excluded in the internal talks, Britain, the United States and other capitalist states 
were extremely concerned by the development of events in Rhodesia. They did not support 
an internal deal that excluded the Patriotic Front. They feared that if the liberation forces 
triumphed in Zimbabwe against the internal settlement forces it would mean the end of the 
prospect of retaining a western foothold in the country (Ngara, 1978: 349). According to 
Astrow (1983:111-112), Britain and America wanted more time to create a more stable 
African government while retaining real power in European hands. He further states that 
imperialist interests were aware that an internal settlement would provide no long term 
answers, only a temporal gain for European settlers because African internal leaders were 
likely to make too many concessions that would leave too much power in white hands. This 
would be a future source of conflict and a danger to imperialist investments. The British and 
Americans preferred a negotiated settlement inclusive of the Patriotic Front that would 
deliver a majority government that would at least not be antagonistic to western interests.  
Apparently the differences that existed between the British and Rhodesian settler imperialists 
were not over the exploitation of the locals but the manner and circumstances under which 
the Africans were to be exploited. The British preferred exploitation of Africans under the 
auspices of global capitalism and coloniality while the Rhodesia Front preferred to exploit 
Africans under colonial rule or under a weak puppet government. An internal settlement with 
moderate African nationalist leaders was likely to give birth to the latter while an all parties’ 
concession was likely to produce a neo-colonial government apparently desired by Britain. 
Talks for an internal settlement were held without the participation of the leaders of the 
Patriotic Front or the input of the Frontline States. The Patriotic Front regarded itself as the 
legitimate and rightful leaders of the Zimbabwe liberation movement. This claim was 
informed and influenced by the fact that they had the backing of the pro-socialist/communist 
Frontline States that resented settler capitalist interests behind an internal settlement. The 
Frontline States were also averse to an internal deal in fear that the resultant government 
could turn out to be an ally of the apartheid regime, thus blocking independence and black 
majority rule in South Africa (Ngara, 1978: 349).   
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The Patriotic Front and the Frontline States rejected internal talks as they felt that Smith’s 
proposals did not offer substantial decolonization and full unfettered independence.  They 
wanted Smith’s unconditional surrender and power transferred to external African 
nationalists immediately.  They were also totally opposed to a settlement with Smith as he 
was not to be trusted having proved intransigent and cunning in the past. In light of this the 
two sought to scuttle the talks by intensifying the war and ratcheting up diplomatic pressure 
against a settlement.  
According to Smith (1997:271) Mugabe and Nkomo were invited to participate in the 
transitional government and were offered seats on the executive council in a bid to end the 
war but declined because of the support received from the Frontline States and the Eastern 
bloc that were seemingly obstructing efforts aimed at achieving peace. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2008:90) however  sees things differently as he argues that the pro-East Nkomo and Mugabe 
were excluded from the internal deal by both Smith and moderate African nationalists who 
sought to outmanoeuvre and render them irrelevant, thus thwarting their chances of assuming 
power.  
Whether they were left out or not it should be pointed out that self interest may have been 
behind the Patriotic Front’s exclusion from the internal deal. Day (1978:274) argues that 
because Mugabe had operated outside Rhodesia since 1975 he had little organized domestic 
support while Nkomo, although having a well- organized party within the country, was less 
popular than Muzorewa who had eclipsed him since the formation of the ANC. To undercut 
Muzorewa and other internal leaders, the Patriotic Front refrained from negotiating with 
Smith. They labeled moderate nationalist leaders as sellouts for electing to collaborate with 
Smith. The Patriotic Front desired power and saw guerrilla military victory, or the use of the 
leverage of guerrilla support to secure a negotiated settlement presided over by the British 
and the Americans. They saw a negotiated settlement with these capitalist powers that had 
lost patience with the Rhodesian inferno as guarantee of a place in the first independent 
African government. 
By and large it has been noted that inclusion and exclusion in the internal talks was driven 
and informed by the coloniality of power. Parties that participated in the talks did so out of a 
desire to acquire power through an internal arrangement while those that did not take part 
sought power through the barrel of the gun or a broader negotiation forum.  
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4.4 TERMS OF THE INTERNAL SETTLEMENT 
It was agreed that an Executive Council of four was to be created to take over the powers of 
the prime minister and run the interim government. Chairmanship of the Council was to be 
rotated among the four signatories during the transition period. There was to be a council of 
ministers composed of an even number of whites appointed by Smith and the other half split 
among three competing African delegations whose main task would be to assist the rotating 
chairpersons of the council. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b) criticizes this arrangement as it gave 
the impression of political power- and authority-sharing between colonizers and colonized.  
Under the provisions of the Internal Settlement the principle of universal adult suffrage was 
to be the basis of a new constitution for Rhodesia. It was agreed that the principle of 
separation of powers would be maintained and guaranteed under the new constitution. All 
personnel hitherto serving the present Rhodesian government were to be guaranteed their jobs 
and pensions for ten years.  It was also agreed that there would be one hundred 
representatives in the proposed assembly, of which twenty-eight would be reserved for white 
legislators for at least ten years. The reservation of white seats contradicted the principles of 
majority rule and non-racialism as it entrenched white separate representation (Sithole: 1978). 
Both Sithole and Muzorewa railed against racial representation, arguing that it smacked of 
discrimination in an independent African state by maintaining an independent European 
community in an independent African state (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011b:56-7).  
The terms of the March 3 Agreement did not aid the decolonization of Rhodesia; rather they 
facilitated coloniality and the continuity of effects of colonialism. Smith was to remain as 
prime minister and the predominantly white Parliament was to continue to exist with the 
ability to block any new legislation or constitutional amendments and supervise the transition 
to majority rule. This meant that executive and legislative power enjoyed by whites under 
Rhodesia Front rule was to persist unaltered.   The retention of Smith in government reflected 
the persistence in power of a regime regarded as the author of the constitutional mess and 
violence that engulfed Rhodesia. The allocation of posts to whites in the cabinet and 
parliament disproportionate to their population reflected the retention of white dominance in 
the new political dispensation. The idea of parity in the council of ministers in a country 
where there were two million blacks to one hundred thousand whites was an obstacle to full 
decolonization. The provision of the settlement placed whites above blacks in furtherance of 
coloniality of being and power and did not set Rhodesia on the path to majority rule. These 
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provisions were to come into effect on 31 December 1978 but the date was pushed forward to 
31 May 1979. The clauses were to last for the life of two parliaments or ten years, whichever 
was longer (Mufuka, 1979:442). 
Real power was not given to internal African leaders. This was evidenced by the fact that the 
white-dominated civil service, police and military structure was largely left intact.  The 
agreement spelt out that there would be no nationalization of the economy or seizure of 
property in the Rhodesian economy and dual citizenship would be permitted during the 
transition period. Although the Internal Settlement provided for universal adult suffrage, 
Whites (including Asians and Coloureds) were to control 25% of the seats in the new 
assembly in a country with six million six hundred thousand Africans.  They were also to 
have a blocking vote in critical matters that threatened their hegemony such as private 
property, defence, civil service, and the courts. By accepting the terms moderate African 
nationalists were in a way embracing the coloniality of power by permitting the continuation 
of imperialist and racist structures of power that the Zimbabwe liberation movement was 
fighting against. 
The Internal Settlement just like legislation under colonial rule apparently gave whites greater 
political and ontological weight than Africans. By allowing white votes to be worth more 
than black votes the concession placed whites on a higher ontological pedestal than blacks, 
implying that they were superior to blacks and therefore deserved more political rights.  The 
value of the white vote in proportion to the population was therefore made significantly more 
important than the black vote since one African had one vote yet one white person had the 
value of five to six votes (ibid). 
Although planning a black government, the internal deal aimed at maintaining white power in 
the new state. The settlers retained control of the security sector that largely resembled a 
colonial force that operated along a colonial modus operandi.  The Internal Settlement was 
able to secure settler interests while Africans were offered little protection against 
exploitation and injustice. The black majority government that was to come into power was 
to inherit colonial debts. These debts were odious as they were acquired in the fight against 
black majority rule. Courtesy of the Internal Settlement settlers were to maintain property 
acquired by virtue of conquest and colonial legislation and policies. There was no 
fundamental alteration to land ownership which was an obstacle to the pursuit of justice. 
Despite conceding power to African nationalists the settlers were still able to influence the 
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political and economic trajectory of the country. This did not come as a surprise as Smith had 
held the aces at the negotiating table. 
The fact that Smith remained part of the new political set up on hand to offer tutelage on 
governance to the incoming administration reeked of coloniality. Apparently, Smith did not 
trust Africans with governance, nor could he fathom them fully in charge. He had little faith 
in Africans as custodians of future peace, democracy, stability and balanced economic 
progress. His refusal to relinquish key state institutions ran deeper than just an interest in 
retaining state control and power. It was tainted by the coloniality of being and knowledge. 
He also thought that African nationalists were ontologically and epistemologically incapable 
of running a modern capitalist economy. By staying on as part of the new transitional 
government Smith wanted colonial tentacles of power that guaranteed whites a pleasant and 
familiar way of life to remain attached to the new government (Smith 1997:224). On the 
contrary, Flower (1987) is of the opinion that had Smith disappeared too quickly it would 
have undermined white confidence, caused anxiety and uncertainty and left Rhodesia 
vulnerable to economic ruin and the prospect of conflict. But also contrary to Flower’s view, 
Smith’s refusal to retreat rendered the Internal Settlement an instrument to perpetuate neo-
colonial relations and thus a reason for an escalation of the war. 
To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b:56), although heavily criticized, the Internal Settlement when 
measured “in terms of the moderate nationalist positions of Muzorewa and Sithole, founded 
on African bourgeois ideologies of legitimation, it was a great achievement. Measured also 
against Ian Smith’s vow that there was not going to be majority rule in a thousand years, it 
was a great African stride” To him, it was not fundamentally different from the other 
negotiated compromise settlements that brought about transfer of power from whites to 
blacks in Africa. On the whole the Internal Settlement was enveloped in coloniality and 
ultimately intended to protect imperialist interests.  In intent, it was all about the transfer of 
power from the white minority to the black majority regardless of its nature. This was seen in 
whites retaining control of critical state institutions that ensured the virtual survival and 
continuation of a racially structured colonial state. Moderate African nationalist leaders were 
co-opted into government but token changes were made to the constitution. The idea was to 
retain the confidence of the white people so that they could be encouraged to continue living 
and working in Rhodesia under conditions that resembled colonial rule albeit under black 
political leadership. Perhaps that explains why Smith remarked “we have now got majority 
rule but not majority rule based on colour” (Astrow, 1983:113). 
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4.5 FLAWS AND FAILURES OF THE INTERNAL DEAL 
According to Mitchell (2004) internal settlements often fail because they are associated with 
fear and anxiety and often follow the pattern of ‘too little, too late”. Settlements born out of 
the context of desperation and rushed compromise are seldom durable and sustainable as they 
involve foregoing principles and positions. The Internal Settlement was doomed to fail 
because it was negotiated within the parameters of the coloniality of power. Internal African 
nationalist leaders agreed to the compromise even though it brought relatively minor changes 
as it was apparently the only way by which they could gain political power in light of having 
been discarded by the larger African nationalists block, the PF.   
The character and composition of the team that negotiated the peace concession with the 
white minority regime were compromised by their being both products and subjects of 
coloniality.  The African nationalists that negotiated the settlement were moderate intellectual 
bourgeoisie. They included the likes of Enerst Bulle, a university lecturer, Stanlake 
Samkange, an American educated writer and professor and Solomon Nenguwo, former 
principal of Schools. These representatives represented elite interests instead of those of the 
revolutionaries that sought to radically transform the colonial system. They were not keenly 
interested in taking over the power of the state, but sought inclusion in the nest of 
accumulation. Their interest in accessing state resources should be understood within the 
realm of the coloniality of power. This group made it possible for the continuity of 
colonialism as they identified with capitalism. According to Ngara (1979:346), it was behind 
this group of persons that capitalist and imperialist interests managed to hide and continued to 
exploit the newly independent country, therefore making it vulnerable to conflict and 
instability.  
The internal African nationalist leaders were in essence a rag-tag of nationalists with varying 
goals that had been outwitted in “the struggles within the struggle” for Zimbabwe’s 
independence (Sithole: 1999).  They lacked the necessary support to enable them to negotiate 
a credible internal deal and guarantee an end to the guerrilla war. This militated against their 
ability to bargain effectively with Ian Smith in the internal talks.  As political outcasts 
internal leaders were desperate to regain political relevance through an internal settlement, 
making them vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by the Rhodesia Front. Perhaps 
more important than the composition of the teams that led the internal talks were the 
leadership. Smith as a defender of colonialism, Muzorewa and Sithole as products of 
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colonialism and Chirau as a surrogate of colonialism were not the best personalities to lead 
and dominate peace talks in 1978 since their interests were inextricably bound to the dictates, 
desires and interests of coloniality. 
It could be argued that the Internal Settlement was presided by coloniality of knowledge since 
it was epistemologically the brainchild of Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, 
modified by Smith and presented to moderate African nationalists as the solution to the 
Rhodesian question. The conflict resolution paradigm employed to resolve the Rhodesian 
impasse was informed by foreign epistemologies bent on maintaining capitalist imperialist 
economic and political interests in the face of socialist/communist expansion. The solutions 
followed western capitalist modes of conflict resolution without taking into cognizance the 
uniqueness of the Zimbabwe situation and conflict. There was little home grown and local 
about the Internal Settlement, it was essentially a capitalist project that sought the survival of 
colonial situations that served the interests of both the white minority settlers and their 
agents, the moderate bourgeoisie black nationalists who claimed to represent the interests of 
the majority of the Africans in Rhodesia.   
The exclusion of Britain and the US in the internal deal meant that these global powers could 
not use their influence to promote the acceptance of the Internal Settlement as a gateway to 
peace, reconciliation and unity in Rhodesia.  Frontline states were also excluded from the 
internal deal and thus opposed. They used their influence at international forums such as the 
Commonwealth, OAU, UN and Non-Aligned Movement to sway the global community 
against embracing the new political arrangement in Rhodesia. The exclusion of a senior 
political figure from Matabeleland also made the search for peace and unity difficult as 
people from the region felt marginalized and unrepresented in the new political dispensation. 
This was vindicated in the April 1979 elections in which the predominantly isiNdebele 
speaking people of Matabeleland voted overwhelmingly for Ndiweni, a Ndebele chief who 
came in third in the polls behind Muzorewa and Sithole but ahead of Chirau, a member of the 
Executive Council in the Interim Government. 
From the drawing board the Internal Settlement was calculated to safeguard white interests 
and maintain their control of the country through the construction of a class of neo-colonial 
rulers dependent on them. To Mitchell (2004) this strategy had worked successfully in former 
French and British colonies in the north in the 1960s where wars of liberation were not 
waged. By trying to superimpose a Euro-centred template used to grant independence to 
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French and British territories in the North in the 1960s through the Internal Settlement 
prospects for peace and unity were ruined in Rhodesia as radical African nationalists vowed 
to continue with the war for total independence. The plan also failed because the war had 
radicalized and revolutionarized the quest for independence to a point where guerrilla leaders 
were not willing to glibly embrace independence without any significant control and 
ownership of the means of production. 
It should be noted that because internal settlements are generally exclusionary in nature they 
thus tend to be characterized by escalation of violence especially by those left out as they 
attempt to delegitimize and liquidate the internal concession. The 3 March, 1978 concession 
did not achieve some of its goals because it excluded the Patriotic Front. Chirau, a signatory 
to the 3 March Peace Agreement, later criticized the Internal Settlement for being 
exclusionist when he remarked that “hapana nhaka inogarirwa vamwe vana vasipo” (there 
can be no discussion of inheritance in the absence of other siblings) –implying that there 
could be no discussion of the future of Zimbabwe in the absence of externally based African 
nationalist leaders - the Patriotic Front (Interview with a retired ZANU PF ex- government 
minister: 14/9/2015).   Chirau’s criticism of the settlement was perhaps driven by envy as 
Muzorewa had emerged dominant amongst internal African leaders of the Internal Settlement 
and upon the realization that the Bishop was the most popular of the internal African leaders. 
Because the Patriotic Front was left out of the 1978 peace process, the Internal Settlement 
was unable to bridge the differences that existed between the major belligerents to the 
conflict. According to Mufuka (1979:449), on the one hand the Patriotic Front viewed Smith 
as a white supremacist bent on perpetuating white rule. It associated Muzorewa with the 
persistence of the colonial, imperialist interests and neo-colonialism. On the other hand 
Muzorewa and Smith continued to see guerrillas as communist terrorists. The Internal 
Settlement failed because it was unable to placate the Patriotic Front. Relations between the 
parties to the internal deal and the Patriotic Front remained antagonistic and hostile. The 
former desired to maintain the economic and political set-up while the Patriotic Front sought 
wholesome changes to the status quo. Neither the internal African leaders nor the Rhodesian 
Front could secure peace without the participation of the men who controlled guerrilla forces. 
As long as the gulf between the interests of the parties to the internal deal and the Patriotic 
Front remained divergent the achievement of peace, unity and reconciliation was always 
going to be difficult. The refusal by the Internal Settlement leaders to accede to the demands 
of the PF was informed by the coloniality of being. The new government was bigoted and 
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imperial in its attitude. It saw itself as righteous while perceiving the Patriotic Front as evil 
and immoral for not embracing the internal deal.  
The achievement of an internal deal was not altogether a dark episode in the history of 
Zimbabwe. Despite the numerous flaws of the Internal Settlement Sithole and Muzorewa 
managed to wring out of the settlers something the guerrilla leaders had failed to do in over a 
decade of fighting and negotiations - a modicum of independence. The Internal Settlement 
surpassed all other previous negotiations, and stood as a very dramatic change that included 
majority rule, universal suffrage, non- racialism and a Bill of Rights (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2008a:90).  The 3 March Peace Agreement produced a settlement in which for the first time 
white and blacks agreed to work and govern together and eventually establish the state of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia run by the first government of national unity on Zimbabwe’s political 
landscape. It marked the end of overt white rule and the beginning of black political rule in 
Zimbabwe, and thus the agreement became a significant event in Zimbabwe’s political 
history.  Although the agreement lacked popular legitimacy, it was the first meaningful 
attempt to incorporate blacks into government- an important step in the search for peace, 
reconciliation and unity as it created hope where there was despair. There was always hope, 
as the war raged on it dawned on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government that only a settlement 
endorsed by all political players in the conflict could bring lasting peace.  
On the whole, as has been noted in this section, the 3 March Peace Agreement had many 
structural faults. Behind the smokescreen the edifice of the agreement had the foundational 
weakness in that it was produced within the bounds of coloniality. It therefore advanced 
coloniality and sought to bring transition without transformation. The results were elusive 
peace, false unity, illusive reconciliation and incomplete independence in Zimbabwe.  
4.6 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, MARCH 1978 TO MAY 1979 
On 12 March, the internal black leaders were sworn in as members of the new Executive 
Council and on 28 March they each nominated three black ministers to serve in the new 
ministerial council as counterparts to those whites already in office. The main objective of the 
interim government was to obtain an effective ceasefire with a safe-return policy for 
guerrillas. This was seen as important for peace and recognition (Muzorewa, 1978:261). 
Peace and recognition were however not achieved because the interim government was a 
creation of the Internal Settlement whose legitimacy was questionable. The absence of the 
Patriotic Front in the interim government meant that the guerrilla war would continue. The 
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Eastern bloc and the Frontline states increased military support to the Patriotic Front. 
Muzorewa and Sithole found themselves in an awkward situation in that they had to persuade 
guerrillas whose allegiance they did not command to lay down their arms yet at the same time 
as members of the transitional government working with the Rhodesia Front they were 
responsible for the continued defence of the country against guerrilla incursions.  
Despite entreaties from Muzorewa and Sithole guerrillas refused to lay down their arms. Only 
100 out of the 6000 guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia heeded the call to give up fighting 
(Hull, 1978: 42). Throughout the transitional period Smith continuously castigated Sithole 
and Muzorewa for failing to keep their side of the bargain of persuading the guerrillas to lay 
down their arms. The failure by internal leaders to halt guerrilla incursions prompted Smith to 
maintain the Rhodesian army onslaught on the guerrillas and peasants further compromising 
the delicate peace process.  Nkomo and Mugabe fiercely challenged the legitimacy of the 
interim government. They felt that under the new arrangement the whites still held too much 
power. They urged guerrilla forces to intensify the war. The continuation of the war 
hampered the effectiveness of the transitional government which was unable to bring any 
fundamental change to the rural populace that continued to suffer as before.  
 Internationally the interim government also suffered from a legitimacy crisis. The West at 
first welcomed the March 3 Peace Agreement as "a step in the right direction” (Ngara 
1978:349). Confidence in the transitional government was nevertheless shaken when Vance, 
the American Secretary of State, and  Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, made it clear to 
Muzorewa and Smith that peace would be a hard call unless the Patriotic Front was included 
in any future Rhodesian settlement. Western capitalist states therefore refused to endorse the 
Internal Settlement. They argued that the internal deal fell short of offering African genuine 
independence. They preferred the handover of power to the more revolutionary Patriotic 
Front government that although Marxist in orientation would be forced by the dictates of 
economics to accept western aid and thus become a capitalist lackey subservient to the 
coloniality of power (ibid).  
In a bid to strengthen their positions and secure the interim government against guerrilla 
forces, Muzorewa and Sithole, who did not control armies of their own, deployed auxiliary 
forces created by the Rhodesian police Special Branch. The main task of these armies was to 
counter guerrilla incursions, win over peasant support from the Patriotic Front and shield 
rural communities from guerrilla influence. They however evolved into Sithole and 
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Muzorewa’s private armies numbering 10 000 by the end of the war (Preston, 2004:63). 
These new security units complicated the security situation as they increased the number of 
belligerents in the conflict, thus raising the specter of violence. They were unleashed on 
guerilla armies and their supporters. They embarked on campaigns of violence and 
intimidation. Their creation and activities added a new dimension to the war.  
The interim government sought to foster unity by promoting racial integration and the 
incorporation of blacks in governance and state institutions. Programmes were put in place to 
promote the emergence of an empowered black bourgeoisie and racial integration.  Blacks 
were permitted to buy houses and live in communities previously designated for whites such 
as Mount Pleasant in Harare. Muzorewa also began the process of Africanizing the civil 
service and other state institutions by absorbing more blacks.  Despite these noble objectives 
the changes that the transitional government brought were piecemeal and did not bring the 
transformation that the majority black population of Zimbabwe had hoped for. Few blacks 
were actually integrated into government and the civil service and social relations were not 
radically transformed. There was not much change regarding racial relations under the 
transitional government, it was repetition without difference. Although the Rhodesia Front 
pledged to narrow the gulf between races during internal settlement talks it failed to see 
through its pledge as evidenced by the limited number of inter-racial social interactions under 
the interim government. Apparently the Rhodesia Front held on to the view that different 
racial groups had to be kept separate in the interests of peace and harmony (Muzorewa, 
1978:81). This view was enforced by what Santos (2007) regards as abyssal lines that seek 
the division of people in distinct racial groups.    
Although common interests brought together internal political leaders the alliance was 
blighted by numerous internal contradictions and disunity bred by the coloniality of power. 
The African nationalist leaders in the interim government competed for political 
preponderance and political high ground. Sithole worked against Muzorewa who he accused 
of trying to overshadow his fellow partners in the hope of getting white RF support.  
Muzorewa in turn accused Sithole of trying to hijack the struggle and to lay claim to 
guerrillas as his personal forces. Within the UANC, the dominant internal African party, all 
was not well; leadership differences ravaged the movement with Muzorewa’s deputy, 
Chikerama, and his followers, frequently criticizing their leader’s management of the party 
(Ngara:1978).  
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Although a transitional government that incorporated both blacks and whites governed, 
politically whites still retained a significant amount of power. Colonial laws such as the 
repressive Law and Order Maintenance Act and the system of justice in general remained in 
place. Byron Hove, the Co-Minister of Justice Law, questioned this state of affairs. He was 
also critical of the transitional government because racial discrimination still pervaded 
government institutions. Blacks still did not hold any senior posts in the police and there were 
wide disparities in the salaries paid to black and white officials working the same jobs. "I am 
aware", said Byron Hove, “that in this country the police force has been used as an 
instrument to enforce Rhodesian Front laws” (Mufuka, 1979:446). Having said this, the 
Muzorewa appointed Hove was asked by the white members of the transitional government 
to publicly apologize or face forced resignation. Co-justice minister Hilary Squires, the Chief 
of Combined Operations, General Peter Wall, and the Commissioner of Police, Peter Allum, 
all united in demanding his removal (ibid).  He refused to apologize and was dismissed from 
his post as Joint Minister of Justice, Law and Order on 27 April by Chirau who held the 
rotational chair of the four-man executive.  It was because of the coloniality of power that 
Chirau capitulated to these demands by the whites.  
The UANC demanded his reinstatement and threatened to withdraw from the interim 
government if its demand was not met. When Hove was not reinstated the UANC was unable 
to carry out its threat. The fact that Muzorewa was unable to prevent the dismissal of Hove 
was evidence that white minority power had not been destroyed; Rhodesia was not on the 
path to full decolonization despite the Internal Settlement. Blacks had come to occupy 
political offices but had remained without political authority as they did not control the levers 
of power.  This proves that the settlement protected the status quo of those public service 
bodies that supported the continuation of colonial patterns of power and relations. The Hove 
case demonstrated the force of the coloniality of power.  The black government was not ready 
to dismantle the colonial system of government and left no doubt that whites were in charge 
in Rhodesia especially after undermining the credibility and position of black leaders in 
government (Flower, 1987:202).  
The Byron Hove saga also glaringly reflected the workings of the coloniality of being. 
Whites were still regarded as ontologically denser despite political changes.  The Co-minister 
of Justice, Squires, Police Commissioner Peter Allum and others still bore greater political 
influence than Muzorewa and other black transitional government officials who were far 
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senior to them on the political ladder but whose influence weighed far less than those of the 
whites when it mattered. 
Martin and Johnson (1981:294) point out that after the Hove affair there was a decline in 
support for Muzorewa among those who had believed that the agreement was a sincere 
attempt to move towards genuine black rule, racial integration, unity and reconciliation. 
Hove’s dismissal portrayed that the agreement was a sham where on the one hand Europeans 
signed an agreement to hand over majority rule and yet on the other hand any African who 
spoke against it was dismissed indicating that black members of the executive council were 
lackeys of whites. This attracted the wrath of guerrilla leaders who regarded Africans in the 
internal settlement as powerless sellouts and puppets of Ian Smith while others criticized the 
interim government as more concerned with gaining European confidence than reforming the 
colonial governance structure. 
Instead of reforming colonial institutions and closing ranks with the generality of the 
population African leaders in the transitional period alienated themselves from African 
support in the rural areas. They threatened peasants that they would be barred from voting in 
the April 1979 elections unless they stopped supporting the guerrillas (Martin and Johnson, 
1981:294). These threats reflect the manifestation of the coloniality of being in the interim 
government. African leaders were now thinking and speaking from their new situations of 
political power and new found wealth and status. Their locus of enunciation was now 
influenced by their new positions and interests in the interim government. They ceased to 
think like nationalists pursuing revolution but more like whites defending capitalist 
privileges.  Although urban support for the settlement was high, the intense propaganda 
campaign against the Patriotic Front and the escalation of the war eventually converted many 
neutrals who ended up throwing their lot with the guerrilla struggle thus further alienating the 
interim government and corroding the transitional government’s stability. 
The awkwardness and weakness of the transitional government was further exposed after 
ZIPRA forces brought down Rhodesian civilian aircraft in September 1978 and February 
1979. The events riled the white community both within and outside Rhodesia, prompting the 
still white commanded Rhodesian army to launch retaliatory attacks into Zambia and 
Mozambique. This action revealed that all of the transitional government leaders could not 
deal with guerrilla incursions and that the black internal leaders were unable to restrain 
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Smith. Power remained reposed in white hands despite political changes that incorporated 
blacks in government. 
Rhodesian army attacks on guerrilla camps in retaliation for the ZIPRA downing of a 
Rhodesian aircraft also showed that  little had changed in the mentality of the Rhodesian 
army even though it was now under an interim government. The swift retribution was 
specifically motivated by the desire to avenge the loss of white lives. These lives apparently 
were seen by the white controlled Rhodesian army as more valuable than those of blacks who 
were also dying in rural Rhodesia in their hundreds at the hands of guerrilla forces yet 
operations were not being conducted to avenge their lives. According to Preston (2004), the 
raids into Zambia and subsequent attacks on ZANU bases in Mozambique virtually 
guaranteed Nkomo and Mugabe that the guerrillas and international community would not 
bless the internal arrangement.  
During its tenure the transitional government produced a constitution for the future state of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia which was to be run by a government of national unity. Each party with 
seats in parliament would be represented in government in proportion to the number of seats 
won. White representatives were to be elected on a constituency basis while black 
representatives were to be drawn from the party that would win the most votes in a particular 
electoral district. The Rhodesian white population constituted less than 5% of the population 
but was to hold twenty-eight seats in a legislature of one hundred people. This was to leave 
whites with influence disproportionate to their demographic status in the new state, therefore 
perpetuating colonial situations that privilege the white race over the darker races.   
Furthermore, a referendum on the new constitution on January 20, 1979 was only reserved 
for the white population who voted for it. There was however no referendum to ascertain 
African opinion on the same constitution (Sithole, 1999:152). The African population was 
denied the right to decide how they wished to be governed while whites were given that right. 
Separate voters’ rolls were to be used in elections for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. This was against 
the principle of equality between races and humanity. Whites were given special treatment as 
though they were superior to other races as was the situation under colonial rule. This 
differential treatment of races did not reflect commitment towards genuine decolonization. 
Despite the internal contradictions of the transitional government, the opposition of the 
Patriotic Front, a flawed constitution and the escalation of the guerrilla war, elections were 
held in April 1979. For the first time Africans were given the opportunity to exercise their 
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right to elect a candidate of their choice based on one man, one vote. Over 60 % of the 
eligible voters cast their votes and Muzorewa’s party won fifty one of the seventy-two black 
seats in the legislature and sixty seven percent of the votes allowing him to be the first black 
prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Sithole 1999:155). Despite the high voter turnout the 
results did not truly reflect the will of the people as votes were obtained coercively against 
the backdrop of intimidation, violence and propaganda by pro-Muzorewa and Smith forces.  
The huge UANC vote was not necessarily a love for Muzorewa but more of a desire to see an 
end to violence and hardships. Nkomo and Mugabe dismissed the election as bogus while 
Sithole and Chikerema, Muzorewa’s former deputy in the UANC, denounced the elections 
and refused to join the government. Besides exposing political divisions the 1979 elections 
revealed the deep ethnic divisions that existed in Rhodesia. Sithole got most of his votes from 
tribesman in the south-east of the country while Ndiweni, an isiNdebele speaking chief, 
obtained most of his from the Matabeleland provinces while most Shona groups had voted for 
Muzorewa. This did not bode well for relations between the different ethnic groups in post-
independence Zimbabwe. 
On the whole the transitional government was in Smith’s imperialist schemes designed to 
serve the purpose of massaging and tampering down internal African leaders. African leaders 
were neutralized during the transition period so that they would not be able to demand drastic 
changes to the colonial situations once black majority rule came into effect.  
4.7 ZIMBABWE –RHODESIA 
In spite of all the criticism directed towards the UANC electoral victory on 1 June 1979, 
Muzorewa, backed by white military and economic power, took up office as Prime Minister 
of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s Government of National Unity.  From its birth the state was beset 
by problems. On the eve of the independence of the new state Muzorewa put it to the whites 
that the Rhodesian flag had to be lowered before the raising of the new flag for the state that 
was coming into being. The Rhodesia Front objected to the lowering of the Rhodesian flag 
first before the raising of the flag of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as they perceived it as surrender to 
blacks. Muzorewa lost the argument. The flag issue cost Muzorewa a significant amount of 
support from the African nationalists for failing to stand up to the whites (Flower: 1987). The 
flag incident symbolized that colonialism and coloniality had not been dismantled. Muzorewa 
had taken over the country only in name but not in practice. 
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Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had to deal with the continuing guerrilla insurgency. In addition to this 
problem, Muzorewa’s deputy, Chikerema, and nine other MPs quit the UANC  to form their 
own party after accusing the former of running the party as a 'secret tribal mafia’ (Mufuka, 
1979). Furthermore, twelve ZANU-Sithole members initially boycotted parliament claiming 
irregularities in the electoral process. Given the vulnerability of Muzorewa’s government in 
its nascence, Chikerema’s defection made Muzorewa more dependent on the Rhodesia Front 
for survival. Dependence on the whites left Muzorewa with little choice but to continue the 
oppressive and unpopular policies of the European settler regime. Doubts arose both 
domestically and internationally over Muzorewa’s claim to leading an African majority 
government independent of white influence (Astrow, 1983:116). Although the government 
had changed in Rhodesia the colonial regime of power had not. This state of affairs in the 
young state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia did not provide a solid foundation for the promotion of 
peace, unity and reconciliation. 
It is important to note that the double-barreled name (Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) given to the new 
state was not an indication of unity between settlers and the Africans but a sign of incomplete 
decolonization. It was in fact a product of imperialist machinations that aimed at 
hoodwinking Africans to believe that colonialism had ended yet in fact it had survived the 
end of formal colonial rule. The name Zimbabwe –Rhodesia instead of merely Zimbabwe as 
the nation imagined by nationalists was dismissed by its enemies.  The name screamed that 
colonialism was not dead but still alive. It was just a case of black political power meeting 
white capital in a settler dominated state ruled by the black majority. Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia government was unable to stamp its mark and bring transformative change. There 
was in reality no real transformation as the political economy of the country remained firmly 
under colonial capitalist control. It was overwhelmed by coloniality as real power was still 
wielded by settler whites who rendered Muzorewa as both a puppet and a tyrant. He was 
regarded a puppet because the governance path was charted by the Rhodesia Front and tyrant 
in that his government presided over the deaths of thousands of guerrillas and their 
supporters.  
The establishment of the new state marked the end of direct white minority rule but it did not 
gain both domestic and international recognition even though Smith had opted out of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as a condition for its recognition, the lifting of sanctions and 
independence. Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government faced a legitimacy crisis at 
home as it did little to alter the status quo for the vast majority of the Africans.  It tended to 
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focus on increasing its support by promoting the rise of a black bourgeoisie. What 
Muzorewa’s government ushered was an elite transition where the black intellectual and 
bourgeoisie class filled the shoes of the retreating settler class. The peasant and the working 
class population opted to continue supporting the guerrillas who promised better living 
conditions and a more egalitarian society.  
The 3 March Internal Settlement which produced the new state of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was 
not designed to produce durable peace. It was hardly possible for peace to be achieved 
through a template designed by Smith, a white supremacist whose actions in 1965 had 
triggered the war. Although the template might have appeared to moderate internal African 
nationalists as offering the best prospects for peace, it fell short of fulfilling the basic tenets 
of a durable peace process. For instance, no reconciliation process was inaugurated nor was 
any truth, justice and compensation programme legislated and rolled out.  It appears the 
whole arrangement of March 1978 was just a ruse to maintain white supremacy and to 
prolong the survival of Smith’s regime. This is because Smith retained real power by 
retaining the control of the army, police, civil service judiciary and economy. The talks 
produced a settlement which guaranteed that Africans would be leaders of the new state of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia but wielding ineffectual political and economic power. The settlement 
was Smith’s way of trying to ensure that white power was retained in light of the impending 
black majority rule. Peace, unity and reconciliation therefore became problematic because 
this state of affairs went against the principles that had driven guerrillas into war against the 
white minority regime. Ultimately, the persistence of the asymmetrical white controlled state 
power structure was responsible for the continuation of conflict and the retardation of peace 
and development. 
When the new conservative British Premier, Thatcher, came into office in May of 1979, she 
told Muzorewa that recognition was out of the question until major constitutional changes 
had been made to the defective Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution (Martin and Johnson, 
1981:312-13). The shortcomings of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia constitution and the persistence 
of the guerrilla war did not only influence Britain and America’s decision to maintain 
sanctions but also to organize an all-parties conference at Lancaster, London, to resolve the 
crisis. In August 1979, Muzorewa accepted an invitation by Thatcher to attend an all party’s 
conference slated for September in Lancaster, to try and resolve the conflict. That sounded 
the death-knell for Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 
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4.8 SETTLING WITHOUT TRANSFORMING 
The Internal Settlement paved the way for the rise of a new political administration but there 
was not much change in the way the government related with the outside world. Muzorewa’s 
first journey as prime-minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to the outside world was to South 
Africa, which had supported settler capitalist imperialism in Rhodesia.  Strengthening ties 
with capitalist interests was unlikely to yield complete change and peace in Zimbabwe. From 
South Africa, Muzorewa proceeded to several western capitals to sell the internal agreement 
in an attempt to gain support and international recognition for the new government. No 
similar trips were made to fellow African countries or states in the South in search of 
recognition. The excursions to the West were manifestations of coloniality of power; the new 
leaders looked up to the Euro-American world for acceptance and guidance. African states 
were perhaps seen by these internal leaders as lacking the mettle to bestow the necessary 
legitimacy to the internal deal while the West was perceived as possessing stature to sway 
political opinion in favour of the agreement.  
The transitional arrangement born out of the 3 March Peace Agreement provided Africans 
inexperienced in national governance with an opportunity to learn from the more experienced 
whites.  By being part of the transitional government African nationalists were schooled on 
the art of state governance by settlers who followed the Westminster system of governance. 
This system of governance, capitalist in nature and unsuited for the emerging “independent” 
state, was inherited without alteration by Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government. The 
retention of the colonialist’s modus operandi meant that wholesome changes to the way 
colonial society was structured and governed were blocked.  
Despite Muzorewa becoming the head of state, real power was reposed in Ian Smith and the 
Rhodesia Front. The racially hierachized power structure that privileged the RF and the white 
minority while marginalizing the blacks persisted. This was seen in members of the Rhodesia 
Front remaining in control of the army, police, civil service, judiciary and economy.  
Rhodesian force attacks on Mozambique and Zambia based guerrillas increased under the 
command of General Peter Walls who had been appointed Rhodesian Army Commander by 
Smith under white minority rule.  
Internal nationalist leaders also awarded medals to white pilots for “distinguished service” in 
village bombing raids in the same fashion Smith had decimated the African population 
(Ngara, 1979:346). This also reflected that the body-politics of knowledge of the internal 
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nationalist leaders had shifted from seeing whites who killed blacks as oppressors to seeing 
whites killing blacks as heroes. This action alienated these leaders from mass support and 
reflected double standards as these black leaders were expected to be defending and leading 
Africans in pursuit of total independence and freedom. This reflected that although the 
government had changed from being predominantly white to black the regime of power had 
not changed.  
In addition, Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government dominated by the African petty-
bourgeoisie perpetuated the colonial situation. It adopted a technicist approach to governance 
that suited western capitalist development models that advanced coloniality. The approach 
did not dismantle the capitalist system of governance which pro-Marxist nationalists and 
guerrilla forces were battling to demolish.  It continued to hierachize society and negated 
egalitarian values consistent with African society. As a consequence of retaining the 
colonially inclined mode of production, whites, affluent blacks and the rising black middle 
class forged an alliance to maintain the prevailing economic status quo. The failure to destroy 
the capitalist system of governance resulted in the persistence of huge inter-racial and intra –
racial socio-economic disparities, thus threatening peace and stability in the newly 
independent state. This went a long way in blocking efforts aimed at fostering reconciliation 
in the years 1978-1979.  
Society in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was hardly any different from that under colonialism. White 
minority control and privilege and black marginalization and exploitation were maintained in 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia disguised as African majority rule. Racial segregation persisted 
reinforcing what Santos (2007) regards as abyssal lines where there is an invisible distinction 
between racial groups. The quality and genuineness of the independence was in doubt.  
Marxist scholars refer to such changes as bourgeoisie revolutions. The salaries of white 
workers still averaged more than ten times those of Africans. There continued to exist serious 
land imbalances between races where fifty percent of the land was reserved for 6.4 million 
Africans while the other fifty percent was reserved for 280 000 whites. This meant that 
Africans remained in hunger and poverty, leaving the state at the mercy of neo-colonialism 
(Muzorewa, 1978:247-248). The absence of fundamental change in land and property 
relations despite the Internal Settlement made it hard for the new African headed government 
to undertake a meaningful policy of land reform and to plant a solid base upon which durable 
peace; unity and reconciliation could be achieved. 
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Invisible lines drawn by colonialism to separate races continued to exist after the Internal 
Settlement, thus leading to the persistence of societal inequality and the colonial under the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government.  The only difference was the co-option of African 
intellectuals, bourgeoisie and educated middle class into the new ruling hierarchy under the 
guise of democracy while millions of blacks continued to wallow in poverty in the 
countryside. The whites had seemingly accepted the principle of majority rule but in reality 
majority rule to the whites was only accepted in exchange for the safeguarding of white 
minority privileges by the African elite that participated in the Internal Settlement. Ngara 
(1978:344) is of the opinion that the Internal Settlement was to white settlers “a tactic to gain 
advantages for themselves from an unchanged exploitative system”. For instance, the still 
white dominated civil service did not inaugurate any crash training program in public 
administration to up-grade the skills of African civil servants or to recruit new cadres. The 
same civil service continued to administer the "protected villages" or “keeps” to Africans in 
which nearly one million rural Zimbabweans still lived (Hull, 1978:42). That was because 
moderate African nationalists that negotiated the Internal Settlement were willing to embrace 
the vestiges of colonial rule. They opted to do this instead of radically transforming colonial 
society to enable it to serve the new political dispensation. 
Furthermore, internal African leaders under the interim government and under the Zimbabwe 
–Rhodesia government failed to use their political positions to radically transform the 
political environment. They began to articulate issues from a colonial perspective denouncing 
guerrillas as terrorists in a fashion similar to that seen under white minority rule. This was 
contrary to African liberation values. Political detainees remained in prison; reviews of 
sentences for offences of a political character were not conducted, there was no further 
removal of discrimination; the rehabilitation of those affected by war was not conducted 
while protected villages continued to exist.  In Smith’s own words majority rule was 
conceded by the 3 March Peace agreement but it did not mean black majority rule 
(Muzorewa, 1978:226). To Preston (2004: 67), “Smith had finally signed away exclusive 
white rule in Rhodesia but he had by no means signed away white power.” Behind the facade 
of African majority rule white privilege in Zimbabwe Rhodesia was preserved.  
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4.9 CONCLUSION  
This chapter discussed the 3 March Peace Agreement/Internal Settlement and its impact on 
the Rhodesian problem and peace process in the years 1978 to 1979.  The agreement intended 
to stop the war through internal talks that aimed at forming an interim unity government to 
promote unity and reconciliation before the holding of elections and majority rule under a 
unity government. It revealed how the Internal Settlement negotiated within the ambit of 
coloniality and be-saddled by a plethora of problems rooted in coloniality offered minimalist 
solutions to problems confronting Rhodesia, rendering it unable to foster sustainable peace 
and unity.  
The chapter demonstrated how coloniality enveloped the search for peace, unity and 
reconciliation. It produced a power-sharing arrangement dominated by settler interests but 
veiled as majority rule. The state power structure that privileged the white minority while 
discriminating against the blacks persisted despite the signing of the 3 March, 1978 Peace 
Agreement that sought decolonization. The agreement thus had the hallmarks of coloniality.  
The next chapter discusses the 1979, Lancaster House Agreement; a second attempt at the 
close of the 1970s decade to achieve peace, unity and reconciliation and bring closure to the 
Rhodesian question.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE 1979 LANCASTER HOUSE AGREEMENT AND THE 
AFTERMATH 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the 1979 Lancaster House Peace Agreement. It begins by looking at 
events leading to the conference at Lancaster and then analyzes the terms of the agreement. It 
discusses how African nationalists were hoodwinked by global capitalist interests into 
accepting a settlement that failed to radically transform the colonial situation leaving the 
interests of the settlers, the British and other global capitalist interests secure.  The chapter 
demonstrates how this failure to transform the colonial situation, particularly with regard to 
land, became the genesis of the crisis that has compromised peace, unity and reconciliation 
and has reversed development goals in Zimbabwe.  
5.2 THE ROAD TO LANCASTER 
Muzorewa’s victory in the May 1979 elections made him the country’s first black Prime 
Minister. He was however rejected by the Patriotic Front which also refused to recognize the 
newly established state of Zimbabwe- Rhodesia. It was regarded as a puppet state of white 
Rhodesians. This is because the Internal Settlement left the governing process unaltered: 
white privilege was maintained, land redistribution did not take place, and the judiciary and 
bureaucracy continued in their colonial form (Cownie, 1984:39). The Frontline States 
denounced the new black led government while in the US, President Carter’s administration 
refused to recognize the new political arrangement. Nigeria, Britain’s biggest trading partner 
in Africa, threatened to block British investments in Nigeria until the Rhodesia crisis was 
resolved (Mtisi et al, 2009:165). This meant that the crisis in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was set to 
continue. The continuation of the war swung the balance of power and popularity from 
Muzorewa to the Patriotic Front inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. These developments disturbed 
Thatcher and capitalist/imperialist states that did not want to risk the possibility of a Patriotic 
Front victory that would have seen the country turn out to be a lackey of the Soviet Union 
and China. Besides, Thatcher was determined to rid Britain of the last vestiges of 
responsibilities for Rhodesia. 
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It was against this backdrop of glaring inadequacies of the Internal Settlement and pressure 
applied by international players that Thatcher resolved to seek further compromise in 
Rhodesia. She engaged in discussions with presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of 
Zambia, influential figures among Frontline States that were mobilizing support in the 
Commonwealth against any British intentions to recognize the Internal Settlement. Thatcher 
was afraid of upsetting the Commonwealth and Frontline States. She assured Nyerere and 
Kaunda that Britain would get Muzorewa’s government to attend a peace conference in 
London. The onus of getting the Patriotic Front to attend was left on the Frontline States 
(Gregory, 1980:13). It should be noted that the negotiations over Zimbabwe’s decolonization 
under the auspices of the British could have gone beyond Britain’s role as the de jure colonial 
power and its economic and political interests to reflect the little faith it had on the 
epistemological capacity of Africans to resolve their own problems. 
Although Thatcher sympathized with Muzorewa she withdrew her support for him and 
denounced the Internal Settlement and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Constitution. She called it 
defective as it retained a significant amount of power in white hands, therefore a recipe for 
disaster. She acknowledged the need to involve the Patriotic Front in the search for a solution 
to the Rhodesian crisis.  With the concurrence of Nyerere, Kaunda and Ramphal, the 
Commonwealth Secretary General, Thatcher announced at the Lusaka Commonwealth 
Conference in August 1979 that there was to be an all- party peace conference in London. At 
the Conference discussions were to focus on reaching consensus on the terms of an 
Independence Constitution and the holding of independence elections under British authority 
(ibid).  
Through persuasion and subtle coercion Kaunda and Nyerere managed to pressure a reluctant 
Patriotic Front to the bargaining table. They told the Patriotic Front that they could not 
indefinitely continue to support them as the war was draining the economies of most 
Frontline States and heightening insecurity in southern Africa. They also informed the 
Patriotic Front of changes in negotiation conditions. The proposed London talks were 
different from the Anglo-American plan that had sought an UN-supervised election and a 
cease-fire before negotiations on the constitution could commence. The agreement reached in 
Lusaka had reversed this process. The new plan entailed the abandonment of the Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia constitution. A British governor would be sent to arrange new elections and take 
control of the army and police. The veto power given to whites by the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 
constitution would be removed. The number of white seats would be reduced to twenty. 
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Zimbabwe would be the new name for the independent state. Britain would urge the UN to 
lift economic sanctions provided elections were held and Smith would be urged to resign 
from politics (Gregory, 1980; Mungazi, 2000). This went a long way into convincing the 
Patriotic Front to participate in the London talks. 
Perhaps more important than the changes to the negotiating conditions in inducing the 
Patriotic Front to attend the talks was the fact that the period immediately after the internal 
deal was characterized by both an intensification and escalation of the conflict. Both 
Muzorewa’s government and the Patriotic Front were engaged in bloody standoffs with 
inconclusive victories. The military deadlock coupled with political pressure from regional 
patrons Mozambique, Zambia and South Africa, and an increase in foreign pressure, 
produced what Zartman (1983; 2000 ) refers to as a mutually hurting stalemate. The 
belligerents realized the futility of continued fighting and accepted Thatcher’s invitation to 
congregate at Lancaster to terminate the war.  
What also catapulted the Patriotic Front into agreeing to attend the Lancaster negotiations 
was not only the growing pressure from Frontline states that were burdened by the Rhodesian 
conflict and the mutually hurting stalemate but also the fact that the Conservative government 
had through Lord Boyd's assessment of the April 1979 elections concluded that they had been 
'free and fair'. Thatcher used this assessment to warn the Patriotic Front about possible 
recognition of Muzorewa’s government if they were to go ahead with their threat to boycott 
the talks. She publicly stated that “British sanctions will lapse in November [1979] and we 
doubt very much whether any renewal will go through the British parliament” (Martin and 
Johnson, 1984: 305). 
The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government at first viewed the proposed London talks as an insult 
as it perceived itself as the legitimate administration. An increase in threats to white civilian 
spaces played an important role in bringing the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government to the 
negotiation table. Two Air Rhodesia Viscounts were brought down and oil storage tanks in 
Salisbury were shelled by the guerrilla armies in the aftermath of the Internal Settlement 
(Mtisi et al, 2009:165). The Zimbabwe–Rhodesia government could not keep on fighting as it 
was burdened by a war costing a million dollars a day (Flower, 1987:229). It consented to the 
London negotiations not only because of the unending war, diplomatic pressure from South 
Africa that had suspended critical oil supplies and the biting economic sanctions, but also 
because Muzorewa and Smith were under the perception that they would benefit from the 
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constitutional conference. They saw the conference as an opportunity to get the international 
community to lift sanctions and recognize their government. For the whites in general 
participation in the Lancaster talks would likely limit the degree to which the power they had 
retained through the internal deal would be eroded.  
According to Anstey (2007: 417), by consenting to the Lancaster House negotiations the 
white dominated government had moved from a position of  
denying majority rule in the 1960s, to talks with international powers (Britain and the 
USA) on a power sharing formula which would retain white control; from there to talks 
with ‘moderate’ African leaders willing to accept minority control in 1974; then in 1978 
to negotiations with internal ‘moderate leaders’ (Muzorewa and Sithole) on minority 
protections in a context of majority rule; and finally in 1979 to negotiations on the same 
basis with leaders of the guerrilla armies (Mugabe and Nkomo).  
Ultimately, it can be argued that the agreement to gather at Lancaster was a manifestation of 
the coloniality of power at work in the Rhodesian crisis. The refusal by Britain and the US to 
recognize Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had a tremendous influence on the international community’s 
decision to reject the new state. They used their global political, economic and diplomatic 
powers to cajole various players in the conflict into agreeing that a fresh round of talks at 
Lancaster could unlock the crisis. The Lancaster House Conference was also a product of 
capitalist support given to white minority rule during UDI. For 15 years capitalist interests 
propped Smith’s intransigent white minority regime by trading with it and providing it with 
military support in defiance of UN sanctions. This action enabled Smith to stubbornly resist 
regime change and also frustrate liberation forces. By 1979, western capitalist interests had 
wearied various parties to the Rhodesian conflict and prepared them for the London 
conference.   
5.3 NEGOTIATION AND AGREEMENT         
The Lancaster House Conference began on the 10th of September under the chairmanship of 
Lord Carrington, the British Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. It was 
attended by the British, the Patriotic Front, the UN, the US, South Africa, the Frontline states, 
the Commonwealth and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government constituted by the UANC, 
ZUPO, Sithole’s ZANU and the Rhodesia Front.   The multinational representation at the 
Lancaster House Conference reflected the tremendous interest that Rhodesia had attracted 
internationally. Notable at the conference was the presence of Ian Smith representing the 
Rhodesia Front element in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government.  Smith was regarded by 
many quarters as a white supremacist notorious for declaring that there would be no black 
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majority rule in a thousand years. The decision by Muzorewa to include white members from 
the Rhodesia Front government in his delegation at a time he was perceived as a puppet of 
the minority whites increased criticism against him, further soiling his image. He argued that 
he needed David Smith of the Rhodesia Front for his knowledge of economic affairs. This 
was a manifestation of the coloniality of imagination. The implication was that whites were 
more conversant on economic matters and epistemologically superior to blacks.  
At the start of the conference, Carrington in his opening remarks pointed out that the 
fundamental problem that the parties had to iron out was agreement on the independence 
constitution.  He stated the need for the principle of majority rule to be maintained and 
guaranteed; the necessity of guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution; 
the immediate improvement in the political status of the African population and the need to 
do away with racial discrimination (Chari: 2013). Carrington decided to dispose of the 
constitutional issues first, then to discuss matters such as ceasefire during the transition 
period and finally to implement what had been agreed including the holding of elections. He 
did not want either party to lose face amongst its supporters - agreement was not negotiable 
(Flower, 1987:232). 
In the negotiations the British stance with regards to property was for its protection from 
compulsory acquisition by the new government.  For any legal acquisition the British 
demanded immediate and adequate compensation remittable outside Rhodesia. Contrary to 
this, the Patriotic Front argued that the prime objective of the liberation war was the recovery 
of lost land and therefore stressed that agreement had to be reached without need for the new 
government to pay compensation. Deadlock thus arose over property rights especially over 
land. In an interview with The Herald in London, Mugabe, alarmed that proposals on land 
reform were not revolutionary enough, remarked that “the land issue is a crucial issue. There 
has to be land given to the people who have suffered in the course of colonialism. That land 
has to be found. We feel that land is inseparable from the whole majority rule issue” (The 
Sunday Mail, February 19-25, 2012).  The Patriotic Front was aggrieved that the proposals 
did not guarantee the transfer of land to the majority blacks and threatened to walk out of the 
talks and return to the battlefield. It was however forced to stay on by the Frontline States 
leaders who were no longer prepared to bear the brunt of the war. The Patriotic Front also 
stayed after South Africa's declaration of support for the British proposals and pledged to 
intervene on Muzorewa’s behalf should the guerrillas choose to fight.  
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The impasse over the land issue was only broken when Britain and America gave assurances 
of a multinational effort to fund land, agricultural and economic programs.  Lord Carrington 
issued the following statement on the 11th of October 1979 regarding the issue of land; 
We recognize that the future of Zimbabwe, whatever its political complexion, will wish 
to extend land ownership. The costs would be very substantial, indeed well beyond the 
capacity, in our judgement, of any donor country, and the British Government cannot 
commit itself at this stage to a specific share in them. We should, however, be ready to 
support the efforts of the Government of Independent Zimbabwe to obtain international 
assistance for these purposes (Chari, 2013:292). 
The Patriotic Front bought the promise of assistance and issued the following statement  
We have now obtained assurances that…Britain, the United States of America and other 
countries will participate in a multinational donor effort to assist in land, agricultural and 
economic development programmes. These assurances go a long way in allaying the 
great concern we have over the whole land question arising from the great need our 
people have for land and our commitment to satisfy that need when in Government 
(ibid).  
It should be highlighted that the pledges made by Britain and America were not included in 
the text of the constitution. 
The British government proceeded to draw a “willing-seller, willing buyer” clause.  Under 
this clause the new government would only be able to acquire land provided the seller was 
willing to let it go at market prices and in a currency determined by the seller.  Sections 16 
and 52 of the Lancaster House Constitution on Declaration of Rights stipulated that there 
could be no major amendments to the constitution for a period of ten years (Kriger, 2003:41).  
The clause on land was silent on the modalities upon which the so called assistance was to be 
rendered, therefore making it inadequate in addressing the land question.  There was a keenly 
felt sense of injustice and deprivation over the question of land amongst Africans, making it 
one of the most contentious issues in the aftermath of the conference (Sachikonye, 2012:109). 
The number of seats reserved for whites in the legislature was reduced from twenty eight to 
twenty.  Under pressure from international capital it was agreed at Lancaster that the new 
government would inherit the Rhodesian debt that stood at $200 million and other financial 
obligations such as the payment of pensions to Rhodesian public servants including those that 
had emigrated (Mtisi et al, 2009:165). The Agreement provided for a ceasefire in which all 
belligerents would cease hostilities.  The ceasefire demanded the grouping of Patriotic Front 
forces at assembly points and the return of Rhodesian Forces to barracks. South African 
troops were to withdraw from Rhodesia and the Rhodesian Air force was to be grounded. 
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After elections the guerrilla armies were to be integrated with the Rhodesian Army to form 
the Zimbabwe National Army.   
The agreement had provisions for a transition period in which the country would return to 
temporary British rule under a governor who would organize elections to pave the way for 
independence.  During the transition the Rhodesian forces would remain intact and so would 
the police force, judiciary and civil service under the authority of the British Governor 
(Gregory, 1980:18). The placement of ground-level enforcement of law and order during the 
transition period in the hands of the Rhodesian security forces reflected the fact that the 
Rhodesian state had not been defeated (Preston: 2004). Colonial forms of domination were 
still very much alive. The Lancaster House Conference ended on 21 December 1979 and the 
accord reached came to be known as the Lancaster House Agreement.   
5.4 SLEIGHT OF HAND - HOODWINKED AT LANCASTER 
From the point of view of parties that desired to be unyoked of the Rhodesian problem, 
(Britain and the US), the Lancaster House Agreement proved a remarkable success.  The 
Agreement achieved its immediate objective of ending almost one and half decades of war. 
They saw the adoption of a new constitution which eliminated most of the explicitly 
discriminatory provisions of the Smith–Muzorewa ‘Internal Settlement’, elections and 
independence as a giant step forward (Preston: 2004). Astrow (1983:149) concurs that for 
imperial powers the Lancaster House agreement was a success as it managed to preserve 
imperialism in Zimbabwe by eliminating the main threat to capitalist stability - war. 
However, to the Patriotic Front and other parties concerned with fostering sustainable peace 
the settlement was just a watered down version of the Internal Settlement which favoured the 
retreating settler state and capitalist imperialist interests.  
This is seen in the fact that the Lancaster Agreement left white control of the economy 
essentially unchallenged. The Lancaster House constitution allowed the British to block the 
Zimbabwean government from making fundamental changes to land and property rights until 
the lapse of ten years. British intentions were to delay if not block full decolonization by 
protecting capitalist property and white settler interest even if it meant subverting the will and 
aspirations of the majority of the African population in Zimbabwe who yearned for the 
restoration of land to the dispossessed. To compound matters, the agreement on land was in 
essence a gentlemen’s agreement that could be violated at any time. This weakness rendered 
the agreement a ticking conflict time bomb that exploded when the British reneged on 
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funding Zimbabwe’s land reform programme at the end of the second decade of 
independence that sent the country spiraling into crisis. 
The outcome of the agreement was largely shaped by Britain, the authority responsible for 
granting legal independence to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The talks were held at the behest of 
Britain and were hosted and chaired by her. The fact that discussions for the independence of 
Zimbabwe were presided over by the colonizer in her own citadel reflects the coloniality of 
power. It was therefore difficult for African nationalists to obtain a settlement in their favour 
as long as the talks were presided over by the British. The negotiations were not likely to 
produce sustainable peace as they were “held thousands of miles away and outside of the 
contextual realities of the conflict they sought to solve” (Interview with a media practitioner: 
7/9/2015).  
Britain aimed at producing a stable pro-capitalist African government that would protect 
capitalist interests (Astrow, 1983:134). Her large stake in mining, manufacturing, service 
industry, business and land compelled her to settle the Rhodesian problem in a manner that 
best suited not only her political interest but also her economic interests. It was therefore 
difficult for Carrington to get a constitution through that would not safeguard British and 
capitalist interests in Rhodesia. That is why from the onset, Carrington sought a constitutional 
agreement that would guarantee the status quo on land. 
Carrington was a biased referee in a settlement that failed to prioritize African interests. He 
was capitalism’s man on the ground whose sleight of hand produced a settlement that 
satisfied global capital interests.  He employed a negotiating style that Novak (2009) 
describes as “dominant third-party mediation”. He controlled the agenda, the tempo of the 
talks, imposed terms, deadlines and directed the trajectory of the talks. One commentator 
likened the agreement to Africans having been offered the driver’s seat while the whites 
would continue to map the route the car must take and control the fuel which made it run 
(Mtisi et al, 2009:166).  
Britain succeeded in obtaining the settlement largely by pressuring the Patriotic Front through 
the use of the 'stick,' while offering the 'carrot' to the Muzorewa-Smith regime. Britain 
threatened the Patriotic Front with recognition of Muzorewa’s regime if they did not append 
their signatures to the Lancaster document while Muzorewa and Smith were encouraged to 
sign in exchange for the lifting of sanctions and nominal changes to the Internal Settlement. 
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The Patriotic Front was therefore coaxed into accepting unfavourable terms which 
perpetuated the colonial situation they sought to eradicate. 
Carrington virtually got what he wanted out of the negotiations and his performance was 
lauded by colleagues in international diplomatic circles. The Patriotic Front leaders conceded 
to almost every point he laid on the table at the beginning of the conference. Astrow (1983) 
attributes the Patriotic Front’s indulgence to reliance on imperialism to bring a secure 
settlement.  Dependence on western powers to resolve the Rhodesian question militated 
against Lancaster producing an outcome that would favour Africans and fully decolonize 
Rhodesia. When Britain finally granted Zimbabwe independence in 1980 it was largely on 
neo-colonialist terms. This was at the expense of peace, unity and reconciliation which were 
sacrificed at the altar of imperialist capitalism that desired to perpetuate the colonial situation 
in Zimbabwe.  
The invisible hand of the colonial matrix of power influenced the proceedings at the 
Lancaster House Conference. American and British intelligence services worked behind the 
scenes at Lancaster to produce a settlement that favoured their interests. According to Ken 
Flower, who served as the chief of Rhodesian intelligence under Smith, the CIA were helping 
the Patriotic Front and undermining Muzorewa. Flower (1987) states that a document later 
emerged that a senior official in the British foreign office was given the task of handling a 
foreign office press campaign to discredit Muzorewa and push Thatcher towards Mugabe.  
This may be plausible given the fact that a Muzorewa victory was unlikely to end the war and 
a Nkomo win was likely to increase Soviet influence in southern Africa. Mugabe backed by 
China was seen by western intelligence services as a mild threat to capitalist interests.  The 
best option to western intelligence services was an electoral victory for a Muzorewa-Nkomo-
Smith coalition. When that was proving hard to achieve they opted for the Chinese backed 
Mugabe who was seen as less of a threat compared to the Soviet backed Nkomo.  
The issue of land was not the only issue on which the Patriotic Front got a raw deal. The fact 
that no fundamental changes could be made to the constitution for ten years meant that white 
settlers got ten years more in which to enjoy the fruits of colonialism. To Muzondidya 
(2009a:172) during this time issues around the radical restructuring of the legacy of economic 
inequality were effectively put on hold, thus guaranteeing the white race unfettered political 
and economic power. The twenty seats reserved for whites in the new parliament were far 
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disproportional to their population as whites constituted only three percent of the population. 
This scenario in effect depicted qualified majority rule.  
The whites effectively used the twenty seats to protect settler imperialist interests. The whites 
were more experienced in statecraft and had a better understanding of parliamentary 
proceedings than their black counterparts who had spent most of their time in prison or in the 
bush fighting the guerrilla war. They were also more seasoned debaters and who often 
floored African legislators, thus enabling them to block motions intended to change 
legislation and policies that perpetuated the colonial situation (ibid). Mamdani (2008:4) 
argues that the reservation of seats for whites sustained illusions among the settlers that what 
they had failed to achieve through UDI and force of arms, they could now achieve through 
the British tailored Lancaster House Constitution. The reservation of seats for whites created 
the impression that whites were a distinct and special racial group whose being is heavier 
than that of Africans. The provision was thus against ideals of nation-building and unity that 
emphasize the equality of persons; the provision became a source of racial friction in 
Zimbabwe.  
The terms of the Lancaster House Agreement meant that the new African government would 
begin its tenure on the economic back foot. It was expected to pay an odious debt, a huge 
debt incurred by the white minority fighting a war against nationalist guerrillas in defence of 
a racist discriminatory regime and coloniality. Furthermore, the new government was 
supposed to reward employees who had sustained the illegal regime with pensions for life.  
Debt payment robbed the new government of important financial resources that the country 
required to avoid international capital, strengthen the economy and promote peace and 
stability (Bond and Manyanya: 2003). The retention of Rhodesian forces and the integration 
of the guerrilla armies under General Peter Walls, the former Rhodesian Army commander, 
meant that African guerrilla armies would adopt the modus operandi of the retreating colonial 
army.  The objective behind placing the population under the protection of security services 
that operated in a colonial fashion was to assure the remaining whites that their protection 
was guaranteed.   
It is noteworthy that Africans got a raw deal from the Lancaster House talks because 
colonialism had produced social categorizations which prevented the Africans from 
significantly contributing to governance issues. Nationalist intellectuals that represented the 
majority black population at the Lancaster House negotiations to the exclusion of the views 
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of the generality of the indigenous population who were regarded as an indistinct mass were 
compromised by virtue of being products of colonialism. Apparently, most of the intellectuals 
and nationalists that negotiated the settlement lived in affluence while the majority of the 
black population struggled to make ends meet. The talks at Lancaster thus merely paved the 
way for an elite transition from white minority rule to the rule by the black elite but bringing 
little change for the majority of the Zimbabwean population that was marginalized in the 
decolonization process.   
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b:7) criticizes the Lancaster House Conference for being a neo-
colonial trap set to block revolutionary transition from racially biased land ownership to non 
racial land ownership. The Lancaster House Agreement allowed economic forms of 
domination that had characterized colonialism to continue in the post-independence period 
evidenced by white settlers and global capitalist powers retaining a significant amount of 
land.  He further states that the Lancaster House Agreement was the maternity ward where 
de-colonization was suffocated and died in its mother’s womb. By inference he argues that in 
spite of Zimbabwe gaining independence it remained trapped in the European and American 
dominated global capitalist system. This essentially meant Zimbabwe was born a neo-
colonial state vulnerable to economic and political instability. It was a tragedy that African 
nationalists left the economy of a fragile state coming out of war and in search of regime 
security in white hands. By failing to conclude the business of decolonization, the Lancaster 
House Agreement sowed seeds of future conflict in Zimbabwe rooted in land ownership 
imbalances and socio-economic inequities. 
On the whole the Lancaster House Agreement was designed to block full decolonization, 
perpetuate resource control by the ex-colonizer and to facilitate the exploitation of the ex-
colony. It was fashioned by the British to serve British, white settler and American capitalist 
imperialist interests. Blacks received political power (flag independence) while the whites 
retained economic control. Underlying problems were not resolved by the Lancaster House 
talks. They merely swept the problems under the carpet for possible resolution in the future. 
For instance, the thorny issue of land was essentially parked for a decade. It is this state of 
affairs that explains the conflict between the white and the blacks and the rise in conflict 
between the elite and the masses in Zimbabwe three decades after colonialism. Although 
peace was produced by the Lancaster House conference it was negative peace, a peace held 
together by the fear of violence and undesirability of war and not by mutual co-operation, 
common interests and goals. Its durability depended on the goodwill of the parties to it, since 
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it was in essence a gentlemen’s agreement and this did not bode well for peace in Zimbabwe. 
Despite the failure of the 1979 agreement to engender sustainable peace, unity and 
reconciliation, it ended the war and established a modicum of stability, therefore laying the 
ground on which the new independent black government would endeavour to achieve the 
peace, unity and development. 
5.5 INDEPENDENCE AND RECONCILIATION 
The conference at Lancaster failed to unite African nationalists and to fill the cracks that 
existed in African society.  Astrow (1983) sees petit bourgeoisie nationalism as responsible 
for deepening the persistent divisions sown amongst the African people by colonialism. After 
the conclusion of the Lancaster House talks, the Patriotic Front unity was broken when 
ZANU resolved to run the election race as ZANU PF without ZAPU that later changed its 
name to PF ZAPU. Peace was sacrificed at the altar of political expedience. The Patriotic 
Front split robbed Zimbabwe of an opportunity to consolidate national unity because 
elections accentuated not only partisan differences but also heightened ethnic identities as the 
country was divided into ‘Nkomo’s country’ and ‘Mugabe’s country’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 
2009a).  
During the transition period British and Commonwealth troops failed to provide security 
resulting in elections being conducted under an atmosphere of fear, violence and intimidation 
as ZIPRA, ZANLA, and Muzorewa’s Auxiliary Forces campaigned for their candidates.  
Soames argued that it was impossible to turn Rhodesia overnight into a humanitarian utopia 
(Soames, 1980). Despite the absence of suitable conditions for campaigning and elections, 
polls were held in February 1980.  They were regarded as free and fair by international 
observers. Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF won 57 seats and 63% of the vote against 20 for PF 
ZAPU, 3 for UANC.  20 seats reserved for whites were won by the Rhodesia Front (Martin 
and Johnson: 1981). ZANU PF had chosen to break the unity with PF ZAPU in favour of 
electoral glory and political power that came with it.   
 PF ZAPU’s loss came as a shock to Nkomo and many of his supporters who suspected foul 
play. Nkomo doubted the fairness and credibility of the elections. He was convinced that the 
elections did not truly reflect the will of the people (Nkomo, 1984).  PF ZAPU alleged that 
ZANU PF had employed tribalism to win elections.  PF ZAPU had however been warned that 
it would lose the 1980 election. During the Lancaster House talks a senior PF ZAPU leader 
was dispatched to Rhodesia by Nkomo to prepare for elections. He was told by Chief Khayisa 
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Ndiweni that if the intention of the Patriotic Front was to establish a unitary state then Nkomo 
could forget about ever becoming president (Interview with a retired ZANU PF ex- 
government minister : 14/9/2015). Apparently Ndiweni was aware that ethnicity strongly 
influenced political fortunes. Although Nkomo was the most senior African nationalist, he 
would not make president in a predominantly Shona country as he was from the minority 
Kalanga ethnic group. Sibanda (2005:239) cites Professor Stanlake Samkange, a leading 
Zimbabwean intellectual and writer, who concurred and commented; “there is no other way 
to explain it, the Mashonaland people will never have Nkomo and Matabeleland will never 
have a Shona”.  
ZANU PF commanded the support of the bulk of the majority Shona ethnic group as it had 
recruited and operated from areas that were predominantly Shona. PF ZAPU had most of the 
support of the minority Ndebele and Kalanga ethnic groups. Voting patterns in the 1980 
elections showed that ZANU PF got most its votes from predominantly Shona speaking areas 
while PF ZAPU obtained most its votes from Ndebele and Kalanga speaking areas. Election 
results reflected a tribal inclination; Mugabe could not therefore claim to be a national leader 
as the results did not reflect national unity but division based on ethnicity.  
Sithole (1999:180) downplays the tribal factor. He surmises that in 1980, a great number of 
people were driven into voting for ZANU PF by the need for peace. ZANLA controlled two 
thirds of Zimbabwe and had promised the population that any result other than a ZANU PF 
victory would entail the resumption of war, something that Muzorewa had failed to stop. He 
buttresses his argument by citing Nkomo (1984) who attributed his loss to PF ZAPU’s failure 
to campaign in the northern and eastern provinces owing to violence and intimidation by 
ZANU PF militias. A more plausible explanation however would be that in a country deeply 
tribalized by colonialism the majority Shona population voted ZANU PF. This had negative 
ramifications for future peace of Zimbabwe. 
After ZANU PF’s victory Mugabe requested that Lord Soames remains in Zimbabwe for a 
year or two to help him establish a new government, but the latter declined. The above 
suggests that Mugabe doubted his own governance ability and regarded Soames as an 
epistemologically superior being in governance. A former ZIPRA guerrilla based in 
Bulawayo argues that Mugabe had little knowledge on how to govern. To him the lack of 
knowledge on governance resulted in post- independence schism between ZANU PF and PF 
ZAPU and schism in the army integration that led to the dissident problem and gukurahundi 
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(Interview with a former ZIPRA guerrilla : 22/9/2015). To Astrow (1983), Mugabe’s request 
to be hand-held by Soames was in essence a proclamation that Zimbabwe would be a pro-
capitalist nation just as it had been under the former Rhodesian premier, Smith.  In his auto 
biography Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal and the Dreadful Aftermath Smith reveals that 
in the first months of independence Mugabe frequently sought his advice (Smith: 2001). 
On 18 April 1980, Robert Mugabe was sworn in as independent Zimbabwe’s first Prime 
Minister.  It was out of a combination of violence and diplomacy that Zimbabwe eventually 
became independent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b).  Many blacks demanded revenge for 
exploitation and brutality experienced over 90 years of colonialism but the government 
decided against retribution. Prime Minister Mugabe pronounced a policy of reconciliation 
and issued the following statement. 
If yesterday I fought you as my enemy, today you have become a friend and ally and 
with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. If yesterday you 
hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me and me to you, the 
wrongs of the past must now stand forgiven and forgotten…let us join together. Let us 
show respect to winners and losers…there is no intention on our part to victimize the 
minority. We will ensure there is a place for everyone in this country. I want a broadly 
based government to include whites and Nkomo. (Huyse, 2003:34).   
Mugabe’s reconciliatory tone and clarion call to forgive and forget was preceded and guided 
by the Amnesty Ordinance 3 of 1979 and the Amnesty (General Pardon) Ordinance 12 of 
1980 which guaranteed that there would be no prosecution of the former Government or 
security forces or persons or forces acting in opposition to that Government.  This meant that 
those who had committed crimes and human rights abuses in the 1970s were not made 
answerable for their actions, thus denying justice to thousands who had fallen victim to the 
most grotesque of abuses (CCJP and LRF, 1997: 37).) The ZANU-PF government was 
concentrating more on the consolidation of regime security at the expense of a clear nation-
building agenda beyond the policy of reconciliation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b:211).  
After independence Zimbabwe was therefore left with a huge justice and reconciliation task. 
Asking the country to let “bygones be bygones” so that the country could start on a new path 
meant that justice was put on the backburner. It is noteworthy that the idea of letting 
“bygones be bygones” is against African conflict resolution philosophy that perceives 
conflicts as a continuum and circular and not as something on which the door can be closed. 
By advocating for amnesia and amnesty in Zimbabwe’s first reconciliation policy a precedent 
was set for later reconciliation processes to do the same at the expense of truth and justice. 
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Put against Bloomfield and Reilly’s (1998) characterization of reconciliation, the 
reconciliation policy pronounced by Mugabe in 1980 fell far short of satisfying the pre-
requisites for reconciliation. There was no truth and reconciliation commission set up, neither 
were programmes for national healing and forgiveness inaugurated nor were provisions made 
for the grassroots to be involved yet they had suffered colonial injustices and violence. These 
issues are crucial for any reconciliation process to succeed.  
In spite of the failure to inaugurate a robust agenda for nation building in the spirit of unity, 
peace and reconciliation, the ZANU PF government formed a government of national unity. 
Mugabe included in it members from the Rhodesia Front and opposition PF ZAPU with the 
intention of calming old rivalries and prejudices and averting potential conflict between the 
liberation movements. Former cabinet ministers in Ian Smith’s government, David Smith and 
Dennis Norman were appointed Minister of Commerce and Minister of Agriculture 
respectively. General Walls was retained as the head of armed forces to preside over 
integration. Four PF ZAPU members were given ministerial posts while three were made 
deputy ministers. Nkomo was given the Home Affairs portfolio after initially having rejected 
presidency. Critics of the government of national unity argue that it was PF ZAPU’s presence 
with twenty seats in parliament that made it possible to forge an alliance with the Rhodesia 
Front against ZANU PF that forced Mugabe to form a government of national unity and not 
statesmanship (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b; Smith, 2001; Martin and Johnson, 1981). 
Conciliatory remarks and actions from Mugabe were not only aimed at promoting peace, 
unity and reconciliation, but also to pacify capitalists and placate the whites whose capital, 
experience and expertise he desperately required for the nascent black government to achieve 
growth with equity. The reconciliation policy was also intended to attract investment after 
conflict. Reconciliation in 1980 was therefore not genuine; it was a deal between the African 
nationalists and the remaining white settlers to co-exist. Co-existence does note denote 
reconciliation as reconciliation means much more – it entails building trust, co-operation and 
the acknowledgement of having transgressed.  What the new black government apparently 
achieved with independence was the deracialization of the country and state-building at the 
expense of full decolonization and nation building.  Socio-economic inequities between races 
and fragmentation of Zimbabwean people along ethnic and political lines persisted (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2013b).  
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The white community did not acknowledge any wrong doing in the colonization and ill 
treatment of blacks over the ninety years of white rule. It is ironic that it was Mugabe’s 
government that appealed for reconciliation and pledged to forgive the whites even though 
whites had not asked for forgiveness. This prompts Mandaza (2000), a leading Zimbabwean 
political scientist quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009c:1142), to describe reconciliation as “the 
mourn of the weak, even when pronounced from positions of apparent moral and political 
superiority over oppressors and exploiters of yesterday”. Mugabe’s plea for reconciliation 
and forgiveness was in fact an acknowledgement of the weakness of his newly established 
government that sought to extend reliance on white capital, expertise and skills in the post-
independence period. 
Mandaza (2000) further argues that the reconciliation exercise was sheer political 
expediency, nothing fundamentally changed. It was to him largely a political function, 
facilitating the necessary compromise between the rulers of yesterday and the inheritors of 
state power, within the context of incomplete decolonization. The hierarchical social structure 
that existed under colonial rule persisted in the independence era. Civil servants became the 
petit bourgeoisie; professionals like accountants, doctors and journalists became the 
professional elite while the brutalized farm workers joined the proletariat. This failure to 
transform these colonial-like forms of domination and socio-economic relations in post 
independence Zimbabwe laid the ground for future conflict. 
 Reconciliatory discourse from Mugabe’s government was also intended to allay white fears 
as some black members of the newly inaugurated black government often spewed 
communist/socialist rhetoric that scared capitalist interests.  Mugabe’s government feared 
that an exodus of whites was likely to lead to the destruction of the economy and cause 
instability as it had in Mozambique. Herbst (1988:46) writes;  
The victory of the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) liberation 
movement that year [1975] in the guerrilla war of independence caused the mass exodus 
of hundreds of thousands of white Portuguese settlers who had run every aspect of the 
economy. In their attempts to retaliate against the blacks for winning their independence, 
the Portuguese destroyed almost everything-even down to the lightbulbs-that they could 
not take with them. The new leaders of Mozambique therefore took over an economy 
that had been brought to a complete standstill by the white departure and that had no 
prospect of significant growth. The chaos in Mozambique was observed at first hand by 
many of Zimbabwe's future leaders who, by the late 1970s, were fighting their own war 
from internal bases in western Mozambique.   
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White fears were indeed allayed as there was no sweeping nationalization; civil servants were 
guaranteed their jobs and pensions.  House owners and farmers were also assured that their 
property rights would be respected. Herbst (ibid) surmises that in essence the ZANU PF 
government bargained with the remaining whites in 1980 where it was unwritten but 
understood by almost everyone that whites who were economically active could remain in the 
country and operate their businesses and farms but not bequeath these to their children. The 
reconciliation mantra was to Alexander (2002:92) symbolically and politically weak as it did 
not effectively address the historical grievances or economic woes of communities in the 
reserves, yet the whites continued to live their colonial life styles. 
The provisions of the Lancaster House settlement gave the settlers a decade long period of 
consolidation and little progress was made towards justice and reconciliation. (Muzondidya, 
2009:172). Race relations did not change much with independence in Zimbabwe. The white 
community opted to co-exist with blacks instead of reconciling with them. Weiss (1984) 
argues that there was no true reconciliation, whites accepted the new black elites because 
they needed politics and policies to facilitate commerce but personal contact between the 
races remained at a low level.  
According to Herbst (1988:45) whites continued to live a colonial lifestyle with servants, 
large gardens and tennis courts, while the vast majority of the population continued to eke out 
an existence from inadequate land-holdings. The white community saw itself as existing 
outside the new nation state.  The white community withdrew into racial enclaves. In urban 
areas some responded to black encroachment by creating alternative spaces where they 
continued to keep to themselves retreating from public life into the laager of sports club, 
home entertainment and the video. In clubs, diners and restaurants, separation was enforced 
through practices such as membership-based admission (Muzondidya, 2009a:172). The 
refusal by the whites to interact with the African race was perhaps because they saw 
themselves as superior beings with higher ontological density that could not interact with 
blacks that they regarded as inferior. By sequestering themselves from blacks, the whites 
were in a way advancing something akin to apartheid, a philosophy rooted in coloniality.  
In the education sector, some white parents responded to the government’s deracialization of 
education and the admission of blacks into formerly white-only schools by building new, 
independent schools whose fee structures were designed to exclude the majority of the 
children from middle-and low-income black families. By isolating themselves and putting 
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little effort in addressing inherited racial imbalances in wealth whites abdicated from actively 
engaging in the process of nation building (Muzondidya, 2009a:192-193). According to 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b), it is social apartheid rooted in settler colonialism that helped 
maintain a hierachized society consisting of two separate races, one white and the other 
black. Many Africans interpreted white isolation as arrogance from a group they perceive as 
unindigenous and holding on to ill-gotten wealth. This in part explains the violence against 
whites during land invasions at the turn of the millennium.  
Kinloch (1997) studies racial attitudes in post-colonial Zimbabwe and reveals that by the 
close of the first decade the blacks were particularly critical of their colonial past and 
complaining about continuing white racism. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b:219), the white 
community seemed to adhere to what Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock described as the spirit 
of ‘Rhodesians Never Die’ which prevented them from embracing the policy of reconciliation 
fully, socially, politically, psychologically and economically.  The whites were either 
defensive of the past or deaf to complaints from the blacks. The whites still did not feel like 
they were a part of the new state. Instead they regarded themselves as an extension of the 
mother country and identified with it more than the land that played host to them. This is 
partially explained by the reluctance of whites to renounce British citizenship. The preference 
of British citizenship over Zimbabwean citizenship by the white settlers strained relations 
with the government. It also signified the absence of unity in the post-independence period 
and the failure of nation building and national integration. 
With regards to the economy, the white race was seen as generally unwilling and/or reluctant 
to surrender or share with the rest of the population the benefits they had accrued from 
colonialism.  They continued to hold on to the bulk of the land and this was seen by the 
majority blacks as an obstacle to justice. The behaviour of the whites was to Muzondidya 
(2009a:173) influenced by what both Ranger and Mandaza refer to as “settler culture”- “the 
great power exerted by settlers, their virtual monopoly over political and legal institutions, 
their coercive control over the labour and livelihoods of Africans, their manipulative methods 
for advancing the economic interests of themselves”.   
One can draw parallels between settler culture and coloniality. Settler culture endorsed the 
creation of hierarchical social structure that placed the white race in a position of domination 
and control while sanctioning the exploitation of the black race.  To Grosfoguel (2004: 328), 
the persistence of a colonial culture after independence constitutes social power.  This earned 
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the whites resentment from the majority black population who expected retribution or at least 
a significant erosion of white power. Peasants and workers became more militant and often 
blamed the white race for their plight as the years went by. Black opposition to inequality 
took an increasingly racial form. Frustrated black business people formed pressure groups to 
address these inequalities by lobbying with government and launching scathing attacks on 
white capital.  Zimbabwean society remained fissured along the lines of race with the effect 
of compromising racial co-existence, reconciliation and national stability  
The reconciliation achieved in Zimbabwe was cosmetic as it promoted co-existence but failed 
to engender mutual understanding and co-operation. This was seen when controversy was 
generated by the government’s decision to embark on projects of removing colonial symbols 
and replacing them with Zimbabwean ones. They included the removal of Cecil John 
Rhodes’ statue on 31 July 1980 among others (Bhebe and Ranger, 1995:140). To the new 
black government colonial symbols represented a dark oppressive past repugnant to Africans 
and thus argued in support of their removal.  Glaring in this act was that blacks could not 
embrace the colonial past no matter how sad and a part of Zimbabwe’s history it was. The 
dismantling of colonial symbols was interpreted by the white race as a rejection of whites and 
their history while blacks saw the removal as great achievements. This went a long way in 
blocking efforts aimed at building a nation united across different races.    
The study is of the conviction that by 1990, the post-colonial project of building a just and 
equitable non racial society was not achieved and nor was reconciliation because colonial 
patterns of domination escaped independence and the transformative power of reconciliation. 
Apparently at independence, reconciliation to the ex-colonizers meant that the ex-colonized 
bent on revenge had to be placated from revolutionarily engaging in asset redistribution.  To 
the former colonizers Zimbabwe had to remain open to Euro-American economic 
exploitation and the permanent settlement of white settlers. To achieve this, fundamental 
change to land ownership had to be blocked and whites had to be protected. The 
reconciliation of interests where black political power had found common ground with white 
economic power in 1980 was to break in the late 1990s as the gulf of socio-economic 
inequalities between races widened and blacks began to advocate for asset redistribution.   
Another factor that blighted Zimbabwe’s reconciliation process was the obsession with 
focusing on deracializing but not detribalizing Zimbabwe. There was little investment put in 
the project of unity amongst blacks. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008a:82-83), during the 
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early years of independence and much later triumphant political leaders and their supporters 
for the most part ignored, ridiculed, detained, sidelined and criminalized as dissidents and 
puppets those nationalist figures that failed to make it into state power. The ZANU PF 
government monopolized the liberation past, and made itself the central focus of the 
mainstream narrative and systematically excluded many other participants from the story. By 
alienating nationalist figures like Nkomo, Muzorewa, Chikerema, Sithole and others who 
contributed to the liberation struggle the government sacrificed reconciliation, nation-
building and unity of the people.  
Reconciliation between blacks became even more difficult when little was done by the new 
government to attend to the weaknesses of the Lancaster House Agreement. The Lancaster 
House agreement did not provide a reconciliation framework to address intra- black 
differences evidenced by the violence that was to engulf the Matabeleland and the Midlands 
provinces in the early 1980s. The ceasefire agreement reached at the Lancaster House 
Conference failed to adequately disarm rival guerrilla armies and provide a sound framework 
for demobilization and reintegration and the integration of the guerrilla armies into the 
Rhodesian army. Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) was not even employed 
as instruments to reward or punish parties to the peace talks, leaving these issues to an elected 
government which fumbled the process. The failure to have DDR programmes resulted in the 
persecution and desertion of former ZIPRA members from the Zimbabwe National Army to 
become dissidents.  Perhaps had intra-black divergences been attended to at the Lancaster 
House Conference then disturbances that were to rock Matabeleland and Midlands could 
have been avoided. One can thus conclude that although the 1979 Lancaster peace process 
ended the war it did not do much to promote both racial and intra-racial reconciliation in 
Zimbabwe. 
5.6 LEGACY OF LANCASTER – THE COLONIAL SITUATION LINGERS  
After ZANU PF’s 1980 electoral victory and the establishment of a government of national 
unity that embraced PF ZAPU and the Rhodesia Front, expectation was high that the country 
would take a new political trajectory. Independence was expected to herald a new era 
characterised by non racialism and equal opportunities for both blacks and whites. There was 
hope that the creation of such a society would foster peace, unity and reconciliation that were 
integral to the development of the nascent state. Independence implied that the colonial past 
was to be left behind and a new epoch was to begin in the political governance of the country. 
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However, this did not come to pass. The liberation struggle only managed to get rid of the 
white colonial administration but failed to extricate Zimbabwe from coloniality.  As result of 
this, the new state of Zimbabwe was thus born a neo-colonial state succeeding the Rhodesian 
colonial state. It failed to do away with of remnants of colonialism because of the blocking 
forces of global imperialism and capitalism that allowed white settlers to retain most of the 
benefits accrued under colonial rule.   
Fanon (1968) studied decolonization in Africa and saw no fundamental change between the 
colonial situation and independence in most African states. He sees coloniality and calls it 
repetition without change. The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement paved the way for a 
transition from white to black rule but the capitalist/imperialist system hid and survived by 
changing the order. The consequence was that a new order that privileged the elite at the 
expense of the majority emerged despite Africans remaining in the driving seat. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2011b:60) adds his voice to the arguments that independence in most of Africa did 
not culminate in change. He argues that in political science a “political order” emerges as a 
product of “political system”, systems are more resistant to change; they are likely to endure 
when orders undergo transformation. The capitalist system on which settler colonialism 
thrived survived by resisting transformation when Zimbabwe got its independence and a new 
order was installed. 
 
Mandaza (2015:1) explains the absence of real change at independence as a result of the new 
independent state having its 
 origins premised on the national bourgeois democratic model, in the acceptance of the 
(national) independence constitution bequeathed to it by the departing (European) 
colonialists on “Independence Day”, and with all the related paraphernalia such as the 
(new) name for the nation–state–in–the–making, the flag and national anthem; and as the 
new member of the international community of nations, the United Nations, the 
OAU/AU, etc. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013a) argues that Zimbabwe’s independence leaders tried to cover up 
their failure to transform Zimbabwe by emphasising the policy of reconciliation yet the 
reality was that coloniality was being rehabilitated. One thing that left Zimbabwe vulnerable 
to coloniality was the fact that the transfer of political power from the white settlers to an 
elite group of African nationalists was supervised by the British and Americans at the 
Lancaster House Conference. Among the objectives of the two capitalist powers was to make 
sure that radical decolonial Marxist ideologies espoused by the liberation forces that sought 
to dismantle coloniality and construct a socialist state did not come to fruition.  
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Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011b) further argues that coloniality was also able to survive in 
Zimbabwe because the African bourgeois elite like Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe 
amongst others that dominated the Lancaster House talks had not completely ‘committed 
class suicide’ to fully embrace the radical demands of the peasants, workers and the guerrilla 
forces who wanted revolutionary  changes. Nationalists were apparently satisfied with 
replacing the retreating white colonial bourgeoisie rather than bringing a radical 
transformation to colonial structure. This was proven when the black bourgeoisie colonized 
spaces previously occupied by white colonizers soon after independence.  
To prove that there was transition without transformation, socio-economic inequities 
characteristic of the colonial era continued under the new black government. The whites lost 
overt political power but they retained economic power. The standards of living of the whites 
remained higher than that of the rest of the population even though political transition aimed 
at resource redistribution. The ownership of resources and means of production remained in 
the hands of the whites allowing them to retain under a new black government a privileged 
status they had enjoyed under colonial rule.  For instance, the Oppenheimer family continued 
to hold on to land the size of Belgium while millions of landless black Zimbabweans suffered 
deprivation (Zimbabwe Independent, 24 March 2005). Peasants and other marginalized 
groups remained socially and economically disadvantaged in much the same way they were 
underprivileged under colonial rule when the white minority leadership controlled the levers 
of economic and political power. This has become a source of consternation for some blacks 
who charge that “whites are rich because they are white”. Black dissatisfaction with white 
affluence at the expense of black poverty, itself rooted in the failure to radically transform the 
existential socio-economic conditions of Africans despite independence, triggered the anti-
white violence from the late 1990s onwards. This can also be traced to the persistence of the 
colonial in which whites remain richer than black communities around them in spite of 
political transition. 
The coloniality laden terms of the Lancaster House Agreement dictated that the Westminster 
model of governance was to be adopted for the new state of Zimbabwe. Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2013b: 6) argues that this state governance framework inherited from the Westphalia state 
template imposed on Africa by colonial modernity and carried over into the postcolonial 
African present did not work well for Africans.  It was not ideal for the newly independent 
black state that was yet to define its political and economic identity, thus weakening political 
and social institutions. Under this model there was to be a constitutional head of state with 
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ceremonial powers (president) and a head of government with executive powers (prime 
minister).  It was not appropriate for Zimbabwe as its traditions were far different from those 
of Britain from which it was being adopted.   
In Britain, the monarch, though not involved in the day to day running of the state, is a 
respected figure whose advice to government is almost sacrosanct, but in Zimbabwe the 
situation was different (Nkomo, 1984). The head of government was under obligation to heed 
advice from the head of state and the consequence of adopting this model of governance was 
the expropriation of far reaching powers by the Prime Minister.  The Westminster system in 
Zimbabwe permitted the Prime Minister to make senior appointments in the public service 
and others services, thus allowing ZANU PF to entrench its rule and dominate the political 
terrain in a fashion reminiscent of colonial times. Zimbabwe was thus prevented from 
framing a development model suited to its context by coloniality.   
A cursory glance across Africa’s political landscape in the 1960s and 1970s reveals that upon 
gaining independence a number of countries developed into one-party dictatorships. They 
also replicated undemocratic styles of governance reminiscent of colonialism. The 
Zimbabwean state under the ZANU PF government developed into a nationalist, pan- 
Africanist, anti-imperialist, anti-neo colonialist, securocrat, neo-patrimonial authoritarian 
regime that uses both violence and political dexterity to remain in power. In a neo-
patrimonial regime the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather 
than through ideology or law. The right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office.  
The essence of neo-patrimonialism is the awarding of public officials and granting of 
personal favours by the patrons. In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political 
support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patron. Mugabe has 
managed to use the system of patronage to reward personalities that are important to the 
survival of the regime with senior positions in the army, parastatals, in government and assets 
such as mines and farms (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Masunungure, 2009; Mandaza, 
2016).  
The ZANU PF regime has also blurred the lines between government and party. The late 
ZANU PF Minister of Gender, Youth and Employment Creation Border Gezi said “if you 
want to work for the government you should be prepared to support ZANU PF (Bond and 
Manyanya, 2003:82) this statement shows that state and party were conflated. It should be 
noted that the conflation between state and party is not only a consequence of deliberate 
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political will but is also a product of complex historical forces.  For instance, in search of 
regime security in the 1980s ZANU PF recruited from its ranks people to serve as 
intelligence operatives. These members have been more loyal to the party than to the state. 
They have assisted the regime whenever its stay in power has been threatened. Masunungure 
(2009) perceives ZANU-PF as a part whose stay in power hinges upon a destructive mix of 
ideology, patronage, and violence. A detailed discussion of this will be provided in chapter 
seven.  
 
 ZANU PF attempted to establish a one-party state like other ruling parties in Africa. It was 
frustrated in its bid in the early eighties by PF ZAPU and in the late eighties by the 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM).  After failing to create a de jure one party state ZANU 
PF had to be content with a de facto one party state system. The creation of a de facto one 
party system restricted citizen participation in governance and decision making promised in 
struggles for independence.  
Observed from the lens of the coloniality of power, the ZANU PF independence government 
assumed the role of a patriarchal figure. It saw itself as the patron of everything existing 
under its authority. That which obeyed its commands was rewarded while that which defied 
its orders was punished. The violence, marginalization and exploitation of those that 
disobeyed the government were predicated on coloniality of being in which the patriarchal 
government saw its ontology as denser than that of its constituency. Once in power, ZANU 
PF metamorphosed into an authoritarian neo-patrimonial regime with an entrenched 
patronage and discrimination system. The regime had a lot in common with Smith’s 
authoritarian government although the difference was the racial composition of the country’s 
leadership.  Coloniality was therefore being reproduced in Zimbabwe albeit under a different 
guise; the oppressor was no longer white, but black. This cast a dark shadow on prospects to 
achieve peace, unity and reconciliation. 
The violence that has been experienced in Zimbabwe can be explained as consequence of 
ZANU PF inheriting the repressive colonial machinery intact at independence. It inherited 
intact an infrastructure of violence; the police service, central intelligence agency, prison 
service and army. To Muzondidya (2009a:176), the Lancaster House Agreement ensured that 
there was a strong continuation with the Rhodesian state perpetuated through the application 
of  repressive laws, such as the Emergency Powers Act (Chapter 11:04) and the 1960 Law 
and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) which were used to detain political rivals and silence 
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critics. Patterns of repression under colonialism persisted in Zimbabwe as little was done to 
reform oppressive colonial legislation such as LOMA that was still in use.  In the year 2002, 
a variant of LOMA known as the Public Order Security Act (POSA) was passed. POSA 
curtailed the freedom of association and movement of the population giving the government 
greater coercive control of the state in a similar way that the colonial government had 
controlled Africans.  By assuming the colonial and equally military oriented structures of the 
retreating settler state serious implications were left for peace and democracy.  
Still on repression, the post-independence government, like colonial authorities, employed 
violence as a mode of governing and pacifying the population. It employed violence to crush 
insurgency in Matabeleland in the 1980s, to thwart the opposition ZUM in the 1990s and to 
punish whites and the MDC from 2000 onwards.  The violence unleashed by the state 
mirrored colonial forms of governance that sanctioned violence as a mode of domination, an 
instrument of control and form of conflict resolution. While the colonial settler state 
employed violence in pursuance of retaining white minority privileges, repression in the 
independence period has, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2012a), come under the guise of the 
national unity, regime security, and post-colonial development but contributing little towards 
the achievement of the same. Sachikonye (2011) adds his voice to arguments on 
institutionalized state violence in Zimbabwe by pointing out that state sanctioned violence on 
citizens in Zimbabwe is a legacy of colonialism and the liberation war waged to end it which 
in essence is consequence of coloniality.  The settlers resorted to brute force to conquer 
Zimbabwe and violence to cower the colonized peoples. In pursuit of independence 
nationalist violence swept away colonial rule but violence associated with colonialism and 
nationalism did not die with independence as it overlapped into the independence period.  
In a fashion akin to colonial rule the police brutally crushed strikes at Hwange Colliery, 
Empress Nickel mine and at Swift Transport Company in Harare in May 1980.  The 
government was congratulated by Don Bullock, chairman of the combined employers’ 
federation on “handling the strike situation very well” (Astrow, 1983: 178). The agreement at 
Lancaster did not usher in a new governance modus operandi. The new black government 
was employing violence to resolve labour disputes just as it had before independence (1927 
Shamva mine strike). The brutal use of force by the government to resolve labour disputes 
was to set it on a collision course with the labour movement by the close of the second 
decade of independence. Government’s conflict with the labour movement contributed 
significantly to the generation of the Zimbabwe crisis. 
148 
 
In 1980, the new ZANU PF government announced that it would be socialist. Although 
having professed to be socialist at independence, Zimbabwe was in reality capitalist, what 
Bond and Manyanya (2003) call talking left but walking right. To Astrow (1983:142 -43), the 
provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution channeled the new Zimbabwe government on 
a capitalist path and integrated it into the global capitalist system. The terms regarding land 
and property and the inheritance of debt forced the country to adopt capitalism despite the 
state’s Marxist rhetoric.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b:19) concurs that the birth of post colonial 
Zimbabwean state was straight into the hands of neo-colonialism, lending credence to 
observations by Grosfoguel (2007 ) that the most powerful myth of the twentieth century was 
the notion that the end of direct colonialism amounted to decolonization of the ex-colonized 
world.    
The notion of “coloniality of power” is that the world has not fully decolonized. The first 
decolonization was incomplete. It was limited to juridical-political “independence” from the 
European imperial states (Grosfoguel: 2003). This is perhaps exactly what Zimbabwe 
experienced in 1980. This was seen when Zimbabwe’s first budget in 1980 was virtually 
indistinguishable from previous budgets presented by the Rhodesian Front ministers in the 
1970s (Astrow, 1983:175).   The budget was pro-capitalist and served to perpetuate the 
colonial situation in Zimbabwe. Having embraced capitalism Zimbabwe was unable to resist 
international finance and got sucked into a dependency it was unable to shake off.   
The Lancaster House Agreement left Zimbabwe economically tied to and dependent on 
Britain in particular and global capitalism in general.  The economy of the new government 
was tailored for interaction with Western powers within the global capitalist system. For 
instance, the Zimbabwean agrarian systems were arranged to make sure they produced the 
cash crops needed in Europe and America. There was no change in the marketing of products 
for the young independent country that was obliged to use the same economic channels used 
by former colonizer. The basis of Zimbabwe’s exports remained fundamentally raw materials 
while finished products continued to be the main import. The economy was still organized in 
order to complete the economy of Britain. Multi-National Companies (MNCs), Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations became the main 
conduits through which Europe and America controlled Zimbabwe. This arrangement 
benefitted Britain more than Zimbabwe just as it had under colonialism, as Britain developed 
Zimbabwe remained mired in underdevelopment and poverty. Post-independence Zimbabwe 
remained ensnared in the coloniality of power.  
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Zimbabwe therefore remained largely a colonial state, a geo-political concept shaped by the 
colonizer. In a classic case of what Fanon (1968) terms repetition without change both the 
African nationalists that acceded to the Lancaster House Agreement and the educated African 
nationalists that embraced the Internal Settlement inherited a bourgeois state model from the 
colonizer that was designed for business with the Western white bourgeoisie. The state’s 
capacity for autonomous and transformative economic development was blocked, therefore 
giving rise to underdevelopment, undemocratic tendencies, an unaccountable executive, a 
weak legislature, a pliant judiciary and distressed “National” institutions. This situation 
retarded Zimbabwe’s development process.  (Interview with a leading academic and 
publisher: 4/9/2015).  
A resident of the city of Harare partially concurs with the above and adds that the absence of 
development and the conflict engulfing Zimbabwe is a consequence of the ZANU PF 
government having ruined the economy as well as its international and domestic relations as 
it attempted to remedy the flaws of the British tailored Lancaster House Agreement that 
failed to bring fundamental economic change at independence (Interview: with a local 
resident 14/3/2015). While the above respondent has a point that the denial of full economic 
independence to Zimbabwe by the Lancaster House agreement has been responsible for 
conflict, it should also be noted that the ZANU PF government has presented capitalist 
powers as solely responsible for the crisis to cover up for its corruption and policy failures 
that also explain conflict in Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe’s development was further set back by a huge debt inherited from Ian Smith’s 
Rhodesia Front government that it had to repay. According to Bond and Manyanya 
(2003:17), at independence the Rhodesians left the Zimbabwe government the following 
financial liabilities: a multi-lateral debt of US$5.3million, a bilateral debt of US$97.9million 
and a private debt of US$593.9million. Attempts by the government to get the settlers to pay 
were blocked by Britain and America that threatened to cut aid grants if the government 
persisted. The Zimbabwean government backed off. The fact that Britain could still call the 
shots on Zimbabwe as it had done under colonial rule was a manifestation of coloniality of 
power. Furthermore by inheriting the Rhodesian debt the new government was embracing 
coloniality as it was taking over a problem from colonialism. 
Bond and Manyanya (2003) point out that by the end of the first decade of independence 
Zimbabwe’s debt stood at US$2.9 billion, forcing it to adopt the disastrous ESAP in the 
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1990s as a way out of economic difficulties. Debt to Bond and Manyanya weakened the 
Zimbabwe’s capacity to resist international finance. The country was forced to borrow from 
the WB and IMF not just to settle debts but to fund massive post-war reconstruction 
programmes.  Zimbabwe was thus sucked into the exploitative global financial system 
dominated by Europe and America from which it was unable to extricate itself.  US and 
Europe controlled IMF and WB institutions became the vehicle through which the West 
managed to influence Zimbabwe’s economic governance. It is clear from the above that 
tentacles of economic power that tied colonial Zimbabwe to international capital were not 
severed after independence.  
Colonial continuities were also noted in the way the new African leadership merely 
facilitated the removal of the privileged whites who were hindering their advancement only 
to fill their shoes - what Marxists term an elite transition and what Fanon (1968:27) in 
particular calls the replacing of a certain “species of men by another species of men”. 
Zimbabwe’s black political elite that took over power at the end of colonialism were a poorly 
resourced class with no economic power.  To Bond (2000) the ruling ZANU PF elite did not 
make a break with the past. The black political elite underwent transformation from being a 
force of liberation for all people to a highly compromised vehicle serving the economic and 
political interests of an elite few. The political leadership invaded towns built by settlers and 
engaged in primitive accumulation of wealth. They corruptly and greedily enriched 
themselves at the expense of initiating development programmes and projects to benefit the 
rest of the population. Wealth came to be concentrated in the hands of the minority elite that 
ignored the basic needs of the population leading to civil unrest in the late 1990s.  
Colonialism had created a hierarchical society with whites occupying the top echelons and 
blacks the bottom. After independence black political power and white economic power 
combined to make the two groups the new elite that occupied the top strata of the social order 
leaving the urban proletariat and peasantry to occupy the bottom echelons of the social 
hierarchy. Kinloch (2007) notes the rise of a ruling indigenous bourgeoisie in the place of 
colonial elites. For instance, by 1990 most of the land that had been taken from whites had 
been allocated to government officials, senior civil servants, ministers and members of 
parliament. The interests of a small section of black Zimbabweans were advanced at the 
expense of landless peasants and the generality of the population of Zimbabwe. Edgar 
Tekere, then Minister for Manpower Planning and Development told university students in 
July of 1981 that some MPs had “inherited the colonial mentality”. Two years later Mugabe, 
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on 17 April 1983, attacked what he called bourgeois tendencies among ministers, who he said 
“with a more theoretical and thus hypocritical commitment to socialism have, under one 
guise or another, proceeded to acquire huge properties by way of farms and other business 
concern” (Rich, 1982:503).  
 The Patriotic Front leadership at the Lancaster House talks had only managed to remove the 
discriminatory structures of settler society but failed to radically transform Zimbabwean 
society. There was no full transformation of Zimbabwean society nor were there fundamental 
changes to eliminate the last vestiges of settler society. Ingham-Thorpe (1997) makes 
reference to several structural inequities that remained unchanged, which coupled with the 
policy of reconciliation, allowed whites to entrench their privileged social and economic 
positions. The Lancaster House Conference may therefore have ended formal colonial rule 
and brought Zimbabwe’s independence but imperialism endured. Imperialism became covert 
and influenced government policies through white dominated bodies such as the Commercial 
Farmers Union and the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries. These bodies possessed 
powerful international connections and possessed tremendous economic and political muscle 
to interfere with government programmes.  
Despite gaining independence culturally, Zimbabwe remained essentially British, for 
instance; British military advisers under the British Military Advisory Training Team, 
(BMATT) trained the Zimbabwe National Army while several British universities and 
institutions offered Zimbabwean students scholarships to study abroad. In the first decade and 
a half of independence Mugabe became a darling of the West. He was lauded and praised by 
the West for “outstanding” leadership and was knighted by the Queen in 1994. The close 
relationship the British government cultivated with the Zimbabwe government allowed the 
former to influence government policy decisions that promoted coloniality, 
underdevelopment and conflict in Zimbabwe. Because independent Zimbabwe was a product 
of colonialism it thus remained entrapped in colonial relations of power. 
It has been observed that in spite of being independent the sovereignty of the newly liberated 
Zimbabwean state was left in doubt in much the same way that the independence of fellow 
African countries Senegal and Gabon was in doubt as they remained tied to their former 
colonial power, France. On the eve of independence Senegal’s first President, Leopold 
Senghor, announced that there would be no change, as his country would remain under 
France’s wing. He remarked; “In Africa, when children have grown up they leave their 
152 
 
parents’ hut, and build a hut of their own by its side. Believe me; we don’t want to leave the 
French compound. We have grown up in it and it is good to be alive in it. We simply want to 
build our own huts (Senghor, 1957:13, quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b). M’ba, the late 
President of the Republic of Gabon on arrival in Paris on an official state visit said “Gabon is 
independent, but between Gabon and France nothing has changed; everything goes on as 
before. In fact, the only change is that M’ba is president of the Gabonese Republic and that 
he is received by the president of the French Republic” (Fanon, 1968:52).  The tentacles of 
power that linked Gabon and Senegal to France under colonialism still hook Gabon and 
Senegal to France in the post-independence period. Fundamentally nothing changed too in 
Zimbabwe after independence. The only change was that Mugabe was the Prime Minister of 
Zimbabwe and was now being received by Margaret Thatcher in the British compound. 
5.7 THE UNRESOLVED LAND QUESTION 
Liberation forces in Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle managed to push back judicial-political 
control but failed to extricate Zimbabwe from the snares of coloniality. One marker of the 
persistence of coloniality was the continued control the white minority had in the ownership 
of strategic resources like mines and industries and above all else, land.  At independence 1.2 
million blacks lived on 19.8 million hectares. Eight thousand five hundred (8.500) black 
small scale and commercial farmers owned 1.6 million hectares whilst 4500 white large scale 
commercial farmers owned 12 million hectares in a country with a total land area of 39, 6 
million hectares (Munemo, 2013:21).   
Despite these land imbalances the new black government could not soon after independence 
renege on the Lancaster House Agreement and expropriate land from whites because the 
government’s hands were tied by the ten year moratorium regarding land African nationalists 
had agreed to under duress from capitalist interests at the Lancaster House Conference.  It 
was thus the Lancaster House Settlement of 1979 that was directly responsible for 
compromising a revolutionary transition that could have resolved the racially biased 
inequalities in land.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) blames the African elite not only in Zimbabwe 
but throughout Africa for incomplete decolonization by arguing that they were mainly 
concerned with taking over where the white colonial bourgeoisie had left off as new leaders 
rather than with radical transformation. This he further argues resulted in Zimbabwe being 
born with what Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos termed ‘unfinished business.’ 
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In the first ten years the new Zimbabwean government could only acquire land on a “willing-
buyer willing –seller” basis in line with the agreement reached at the Lancaster House talks. 
This task was difficult for the government. The government encountered problems from 
white landowners who were unwilling to sell. When the government tried to arm-twist them 
they turned to the courts for protection. The courts frequently ruled in favour of white 
farmers, thus frustrating government efforts aimed at land redistribution. For those that 
agreed to sell, the land was either unproductive or was pegged at steep prices making it 
difficult for the government that had inherited Smith’s debilitating odious debt to purchase 
the land (Bond and Manyanya: 2003).  
When the land issue finally ruptured violently in the year 2000, apparently the British and 
whites settlers blamed the ZANU PF government for corruption, and the disregard of the rule 
of law among other things, which is a classic case of what Maldonado-Torres (2004) refers to 
as ‘forgetfulness of coloniality’ where modernity tends to forget that it creates problems for 
the subalternized for which it does not have immediate solutions. Similarly, in domestic 
coloniality ZANU PF forgets that through corruption and other related bad governance 
practices it has run down the Zimbabwean economy, struggled to find solutions and finds it 
convenient to blame imperialism. 
Most pledges made by the West to assist the government with funds for resettlement purposes 
were not fulfilled. This further rendered the “willing-seller-willing-buyer” arrangement 
ineffective as little land was acquired owing to the lack of resources. Difficulties with 
“willing –seller willing buyer” arrangement meant that the government was unable to resolve 
the problem of land hunger. Land hunger had led to the problems of the illegal occupation of 
white owned land by the black population in the 1980s (Bond and Manyanya: 2003).  The 
government labeled the black land occupants ‘squatters’.  At this point, according to 
Mamdani (2008:4), Zimbabwean law still defined a squatter in racial terms as ‘an African 
whose house happens to be situated in an area which has been declared European or is set 
apart for some other reason’. Although the government was black it enunciated policy issues 
in colonial terms and viewed developments through settler lenses, a sign that independence 
had not brought about decolonization of the mind and epistemological liberation. 
The government was on numerous occasions forced to use violence to remove the illegal 
settlers as it did not want to upset the whites in the spirit of reconciliation and economic 
stability. This strained relations not only between government and the landless peasants but 
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also between the peasants and the white population, the former blamed the latter for holding 
on to what they considered to be their birthright. According to Mamdani (2008), the Mugabe 
government policy of evicting illegal land occupants that his government referred to in 
colonial terms as “squatters” earned him praise as conciliator from the international 
community (the West) for ensuring the security and the property rights of whites who 
remained in Zimbabwe. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) such political madness takes 
place within neo-colonial situations whereby black people are forced to decimate each other 
as Western powers and their European diaspora in Africa continue looting national resources 
and expatriating the profits. It should be highlighted that the Zimbabwean government was in 
the 1980s largely praised by the West for protecting imperialist capitalist interests that sought 
to perpetuate the colonial situation regarding land. However, when it refused to evict farm 
invaders from 2000 onwards when it no longer required white support it was vilified and 
demonized by the West because its actions were de-colonial. This is a clear manifestation of 
the hypocrisy of the coloniality of power.  
Although frustrated by several obstacles placed to land redistribution by white capitalism, the 
Zimbabwean government could not in the early years of independence throw a tantrum and 
disregard the agreement on land reached at the Lancaster House peace talks. Such action 
would have been seen to be against the spirit of reconciliation. Whites were seen as vital to 
avert capital flight, the loss of skills, expertise and experienced public servants. Disregarding 
the Lancaster House Constitution would also have compromised the state’s access to 
international capital to finance post-war reconstruction and development programmes. The 
reconciliation policy made land redistribution difficult and this failure to redistribute land 
became one of the primary causes of the Zimbabwe crisis and a bulwark to peace, unity and 
reconciliation. 
For the greater part of the 1980’s the government was also bogged down by insurgency in the 
south western parts of the country.  The Fifth Brigade that was deployed in the region 
committed atrocities bordering on genocide (CCJP and LRF: 1997). The international 
community turned a blind eye to it. Any revolutionary takeover of white owned land at this 
time may have lost the government international sympathy and support to tackle the dissident 
problem.  In 1987, the insurgency in the south western parts of the country ended but the 
government could still not take drastic action on land as this may have interfered with efforts 
to secure South Africa’s independence. It was likely that revolutionary takeover of land by 
the Zimbabwean government would have hardened the capitalist backed apartheid regime in 
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South Africa. Therefore international factors imperial in nature also militated against the 
Zimbabwean government’s efforts to acquire land. 
In 1990, the Lancaster House terms regarding land lapsed. Restrictions on the acquisition of 
land by the government were reduced but the government could still not take decisive action 
to redistribute land. It was forced by a global economic recession, debt and economic 
hardships that Bond and Manyanya (2003) trace to colonialism and the adoption of the IMF 
and WB sponsored Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990. The 
programme was imposed by international capital and required its assistance to succeed. 
Among many things ESAP entailed rolling back the state as a strategy for development and 
integrating the economy into the global capitalist system. It therefore became difficult for the 
government to engage in land reform during ESAP as this would have compromised its 
success and upset international capital whose assistance it direly needed. As a consequence of 
factors mentioned above the Zimbabwean government failed to commit itself to land reform 
and to address the land discrepancies which allowed settler capitalists to continue to hold on 
to land at the expense of the majority black population. This did not promise a future with 
harmonious racial co-existence and sustainable peace and development. 
It should be noted that the failure to address the land issue was not all together a consequence 
of interference by capitalist linked imperial interests but also a result of other factors of an 
internal nature.  Of note is that in the first ten years of independence the ZANU PF 
government was largely popular because it had launched successful social amenities and 
reconstruction programmes with improvements in transport, education and health provision. 
The massive reconstruction and social rehabilitation projects embarked on by the government 
after the war were part of efforts to foster peace and stability. Failure to do this may have led 
to disenchantment with the government and civil strife. These early post-independence 
successes lulled most of the peasant population that would have otherwise put pressure on the 
government to redistribute land. In the end the government relaxed and put the land issue on 
the back burner. Muzondidya (2009a:174) states that as a consequence of the lack of 
concerted pressure for justice and economic reform from both the government and poor 
masses, the whites were lulled into a false sense of political and economic security, in which 
many felt safe in their privileged economic positions over blacks.  
Corruption also explains the failure to effectively redistribute land. By 1996 farms for 
resettlement had mostly been given to senior government officials at the expense of peasants 
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in marginal lands. According to Meredith (2002:119–121) Witness Mangwende, a 
government minister, received from government a 3000 acre farm in Wedza which was 
earmarked for the resettlement of thirty three landless peasant families. Furthermore Meredith 
reveals that during this time some seventy farms were allocated to members of parliament, 
senior civil servants and members of the security forces, and influential friends.  
Disappointed by corruption in land resettlement the British government from 1990 reduced 
and then terminated funding for the land resettlement programme with 3 million pounds of 
the 44 million allocated at independence left unspent  (ibid). This meant that about 4000 
white commercial farmers would continue on land therefore leaving the land issue unsettled.   
The year 1991 saw the government avoiding action likely to upset the West in view of the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government Conference, due to be held in Harare in the latter part 
of the year. It backtracked on the Land Acquisition Bill designed to among other things 
address inadequacies of the “willing-seller, willing buyer” policy. The law would also have 
allowed land and improvements to be expropriated by government (Smith, 2002: 390). 
Disenchanted by the failure of the “willing-buyer, willing -seller” understanding which had 
only managed to resettle 70 000 families on 9 million acres out of a target of 162 000 since 
1980 the government promulgated a new law, the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 (Mamdani, 
2008:5).    
The Land Acquisition Act (1992) was enacted to speed up the land reform process by 
removing the “willing -seller willing- buyer” clause. It gave the state powers to compulsorily 
purchase land although the landowners retained the right to challenge the price set and to 
receive prompt compensation. White land owners exercised this right further frustrating 
government efforts to redistribute land. Not only did the whites frustrate government’s efforts 
to redistribute land, but they also put little effort into bridging the gulf of socio-economic 
inequities between black and white communities (Mbeki, 2001 in Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b). 
Between 1992 and 1997 opposition by white landowners against compulsory acquisition by 
the government increased with many turning to the courts for protection.  The government 
was undeterred and threatened the expropriation of white farms arguing that land stolen in 
conquest should not have to be bought back. According to Anstey (2007: 423) the UK, the 
WB and the IMF responded by threatening to cut aid packages if land was taken without the 
payment of compensation. This act exposed the West’s conspiracy in keeping the colonial 
status quo regarding land in Zimbabwe. 
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The adoption of the ESAP was accompanied by a decline in living standards of the majority. 
Unemployment, retrenchments, shortages of basic commodities and poverty took their toll on 
the population. War veterans of the liberation struggle were not spared. They took to the 
streets in July 1997 demanding compensation in the form of cash and land for their 
participation in the war. They disrupted a number of state functions including the Heroes Day 
celebrations held in August by jeering Mugabe who presided over the event. Sensing that the 
war veterans might erode the credibility of his government Mugabe capitulated to the war 
veterans in November. He promised them land and awarded them financial gratuities of ZW 
$50 000 each and ZW$2000 monthly payment (Bond and Manyanya: 2003). This action 
more than anything was ruinous to the economy in the 1990s as the Zimbabwe dollar hit an 
all time low against the US dollar.  
The land issue had been reignited. The ZANU PF government’s attacks on white settlers, 
Britain, the IMF and WB increased as the government fingered them as the problem in 
Zimbabwe’s development conundrums.  Drawing from Fanon’s (1968: 39)  injunction that 
“the settler never ceases to be the enemy, the opponent, the foe that must be overthrown”, the 
Zimbabwe government threatened to expropriate 1503 farms covering 12 million acres for 
redistribution - about 45% of land held by white commercial farmers, thereby attracting 
external criticism and the erosion of the economy (Anstey, 2007:424).  The promise of land 
to war veterans alarmed white farmers and the international community who began to tighten 
screws on the Zimbabwean government for threatening white capitalist interests.  In 
September, the government failed in its efforts to obtain the US$2billion assistance it wanted 
from the UN, IMF, World Bank, EU, and 23 foreign governments to resettle 150000 families 
(ibid). The international community suggested that it supervises the proposed resettlement 
programme arguing that earlier resettlement programmes had been bedeviled by government 
corruption. It also insisted that the programme adheres to market related prices and “willing 
buyer-willing seller” principles, a thing the government was averse to. 
In November 1997, the new labour government announced through its Secretary for 
International Development, Claire Short that Britain was no longer prepared to fund the 
Zimbabwean government’s land reform programme.  In a letter written to the Zimbabwean 
Minister of Agriculture, she said “my own origins are Irish and as you know we were 
colonized not colonizers” (Eriksson, 2007:12-13).  The labour government was in effect 
stating that it would not be held responsible for what Britain had done in colonial Rhodesia. 
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This letter marked the breaking point in British-Zimbabwe relations. Immediately after the 
Zimbabwean government announced the seizure of 841 farms (Meredith 2002:142–4). 
With the British government having refused to fund land reform and the Zimbabwean 
government threatening possible expropriation of white owned land without the payment of 
compensation, an attempt was made to resolve the impasse. In September, the government 
called a donors conference in Harare on land reform attended by 48 countries and 
international organizations, white farmers, the commercial farmers union and multi-lateral 
institutions. The participants insisted on principles such as transparency, respect for the rule 
of law, poverty reduction, political stability and economic growth as crucial for any land 
reform the Zimbabwean government would want to undertake. Most of these principles were 
viewed by the Zimbabwean government as designed to frustrate land reform and complete 
decolonization. Once again global capitalist interests stood between the Zimbabwean 
government and its attempts to correct the wrongs of the Lancaster House terms that had 
insufficiently decolonized Zimbabwe by leaving most of the land in the hands of white 
settlers. 
5.8 LAND REVOLUTION- THE DEATH OF THE LANCASTER HOUSE 
AGREEMENT 
In February 2000 the Zimbabwean government organised a referendum on a new constitution 
to replace the 1979 Lancaster House constitution.  The draft constitution proposed that the 
government be given powers to compulsorily acquire land without paying compensation. 
This was a source of consternation for whites who saw the imminent expropriation of their 
property by the state. Together with western donors, civil society organisations, NGOs and 
the opposition political parties, whites campaigned against the new constitution.  The people 
of Zimbabwe voted “NO” against the government supported draft on 14 February 2000.  
Stunned by the referendum outcome, but clear on the policy of the government, President 
Mugabe, rather than accepting the election result, opted to continue even more vigorously to 
appeal to the people on the need to pursue the land re-distribution (Mamdani :2008). He 
projected himself as the champion of victims of colonialism. Two weeks after the referendum 
results hordes of ZANU PF supporters and landless peasants backed by war veterans invaded 
farms indicating the beginning of the land reform exercise. The ZANU PF government saw 
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the invasions as a Third Chimurenga, a continuation of the aborted decolonial Chimurenga II 
/ Umvukela II and a rebellion against neo-colonialism(Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2013b).   
It was carried out in a haphazard manner and was accompanied by violence that mainly 
targeted the white community. Whites were labeled foreigners by the government and thus 
denied the right to own land. ZANU PF supporters were told that “murungu hasi munhu,  
murungu”-  (the white person lacks the quality of being human, he is just a white person). 
They were not seen as human but white objects. Only the blacks were said to possess human 
ontology. The violence unleashed on whites during the land invasions should be understood 
from the coloniality of being; it was seen as violence not on humans but on dehumanized 
objects. By so doing the nation building project suffered and doom was spelt for 
reconciliation. The government refused to pay compensation to dispossessed white 
landowners declaring that it was the duty of the British government to do so. Mugabe 
described white farmers as enemies, not just political enemies but definite enemies for 
wanting to reverse our revolution and independence (Alexander, 2003:103). 
The refusal by the Zimbabwean government to remove farm invaders and compensate white 
farmers for the loss of land was a violation of the rule of law. The government suspended the 
law to affirm its dominance over the objectified whites.  This also explains the failure of the 
state to prosecute any of the farm invaders that caused the deaths of white farmers. The 
coloniality of power placed the ZANU PF government and its supporters above the law. The 
post-independence leaders, themselves victims of colonial violence in the struggle for 
liberation, were now perpetrators of violence against people fighting for democracy and 
freedom from authoritarian rule. The above lends credence to arguments that the paradigm of 
violence cuts across epochs.  
The government gave whites 90 days to leave farms and informed them that compensation 
for improvements made on land would come in due course but not for the land itself as this 
land was stolen from the original owners in the colonial era. The white population that for 
more than a decade had withdrawn from mainstream politics returned with renewed interest. 
It threw its weight behind the nascent opposition MDC hoping that the new party would 
defeat ZANU PF in the June 2000 elections and restore expropriated land to the white 
farmers. The white community and the British government responded to land invasions by 
calling for the imposition of sanctions on the government of Zimbabwe for human rights 
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abuses and the absence of the rule of law that characterized the land reform exercise 
(Raftopoulos: 2006).  
Land grabs continued over the years and by 2004, only 300 white farmers remained (Anstey, 
2007: 426). Crucially, in 2005 the government passed an amendment declaring all 
agricultural land to be state land and by the end of the year it had seized 6.42 million hectares 
of land from 4000 white farmers and redistributed to about 200 000 landless blacks 
(Mamdani, 2008: 7). This act of revising the terms of the Lancaster House Agreement  that 
Mugabe referred to as a “a dirty little piece of paper” (Smith, 1997: 381) by expropriating 
white owned land without paying compensation signaled the death of the Lancaster House 
Agreement and the policy of reconciliation between blacks and whites.  To Mamdani (2008) 
it marked the end of the settler colonial era.  
The seizure of white owned farms by blacks was an attempt to complete the decolonization 
process that had been blocked by provisions of the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement. 
Officially opening the 2002 ZANU PF National People’s Conference, Mugabe remarked that 
“Ownership of land completes our freedom and makes us real, complete Zimbabweans” (The 
Sunday Mail 16 February, 2012). This de-colonial action had negative ramifications for the 
country as it was followed by economic collapse, social problems, political polarization, 
international isolation which scholars generally refer to as the Zimbabwe crisis that reversed 
the country’s development by half a century.  
To quote Ncube (2015), in the agricultural sector which is the country’s mainstay, the crisis 
had the following impact between 2000 and 2015;  
Maize production has fallen from a peak of 2 million tons in the year 2000 to just over 
500 thousand tons in 2014; wheat from a peak of just over 300 thousand tons in 2001 to 
less than 10 thousand tons last year; coffee from 10 thousand tons in 1998 to around 1 
000 tons in 2014; beef from a peak of just under 160 thousand tons in 1991 to around 25 
thousand tons by 2014; milk from a peak of 250 million liters in 1991 to about 50 
million liters by last year. As a result, the country’s food imports as a percentage of total 
imports has multiplied on average almost seven-fold between the year 2000 and to date. 
Mugabe blamed the West for the crisis. At the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg he blasted 
Western imperialism; “We have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, 
small as we are, we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed blood…So, 
Blair keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe” ” (The Sunday Mail 16 February, 
2012).  
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To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b:18) the Lancaster House Agreement sired a Zimbabwe with 
terrible birth defects, superficial racial reconciliation and incomplete decolonization. It was 
thus more of a ten year armistice than the resolution of the race and land problems. The 
settler-native conflict bequeathed by colonialism resurfaced in a more virulent form with the 
expropriation of white farms. This meant that the gloves were off once again between 
Africans and whites and the fight sucked in a host of players and reversed Zimbabwe’s 
development.  
5.9 CONCLUSION 
It has been shown that for more than a decade the colonized people of Zimbabwe fought a 
war of liberation against Smith’s white minority regime only to lose the war to the settlers at 
the Lancaster House negotiation table. Under pressure from local but in the main external 
pressure African nationalists mortgaged Zimbabwe to external international interests. 
Imperialist deception drove the African nationalists into agreeing to an imperfect settlement. 
This was confirmed by an agreement that safeguarded settler interests, particularly land that 
was left in white hands. The agreement came to be labeled the “root of all evil” for failing to 
create a stable social, political and economic order that Zimbabwe required to surmount its 
development challenges.  It was noted that the new black government inherited and 
refashioned colonial modus operandi and modes of power such that the colonial structures 
remained intact to the detriment of progress for the generality of the population. Efforts by 
the Zimbabwean government to improve the lives of the majority of the population who had 
endured colonial injustice by radically departing from colonial continuities were viewed by 
the capitalist forces as an attempt to reverse the defeat suffered at Lancaster and a bid by a 
former colony to escape the clutches of imperial power that had survived the end of formal 
colonial rule.  This set the stage for conflict between a de-linking neo-nationalist 
Zimbabwean government and western capitalist powers at the end of the second decade of 
independence, but more immediately the hurried and flawed peace process failed to foresee 
ethno-political violence in the form of gukurahundi in the early years of independence. The 
results were negative ramifications for peace and development in Zimbabwe.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
POST-INDEPENDENCE VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND AND 
MIDLANDS AND THE 1987 UNITY ACCORD 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the 1980s disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces, 
also referred to as gukurahundi, and the 1987 Unity Accord. It begins by tracing the roots of 
the violence that rocked the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in the 1980s. It examines 
the contribution of coloniality to gukurahundi by revealing how the Cold War provided 
global capitalism with a platform from which to influence events leading to the conflagration 
that engulfed Matabeleland and Midlands. It explains how triumphant global capitalist and 
imperialist interests were indirectly and directly involved in shaping the nature and trajectory 
of the 1980s violence and the nature of the agreement reached to end the conflict. The chapter 
also exposes how the new black government in Zimbabwe continued with colonial modes of 
governance and repression in pursuit of regime security during the 1980s. Lastly, the chapter 
discusses the absence of transformation in the aftermath of the Unity Accord. It argues that 
the unity agreement facilitated transition but there were no fundamental changes in the post 
unity period as a consequence of coloniality permeating the peace accord.  
6.2 THE ROOTS OF THE 1980S VIOLENCE IN MATABELELAND AND 
MIDLANDS  
6.2.1 Ethnic Differences 
In the 1970s and 1980s there was a lot of focus from scholarship on race as the chief driver of 
conflict before independence.  After independence it was noted that ethnicity had for a long 
time been an important source of conflict and threat to peace, reconciliation and unity in 
Zimbabwe.  The violence that engulfed the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces in the 
1980s transformed the discussion of violence from a focus on race to ethnicity.  
Although denied by nationalist leaders, ethnicity, it has been discovered, is an important 
explanation for the 1980s gukurahundi violence. The roots of ethnic tensions between the 
Shona and the Ndebele can be traced to coloniality that led to British expansion in the Cape, 
the Great Boer trek to escape British rule and the mfecane (ethnic warfare between Nguni 
groups in 19th century South Africa). Pressure from these processes forced Mzilikazi in the 
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1830s to lead the Khumalo clan and other disparate groups across the Limpopo to settle on 
the south-western parts of the Zimbabwean plateau where they vanquished Shona chiefdoms 
and established the Ndebele state. To consolidate the new state especially in the early days of 
settlement the Ndebele raided the Shona for cattle, women and grain and later raided them to 
mete out punishment on errant chiefs (Ranger, 1968). Ndebele conquest and raids on the 
Shona and other indigenous groups on the Zimbabwean plateau raised ethnic animosity.  
Despite Ndebele raids on the Shona, relations between the two ethnic groups were relatively 
cordial in the 19th century until the British occupied Mashonaland in 1890.  The white 
settlers encouraged Shona chiefs living on the margins of the Ndebele state to disregard the 
Ndebele king, therefore creating tension between Shona chiefdoms and the Ndebele. In 1893, 
the Ndebele king dispatched an impi (army detachment) to punish Chief Gomara for 
wayward behaviour in settler occupied Fort Victoria. This resulted in a war between the 
Ndebele and white settlers that led to the destruction of the Ndebele State (ibid).  
As part of their strategy to administer Zimbabwe the British employed divide and rule tactics 
to maintain dominance and control. Shona police were deployed in areas inhabited by the 
Ndebele. They were often harsh on the Ndebele and this caused resentment among the 
Ndebele who for a long time had considered the Shona to be their subjects. The deployment 
of Shona police in Matabeleland became one of the main reasons for the 1896 Umvukela and 
it came as no surprise that the first victim of the rebellion was a Shona policeman (ibid).  
While the seeds of ethnicity in Zimbabwe could be found in the pre-colonial period, it was in 
the colonial era that tribalism was nurtured and flourished. British colonialism introduced the 
politics of ethnicity to the politics of race emerging from the pre-colonial period (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni: 2011b).The whites produced a version of history that did not seek to unite the 
Ndebele and Shona but to portray relations between the two ethnic groups as ever hostile, 
thus entrenching divisions. Colonial historians depicted the Ndebele as a violent warrior 
group that mercilessly plundered helpless Shona villages leaving a trail of destruction and 
bloodshed (ibid). The politicians in independent Zimbabwe later exploited this colonial 
rendition of history to create friction between the two groups. It has been argued that ZANU 
PF politicians in the early 1980s reminded the Fifth Brigade and the Shona of nineteenth 
century Ndebele raids as part of efforts to bolster its support among the Shona (CCJP and 
LRF: 1997). This action served to sow seeds of resentment towards the Ndebele, thus making 
unity and nation building difficult.  
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Rhodesian colonialism continued to deepen divisions between ethnic groups to the detriment 
of peace. It politicized African ethnic identities which hitherto had been more social than 
political. It did this through attempts to construct and reconstruct people’s identities and by 
compartmentalizing them in cultural and geographic terms culminating in Shona-Ndebele 
political polarization (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2007, Chimhundu: 1992, Ranger: 
1985). For instance, provinces were named along tribal lines by colonial authorities. The 
people of Zimbabwe came to identify provinces with tribes and not with the nation.  The 
naming of provinces after tribes broke the spirit of unity and fomented conflict. The fact that 
provinces continue to bear colonial names after independence is not only a reflection of 
colonial continuities but also a reflection of unresolved tribal divisions. Maintenance of these 
colonial names for provinces has hampered efforts aimed at de-tribalizing Zimbabwe for the 
achievement of peace.  
Ranger (1985) and Chimhundu (1992) explain how colonial authorities and colonial 
missionaries invented tribalism in Zimbabwe and planted seeds of ethnic conflict.    
Missionaries in an attempt to standardize ‘native’ languages created ethnicity while colonial 
authorities through rigid ethnic demarcations, legislative codifications (identity cards), census 
mappings and other cartographic measures that organized Africans into various ethnic 
groupings denied them the chance to unite into a single national identity ( Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2011b:12). The ethnic violence that has been experienced after independence is in part a 
consequence of the Zimbabwean government failing to dismantle the system of racial and 
tribal profiling introduced by the colonial regime. Identity documents that bear one’s race, 
ethnic identity and village of  origin  and other information that make it easy to reveal one’s 
identity continue to be used today.   
 Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) is of the view that colonialism never intended to create nations in 
Africa based on common national identity capable of uniting against colonial oppression and 
domination. Mahuku and Mbanje (2013:7) concur with Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2013b) argument 
when they argue that “British colonialism activated, worsened, heightened and enlarged 
ethnic differences between the Shona and the Ndebele by strengthening ethnic loyalties and 
segregating ethnic groups into various provinces. They even promoted differential treatment 
of ethnic groups as a policy”. Partly as a result of settler influence and other social dynamics 
the Ndebele and the Shona resented each other’s presence in areas they regarded as their 
domains. Msindo (2012) cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008b:42) reveals that the Ndebele 
attacked the Shona working and residing in Bulawayo in 1929 as part of their claims to 
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Bulawayo as their city, while Sibanda (2005) makes reference to the Shona in the Gwelo 
district as not being very comfortable among the Ndebele. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2011b: 24-25)  the overall contribution of colonialism to ethnic conflict in Zimbabwe is 
captured by Solomon Mombeshora (1990)  who he quotes as stating that ‘the seeds of ethnic 
factor were derived from the pre-colonial past, [but] the colonial era provided fertile soil in 
which the ideology of tribalism germinated, blossomed and was further propagated”. 
By the 1950s ethnic differences had taken root in nationalist politics evidenced by 
disagreements that emerged between the Ndebele and the Shona nationalist politicians over 
the use of the name “Zimbabwe” for the imagined future independent state. According to 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011c) an insignificant party called the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) 
formed by some Karanga-speaking politicians that had broken up from NDP used the name 
Zimbabwe for the imagined future state. It drew criticism from some members of Matebele 
Home Society who preferred the use of the name Matopos as it was seen as inclusive and 
non-ethnic, thus more accommodative. Not only did differences arise in African nationalist 
politics over the naming of the imagined future state but also over which heroes, symbols and 
history the nationalist struggle had to adopt. The struggle for independence was thus not all 
about the racial question but also about the ethnic question that was subordinated to 
nationalist struggle (ibid). In a bid to destroy the racialized colonial state, nationalism by 
inadvertence reproduced ethnic discrimination and created the notion of ethnic citizenship, 
thus forestalling efforts aimed at building national unity. 
The 1963 ZAPU split added to ethnic tensions between the Shona and Ndebele. The 
emergent ZANU party apparently pursued political dominance and the re-establishment of 
Shona preponderance on Zimbabwe’s political landscape within the framework of the 
nationalist struggle against colonial rule. Critics of ZANU PF argue that it achieved this 
objective in 1980 when Mugabe and ZANU PF won the 1980 elections at the expense of 
Nkomo and PF ZAPU. The restoration of Shona hegemony in Zimbabwe was an affront to 
the Ndebele who historically had considered the Shona to be their subjects. PF ZAPU and 
Ndebele disenchantment grew as ZANU PF celebrated its victory in the 1980 elections not 
only as a victory for the party over settler colonialism but also as the triumph of the Shona 
and ZANU PF over the Ndebele and PF-ZAPU (ibid). This laid the ground for conflict 
between the two parties and ethnic groups in the post-independence period. 
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The newly independent state of Zimbabwe was built on a ZANU PF and Shona platform. The 
politicized and ethnicized power structure on which the new state stood privileged the Shona 
and ZANU PF while marginalizing other political actors and ethnic groups like PF-ZAPU 
and the Ndebele and ZANU Ndonga and the Ndau. They were denied space to contribute to 
the national project. The coloniality of power was propagated through Shona and ZANU PF 
symbols, slogans, regalia and music used at national ceremonies like Independence and 
Heroes’ days to the exclusion of those of other parties and ethnic groups.  ZANU PF 
therefore created an ethnocracy in Zimbabwe. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) ethnocracy arises 
where the distinction between nation and ethnicity is eliminated. The Shona-speaking people 
to him became the authentic subjects of the nation, while other ethnic groups were 
marginalized. He traces the birth of ethnocracy in Zimbabwe from colonialism’s divide and 
rule practices of governance to African nationalism as a terrain of re-tribalization of politics. 
ZANU PF’s imagination of the newly independent state in Shona terms was tantamount to 
bestowing on the Shona greater ontological density than other ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. 
Most resources and development projects were directed to Shona country at the expense of 
other regions where groups like the Tonga, Ndebele, Venda, Kalanga and Ndau among other 
ethnic groups lived. The elevation of the being of the Shona above that of other tribal groups 
was a reproduction of coloniality albeit at the ethnic level. This placed obstacles to unity and 
nation building and prompts Ndlovu-Gatsheni: (2011b) and Masunungure (2006) to conclude 
that in 1980 what was born was the state of Zimbabwe but not the nation.  
The neglect and exclusion of PF ZAPU, ZIPRA and the Ndebele from the narrative of the 
liberation war and the history of the state in general aroused a new form of Ndebele 
particularism. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008c) defines Ndebele particularism as  
the rendition of a separate Ndebele history which is different from the Shona historical 
experiences, the attempts to revive Ndebele kingship, and the continual formation of 
Ndebele particularistic organizations up to the mass nationalism phase of Zimbabwean 
history…. in its new form Ndebele particularism seeks autonomy as the Ndebele feel like 
outcasts in the imagination of the newly independent state of Zimbabwe.  
The failure to build a nation state with a common vision, aspirations and unity of mind and 
purpose tremendously contributed to the violence that afflicted Matabeleland and the 
Midlands in the 1980s. This can be traced to coloniality which bifurcated social formations 
and prevented the coalescence of citizens into a united nation state (Mamdani, 2001 in 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b). Coloniality was replicated when divide and rule tactics used by 
colonizers to conquer, subjugate and rule the African people were borrowed by new 
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governments to create cleavages amongst different ethnic groups in furtherance of elite 
hegemony. One can draw parallels between the exclusion of other political players and ethnic 
groups by the new Shona dominated ZANU PF government on the one hand and the white 
minority colonial regime that pushed to the periphery other racial groups in the imagination 
and governance of the state of Rhodesia on the other. This bifurcation of social formations 
went a long way in preparing fertile ground for gukurahundi internecine conflict after 
independence.  
6.2.2 The 1963 ZAPU Split 
In Chapter Three, the study highlighted that the 1963 ZAPU split was due to a number of 
factors. Principally, the discourse touched on arguments related to tactics, power dynamics, 
ideology, ethnicity, leadership and personality. This section does not focus on a discussion of 
the several reasons behind the fragmentation but explains how the split became the genesis of 
the tensions between ZAPU and ZANU and the role of the split in generating the post-
independence ethno-political conflict in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces.  
The ZAPU split was primarily caused by political differences but as the differences widened 
the split assumed an ethnic dimension; most Shona speaking members formed ZANU while 
the majority of the Ndebele speaking members remained in ZAPU save for the likes of Enos 
Nkala who had personal differences with Nkomo. Mutual aversion between these two men 
was to be exploited by the ZANU-PF government in the 1980s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011b). 
Msindo (2012) who argues that up to 1963, the relationship between ethnicity and 
nationalism was by and large cordial. It only deteriorated after the split that saw the 
emergence of ZANU as a rebel movement. Mugabe (1989:338) explains the tribal division as 
a consequence of “remnants of loyalties emanating from old feudal social formations” under 
which the Shona and Ndebele were governed in pre-colonial times. To him, the Ndebele 
came to support ZAPU because the leader was Ndebele while those that drifted towards 
ZANU were Shona as its leader was Shona. He further argues that colonial authorities 
capitalized on the divisions between ZANU and ZAPU and played them against each other 
by exaggerating and accentuating tribal consciousness among Africans in an attempt to 
weaken national consciousness and the nationalist cause. Mubako (1975) agrees with Mugabe 
(1989) that colonial authorities fanned the flames of the conflict.  He points out that the 
Rhodesian Secret Service encouraged interparty battles as it sought to present Africans as 
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unfit to govern and thus justify continued settler colonialism.  Ultimately the political rivalry 
between ZAPU and ZANU turned into enmity between the Ndebele and the Shona. 
The split resulted in fierce competition for political high ground between ZANU and ZAPU.  
The conflicting parties employed vitriolic rhetoric to denounce each other. According to 
Sachikonye (2011) violence pervaded the contest for political power with running battles 
between supporters of both parties taking place across the country. The culture of arson and 
coercion to obtain political consent so common in Zimbabwe was nurtured in the struggle 
against colonial rule when houses of rival supporters and politicians were burned down. This 
culture of violence came back to haunt Zimbabwe in the new millennium. Arson 
characterized the 2000 farm invasions and MDC-ZANU PF electoral and political violence.  
Sachikonye (ibid) is of the opinion that the viciousness of the inter-party violence was a 
manifestation of latent aggression built into the colonial system.  
After the ZAPU split, the geographical spaces from which the military wings of the parties 
recruited and operated during the war of liberation reinforced political and tribal differences. 
As was highlighted in chapter 3, ZIPRA mainly recruited and operated from the south-
western part of the country mainly inhabited by Ndebele speakers while ZANLA operated 
from the more populous northern and eastern parts of the country that are largely Shona 
country. The split was also in part responsible for conflict in guerrilla training camps in 
Zambia, Mozambique, Libya and Tanzania, fights would breakout between ZIPRA and 
ZANLA. Battles were also witnessed whenever the two guerrilla armies encountered each 
other in the field. Bhebe (2004) attributes the fighting between rival guerrilla armies to the 
influence of the political leadership of both parties; 
These young men and women were trained to hate each other by their leaders, who 
wanted to justify the separate existence of their parties. Each party had its own 
Commissariat Department, whose task was to teach recruits the history of the party, how 
the party was different from each other, who the leaders were and how they were 
different from the less revolutionary or sell-out leaders of the rival party. Thus, the 
cadres were brought up to hate (Bhebe, 2004:256). 
This state of affairs underlay the deep division that existed between the two liberation 
movements and left a legacy of distrust between their military wings.  
Mpofu (2013a) concurs with Bhebe’s (2004) analysis that the post-independence tribal 
schism that gripped Zimbabwe in the early years of independence is in part traceable to the 
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form that nationalism took in its fight against injustices of colonial rule.  His point of view is 
backed by Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009a:97) who argues that 
Zimbabwean nationalism failed not only to unite the key nationalist actors throughout 
the struggle for independence but also to unite different ethnic groups into a common 
Zimbabwean identity. Nationalism just like colonialism re-tribalized politics and 
fragmented its supporters along ethnic lines, and the post-colonial state is paying a huge 
price for this failure of nationalism. 
What Ndlovu-Gatsheni exposes above is that the 1963 ZAPU split exhibited manifestations 
of coloniality seen in its fragmenting tribal groups in much the same way coloniality 
fragments races and ethnicities.  Coloniality thus contributed immensely to nationalist 
violence as well as ethno-political violence that gripped the Midlands and Matabeleland 
provinces with the resultant effect of reversing strides made in the quest for peace, 
reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. 
In the late 1970s, under pressure from the Frontline states, ZANU and ZAPU agreed to an 
alliance - the Patriotic Front – to negotiate independence with settler government. At the 
Lancaster House Conference they presented common positions and secured an agreement to 
decolonize Zimbabwe. ZAPU’s Nkomo was the most senior nationalist and was seen in 
nationalist circles as likely to lead the alliance to contest the 1980 elections.  ZANU however 
broke ranks with ZAPU and decided to contest the elections alone. This action further 
damaged the relations between the two parties and their military wings as ZAPU/ZIPRA felt 
betrayed by their counterparts. The relationship between ZANU/ZANLA and ZAPU/ZIPRA 
was also further strained when the two blocks forestalled each other from campaigning in 
areas they considered to be their spheres of influence.  When ZANU PF emerged victorious 
in the 1980 elections following voting that followed ethnic and regional lines, ZAPU was 
disenchanted, accusing ZANU PF not only of violence to win the elections but also tribalism. 
This did not bode well for harmonious ethnic and political co-existence in independent 
Zimbabwe.  
6.2.3 Suspicion, Mistrust and Exclusion  
At independence the Zimbabwean government was faced with a difficult task of soothing 
historical animosities between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU. Prime-Minister Robert Mugabe tried 
to ease the tension through his conciliatory action of forming a government of national unity 
that included members of PF ZAPU and the Rhodesia Front. Despite this, suspicion and 
mistrust ran deep between partners in the coalition government, especially between PF ZAPU 
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and ZANU PF. Although Nkomo accepted the invitation to join the unity government, 
apparently PF ZAPU found it difficult to accept the role of junior partner in government as 
the party regarded ZANU PF as a splinter group and Mugabe as junior to Nkomo. A senior 
surviving PF ZAPU official intimated that Nkomo was under pressure from many ZIPRA 
combatants and some PF ZAPU politicians not to embrace the 1980 election results 
(Interview with a retired ZANU PF ex- government minister :14/9/2015). 
Mistrust between the two political formations extended to their military wings with a history 
of skirmishes between them. ZANU PF was particularly worried by ZIPRA’s capacity for 
conventional warfare.  ZIPRA like ZANLA had violated the Lancaster House Agreement by 
caching weapons and keeping a significant number of the fighting forces outside the country 
during the transition period. This made ZANU PF uncomfortable because ZIPRA had 
sophisticated military hardware which the new government assumed PF ZAPU would use to 
launch a counter revolution supposedly to make up for the 1980 electoral defeat.  
ZANU PF’s mistrust of PF ZAPU was deepened by the fact that Soviet support for PF ZAPU 
dramatically increased during the transition period. According to Kriger (2003:53) arms 
valued at US$60 million were given to ZIPRA by the Soviets in 1979. The escalation in 
funding also continued after elections. Arms from the Soviet Union were directly flown to 
Zambia contrary to the custom of delivering them to Angola first. This fueled speculation that 
Soviets were planning to back Nkomo in a military campaign against ZANU PF, a party 
capitalist powers saw as lesser of a threat than PF ZAPU. ZANU PF also accused ZIPRA of 
having held back its troops and of having halfheartedly fought the colonial regime with the 
intention of unleashing its full military might against ZANU PF.  
The CIA was keen on keeping Soviet influence out of Zimbabwe and distorted facts 
regarding PF ZAPU’s intentions. Their actions together with those of the South African 
intelligence agents who engaged members of the former Rhodesian CIO to work with 
disgruntled former ZIPRA cadres to destabilize the new Zimbabwean government as part of 
their strategy to protect the apartheid regime against the threat of Frontline States elevated the 
government’s sense of insecurity and raised tensions between ZANU PF and PF ZAPU 
(Chimhanda: 2003).   
PF ZAPU’s status as a formidable opposition also gave the new ZANU PF government little 
sleep. To counter the threat posed by PF ZAPU, the ZANU PF government peddled a 
singular and celebratory narrative buttressing ZANU PF’s claims to power at the same time 
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undermining the contributions of ZIPRA and PF ZAPU. The ZANU PF politicians used the 
state controlled media to cast the Ndebele, PF-ZAPU and its leader Joshua Nkomo, and its 
military wing (ZIPRA), as no heroic liberators, as no committed nation-builders, but as a 
threat to the country’s hard won independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011c:6 ). Even on the 
occasion of Zimbabwe’s independence Nkomo was undermined. He was given a seating 
position among the back benchers which was an affront not only to him but also to PF ZAPU 
supporters.  Nkomo lamented that “behind the saluting base were the benches for junior 
ministers, the party officials and the supporting cast. At the back of those rows, in the dark by 
the radio commentators’ box where the television cameras could not see us and our 
supporters in the crowd could not single us out for applause, places were reserved for 
maFuyana[Nkomo’s wife] and myself” (Meredith,2002:40).  This cold treatment of Nkomo 
and PF ZAPU was a spillover of the unresolved contestation for power between the two 
parties in the 1960s and 1970s. It served to heighten the tension between the two parties and 
members of the former military wings. Moreover, the Ndebele population, most of who 
identified with Nkomo, was particularly incensed when their leader was sidelined by the 
ZANU PF government. In Sibanda’s (2005) opinion, as long as Nkomo remained undermined 
by the new government, hopes of reconciliation that had been kindled by the formation of a 
GNU would not last for long and co-existence was always going to be difficult.  
In October 1980, Prime Minister Mugabe signed an agreement with the North Korean 
President, Kim Il Sung, for the North Korean communists to train what was to become the 
“Fifth Brigade” of the Zimbabwean army. The Fifth Brigade was largely comprised of 
Shona-speaking soldiers that operated outside of the army chain of command, and was 
answerable only to Mugabe. Implied in this move was that Mugabe was preparing for 
confrontation with PF ZAPU. In February 1982, the government announced that it had 
discovered weapons cached on properties owned by PF ZAPU and ZIPRA around Assembly 
Points and used this as evidence that ZAPU had for a long time been planning to stage a coup 
(Mashingaidze, 2010:83). For ZANU PF, the question of control of political power which 
since the 1960s had remained unresolved between African nationalist parties was soon to be 
resolved as this discovery provided it with a casus belli to crush PF ZAPU and terminate a 
longstanding battle for political supremacy. 
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6.2.4 The Pursuit of a One Party State  
According to Mashingaidze (2010:83), Africa’s post-colonial nation building processes have 
been marred by the failure to tolerate political difference, and he also cites the absence of 
open-mindedness to share political space by the ruling elite as important.  Despite a landslide 
victory in the 1980 elections ZANU PF was uncomfortable sharing political space with its 
main rival PF ZAPU. It suspected PF ZAPU of harbouring ambitions of staging a coup to 
oust it from power.  ZANU PF began to pursue a long held desire to establish a one-party 
state but PF ZAPU with its 20 seats in parliament and huge following in Matabeleland and 
parts of the Midlands provinces were to ZANU PF the elephant in the room.  
To achieve the objective of a one party state a political-military campaign had to be launched 
against the PF ZAPU leadership and its supporters. In January 1982, Mugabe declared that it 
was 'not a matter of whether' a one-party state was feasible, but 'when it shall come about' 
(Rich, 1983:502).  Soon after the declaration a violent campaign was launched until PF 
ZAPU finally capitulated to state pressure and violence, culminating in the 1987 Unity 
Accord that paved the way for the merger of PF ZAPU and ZANU PF.  Although the accord 
did not make Zimbabwe a de jure one party state due to the presence of ZANU Ndonga and 
ZUM in parliament, the country assumed a de facto one party state status sealing ZANU PFs 
dominance of Zimbabwean politics.  
Further credence to arguments that ZANU PF sought to destroy ZAPU and establish a one-
party state are exposed by Dumiso Dabengwa, the former ZIPRA intelligence supremo who 
was unlawfully incarcerated by the ZANU PF regime in the 1980s on allegations of planning 
a coup. In an interview with Nduduzo Tshuma of the Southern Eye Dabengwa revealed that 
Enos Nkala, Edison Zvobgo and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa visited him in 
Chikurubi Maximum Prison in 1986 after the death of ZIPRA commander Lookout Masuku 
offering him freedom on condition that he abandons PF ZAPU to join ZANU PF (Southern 
Eye, August 25 2013). 
It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the employment of force to try and force PF 
ZAPU to govern with ZANU PF under a one party state system was coloniality driven. 
Coloniality seeks dominance and justifies the use of force to obtain compliance. ZANU PF 
sought hegemony on Zimbabwe’s political landscape even if it meant violently crushing PF 
ZAPU in the name of regime security and state building. 
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6.2.5 Flawed Integration of the ZNA  
The achievement of independence in Zimbabwe in 1980 did not usher in a period of stable 
peace. National leaders at the Lancaster House Conference and immediately after 
independence were preoccupied with racial and political reconciliation while scantily 
attending to reconciliation between former fighting forces.  Tension characterized relations 
between the Rhodesian Army, ZANLA and ZIPRA.  It was the latter two in particular that 
envisaged the assumption of power at independence.  When PF ZAPU did not acquire state 
power ZIPRA forces loyal to Nkomo were dissatisfied, prompting ZANLA to suspect that it 
intended to acquire through the barrel of the gun what it had failed to acquire through 
elections (Martin and Johnson, 1981).  
The tense relationship between ZIPRA and ZANLA was further stretched by the botched 
integration of the guerrilla armies and the Rhodesian Army to form the Zimbabwe National 
Army (ZNA). The failure of integration had its roots in the 1963 ZAPU split and the hostile 
relations that characterized PF ZAPU and ZANU PF and their military wings.  Against the 
background of hostilities, mutual suspicion, distrust, racial and ethnic rivalry, the integration 
of ZIPRA, ZANLA and the Rhodesian Army to form the ZNA was always going to be 
problematic. These armies were of different political persuasions and loyalties, differed in 
training and outlook, had recruited and operated from different parts of the country and 
fought each other.  The incomprehensive intra-ethnic and inter-party political reconciliation 
after the Lancaster House Agreement meant that ill feeling between the two guerrillas 
movements did not die.  The sour relationship was worsened by sidelining of PF ZAPU in 
government and the belittling of ZIPRA’s contribution to the liberation war by the ZANU PF 
government controlled media. 
The integration of the ZNA was also bungled when bias in the integration exercise was not 
removed. ZIPRA complained about favouritism in the army integration exercise. It accused 
the former Rhodesian security forces of allying with ZANLA. ZIPRA cited the promotion of 
junior ranked and ill trained ZANLA forces ahead of the conventionally trained ZIPRA army.  
According to Dabengwa, when most ZIPRA went into the integration exercise most “came 
out tops because by that time they were already well trained to fit easily into the army. 
However, the ZANLA comrades complained when the ZIPRA comrades always excelled, 
and it was then decided that if number 5 unit of the battalion is headed by ZIPRA, number 6 
must be headed by ZANLA. (Sunday Mail, 21 July 2012).  One of the ZIPRA grievances 
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about favouritism in the ZNA integration exercise resonates with coloniality that seeks to 
fragment groups before structuring institutions. 
The tension in the ZNA was also a result of government’s decision to hire British troops to 
train the new army. The British Army worked together with General Peter Walls, 
Commander of the Rhodesian Army, who was retained to lead the army. The British and 
former Rhodesian security forces were perhaps the least apt forces to train and integrate the 
new army as they did not have a full understanding of the ethnic and political dynamics that 
surrounded ZANLA and ZIPRA tension. Perhaps integration and training of the new ZNA 
would have been better conducted by people with the knowledge of the dynamics. The 
disregard of local epistemologies for integration and training in preference of western 
epistemologies in part explains the failure of integration and gukurahundi violence. It was 
really awkward that colonial and settler personalities were placed at the helm of creating an 
army that was expected to defend and provide security to an African people. The result of the 
mess was the desertion of ex- ZIPRA members from the army citing persecution and unfair 
treatment. This failure to properly integrate the armies became one of the principal sources of 
gukurahundi violence. 
The unresolved political conflict between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF dating back to the 1960s 
also contributed to the failure to integrate the armies that consequently resulted in 
gukurahundi.  In November 1980, at a rally in Bulawayo Nkala, the then ZANU PF Minister 
of Finance, threatened to discipline PF ZAPU and its supporters” if they did not behave,” 
implying that the ZANU PF government was unhappy with PF ZAPU conduct in the post –
independence period.  This threat triggered clashes between the still armed ZANLA and 
ZIPRA forces that were housed in Entumbane, Bulawayo, awaiting demobilization and 
integration into the ZNA. Within a year unease between the two armies had led to fighting in 
other centres where the two guerrilla armies were accommodated, such as Connemara, 
Intabazinduna and Chitungwiza (CCJP and LRF: 1997).  
The discovery of arms on properties owned by PF ZAPU, the subsequent dismissal of Nkomo 
and other PF ZAPU ministers from government and the arrest of former ZIPRA commanders 
Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa on treason charges added to turbulence in the army 
and compounded an already dire security situation ( Stiff:2000). The courts acquitted the two 
but the government immediately re-detained them. The dismissal of Nkomo was particularly 
painful for ZIPRA soldiers who deserted the ZNA in droves in solidarity with their former 
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Commander-in-Chief and took up arms against government.  Nkomo was forced to flee into 
exile in Britain alleging state agents intended to kill him (Nkomo, 1984). Nkomo’s forced 
exile led to a further increase in ZIPRA forces abandoning the army with their weapons to 
join disenchanted disparate elements prepared to fight the ZANU PF government. Together 
they developed into what the ZANU government termed dissidents.  
Dzinesa (2006:2) ultimately sees the Lancaster House Agreement as responsible for the 
flawed ZNA exercise.  He argues that the 1979 agreement did not deal with rivalries amongst 
the different security forces and neither did it provide the framework for army integration 
resulting in a botched army integration exercise. The leaders at the Lancaster House 
Conference also failed to see that the guerrilla armies’ objectives of the armed struggle were 
secondary to guerrilla parties’ quest for power (Kriger, 2003:36).  As a result of this failure, 
ZANU PF took advantage of flaws in the integration system to put forward its factional 
forces as the national force while alienating ZIPRA (Raftopoulos: 2006).  The domination of 
the integration exercise by ZANU PF produced discontent and tensions within the army that 
led to the desertion of ZIPRA members, some of whom went on to become dissidents. The 
absence of stringent integration regulations also resulted in the remaining white Rhodesians 
in the army creating panic and insecurity amongst guerrillas by promising to punish the 
guerrilla armies upon the completion of the integration exercise. To Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011c) 
the threat issued by Rhodesians prompted the caching of weapons by both ZIPRA and 
ZANLA fearing that the Rhodesian soldiers might attempt to see through their threat.  On the 
whole the coercive nature of state-building bequeathed by the Lancaster house agreement that 
“paid little attention to the ethnic configuration of the inherited state, as well as the structures 
and institutions which enacted and produced ethnicity” bequeathed to Zimbabwe a future 
characterized by ethnic and political instability and disunity such as that which blighted the 
army integration exercise and triggered gukurahundi (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 
2007). 
6.2.6 Apartheid South Africa’s Destabilization of Zimbabwe 
As a proxy for western imperialism and capitalism with the responsibility of stemming the 
socialist/communist threat in southern Africa apartheid South Africa played a significant role 
in brewing troubles in Zimbabwe.  Some ZIPRA elements that deserted the ZNA were 
recruited and retrained by white Rhodesian soldiers that had left the army soon after 
independence to join the South African military and intelligence services (Stiff:2000). These 
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former Rhodesian servicemen saw themselves as continuing with the struggle against a 
communist terrorist government threatening the South African capitalist system. They 
retrained former ZIPRA fighters who were then later sent into Zimbabwe as Super ZAPU to 
fight against government forces and to commit acts of sabotage. Super ZAPU missions were 
carried out under "Operation Drama" the South African code name for covert support of 
dissidents in Zimbabwe as part of South Africa’s grand plan of weakening Frontline States 
(ibid).  
South Africa employed former members of the Rhodesian CIO as double agents. They were 
ideally placed to ignite an already combustible situation in Matabeleland. To further 
destabilize Zimbabwe, they exploited the mutual hostility between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF 
to further entrench the wedge between the two parties.  The act of sabotage at Inkomo 
Barracks in August 1981, and the destruction of several Zimbabwean Air force jets in an 
attack on the Thornhill Airbase in July 1982 were part of this scheme (Mashingaidze, 2010: 
84-85).  South Africa also used misinformation as a tool to foster an atmosphere of suspicion, 
mistrust and insecurity thus exacerbating the already strained relations between ZANU PF 
and PF ZAPU. The 1997 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal 
Resources Foundation report reveals that PF ZAPU was often blamed for various events, 
which were in fact often at least partly the work of South African agents (CCJP and LRF 
1997:40). It has thus been noted that independence in 1980 did not mean that capitalist 
imperialist South Africa would cease to interfere in Zimbabwe’s affairs. South Africa in 
furtherance of the agenda of global capitalist powers sought to ensure that Zimbabwe did not 
fall under communist control and therefore played a significant role in generating the 1980s 
violence in Zimbabwe. 
6.3 VIOLENCE IN THE MATABELELAND AND MIDLANDS PROVINCES 
The previous section discussed the factors that provided fertile ground for ethno-political 
violence that engulfed Matabeleland and Midlands and the emergence of dissidents. This 
section explores the nature of banditry in Matabeleland and Midlands and the government’s 
reaction to the problem. It also examines the contribution of capitalist imperialists to the 
nature of violence that engulfed the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. 
The discourse has highlighted how the ceasefire agreement reached at the Lancaster House 
Conference failed to adequately disarm rival guerrilla armies and to provide a sound 
framework for the integration of the guerrilla armies into the Rhodesian army. This resulted 
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in the persecution and desertion of former ZIPRA members from the Zimbabwe National 
Army. Some of the deserters became dissidents after teaming up with bands of disgruntled 
former ZIPRA members operating in the Matabeleland and Midlands Provinces.  
The years 1982 to 1987 mark a period in Zimbabwe’s history known as the dissident era. The 
dissidents were responsible for attacks on government infrastructure and installations as well 
as rape, robbery, murder, attacks on tourists, government personnel and civilians. Civilian 
attacks often targeted Shona speakers, particularly those in the Midlands district of 
Mberengwa (Mashingaidze, 2010: 85). Alexander et al (2000) identify three categories of 
dissidents. The first category was that of the ex-ZIPRA dissidents that were loyal to PF 
ZAPU although hard proof that they took instructions from it is yet to be availed. The second 
group was that of South African backed Super ZAPU armed units discussed in the preceding 
section and the last is that of criminal elements taking advantage of the lawlessness and 
security situation in Matabeleland.  
From late 1983, the dissidents presumed to be loyal to PF ZAPU operated from three zones in 
Matabeleland and parts of Midlands. The Western region was under the command of a 
dissident called Tulane, the Northern region was under the command of three successive 
dissidents, first Gilbert Sitshela, then Mdawini, and then  Masikisela, while the Southern 
region was under the command of a man called "Brown". Each region had a commander and 
a few platoons of 15 to 30 men, with sections of up to five men (CCJP and LRF, 1997:42). 
The dissidents’ population was not large. They numbered no more than around 400 at their 
peak but were still able to cause a lot of mayhem and create an atmosphere of insecurity 
amongst the population. They disrupted government’s development projects and threatened 
regime security. In response integrated security units and the North-Korean trained Fifth 
Brigade were deployed into Matabeleland and Midlands to deal with the insurgency. To Rich 
(1983:501) the ZANU PF regime had learnt little from the independence struggle. It once 
again sought to resolve long term political problems through military means. In an interview 
with Mugabe, Donald Trelford, the Editor of The Guardian newspaper in the early 1980s and 
credited with breaking the story of gukurahundi to the outside world, reveals that when he 
asked Mugabe “if he would consider a political rather than a military solution in 
Matabeleland “he replied bluntly: 'The solution is a military one. Their grievances are 
unfounded” (newzimbabwe.com, 12 March 2000).  
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The mandate of the security forces led by the Fifth Brigade was to deal with the dissident 
problem by any means necessary.  The operation was dubbed gukurahundi. The violence 
turned out to be ethno-political in nature as many Ndebele speaking and PF ZAPU supporters 
were killed by the predominantly Shona and ZANU PF sympathetic government security 
forces. The campaign to flush out dissidents was brutal and mirrored colonial atrocities. It 
resulted in the deaths of an estimated 20 000 people (CCJP and LRF: 1997). 
The Fifth Brigade tortured, harassed, raped, detained and killed civilians they suspected of 
providing dissidents with material and logistical support. Some were shot dead in public 
executions, often after being forced to dig their own graves in front of family and fellow 
villagers. Some of the victims of the Fifth Brigade campaign were thrown down mine shafts 
or burned alive in huts (ibid). Life in Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands during 
gukurahundi was terror laden. Just like under colonialism terror was employed as a mode of 
violence to subjugate PF ZAPU and the Ndebele.  One feature of coloniality is the disregard 
and devaluation of life.  The way Ndebele speakers and PF ZAPU supporters’ lives were 
extinguished by the Fifth Brigade reflects the reproduction of coloniality as the ZANU PF 
government saw them as what Mignolo (2009) refers to as “dispensable bare lives” living in 
Fanon’s (1968) zone of being and lacking ontological resistance in the eyes of the dominant 
ZANU PF ( Fanon:1952, Maldonado-Torres: 2007). The extreme brutality with which 
security forces sought to end banditry in Matabeleland lingers in the memories of the victims, 
making hopes of achieving future national unity difficult.   
The government cordoned off Matabeleland and imposed strict curfews that restricted access 
to areas where the Fifth Brigade operated, thus enabling it to place a blanket over the 
atrocities. Information regarding security force excesses did however leak out but the world 
at large believed the ZANU PF government’s propaganda that the disturbances in 
Matabeleland were all about violence perpetrated by PF ZAPU supporting dissidents rather 
than the largely one‐sided massacre and oppression of civilians that the conflict had turned 
out to be (Eppel : 2009). A commission of enquiry established on 13 September 1983 chaired 
by Justice Chihambakwe to investigate Fifth Brigade activities in Matabeleland North never 
had its findings published; even at the time of writing these findings are yet to see the light of 
day. It is not within the scope of this study to provide a detailed account of the government 
campaign in Matabeleland and the Midlands. One can refer to the Catholic Commission for 
Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation Report on the 1980s disturbances in 
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces for a more detailed explanation.  
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Ndebele speaking people in Matabeleland and Midlands were the main targets of the largely 
Shona speaking Fifth Brigade and other state security units. This was partly a result of the 
Shona having cultivated negative feelings towards the Ndebele by passing on to their children 
stories about the Ndebele crossing the Limpopo from South Africa to settle in Zimbabwe 
where they conducted raids which involved the confiscation of cattle, food, strong young men 
and beautiful women (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008b:34-35; ZCBC, 2009:2). Basing on these 
stories negative perceptions of the Ndebele filtered to the Fifth Brigade. Their attacks on the 
Ndebele were in part driven more by a desire to revenge for 19th century Ndebele raids rather 
than to contain the insurgency in Matabeleland.  
Ndebele speaking people were also targeted as they were seen as Nkomo sympathizers given 
the massive support he enjoyed in the Matabeleland provinces evidenced by PF ZAPU’s 
victory in all Matabeleland seats in the 1980 elections. Given this state of affairs state 
security units perceived all Ndebele as supporters of dissidents loyal to Nkomo and PF ZAPU 
and thus candidates for liquidation. This is despite the fact that dissidents were not welcome 
in Ndebele speaking areas from which they operated. This kind of reasoning was 
characteristic of how coloniality- produced imperial tribal reductionism dealt a major blow to 
peace and national unity in post-independence Zimbabwe. 
Mashingaidze (2005:85) states that although the state security units mainly targeted the 
Ndebele, the Shona were also attacked if they were perceived to be amenable to the dissident 
cause, especially those that fell under the PF ZAPU spheres of influence during the liberation 
struggle, such areas as Hurungwe and Gokwe. All in all, Fifth Brigade violence was largely 
justified in political and tribal terms; an attack on the Ndebele was an attack on PF ZAPU and 
attack on PF ZAPU was seen as an attack on Ndebele (Alexander et al, 2000). To Nkomo 
(1984) cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b), the Fifth Brigade was a ‘political army’ fighting a 
‘political’ if not purely partisan cause that was justified in ethnic terms. Santos (2007) 
concept of abyssal thinking is relevant for an understanding of gukurahundi violence. PF 
ZAPU, ex-ZIPRA and the Ndebele were labeled enemies of the state living below the abyssal 
line and thus worthy of punishment. The appropriation of enemy-hood to Africans made it 
easy for the state’s repressive machinery to unleash violence on them. 
According to Mignolo (2013) colonial subjects regurgitate, relive, and re-enact experiences 
of colonialism. The violence and oppression that continues to engulf the formerly colonized 
parts of the developing world are a result of the experiences of liberators that in fighting 
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against colonial rule adopted the former colonizers’ oppressive tendencies (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 
2012). These liberators have unleashed terror of a similar nature on their populations. To 
make his case Ndlovu-Gatsheni cites Friedrich Nietzsche (1990:102) who echoes Fanon by 
arguing that: “He who fights with monsters should look to it that he himself does not become 
a monster…” Implied by Ndlovu-Gatsheni is that the ZANU PF leadership that suffered 
colonial brutality and repression gave the people of Matabeleland a similar kind of treatment 
during gukurahundi. The ZANU PF government found comfort in using colonial legislation 
to allow its security forces to operate unhindered in Matabeleland just like Smith had justified 
the Rhodesia Front excesses in the fight against guerrillas on draconian colonial legislation. 
Colonial situations were therefore evidently continuing albeit in independent Zimbabwe. 
The persistence of colonial situations was seen in July 1982, when the government 
reintroduced colonial laws such as the Indemnity and Compensation Bill first used in 1975 to 
grant immunity from prosecution to government agencies. The intention was to protect 
security units and provide them with greater latitude in the campaign against dissidents and 
their perceived supporters in Matabeleland and the Midlands. The Emergency Powers 
(Maintenance of Law and Order 1960) regulations were also reactivated. These gave security 
units sweeping powers of arrest and detention without trial, the right to control meetings, and 
so on. Using emergency powers, the Government had the right to override almost all 
fundamental rights in existence under the Constitution if this was deemed necessary to 
maintain law and order (CCJP and LRF, 1997).  
In order to further buttress the argument that the Zimbabwean state had become a monster 
devouring its own children Kevin Woods, a former CIO officer that the Zimbabwean 
government once detained and who published The Kevin Woods Story in the Shadow of 
Mugabe’s Gallows, a book that details among other things government’s involvement in 
gukurahundi atrocities, argues that the ZANU PF government created dissidents, planted 
them in Matabeleland and created an excuse for the Fifth Brigade to be deployed in the 
region to destroy ZAPU and its supporters by any means necessary (Woods, 2008).  
Atrocities that were committed in Zimbabwe were not only perpetrated by PF ZAPU 
sympathetic dissidents and the Fifth Brigade but also by South African sponsored Super 
ZAPU that operated mainly in southern Matabeleland and were no more than 100 in number 
(Ibid). Faced with the involvement of a more economically and militarily powerful force in 
the form of South Africa.  Mugabe’s government did the unthinkable in its quest to destroy 
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PF ZAPU and the dissidents. It found it tactically prudent to work with the South African 
Defence Forces against the Soviet backed Umkhonto we Sizwe fighting for independence 
against apartheid South Africa. Bi-annual meetings between the Central Intelligence 
Organization (CIO) and their counterparts in the South African Defence Force were held in 
1982 and 1983. From this alliance Mugabe’s government hoped to obtain security 
intelligence from South Africa regarding ZIPRA operations and in exchange it pledged to 
deny the Umkhonto we Sizwe Zimbabwean bases from which to operate and to destroy its 
historic link with ZIPRA (Scarnecchia, 2011:88).  Imperialist interests represented by South 
Africa were therefore able to worm their way into the 1980s disturbances with the resultant 
effect of exacerbating the conflict.  
The South African policy of destabilizing Zimbabwe through Super ZAPU worsened the 
relationship between PF ZAPU and ZANU-PF, prompting the latter led government to retain 
the State of Emergency throughout the 1980s and to deploy more security forces and to place 
more restrictive measures in Matabeleland. By and large in the 1980s, Mugabe could at that 
time be therefore be perceived as both puppet and tyrant. By presiding over the massacre of 
over 20 000 Ndebele speaking people thought to be PF-ZAPU and dissident supporters in the 
Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces Mugabe was exuding tyranny. By working with 
apartheid South Africa to destroy Soviet ally PF ZAPU in exchange for diplomatic, military 
and financial support from Britain, Mugabe was embracing puppetry. This is reflective of 
coloniality, a power matrix characterized by entrapments and entanglements that negated the 
search for unity and peace in Zimbabwe. 
6.4 INDIFFERENCE, COLLUSION AND THE SILENCE OF COLONIALITY  
This section discusses the role of the West in the violence that engulfed Matabeleland and the 
Midlands provinces in the 1980s. In an interview with the Sunday Mail, 15-21 February 
2015, one of Zimbabwe’s two newly appointed vice presidents Phelekezela Mphoko, a 
former member of ZAPU who was once incarcerated by the ZANU PF government in the 
1980s, had the following to say about the West’s complicity in gukurahundi; 
... I have always said the post-Independence Gukurahundi was a conspiracy of the West. 
This I maintain …People can say what they want, but that was a Western 
conspiracy…Because their (West’s) concern was South Africa, they wanted to protect 
their interests in South Africa from the Mozambican front and the Angolan front that 
side…Come Zimbabwe becomes independent: South African gets the same threat now. 
Zimbabwe is independent; the front is open…So what do they do? They create – from a 
myth, from nothing: ‘Ah, Zapu wants to overthrow you (the Zanu Government)’. (This 
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was) in order to justify, to create something…You can never hear the British 
condemning that – never! They can’t say anything. They never said anything. They 
never condemned anything because it was their baby…They knew what they were doing 
because they were protecting South Africa. So that point should be emphasised; it is very 
important (Sunday Mail, February 15-21 2015). 
The British Conservative Party that was in power when Matabeleland atrocities occurred had 
long foreseen gukurahundi.  Rich (1983:500) argues that Britain had predicted tribal conflicts 
between the Shona and the Ndebele, the implementation of a one-party state, economic 
decline as the whites left, and an increasing disregard for the rule of law with the coming of 
independence in Zimbabwe. Despite this prediction Britain did nothing to stop it. Instead 
when the Matabeleland massacres began in 1982, so unconcerned was Britain that in August 
it even agreed to provide further training to the Fifth Brigade officers. It went on to 
strengthen bilateral relations with Harare. Aid to Zimbabwe was increased by 10 million 
pounds (Taylor and Williams, 2002:553). In 1984, the British gave the Zimbabwe 
government new planes to replace the ones destroyed at Thornhill Airbase by South African 
saboteurs, thus abetting the gukurahundi campaign. For the British and Americans, Mugabe’s 
government at war with PF ZAPU but also co-operating with apartheid South Africa was a 
strategic regional partner in the fight against the spread of socialist expansion in southern 
Africa.  
There was no attempt by the British to rein in the ZANU PF government at the time. This 
was because the ZANU PF government was protecting British economic and political 
interests from ex-ZIPRA guerrillas allegedly receiving support from the Soviet Union.  
Mpofu (2013b:13) lambasts the West’s duplicity when he writes that the British and the 
Americans, “self- appointed prophets of human rights, stood by as the Mugabe regime 
slaughtered political enemies, the Ndebele people, with impunity, as long as Western 
business interests were secure in Zimbabwe.”  
In December 1982, Ronald Reagan joined Britain in turning a blind eye to the inferno in 
Matabeleland. The Americans viewed  Zimbabwe as a non-Soviet southern African state that 
with sufficient funding and support could help maintain a balance against Soviet and Cuban 
influence in Angola, Mozambique and to a certain extent in Zambia (Scarnecchia, 2011:89 ). 
The ZANU PF government thus received a significant amount of Cold War funding from the 
US. It pledged to assist Zimbabwe with military aid, declaring that the “stability and security 
of Zimbabwe, a pivotal new state striving for the support of the Western democracies to 
achieve national unity and economic and social justice after years of civil strife, is important 
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to US interests in Southern Africa and to world peace” (Phimister, 2009:476). The Americans 
had in fact seen the peaceful transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe as “the greatest reverse 
the Russians had suffered in Africa for years” as it had effectively blocked the Russians from 
gaining a foothold in Zimbabwe (Scarnecchia, 2011: 90). The military and diplomatic support 
rendered to Mugabe by the West during the Cold War gave ZANU PF the space to carry out 
the gukurahundi to crush PF ZAPU and consolidate its control of the state (Scarnecchia, 
2011: 87).   
While the British and the US decision to ignore gukurahundi massacres could be regarded as 
indifference, their provision of military aid and diplomatic aid to the ZANU PF government 
could be regarded as collusion with the regime. Scarnecchia ( 2011:96) makes reference  to a  
Panorama documentary that investigated Britain’s support for Mugabe during the 
Gukurahundi in which Sir Martin Ewans, the British High Commissioner in Harare at the 
time, admitted on camera that his instructions from London were to ‘steer clear of it’. Other 
countries like Sweden acquiesced to the use of coercion by African leaders as instruments of 
state building. Before becoming the Swedish ambassador to Zimbabwe Kristina Svensson 
when asked about her country’s silence over human rights abuses in Africa in the 1970s and 
1980s responded by saying that “it was a period of post-colonial consolidation, the period of 
one-party rule was necessary and Sweden supported it” (Hill, 2003:78).  
British criticism of ZANU PF’s authoritarianism and human rights record in the new 
millennium has thus confounded many because not a word of criticism from Margaret 
Thatcher’s conservative government was uttered during the Matabeleland massacres.  The 
interests of coloniality of power were in the preservation of the ZANU PF regime even 
though it was committing human rights violations. As long as the ZANU PF regime did not 
threaten capitalist interests the West was quite comfortable with the situation. Ironically when 
human rights abuses of the magnitude of gukurahundi or even smaller visit the whites  and 
threaten capitalist interest the western leaders are quick to respond and douse the flames as 
was the case in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.  The swift response with which western 
dominated multilateral institutions attend to crises afflicting whites while slow to respond to 
problems affecting blacks suggests that these institutions in line with notions of the 
coloniality of being regard the lives of the whites as more valuable than those of blacks.  
Phimister (2009:476) argues that silence over gukurahundi was not confined to the influences 
of the coloniality of being but overlapped to the coloniality of power. For instance, Masire, 
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the president of Zimbabwe’s neighbour Botswana, offered sanctuary to thousands of PF 
ZAPU and Ndebele speakers fleeing gukurahundi violence at Dukwe refugee camp but 
heaped praise on Mugabe on a state visit in August 1983. It can be argued that his silence on 
gukurahundi was a consequence of his country’s dependence on western capitalist economic 
support that he did not want to upset. Silence on gukurahundi both globally and locally gave 
the Zimbabwean government latitude to continue with repression uncensored to the detriment 
of peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  
6.5 TERMS OF THE UNITY ACCORD 
According to Sibanda (1985) post-independence talks to discuss unity between PF ZAPU and 
ZANU PF began as early as 1981. Other attempts were made in 1983 but these efforts did not 
yield results. Following PF ZAPU’s acquisition of all Matabeleland seats in the 1985 
elections and the continuation of disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces 
the two parties saw a dire need for talks to end the violence. Negotiations for unity talks took 
off after the elections but broke down in April 1986 mainly over the issue of the new name 
for the party.  PF ZAPU preferred that the new party be called the Zimbabwe Unity Party but 
ZANU PF insisted that the new party remain ZANU PF. Following the suspension of talks 
the government increased the heat on Nkomo who had returned from exile, PF ZAPU, 
dissidents and their perceived supporters. PF ZAPU offices were closed country wide and its 
activities banned. Nkomo’s personal security was at high risk especially after allegations of 
harbouring dissidents were leveled against him (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009a, Mashingaidze: 
2005). In light of this, Nkomo eventually capitulated and agreed to the resumption of talks in 
1987.  
The talks culminated in the signing of the Unity Accord that merged PF-ZAPU with ZANU-
PF to form the United ZANU PF on 22 December 1987, thus terminating the violence.  
Shari Eppel (2009) succinctly outlines the terms of the Unity Accord below; 
1. That ZANU PF and PF ZAPU have irrevocably committed themselves to unite under one 
political party. 
2. That the unity of the two political parties shall be achieved under the name Zimbabwe 
African National Union (Patriotic Front), in short ZANU PF. 
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3. That Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe shall be the First Secretary and President of ZANU 
PF. 
4. That ZANU PF shall have two Second Secretaries and Vice Presidents who shall be 
appointed by the First Secretary and President of the Party. 
5. That ZANU PF shall seek to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the guidance of 
Marxist‐Leninist principles. 
6. That ZANU PF shall seek to establish a One Party State in Zimbabwe. 
7. That the leadership of ZANU PF shall abide by the Leadership Code. 
8. That the existing structures of ZANU PF and PF ZAPU shall be merged in accordance 
with the letter and spirit of this Agreement. 
9. That both parties shall, in the interim, take immediate vigorous steps to eliminate and end 
the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland. 
10. That ZANU PF and PF ZAPU shall convene their respective Congress to give effect to 
this Agreement within the shortest possible time. 
11. That, in the interim, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe is vested with full powers to 
prepare for the implementation of this Agreement and to act in the name and authority of 
ZANU PF.  
There was also a gentleman’s agreement to the effect that by mutual agreement one vice 
President and the Chairperson of the united party would come from PF ZAPU. Other than 
this concession, Eppel (2009) notes that there were no other commitments made by ZANU 
PF in the signed unity agreement. After the signing of the Unity Accord, President Mugabe 
announced that there would be an amnesty for all dissidents provided they lay down their 
arms. Amnesty was extended beyond dissidents to security units responsible for human rights 
violations as well as criminals languishing in jail (CCJP and LRF: 1997, Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 
2009a, Mashingaidze: 2005). The final seal to the Unity Accord came at the joint congress of 
both PF ZAPU and ZANU PF in December of 1989. As a way of promoting peace and nation 
building Nkomo was promoted from Senior Minister in the President’s office to vice-
president joining the other vice president, Simon Muzenda, while Mugabe retained 
presidency.  
186 
 
The agreement came as relief to the people of Matabeleland and Midlands who had suffered 
much of the brunt of the conflict. It is estimated 20 000 people died due to gukurahundi 
violence (CCJP and LRF: 1997). There was a severe disruption and a halting of development 
projects in the Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces. By early 1984, the disturbances had 
resulted in nearly 500 000 acres of commercial farmland in Matabeleland being abandoned 
by fearful white farmers (Ncube: 1989). There was also the destruction of infrastructure and 
attacks on schools, resettlement schemes, and commercial farms.  This forced the government 
to shift some of its resources towards the provision of security. The consumption of state 
development resources in security provision retarded the development.  
6.6 CRITICISM OF THE ACCORD 
The Unity Accord was an attempt to attend to issues inadequately addressed and ignored by 
the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement and the immediate post-independence peace and nation 
building process that bequeathed to Zimbabwe a huge reconciliation and integration task. It 
has been criticized for the manner in which it was reached and its failure to provide a solid 
base from which to foster sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation.  The accord was not a 
genuine commitment by parties to negotiate peace as a better option than continuing with 
violence. It was a product of unrelenting state sanctioned violence aimed at coercively 
imposing ZANU PF’s will on PF ZAPU. It exhibited the restrictions that are concomitant 
with coercion as a force for nation-building. 
 A quick glance at the text of the agreement confirms that for ZANU PF the “explicit and sole 
objective was the complete annihilation of PF ZAPU as a separate entity” (Eppel 2009:8).  
After the battering PF ZAPU and the Ndebele were invited into government and a Shona-
imagined nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2008b).  This echoes the manner in which European 
colonialists only summoned Africans into the state after vanquishing them. Clause 3 of the 
Unity Accord states that “Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe shall be the First Secretary and 
President of ZANU PF” while clause 4 reads “That ZANU PF shall have two Second 
Secretaries and Vice Presidents who shall be appointed by the First Secretary and President 
of the Party.” The position given to Mugabe as First Secretary and President of the united 
ZANU PF with powers to appoint reveals that the Unity Accord was heavily skewed towards 
ZANU PF.  The failure by the Unity Accord to dilute Mugabe’s powers allowed for the 
continuation of pre-Unity Accord patterns of power to persist in Zimbabwe the same way the 
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Internal Settlement of 1978 and the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement failed to check the 
powers of the retreating authorities.  
Eppel (2009) is of the opinion that the agreement entailed the submersion of PF ZAPU into 
ZANU PF rather than the sharing of power; ZANU PF surrendered little to PF ZAPU. This 
was shown by the continued use of the name “ZANU PF” and the cockerel as the symbol of 
the united party while denying the use of any of PF ZAPU’s symbols. To reinforce the fact 
that PF ZAPU was swallowed Sithole (1991:150) points out that;  
Nowhere in the eleven-point agreement does Nkomo's name appear, but Mugabe's 
appears three times. (Nkomo's name only appears as a signatory to the document.) 
Nkomo should be praised for the bitter pill he swallowed because his humility brought 
peace to Matabeleland. Eight of the eleven points are pregnant with victorious Mugabe's 
ideas. Where mention is made of PF-ZAPU it is either to indicate that henceforth it shall 
be called ZANU (PF) or that its leadership shall take 'immediate vigorous steps to help 
eliminate and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland'.  
The fact that the being of the ZANU PF party remained unaltered while that of PF ZAPU was 
diminished reinforces the notion that coloniality permeated the agreement.  ZANU PF 
perceived itself as an ontologically superior political formation to PF ZAPU.  
Despite having been subsumed in ZANU PF, PF ZAPU claimed to have retained its political 
identity. One ZAPU official said “a woman doesn’t lose her maiden name even if she uses 
her husband’s name” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2008b).   Loyalty was given first to the party in the 
marriage than to the united movement. The above statement from the PF ZAPU official lends 
credence to arguments that the PF ZAPU-ZANU PF unity was a product of political 
expedience rather than a genuine commitment to peace and unity.  
According to the terms of the Unity Accord the PF ZAPU leadership was supposed to take 
immediate steps to help eliminate banditry and end the insecurity and violence prevalent in 
Matabeleland. This clause implied that PF ZAPU was responsible for causing the 
disturbances in Matabeleland and was thus supposed to end it. There was no provision in the 
agreement that required ZANU PF to take any action to end hostilities in Matabeleland. 
Putting the blame on PF ZAPU was not reconciliatory but provocative, it was likely to arouse 
feelings of resentment among a large number of innocent PF ZAPU supporters in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands provinces that had to endure hardship and state sanctioned 
violence.  It should be highlighted that the template used to produce the agreement was 
framed and presented by the ZANU PF party. ZANU PF in tandem with notions of 
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coloniality regarded itself as epistemologically superior to PF ZAPU whose contribution to 
the peace document was undermined.  
 The granting of amnesty and clemency for dissidents and state security units by the Unity 
Accord was condemnable as it denied justice for both dissidents and government forces. By 
granting amnesty the politicians were taking away the victims’ right to forgive perpetrators of 
violence. A truth-telling commission should have been set up before the state appropriated 
forgiving powers for itself given the fact that the process of psychological healing for any 
victim of abuse is being given the opportunity to recount that suffering to a supportive, non-
judgmental audience (CCJP and LRF, 1997:17).   
Apparently it was not in the interest of government for truth to be known as a precondition 
for the signing of the Unity Accord. The Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry Report into 
disturbances in Matabeleland and Midlands and the Dumbutshena Commission of Inquiry 
Report on the Entumbane battles were not published (CCPJ and LRF: 1997). These reports 
could have provided the starting point for healing but their suppression blocked truth and 
justice processes which are integral to peace, unity and reconciliation.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2003a) argues that peace and reconciliation can only be achieved where 
justice is served, the guilty are recognized publicly and victims restored their honour, but this 
was not the case with the Unity Accord. The victims were not in any way restituted nor were 
the perpetrators of violence punished.  State officials, ZANU PF supporters and security 
details were not brought before the justice system to answer for gukurahundi excesses 
because the coloniality of power placed the ZANU PF government and its supporters above 
the law. 
While the Unity Accord ended the disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, it failed to 
foster reconciliation and healing. It did not establish a truth and reconciliation commission 
that would have created space for acknowledgment, truth-telling and apology which may 
have possibly brought closure to the gukurahundi issue. The Accord did not also make 
provisions for memorialisation or ritualization but instead preferred to elect silence and 
amnesia as reconciliation mantra, thus making the achievement of unity difficult. By opting 
for silence and amnesia the Unity Accord left the ground fertile for seeds of bitterness, 
resentment and revenge to germinate, which bodes ill for peace, unity, reconciliation and 
development in Zimbabwe.  This is because “it is the axe that forgets what it has done, but 
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the tree that has been cut does not forget,” as the old proverb goes (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009a). 
As long as the socio-economic, political and psychological problems the victims experienced 
were not addressed little headway would be made to reconcile, heal and unite the people of 
Matabeleland and the Midlands with their counterparts in the Northern provinces. 
The government may not have apologized for gukurahundi but Mugabe acknowledged the 
violence. At the memorial of the late Vice President Nkomo on 2 July 2000 Mugabe referred 
to the 1980s violence as a ‘moment of madness”. “It was an act of madness; we killed each 
other and destroyed each other’s property. It was wrong and both sides were to blame. We 
have had difference, a quarrel. We engaged ourselves in a reckless and unprincipled fight” 
(Stiff, 2000:228). Dabengwa sees this admission as inadequate for reconciliation. The 
following is an excerpt from an interview he had with Munyaradzi Huni of the Sunday Mail;  
H: But, Cde Dabengwa, the President described what happened as “a moment of 
madness.” 
DD: Is that an apology? Do you call that an apology? When the amnesty was declared 
and even those people, the so-called dissidents, who were responsible for what 
happened, they should have offered an apology to the government for all that happened 
and the government was supposed to do the same. We should have a public apology 
from those dissidents that were operating at that time and then the element of healing 
should have immediately taken effect (Sunday Mail ,21 July 2012).  
The closest the government has came to regretting gukurahundi came from the late former 
Defence Minister, Moven Mahachi , who is reported to have said in the Sunday Mail of 6 
September 1992 that:  "...events during that period are regretted and should not be repeated 
by anybody, any group of people or any institution in this country" ( CCJP and LRF:1997). 
Other government ministers have not shown contrition and have blatantly refused to 
apologize or show regret. Zimbabwe’s Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa, then ZANU 
PF secretary for administration, is quoted as having said in 2004;  “Politically, if the ZAPU 
leadership had accepted that they had lost the elections and that the number of seats they had 
were equal to their popularity and convey(ed) that message to their forces, then it could not 
have happened. It was necessary for them to have accepted democratic decisions” 
(Zimbabwesituation 15 November 2004). Another senior ZANU PF official and former 
government Minister, Nathan Shamuyarira, asked if he ever regretted the gukurahundi 
atrocities, is reported to have told a conference on national reconciliation in Vumba: "No, I 
don’t regret. They (5 Brigade) were doing a job to protect the people",” (Zimbabwe Focus, 5 
June 2014). These comments try to exonerate the ZANU PF government from culpability and 
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explain government’s non-committal attitude towards the compensation of gukurahundi 
victims. 
The Unity Accord lost an opportunity to extend the measure of political and ethnic unity 
gained between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF and the Ndebele and Shona to other ethnic groups 
and political formations. By not including other political parties and ethnic groups in the 
imagination of Zimbabwe after the Unity Accord the opportunity for comprehensive nation 
building and reconciliation was also lost. Minority groups like the Shangani, Kalanga, Tonga 
and Venda, located in the marginal borders with little economic development felt 
marginalized and complained of political and cultural domination by both the Shona and 
Ndebele (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007: 289) quoted in Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2013b:224).  In addition, because the accord focused on inter-tribal Ndebele –Shona schism, 
it did not address conflicts among the various Shona sub-ethnic groups such as the Karanga, 
the Manyika, the Zezuru, the Korekore and the Ndau, which have accused and counter-
accused each other of ethnic favouritism. Coloniality as has been discussed earlier in the 
discourse transcends racism and overlaps into the realm of ethnicity.  The marginalization of 
small ethnic groups by the larger, more dominant ones in Zimbabwe in the Unity Accord was 
evidence of coloniality reproducing itself at the level of ethnicity.  
The accord did not just exclude other ethnic groups in the framing of a peace charter for 
Zimbabwe but the other political players as well. The absence of civil society and other 
political parties meant that simmering grievances in society that had been overshadowed by 
gukurahundi continued to be ignored. The failure to attend to societal disgruntlements 
resulted in students, opposition and the labour movement protests over bad economic and 
political governance in the immediate post-Unity Accord period. 
Another weakness of the Unity Accord was that it was minimalist in that it merely sought to 
create space in government for leading political figures in ZANU PF and PF ZAPU.  It 
actually ignored, ridiculed, and sidelined prominent nationalist figures that fell outside the 
new political arrangement. These include the likes of Muzorewa, Chikerema, Sithole, later 
Tekere and others. The alienation of these figures who contributed immensely to the struggle 
for independence held back nation-building and unity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2008a:82-83).  
The accord was in fact an exclusionist top-down project in which Mugabe and Nkomo 
appended their signatures to the agreement, announced to the people that PF ZAPU and 
ZANU PF were now one. The agreement was achieved without grassroots consultation. The 
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Ndebele and the Shona were told to forget the past and start working together for 
development. This was naive given that the state had not instituted any programmes for 
healing and reconciliation that are integral to unity and development. As a result of this, as 
Mashingaidze (2005: 87) argues, the Unity Accord came to be “perceived in personality 
terms rather than as a communal and national undertaking. To the grassroots the accord 
symbolized nothing more than a piece of paper that contained the signatures of the political 
elite.  
Despite the destruction of infrastructure and the retardation of development in Matabeleland 
and Midlands due to gukurahundi, the Unity Accord made no promises to these regions in 
terms of future development. For unity to be meaningful, it should be accompanied by 
reconstruction and economic development.  By neglecting the need to develop and 
rehabilitate infrastructure the Unity Accord permanently alienated many people from these 
provinces. Ncube (1989:318) cites the state’s main daily news paper for the southern region, 
The Chronicle, as reporting that “there was a poor turnout at meetings in Matabeleland by an 
integration taskforce to form new cells for the united ZANU PF party” (The Chronicle, July 
31 1988). This was a sign that the Unity Accord was not popularly embraced by the rank and 
file of PF ZAPU.   
The Unity Accord was a home grown project, just like Smith’s Internal Settlement.  ZANU 
PF like Smith’s regime during the Internal Settlement talks dictated the tempo, pace and 
agenda of the talks. The outcome was determined by an interested party that sought to end the 
violence and guarantee regime security, silence the opposition, pave the way for a one party 
state and political hegemony as is revealed by Mutasa, a cabinet minister and ZANU PF 
stalwart who stated that ‘unity was necessary for ZANU (PF) to achieve the long cherished 
goal of a one-party state, (Sithole, 1991:150). Therefore for one to conclude and say that the 
Unity Accord was a compromise and not surrender would not be inaccurate. Because the 
accord was reached after capitulation it was far from being a durable and a comprehensive 
conflict resolution mechanism.   
Ultimately, the Unity Accord did not alter the asymmetrical national political and ethnic 
power structure in Zimbabwe that privileges the Shona and the old ZANU PF. Most power 
continues to be located amongst the old ZANU PF guard from Mashonaland. In this power 
structure everything is considered from the perspective of the politics of region and ethnicity. 
The Matabeleland provinces largely populated by Ndebele speaking peoples continue to 
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suffer from marginalization from the more hegemonic Shona populated northern provinces. 
Most development resources are consumed in the north while the south is denied 
development projects. A good example is the government’s failure to fund the Matabeleland 
– Zambezi water project yet numerous new projects such as the Tokwe- Mukosi dam project 
have been inaugurated in Shona speaking provinces long after calls for water problems to be 
resolved in Matabeleland. The old ZANU PF and Shona controlled power structure can be 
argued to be responsible for ethno-political tensions that continue to engulf the country to the 
detriment of peace and development in Zimbabwe.  
Like on any dark cloud one can find a silver lining, the Unity Accord did manage to terminate 
the bloodshed of genocidal proportions and to end the insecurity that had come to 
characterize life in the Matabeleland and the Midlands. State resources that had been directed 
towards the suppression of banditry became available for other development priorities. 
Refugees from Dukwe camp in Botswana returned. The feud between politicians from 
Matabeleland and Mashonaland subsided allowing the two parties to work together on 
development projects that had come to a halt during the war. Although not by any great 
measure, a modicum of unity was achieved between the Shona and the Ndebele, allowing the 
two ethnic groups to co-exist and work together. The misery and suffering that had become 
part of day to day living came to an end and hope replaced despair. There was also hope that 
maybe the unity agreement might bring not just transition but transformation and 
development to Zimbabwe.  
6.7 LEGACY OF THE 1980s VIOLENCE AND THE UNITY ACCORD 
Following the merger with PF ZAPU, ZANU PF’s political dominance on Zimbabwe’s 
political landscape reached new proportions. It held 79 of the 100 seats in the House of 
Assembly. Its dominance of parliament enabled ZANU PF to make significant changes to the 
independence constitution.  Constitutional Amendment No 7 of 1987 created executive 
presidency which gave Mugabe monolithic powers to control parliament and make senior 
appointments with grave consequences for constitutionalism, political stability and peace in 
Zimbabwe.  ZANU PF’s dominance of parliament and the sweeping powers given to the 
executive through constitutional Amendment No 7 made Zimbabwe virtually a de facto one 
party state. 
The de facto one party state system in the post-unity period entrenched the ZANU PF 
hegemony. A new era was ushered in which anyone seen not to embrace the idea of a one-
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party state was seen as an enemy of unity, the united ZANU PF and government.  Unity was 
regarded by the government as synonymous with the idea of a one party state. A close 
analysis of the concept of a one party state system reveals that it has similarities with 
coloniality. Both seek dominance through authoritarian and undemocratic means.  The de 
facto one party political system that emerged after the Unity Accord led to government 
arrogance, unilateralism, intolerance and a decline in constitutionalism, critics of government 
called it a dictatorship. The powers of the rulers were scantly limited.  For instance, the 
ZANU PF dominated parliament became a rubber stamping institution, acceding to ESAP 
under instructions from the party executive without debate. The adoption of the IMF and WB 
imposed ESAP in 1990 became one of the main reasons for civil strife that engulfed 
Zimbabwe at the close of the 1990s decade. 
According to Ncube (1989) the conclusion of the Unity Accord allowed a host of 
discontented forces that had been held back  for fear of state excesses or that had not surfaced 
as they had either allied or sympathized with the state in the 1980s. The opposition, student 
movement and labour movement found space in the aftermath of the Unity Accord to criticize 
government on a host of its failings such as corruption and deteriorating standards of living. 
The rise of the opposition Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the aftermath of the Unity 
Accord to challenge the one party state plan and corruption heralded a return to the pre-unity 
atmosphere of division and fighting. Anti ZUM violence was unleashed on the population by 
the government with the resultant effect of negating the quest for peace and unity in 
Zimbabwe. 
The killing of the Ndebele by the Fifth Brigade and the denial of development for 
Matabeleland during gukurahundi sowed seeds of resentment among the Ndebele against 
both ZANU PF and the Shona people that has lasted well into the new millennium.  In spite 
of the termination of hostilities the region continues to suffer from the lack of development in 
the post-Unity Accord era. Expectation was that the Unity Accord would be followed by 
development to consolidate it or it would come as a reward to the people of Matabeleland for 
having accepted unity. A strong conviction has remained amongst the people of Matabeleland 
that the 1980s violence is the reason behind the political and ethnic discrimination and the 
lack of development (Alexander et al: 2000).  
According to Martinot (undated) the idea behind racialization/tribalization under colonialism 
was to create social categorizations that differentiated between who could access, control and 
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utilize resources. Through racialization/tribalization social inferiorization and superiorization 
emerged. People were given different positions in society. In colonial Zimbabwe if one was 
black they occupied the lower strata of society and performed menial work but if one was 
white one was usually accorded an office job.  With the signing of the Unity Accord a supra-
tribal political dispensation was envisioned but it has been difficult to achieve. Shona tribal 
groups have continued to dominate the political economy.  The country has been 
administered in the way the Shona imagine it.  Most leadership positions in the public and 
private sector in Matabeleland are occupied by Shona speaking people from the north and the 
bulk of student and staff vacancies in tertiary education institutions in the south are filled by 
Shona speaking people (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011c). In Zimbabwe’s post independence labour 
market belonging to the Shona tribe apparently enhances chances of landing a job in 
management while other tribal groups have to make do with inferior posts.  
 
For the most part state development resources are consumed in the north and hardly find their 
way to the south. Radical Matebele politicians in particular and the people of Matabeleland in 
general interpret this marginalization and deprivation of important development resources for 
Matabeleland as a continuation of ‘ZANU-PF’s disciplining of a dissident city’. The 
perception carried by the Ndebele is that they are being punished for past dissent by a Shona 
dominated government and this hardens feelings of resentment they have against the 
government and alienates them from identifying with Zimbabwe (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2007: 286).  To the Ndebele a feeling of being “second class” citizens in the 
Zimbabwean state has been engendered amongst them owing to their marginalization by the 
government. In fact, despite the Unity Accord an ethnically and politically hierachized power 
structure that privileges the Shona , the old ZANU PF  and Mashonaland provinces while 
marginalizing other ethnic groups, political actors and the Matabeleland provinces persists in 
Zimbabwe. 
Complaints by politicians from Matabeleland such as the late MP Sydney Malunga, the late 
Governor of Matabeleland North Welshman Mabhena and former ZANU-PF Politburo 
member Joshua Malinga regarding the region’s marginalization and the unequal sharing of 
the national cake have been to no avail. The systematic and unfair deprivation of the fruits of 
independence through the disproportionate reallocation of resources to the Shona-speaking 
people and to Harare, the capital, at the expense of Bulawayo has not stopped (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2008a:47). As a result of this the people of Matabeleland see the post-independence 
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state as an ethnocracy in existence to serve Shona interests at the expense of the Ndebele. Not 
only do the Shona dominate the government and private sector but their language has been 
hegemonic too. Shona personnel have tended to use the Shona language even when employed 
in areas that are predominantly inhabited by the Ndebele or speakers of other local languages.  
This is against the spirit of unity envisioned in the 1987 Unity Accord. 
 
There has been little change in the socio-economic status of the common man in 
Matabeleland since the Unity Accord. The backhanded treatment of the Matabeleland 
provinces in spite of the Unity Accord can be argued to be a consequence of the ZANU PF 
government continuing to see PF ZAPU, Ndebele speaking people and the south western 
regions of Zimbabwe as occupying a lower socio-political rank. The Shona and ZANU PF 
see themselves as ontologically denser than those of different ethnicity and political 
persuasion.  This mirrors colonial situations in which whites and the Rhodesia Front occupied 
higher echelons in social and political strata and ill-treated the blacks that they saw as 
inferior. Hierachization consistent with colonial society has been replicated at the level of 
ethnicity. This state of affairs has soured relations and compromised peace between the 
Shona and other ethnic groups, particularly the Ndebele who argue that the north receives 
greater funding from government because it is largely Shona populated.   
Some Matabeleland politicians have elected not to complain about Matabeleland’s lack of 
development but to defend the government’s failure to develop Matabeleland while amassing 
personal wealth.  Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2011c) laments this when he writes; “They 
[Matabeleland politicians] conduct themselves like colonial constables, whose brief is to 
represent Mugabe in Matabeleland, rather than to represent Matabeleland in government.” 
The locus of enunciation of former PF ZAPU politicians from Matabeleland and the 
Midlands has changed. They have begun to think and act as though they were originally 
ZANU PF or from the Zimbabwe’s Northern provinces. Some have begun to speak of the 
absence of development in Matabeleland as consequence of Ndebele people being “lazy and 
sleepy” (Zimeye, 1 October 2012). This echoes the sentiments of white colonizers that would 
argue that blacks were impoverished because they were lazy.  
Although the Matabeleland region has been neglected one should note that there are also 
other regions of Zimbabwe such as Chipinge in the Manicaland province, parts of Masvingo 
Province, Gokwe in the Midlands and  Omay in Mashonaland West that have suffered the 
same fate. It is also noteworthy that while the neglect and marginalization of Matabeleland 
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can be blamed on the post-independence government, it should be seen as a continuation of 
colonial tendencies. Historically the whites had little interest in the remote and sparsely 
populated areas of Binga in Matabeleland and this has persisted under an independent black 
government.  
Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2007:286) argue that the brutal and ethnic nature of the 
violence that engulfed Matabeleland hardened ethnic prejudice and aroused amongst the 
Ndebele a feeling that they were a different and unwanted social group, thus giving birth to 
Ndebele cultural nationalism, Ndebele particularism and radical Ndebele politics. To them, 
one of the gravest consequences of gukurahundi atrocities is that it reinforced the feeling of 
Ndebele-ness among the people of Matabeleland at the expense of being Zimbabwean, with 
the resultant effect of making national integration difficult to achieve.  
The lack of unity, the failure of national integration coupled with the neglect and 
marginalization of Matabeleland have hardened the determination by radical Ndebele 
politicians to entertain conflict provoking ideas of secession as a way of addressing their 
plight. This has culminated in the rise of the Mthwakazi Liberation Front, a political party 
whose agenda is to secure the secession of Matabeleland and parts of the Midlands from the 
rest of Zimbabwe. As a consequence of the marginalization of Matabeleland and Midlands 
and Shona control of economic, social and political space, radical Ndebele-oriented pressure 
groups have also emerged. These include Vukani Mahlabezulu, Imbovane Yamahlabezulu, as 
well as Mthwakazi Action Group and Mthwakazi People’s Congress. They have openly 
questioned the dominance of the Shona in employment in general, senior civil service, 
security and education as well as open neglect of economic development of Matabeleland and 
the Midlands regions (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011c). These groups have not only challenged 
ZANU PF’s political power but also the Shona identity, thus laying the bases for ethnic-based 
identity related conflict. The actions of these groups that are sometimes perceived by the state 
media to border on tribalism have also attracted support and funding from western NGOs and 
civil society groups that sympathize with the experiences and plight of the people of 
Matabeleland.  
 
 It appears inter-tribal grievances, just like under colonialism have apparently been used to 
advance the colonial and imperialist agenda. Former colonial powers have been accused by 
the Zimbabwean state media of working through NGOs to redeploy tribalism as part of an 
effort to foment division, disunity and disharmony in an attempt to asphyxiate sustainable 
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political and socio-economic development (The Sunday Mail, January 11 2015).   Some of 
the civil society groups with political agendas to tarnish and weaken the ZANU PF regime 
have sown seeds of division among Zimbabweans. They have deployed millions of dollars 
into keeping Ndebele memories of gukurahundi fresh yet not putting a penny into ensuring 
that the people of Matabeleland do not forget the brutality of the white race under colonial 
rule.    
Identity related conflict rooted in ethnicity has also found expression at social events like 
football matches pitting the Bulawayo based and predominantly Ndebele supported 
Highlanders Football Club and the Harare based and largely Shona supported Dynamos 
Football Club. These clubs although not admitted in football and political circles represent 
not only Ndebele and Shona ethnic identities but also political identities of the PF ZAPU of 
old and the old ZANU PF.  The violence that is sometimes experienced when the two clubs 
meet goes beyond football hooliganism. This is seen in the fact that both Dynamos and 
Highlanders fans have composed songs that denigrate the ethnic identity of the other or refer 
to a period in history when acts of brutality were committed against each other – pre-colonial 
Ndebele raids on the Shona and gukurahundi violence against the Ndebele. The violence and 
hate language used at the matches is evidence that the Unity Accord did not mend cracks 
between the Shona and Ndebele but merely papered over them (author’s own observations 
and experiences). 
 
In 1999 the MDC was formed to challenge to ZANU PF hegemony. Its entrance into the 
political ring was greeted with enthusiasm in Matabeleland. The party thought it could end 
the Ndebele-Shona tribal rift through political therapy. The MDC leaders pretended that 
tribalism was not a factor in Zimbabwean politics arguing that ZANU PF was the fount of 
tribalism. They claimed to have found a formula or panacea to the tribal question. The MDC 
split of 2005 proved them wrong. The experiment failed as the MDC split into two factions. 
Most Ndebele executive members opted for the faction led by the Ndebele speaking party 
Secretary General Welshman Ncube while most Shona party officials backed Shona speaking 
party President Morgan Tsvangirai. The mass of the MDC supporters in Zimbabwe across 
ethnicities threw their weight with Tsvangirai save for a few pockets of Ndebele supporters 
that backed Ncube. In the diaspora many Ndebele-speaking ones opted for the MDC that was 
led by Welshman Ncube (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011c). Although the split in the MDC was 
caused by a multiplicity of factors that included differences over strategy and leadership, the 
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inadequacies of the Unity Accord as a mode by which to resolve conflict rooted in regional 
and ethnic divisions was exposed.  
 
One of the lasting legacies of the Unity Accord is that it ended the violence in Matabeleland 
and Midlands but it brought what Bloomfield and Reilly (1998) refer to as Cold Peace, where 
there is almost a neutral view of a previous enemy and little mutual hostility but where there 
exists a lack of mutually beneficial interactions aimed at developing trust, independence and 
collaboration. If programmes are not inaugurated to translate cold peace into positive peace 
the former may serve as an incubator for the re-emergence of conflict thus retarding progress 
made towards the achievement of sustainable peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. 
6.8 THE DEATH OF NKOMO AND THE REJECTION OF UNITY  
On 2 July 1999 Vice-President Nkomo passed on. It was a colossal event for both ZANU PF 
and the nation, for Nkomo was instrumental in securing the Unity Accord that ended the 
violence in the Midlands and Matabeleland provinces. He was the symbol and the driving 
force behind the 1987 agreement. His death heralded a new era for ZANU PF as it was a 
period in which its political dominance was beginning to wane and a time in which it began 
to implode and an epoch in which the significance of the Unity Accord was increasingly 
being questioned.  His death also created uncertainty around the ability of the Unity Accord 
to subsist in his absence since some had perceived the Unity Accord in personality terms, as 
an Nkomo-Mugabe agreement because of its top-down nature. Mashingaidze (2005: 87) 
argues that many saw the death of Nkomo as spelling the death of the Accord. He cites 
Bulawayo Human Rights Lawyer David Coltart as commenting that “just as the President 
Robert Mugabe is the cement that holds ZANU (PF) together, Nkomo was the cement that 
held PF ZAPU together and those former (PF) ZAPU members who are now ZANU PF.” 
Bekithemba Sibindi, leader of a Ndebele pressure group said “Nkomo has gone with his 
signature, it is the end [of the unity accord]” (Stiff 2000:227). 
Despite the marginalization of the people of Matabeleland, the region itself, and former PF 
ZAPU leaders, after the signing of the Unity Accord, restraint was exercised as a mark of 
respect and sign of loyalty to Nkomo.  However, following his death dissent and open 
hostility towards government has been displayed lending credence to arguments that Nkomo 
was indeed the glue that held disgruntled elements in check. Dissatisfaction with the Unity 
Accord became evident when within a year of Nkomo’s death an attempt was made to revive 
PF ZAPU under the ZAPU 2000 banner. ZAPU 2000 was a regional party that sought the 
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repudiation of the Unity Accord that it perceived as unjust as it largely served the interests of 
one ethnic group.  The group remembered 22 December 1987 as a day of national mourning 
in Zimbabwe and not the day of national unity. At the same time it attacked the former PF 
ZAPU elite for “selling out” the people of Matabeleland for personal aggrandizement 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2011c). 
 Disenchantment with the Unity Accord after Nkomo’s death was worsened by the lack of 
development, investment, unemployment, inflation and corruption that was choking not only 
the Matabeleland provinces but the country as a whole in the late 1990s. This disenchantment 
with the Unity Accord was reflected in support for a new political party that made significant 
inroads into Matabeleland. In the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary and presidential elections 
respectively the MDC party did remarkably well in the Matabeleland and Midlands 
provinces. Its successes in these regions were viewed as a rejection of ZANU PF and the 
Unity Accord. This rejection can be explained as a consequence of gukurahundi, the regions’ 
marginalization and lack of development and Nkomo’s death that further weakened the 
existing loose bond between the Ndebele ethnic communities in Matabeleland and the 
Midlands with the ruling ZANU-PF party. This is summed up by Dabengwa, a losing ZANU 
PF candidate in the 2000 parliamentary elections, who observed that:  
 [T]he people have rejected us not only as candidates, but also as ruling party ZANU-PF 
now. The reason is that since the signing of the Unity Accord in December 1987, the 
people of Bulawayo feel they have not gained anything. The people have been saying 
what is the use of supporting ZANUPF and its candidates and that is their message 
(Sunday Mail, 2 July 2000).  
6.9 WALKING OUT – THE UNITY ACCORD IN THE INTENSIVE CARE UNIT 
On November 8 2008, disgruntled PF ZAPU members in ZANU PF teamed up with elements 
nostalgic of the ZAPU of old and announced that a congress would be held to re-establish  
ZAPU as a separate party. They declared that the political structures of PF ZAPU had ceased 
to operate under the title ZANU PF, and were to resume under the title ZAPU. In 2009, 
ZAPU was re-launched with high-ranking ZANU PF leaders from Matabeleland in the mould 
of Thenjiwe Lesabe, Cyril Ndebele and Dumiso Dabengwa breaking ranks with their 
colleagues in ZANU PF. Some high-ranking members of the former PF ZAPU however 
chose to remain in the united ZANU PF. Although many high-ranking former PF ZAPU 
members remained in the party the walkout could by some quarters be regarded as a 
repudiation of the Unity Accord. 
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Amongst some of the grievances borne by members that walked out was that ZANU PF had 
destroyed the values PF ZAPU stood for through the ethnicization and racialization of 
national politics and development particularly in the new millennium. The pull out was also 
as a result of what they saw as ZANU PF’s arrogance by acting unilaterally and ignoring 
protests made by PF ZAPU.  Amongst the complaints were unequal development and the 
conferment of national hero status seen as favouring ZANU PF. They were also disaffected 
by the way Nkomo’s legacy was being instrumentally used to capture the Matabeleland 
constituency yet depriving the people there of development resources (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2011c).  
Although the Unity Accord has lost its gloss and credibility the last that is left of it has been 
kept alive by members of the former PF ZAPU that have remained in the United ZANU PF. 
These include Phelekezela Mphoko, the ZANU PF vice president, Simon Khaya Moyo, the 
spokesperson of ZANU PF, Sithembiso Nyoni, Angeline Masuku, Andrew Langa and Kembo 
Mohadi, the Minister of State Security. Despite their presence in the state and ZANU PF 
hierarchy a significant number of the Matebele and original PF ZAPU that walked out with 
Dabengwa argue that these remaining members have no real power; they see them as self 
seeking sycophants serving the interests of the original ZANU PF that need them to deliver 
votes from Matabeleland and Midlands at election time. 
6.10 CONCLUSION   
It has been noted that as a consequence of the colonial past, the continuation of colonial 
situations and their reincarnation under a different political dispensation that Zimbabwe 
experienced ethno-political violence in the early years of independence. It is also in conflict 
resolution mechanisms resembling colonial modes of ending conflict via violence that the 
Zimbabwe’s peace and reconciliation problems were inadequately resolved leaving the 
country in dire need of peace, unity, reconciliation and development.   
It was noted that peace and unity have been difficult to achieve in the post independence 
period because colonialism entrenched ethnic divisions and set ethnicities against each other 
during the height of African nationalism while decolonization through the Lancaster House 
Agreement focused on ending the war and fostering racial reconciliation while leaving 
historical, ethnic, political and military animosities amongst the blacks unresolved. These 
issues became the source of the violence in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s 
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resulting in the retardation of development in Matabeleland in particular and Zimbabwe as a 
whole. 
Perhaps more striking than anything in the failure to foster and institutionalize peace is the 
fact that the new independence government like the colonial government sought to create a 
state instead of building a nation. To Masunungure (2006:3-4), a state “entails creating and 
strengthening the institutions necessary to support and promote long-term economic, social 
and political development” while nation building is the creation of a nation united in cultural 
diversity.  There is need to rethink and build a Zimbabwean nation which will be sensitive to 
the disadvantaged provinces of the Matabeleland and Midlands regions. It is imperative that 
the Zimbabwe government develops clear policies on the fair sharing of resources and ethnic 
power balancing as a mode of promoting peace, reconciliation and unity so as to avert the 
potential of the combination of ethnicity and power politics becoming a powerful divisive 
force in the future.  The following chapter discusses the Zimbabwe crisis and the 2008 Global 
Political Agreement, another attempt to foster peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 7 
      THE ZIMBABWE CRISIS AND THE 2008 GLOBAL POLITICAL 
AGREEMENT  
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter examines the global context within which the Zimbabwe crisis emerged and the 
impact of the crisis on the quest for peace, unity, reconciliation and development in 
Zimbabwe. It traces the origins of the Zimbabwe crisis, the rise of the MDC, western 
machinations against the ZANU PF regime, government’s increasing repression in search of 
regime survival, SADC mediation and the 2008 harmonized elections, the signing of the GPA 
and the establishment of a GNU and its end.  Concomitant to this analysis is an examination 
of how the persistence of colonial forms of domination that define power, knowledge and 
being long after the end of colonialism contributed to the crisis and the search for peace, 
unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  
7.2 HURTLING TOWARDS CRISIS  
Following the failure of corporatist economic policies adopted at independence and debt 
accrued in post-conflict reconstruction the Zimbabwean government was unable to resist 
international capital and thus adopted the IMF and WB sponsored ESAP in 1990.  It was 
forced to implement ESAP not only because of the failure of corporatist economic policies 
but also because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was after a capitalist onslaught on 
the Eastern bloc left the Marxist leaning ZANU PF government with only one global 
hegemonic power in the form of the Euro-American alliance to negotiate with. Embracing 
ESAP meant that Zimbabwean government had to submit to the dictates of neo-liberalism 
and surrender the economic trajectory of the country to multi-lateral imperialism.  
The government was unable to chart its future on its own terms but was instead forced to 
pursue an economic programme designed by ex-colonizers of the developing world. 
According Bond (2000) Zimbabwe succumbed to arm twisting by Washington to accept 
structural adjustment as a way of accessing western financial aid. Structural adjustment was 
supposedly home grown but the World Bank staff drafted much of the document, which was 
substantially identical to those imposed across Africa during the 1980s and 1990s. By 
adopting ESAP Zimbabwe was formally embracing capitalism, a development and 
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governance model espoused by its former colonizer and most of the western world. It 
formally became part of the global capitalist system just like it had been under colonialism.  
The IMF and WB programme was prescriptive and laden with conditionalities unfavourable 
to Zimbabwe. These included the removal of subsidies by government, democratization, 
deregulation of government services and devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar. Grosfoguel 
(2009) warns the developing world of the need to decolonize capitalist informed political 
economy paradigms that constructed and sustained colonial states. The Zimbabwean 
government did not heed this warning and thus found itself clasped in the jaws of coloniality. 
ESAP was so immensely unsuited to Zimbabwe that instead of positively transforming the 
economy its effects were catastrophic.  It brought immediate, unprecedented increases in 
interest rates and inflation as money was drained from the country. In 1991 the stock market 
plummeted by 65% while manufacturing output declined by 40% over the subsequent four 
years (Thompson: 2000).  There were also shortages of basic commodities, rising prices and 
poverty, unemployment, retrenchments and company closures and a decline in health and 
education among a host of social and economic hardships that served to reverse the 
development process and erode the government’s legitimacy.  
ESAP did not just bequeath on Zimbabwe socio-economic problems but political ones as 
well. The socio-economic hardships brought by ESAP directly led to a decline in ZANU PF 
support while that of the opposition rose creating spaces for conflict. Because ESAP required 
the state to open democratic space and to be more tolerant of dissenting voices, opposition 
political parties and civil society groups encouraged citizens to criticize government 
inadequacies and oppose its policies. Also taking advantage of the increase in democratic 
space that accompanied ESAP civil society organizations coalesced around the labour 
movement and increasingly began to criticize government repression and poor economic 
management.  Social upheavals pervaded ESAP years, labour unrest and urban riots over the 
poor state of the economy became commonplace particularly in the late 1990s. The 
government turned to repression to deal with dissenters. Citizens were denied the enjoyment 
of basic human rights by an increasingly authoritarian government (Raftopoulos: 2006). 
Eventually the labour movement mutated into the opposition Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC). Its creation heralded a new era of political contestation characterized by 
violence and repression.  
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Munemo and Matunhu (2011) argue that the imposition of ESAP by the IMF and WB was 
perhaps a neo-colonial agenda by the Bretton Woods institutions to weaken the political-
economy of Zimbabwe and keep Harare dependent on international finance. These 
institutions were aware of the failure of such programmes in most of Africa and Asia with 
structural weaknesses such as corruption, lack of expertise, lack of managerial knowhow, and 
corruption that would militate against the success of ESAP but still cajoled the Zimbabwean 
government into accepting structural adjustment. Perhaps more than anything ESAPs biggest 
drawback was that it distracted the Zimbabwean government from embarking on 
indigenization and black empowerment policies such as the land reform following the expiry 
of the Lancaster House Agreement clauses regarding land. This left the country politically 
and economically dependent on western support and vulnerable to conflict. By the mid 
1990s, Zimbabwe was already experiencing political and economic instability that was 
blamed on ESAP, an instrument of coloniality and multilateral imperialism.  
One can thus trace the origins of the Zimbabwe economic crisis to coloniality.  The 
imposition of the IMF and WB sponsored ESAP was a ploy by former colonizers that 
through multi-lateral and financial imperialism  sought to keep Zimbabwe entrapped within 
the clasps of the ensnaring global capitalism. ESAP left Zimbabwe economically feeble and 
dependent, socially distressed and politically unstable, therefore holding back prospects of 
achieving peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. 
Despite the difficult existential conditions brought by ESAP the government plodded on with 
the western framework, pandering to the dictates of western capitalist interests while ignoring 
the national context and the voices of the masses in much the same way African grievances 
had been ignored by colonial authorities. Government took little notice of the plight of the 
suffering masses including veterans of the liberation war who were not spared the troubles 
brought by ESAP. The governing liberators and ruling elite enjoyed privilege while the 
governed were exploited and marginalized as they were seen as deficient in ontology and 
therefore deserved to endure the hellish conditions created by greed, corruption and primitive 
accumulation.  
In 1997 the politically explosive war veterans joined the bandwagon of protesting suffering 
citizens. They displayed their frustration and displeasure towards the ruling black elite and 
whites. The two social groups led better lifestyles as they owned most of the land and 
controlled the economy. With pressure mounting on a government that was increasingly 
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becoming unpopular,  it was in August 1997 forced to pay unbudgeted gratuities of ZW$450 
million, monthly payments of ZW$2000 and make promises of land to restive war veterans 
(Bond and Manyanya: 2003). This had a devastating effect on the economy with the 
Zimbabwean dollar plunging to an all time low against the greenback as investors lost 
confidence in the economy. A swift economic decline set in characterized by regular price 
increases, inflation and a further decline in the standard of living of the majority.  
The decision by Mugabe to award generous gratuities to war veterans was not only to pacify 
them but also to enlist their support in preparation for an assault on the opposition. War 
veterans became a security arm of the ruling party tasked with the intimidation of opponents 
and the dissemination of propaganda that glorified ZANU PF and its liberation history while 
vilifying opposition parties and the whites. The war veterans’ involvement in politics and 
governance issues compounded an already dire peace and security situation. Together with 
security units, war veterans became the epicentre of ZANU PF violence on opponents of the 
government (Raftopoulos: 2006).  
Hard upon the payment of war veterans gratuities the Zimbabwean government decided to 
send troops to fight a war in the DRC as part of SADC intervention forces. The Zimbabwean 
army’s involvement attracted a lot of political criticism from both within and outside 
Zimbabwe. Civil society and domestic opposition forces together with western forces 
criticized the government for its intervention in the DRC war; a distant conflict that hardly 
threatened Zimbabwe’s security.  The war in the DRC cost the government an estimated 
US$I million a day and exacerbated the economic situation (Bond and Manyanya, 2003). 
Against the backdrop of economic, social and political turmoil a new opposition party backed 
by civil society emerged on the Zimbabwe political landscape to challenge ZANU PF 
government’s rule with the resultant effect of further straining relations between the 
government and the opposition and civil society.  
7.3 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MDC, POLARIZATION AND CRISIS IN 
ZIMBABWE  
According Bloomfield and Reilly (1998), for a system of government to be considered 
democratic, it must include three essential conditions: meaningful competition for political 
power between individuals and organized groups; broad involvement in the choice of leaders 
and policies, free and fair elections; and a level of civil and political liberties adequate to 
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ensure the integrity of political contestation and participation. By 1999, Mugabe’s regime had 
fallen short of achieving the above and thus could not be considered democratic.  
Perhaps motivated by the absence of democracy in Zimbabwe and compounded by escalating 
political, economic and social problems, a constellation of civil society groups with a strong 
backing of the labour movement formed in 1999 a new political party, the MDC.  The ZANU 
PF government claimed that the MDC was not a home grown response to the challenges 
facing the country but a British project formulated on 23 January 1999 at a Chatham House 
where Britain convinced the EU that Mugabe should be removed and replaced by Morgan 
Tsvangirai (The Herald, 21 October 2014). New African magazine editor Baffour concurs 
with voices that place the origins of the MDC in the ex-colonizer. He argues that in 2001, the 
Westminster Foundation, an organization that manages funds of three of Britain’s main 
political parties put together published on its website a breakdown of money that it had spent 
nurturing the MDC (New African, October 2013).  Perhaps to confirm this in his memoirs At 
the Deep End (2011), Tsvangirai acknowledges strong foreign and white involvement in the 
formation of the MDC.  The British government role in the formation and sponsorship MDC 
is consistent with coloniality which seeks to perpetuate colonial situations in ex-colonies 
through creating and sponsoring the opposition elements to eject from power defiant 
governments.  
The MDC asserted that its formation was to salvage Zimbabwe from de facto one party rule 
and to preserve democracy. It pronounced the need for both political and economic reforms 
and captured the growing disenchantment of the populace over poor economic and political 
conditions prevailing in the country. The MDC managed to attract a broad support base 
particularly among the workers, because of the declining benefits, unemployment and overall 
economic malaise. It also had support from the rural populace who had been frustrated by 
ZANU PF’s lack of progress towards their development and the resolution of the land 
question (Raftopoulos: 2006).  
The MDC forged alliances with whites whose economic interests were threatened by ZANU 
PF’s desire for black empowerment through the redistribution of resources such as land. The 
party received massive support from the large white commercial sector whose lands had been 
earmarked by the ZANU PF government for redistribution. The massive support the MDC 
received from whites could be explained as an attempt to defend the unfair colonial situation 
regarding land that continued to exist. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2014) argues that Zimbabwe’s white 
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population was opposed to the decolonial action of taking land because they were set to lose 
their ill gotten wealth and racially constructed notions of superiority. He further argues that as 
a group that had never experienced the dark side of modernity and yet at the same time 
enjoying the fruits of modernity they felt justified in resisting decoloniality. 
Western capitalist support was also rendered to the young party in light of the government’s 
threats to shrink the economic space western countries enjoyed in Zimbabwe. Within a few 
months of its formation the MDC had made inroads in the urban centres where social 
hardships had taken their greatest toll. The MDC’s strongest bastion became the 
Matabeleland region ostensibly because the people of the region still had memories of Fifth 
Brigade violence unleashed by the ZANU PF government in the 1980s and government’s 
failure to acknowledge atrocities and develop the region. The popular support the MDC 
received in the late nineties suggested that the people of Matabeleland and the Midlands 
provinces had not been reconciled (Raftopoulos: 2006).  
The MDC’s first major blow on ZANU PF was a successful “NO” vote campaign against a 
government sponsored draft constitution in February of 1999. With the support of white 
farmers and civil society groups such as the NCA, ZCTU and ZINASU, the MDC frustrated 
government efforts to introduce a constitution which would have entrenched Mugabe’s rule 
and also enabled government to compulsorily acquire land without paying compensation.  
Striking in the referendum of February 2000 was the British interest and the massive white 
voter campaign and turn out against the draft constitution that threatened their economic 
interests. The threat of white farm takeover had awoken the white population from their deep 
political slumber. Not long after the formation of the MDC white farmers were captured by 
state television cameras making massive donations to bolster the party. Nyakudya (2013:171) 
surmises that the conflict that characterized Zimbabwe’s political landscape after the 
formation of the MDC was more than just a confrontation between it and ZANU PF. It was 
also a confrontation between the West and ZANU PF. 
The MDC had used the “vote no” campaign against the government draft constitution as a 
test of support before parliamentary elections that were due in June 2000.  The rejection of 
the constitutional draft drew a hostile response from the government. The ZANU PF 
government blamed Britain and white farmers for the referendum loss. The state controlled 
media unleashed a torrent of racist attacks against whites claiming that all whites were racist 
and denounced them for trying to perpetuate white economic domination. Whites were 
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accused of profiteering and the government began to increasingly call for the indigenization 
of the economy and land redistribution.   
The government encouraged ZANU PF linked war veterans and peasants to violently take 
over farms belonging mainly to the white community in what came to be called the Fast 
Track Land Reform Programme/Hondo Yeminda/Jambanja /Third Chimurenga, discussed in 
chapter 5. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009c:1139), to the Zimbabwean government the 
‘return’ of the land to its ‘rightful’ owners marked the completion of the decolonization 
process. The act of taking land from white farmers of mainly British descent was de-colonial  
and the year 2000 marked the year Zimbabwe took a pronounced decolonial turn that led to 
the fallout between Zimbabwe and Britain/West.  According to Maldonado- Torres 
(2006:114), decolonial turn refers to the decisive recognition and propagation of 
decolonization as an ethical, political, and epistemic project. This project reflects changes in 
historical consciousness, agency, and knowledge, and it also involves a method or series of 
methods that facilitate the task of decolonization at the material and epistemic levels. In 
Zimbabwe the decolonial turn manifested itself through the appropriation of white farms, an 
act the government argued was geared towards the completion of the decolonization project 
that was aborted by the Lancaster House Agreement and the dismantling of coloniality  which 
was proving to be a stumbling block to the quest to achieve development.  
From the year 2000 onwards, Zimbabwean citizenship was re-defined along nativist lines 
following the occupation of white farms. The white commercial farmers were redefined as 
mabhunu - a term derogatorily used commonly during the colonial era to refer to white 
settlers descendent from South Africa - rather than citizens (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2009b). The 
government went further to label the whites as unindigenous and therefore neither 
Zimbabwean nor African and thus without a right to citizenship and resources in Zimbabwe.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009c: 1152) cites Phineas Chihota, a deputy cabinet minister as saying 
that an indigenous person had to have a rural home. This description to him is a purely 
nativist definition of an indigenous Zimbabwean. The government’s labelling of whites as 
unindigenous was tantamount to a repudiation of the earlier policy of reconciliation which 
had favoured the settlers.  
The Zimbabwe Supreme Court ruled in 2000 that farm invasions were illegal. The 
government was annoyed by the decision of the country’s highest court still manned by 
judges inherited from the colonial era. The government launched scathing attacks on the 
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white judiciary accusing it of bias and racism and eventually forced the judges to retire 
(Meredith: 2002). Some sections of the white population that had been responsible for the 
brutalization and oppression of blacks began to scream to the world that they were victims of 
black on white racism by a neo-nationalist black government targeting whites yet forgetting 
their own past transgressions on the black population of Zimbabwe. Maldonado-Torres 
(2014: 30) is of the opinion that coloniality is blind and forgetful when it is the perpetrator of 
violence.  The whites did not see oppression on blacks during colonialism but only began to 
see it after independence only because they were on the receiving end of “injustice”.  
 
As was mentioned in Chapter 3, colonialists in Zimbabwe employed what Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos (2010) refers to as “epistemicide,” that is, the extermination of knowledge and 
ways of knowing. For instance, the teaching of history from a Eurocentric perspective was an 
epistemicide meant to quash Africa’s glorious past (Ndlovu-Gatsheni: 2011a). Under ZANU 
PF rule a new variety of historiography known as patriotic history that fomented anti-white 
sentiment and engendered black on white racism and abhorrence of the opposition MDC was 
born as an epistemicide to exterminate knowledges that were pro MDC and white. The white 
population was accused of being unrepentant racists bent on blocking black empowerment 
while the MDC was portrayed as a puppet party selling out to imperialists for opposing the 
mode by which land reform was  being carried out, thus deserving the full wrath of the state 
coercive machinery (Ranger:2004). The ZANU PF attacks on the MDC as a white-sponsored 
party reflected the operations of the forgetfulness of coloniality. During the liberation 
struggle ZANU PF received funding from white liberals in the western world. ZANU PF 
continues to receive support from white businessmen based in Europe to thwart regime 
change. These include John Bredenkamp, Rautenbach and British businessman Nicholas van 
Hoogstraten to name a few.  
Whites and MDC supporters became the targets of black political and economic violence and 
discrimination in what Mlambo (2013:245) refers to as reverse nationalism.  The attacks on 
whites and perceived MDC supporters were retribution for having championed the “NO” 
vote, resisting land redistribution and generally opposing the government. These attacks 
fissured Zimbabwean society. By the end of the first decade of the new millennium 
Zimbabwe was fragmented into the following identifiable groups; patriots, puppets, war 
veterans, machef (senior ZANU PF officials) bornfrees (born after 1980), machinja (MDC 
supporters), macomrades (ZANU PF supporters), varungu (whites) and so on. In this 
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classification war veterans and senior ZANU PF officials were taken to be ontologically 
denser and thus regarded as “first class” citizens with more rights than MDC supporters or 
whites who were seen as “second class” or even third class citizens. Social classification was 
determined by the role one played in the liberation war or plays in defence of the ZANU PF 
regime.  
Whites previously seen under colonial rule as superior and ontologically denser beings were 
no longer viewed in this light. They were seen as detractors bent on reversing the gains of the 
liberation struggle. MDC supporters were seen as puppets, sell-outs, and totemless 
descendants of immigrants while ZANU PF supporters were regarded as patriots. The 
ontology of the MDC supporters and that of whites came to be doubted. They were now 
perceived by the ZANU PF government to be in the zone of non-being, thus not worthy of 
rights and protection from violence in Zimbabwe. Santos’ (2007) concept of abyssal thinking 
is invaluable for an appreciation of post-2000 violence. The MDC and the white race were 
labeled puppets and agents of neo-colonialism situated below the abyssal line, bent on 
reversing the gains of the liberation struggle. This left them open to violence from state 
enforcers indoctrinated by state propaganda into uncritical acceptance of these labels. This 
was evidence of the workings of the coloniality of being.  
Mignolo’s (2009) notion of dispensable lives within the realm of coloniality also helps to 
explain the treatment of perceived opponents on Zimbabwe’s political landscape.  Under 
colonialism human ontology was hierachized according to race. The white race was 
privileged while blacks were marginalized and seen as an unimportant, dispensable 
population without writing, history, Christianity and therefore did not qualify to enjoy human 
rights. Colonialists saw African nationalists, activists and guerrillas who took up arms to fight 
the racially structured colonial system as problems that had to be eliminated. Colonialists 
never bothered to research or concern themselves with African grievances but simply 
resolved to dispense with those that stood up to voice their grievances. The colonialist’s 
perception of Africans as a problem resulted in colonial brutality and liberation war violence 
against Africans whose elimination was seen as good for the perpetuation of colonial society.  
This perception of people as problems while ignoring the need to acknowledge that people 
are not problems but have problems crossed over into the post independence era and explain 
the violence unleashed on political opponents. 
 
Since independence the ZANU PF government has similarly ranked persons based on 
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political persuasion and adherence to the ruling elite’s philosophy.  Post independence 
elements with views contrary to those of the ruling party have suffered state oppression. They 
have been perceived as problems that ought to be eliminated and this has been used to justify 
state violence.  ZANU PF regarded PF ZAPU in the 1980s and MDC supporters after 2000 as 
worthless dispensable lives. This perhaps explains why thousands of Ndebele-speaking PF 
ZAPU supporters were killed in the 1980s and hundreds of MDC supporters were killed in 
the year 2008 in state sanctioned violence.    
 
White farmers and immigrants from Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique, perceived as MDC 
supporters, were denied full citizenship and the right to own land by the government, 
resulting in them being violently ejected from farms by war veterans in 2000. As people they 
were denied humanity, citizenship and polity and thus became dispensable.  Mignolo (2009: 
81) notes that devaluation through dispossession leads not only to the loss of rights but the 
loss of humanity too.  The lives of these minority groups were made dispensable so that the 
ruling elite could exploit and dominate them. These groups, particularly black immigrants, 
were discriminated against and denied development resources by the state on allegations of 
sympathising with the opposition. 
 
The denial of development assistance to persons perceived to be anti-government is informed 
by the state’s perception of the persons as expendable people that the state can do without.  
According to the Newsday of 22 January 2015, in 2002, Didymus Mutasa, then a senior 
government minister, was asked how he felt about three serious development problems 
confronting Zimbabwe which related to hunger, the effect of HIV and Aids, and the mass 
exodus of Zimbabweans to other countries, responded as follows; “We would be better off 
with only 6 million people, with our own [ruling party] people who supported the liberation 
struggle. We don’t want all these extra people.” To Mutasa those that did not belong to the 
ruling ZANU PF was dispensable surplus population that the state could do without. 
Mutasa’s sentiments were echoed by Emmerson Mnangagwa, the country’s Vice President, 
who intimated that if he had the power he would deprive MDC supporters of oxygen 
(newsdzezimbabwe, 29 April 2015). Like Mutasa, Mnangagwa thinks MDC supporters 
dispensable and in a way authorizes their extermination in much the same way colonialists 
saw the lives of blacks as dispensable.  
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Human rights violations, contested elections and shrinking democratic space from 2000 
prompted Britain and the United States to sympathize with and render support to the MDC 
and other opposition elements bent on removing ZANU PF from power. To counteract 
western support for the opposition the government passed legislation such as the Public Order 
and Security Act (POSA) and the Access to Information and the Protection of Privacy Act 
(AIPPA). The former curtailed the freedom of movement and assembly while the latter 
restricted the media. Opponents of the ZANU PF regime were the main victims of this 
legislation. The MDC received sympathy from the liberal West that perceived the legislation 
as draconian and designed to curtail opposition activities while entrenching ZANU PF’s rule.  
The collaboration of domestic opposition groups, the US, the British government and their 
allies against the Zimbabwean government’s excesses gave birth to what ZANU PF 
christened the “Regime Change Agenda” (Munemo: 2012a). ZANU PF argued that the 
agenda involved removing Mugabe from power and replacing him with MDC’s Morgan 
Tsvangirai, a character it saw as a puppet of the British government. The quest to remove the 
ZANU PF regime from power and the desire by the ZANU PF to retain power at all costs 
precipitated a new era of violence never before experienced in Zimbabwe.  
The emergence of the MDC on Zimbabwe’s political landscape ushered in a new era of 
political violence. Inter-party violence between ZANU PF and the MDC engulfed Zimbabwe. 
Youths from both parties frequently clashed resulting in injuries and deaths.  A programme 
officer at a local peace building organization is of the view that socio-economic hardships 
drove the youth into engaging in acts of political violence in exchange for rewards from 
political gladiators (Interview with an NGO programme officer: 28/8/2015).  
The MDC and its officials often suffered the most from the violence as partisan state security 
agents and war veterans often lent support to ZANU PF. In the 2000 and 2002 parliamentary 
and presidential elections respectively the MDC gave ZANU PF a strong challenge. The 
elections were the most tightly contested since independence. In the June 2000 elections, the 
MDC gained nearly 50% of the parliamentary vote in the face of enormous electoral 
obstacles and state violence. With this performance, chances were high that the MDC would 
defeat ZANU PF in the 2002 presidential elections. The government increased repression to 
forestall the likelihood of such an occurrence.  In a closely fought 2002 election ZANU PF 
defeated the MDC but violence, intimidation and allegations of rigging pervaded the 
elections resulting in them being disputed.  
213 
 
The MDC with the aid of western funded civil society broadcast its disgruntlement over 
unfair elections and human rights abuses to the international community, in particular to the 
West.  Owing to this, the legitimacy of the government was eroded and it lost friends and 
neutrals particularly in the West. This was evidenced by the withdrawal of aid by Britain, the 
EU and the US from various government development programmes, thus compromising the 
government’s ability to provide services to its citizens who then blamed the government for 
economic difficulties, thus compromising peace and stability.  
7.4 WESTERN MACHINATIONS TO OUST ZANU PF FROM POWER 
Lawson (1993) studied regime change on the African continent and discovered that the 
majority of regime changes have been masterminded by capitalist states working with agents 
in satellite states. These states have engineered regime changes in Zaire in the 1960s, Uganda 
in the 1970s and in Zambia and Liberia in the 1990s and the Arab Springs of 2011. Some of 
the regime changes have been hatched to extend Western capitalist control and access to and 
over important resources such as oil, gold, diamonds and other investment opportunities.  For 
instance, in 1997 Lissouba’s government in the  Congo was overthrown by the French for 
refusing its companies oil contracts (New African, November 2009). 
Since the year 2000, the ZANU PF government has been struggling to ward off regime 
change from the West that is bent on controlling Zimbabwe’s economic resources. European 
economic interests in Zimbabwe can be traced to the colonial era, through neo-colonialism 
right up to the globalization period.  Through these epochs the Western countries with huge 
investments in agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and mining amongst others, have been 
using their economic muscle to keep Zimbabwe dependent on them.  At the turn of the new 
millennium Western machinations to remove ZANU PF from power were largely triggered 
by the government’s introduction of indigenization and black empowerment policies aimed at 
ending the persistence of colonial patterns of power that determined the control of authority, 
labour and economy – hence coloniality of power.  The massive capitalist investments in the 
country and the presence of a significant white population with strong ties to their kith and 
kin in Europe make Zimbabwe a special case in the West’s recolonization agenda and its 
resolve to determinedly seek to effect regime change in Zimbabwe.  
From 2000 onwards, the West that used to mainly fund civil society and NGO social welfare 
programmes began to increasingly fund NGOs and civil society organizations that focus on 
democracy and human rights. They began to document and publicize extensive human rights 
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abuses that accompanied elections and Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order of 2005 
(Raftopoulos, 2006:29).  Civil society organizations and NGOs lobbied regional, continental 
and international organizations such as the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC), African Union (AU), the EU and the UN to censure the Zimbabwean government 
for human rights violations. The government lost friends and neutrals particularly in the West 
when human rights violations and other democratic deficits were broadcast to the 
international community. The West did not only seek to erode the legitimacy of the 
Zimbabwean government but also intended to put pressure on Zimbabwe to reform state 
institutions critical to ZANU PF’s survival. 
The collusion between the West and civil society critical of the ZANU PF government soured 
state and civil society relations in the new millennium. Arrests, torture and harassment of 
civil society activists increased in the new millennium. The then Minister of Justice, Legal 
and Parliamentary Affairs, Patrick Chinamasa, branded western funded civic society 
organizations as regime change activists. He identified the Media Institute of Southern 
Africa, Zimbabwe chapter, Legal Officer Wilbert Mandinde, as an activist working for 
British and American funded Non - Governmental Organizations (zimbabwesituation.com/23 
May 2007).  
Citing human rights violations, the absence of the rule of law and democratic deficits, Britain, 
the EU, Australia, Canada and New Zealand imposed targeted sanctions on ZANU PF 
officials and its associates as from 2000. These sanctions entailed a travel ban on Mugabe and 
nineteen members of his inner circle, an asset freeze affecting those same individuals, an 
embargo on the sale of arms and technical and training assistance relating to arms in 
Zimbabwe, and an embargo on the sale or supply of equipment that might be used for internal 
repression (Taylor and Williams, 2002:555).  The West felt that the action would send an 
important message of political support to Zimbabwe's beleaguered opposition while 
simultaneously isolating Mugabe's regime and targeting the private wealth and liberties of 
senior ZANU PF officials (Raftopoulos: 2006).  
 Britain imposed an arms embargo against Zimbabwe on 3 May 2000. In addition, it halted 
the provision of 450 Land Rovers to the Zimbabwe police force, withdrew the British 
Military Advisory Training Team, which left at the end of March 2001, and cut aid to 
Zimbabwe by one third (Taylor and Williams : 2002).The disciplining of the Zimbabwean 
government by the West through the imposition of sanctions and international isolation 
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reveals that the economically and politically powerful North still dominates other parts of the 
world just like they did in centuries past. In addition, the coloniality of being was behind the 
West’s perception of self as standing on higher moral ground, thus passing judgements and 
imposing sanctions on the Zimbabwean government in an imperial way.  
The ZANU PF government argued that the imposition of sanctions by the West was not a 
consequence of the absence of the rule of law, human rights abuses and democratic deficits 
but anger over the decolonial action of redistributing white owned land to landless black 
farmers. Zimbabwe therefore had to be disciplined for challenging Western hegemony 
through redistributing land owned by the white farming community (‘the children of the 
empire’) with roots in Rhodesian settler colonialism (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b:180). To him, 
it also reveals the machinations of the colonial matrix of power and the troubles that visit a 
small peripheral state for trying to chart an autonomous decolonial path of development. 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) and Mpofu (2013a) argue that coloniality masks itself behind the 
promotion of democracy, human rights, gender equality and freedoms. Under the guise of 
promoting these former colonizers infiltrate and dominate ex-colonies. The imposition of 
sanctions was not meant to restrain the Zimbabwean government and encourage it on a good 
human rights and democracy path but was part of British machinations to remove the ZANU 
PF regime from power. Furthermore, Zimbabwe, compared to other countries globally, is a 
relatively peaceful country by any measure but it has captured the attention of The New York 
Times and the London Guardian. This is because it still plays host to a significant number of 
white British settlers and businesses. Europe and America have thus meddled in Zimbabwe’s 
affairs in defence of not only their white kith and kin that they consider to be of the same 
ontological weight and epistemological capacity but also their commercial, political and neo-
colonial interests. 
In June 2004, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair openly told the House of Commons that 
his government was working with Tsvangirai’s MDC to effect regime change in Zimbabwe. 
Grebe (2009:6) quotes Blair as saying: 
We work closely with the MDC on the measures that we should take in respect of 
Zimbabwe, although I am afraid that these measures and sanctions, although we have 
them in place, are of limited effect on the Mugabe regime. We must be realistic about 
that. It is still important that we give every chance to, and make every effort to try to 
help, those in South Africa – the southern part of Africa – to put pressure for change on 
the Mugabe regime, because there is no salvation for the people of Zimbabwe until that 
regime is changed.  
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The above is a clear statement from the British government aiming at changing the 
Zimbabwean regime. This statement exposes naked machinations of coloniality of power in 
Zimbabwe. African actions seldom take place in their own forms and in a vacuum. They are 
clearly orchestrated and they are controlled and directed externally by coloniality of power. 
British open support for the opposition exposed the MDC as a puppet party abetting post-
independence colonialist machinations against the emerging state of Zimbabwe. Puppetry 
represents a new form of imperialism, weakens political institutions and attracts violent 
attacks from patriots. ZANU PF reacted to British interference in Zimbabwean affairs by 
increasing repression against the MDC that it viewed as an agent of imperialism and a threat 
to national security, thus raising the spectre of violence in Zimbabwe.  
The US Congress and Senate reacted to a decline in democracy and an increase in human 
rights violations in Zimbabwe by passing the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic and 
Recovery Act (ZDERA) in 2002.  The document outlines the sanctions. ZDERA states that 
the US will not support any multi-lateral or bilateral loans or grants to Zimbabwe unless there 
are specific reforms regarding ownership of property, the rule of law, and the use of political 
violence. ZDERA specifically sought collaboration of the European Union in the 
enforcement of these sanctions. What this means in reality is that Zimbabwe cannot access 
grants and investments from the West. Zimbabwe used to receive an average of about 
US$350 million in aid and investment in the 1980s and 1990s, but this stopped abruptly in 
2001 (Chung: 2010). This points out to the constitutive nature of coloniality of power.   
To the US, the idea behind ZDERA was to assist democratic transition in Zimbabwe and to 
revitalize the collapsed economy. Cancellation of debt or any other kind of financial 
assistance through the multilateral financial institutions were prohibited under ZDERA until 
the US President was satisfied that crucial improvements of basic human needs for the 
Zimbabwean  people had been met and that the government in Harare would be able to meet 
good governance criteria (Grebe, 2009:4).  ZDERA forbade US representatives on the boards 
of the Bretton Woods institutions to vote for the provision of loans to Zimbabwe (Matyszak, 
2010:119).  Essentially what this has meant in reality is that Zimbabwe was to be deprived of 
grants and investments from the West for more than a decade and its economic well being 
became the subject of US control. This loss of financial resources owing to ZDERA has 
devastated the Zimbabwean economy and created a wedge between the national leadership 
and ordinary people evidenced by people’s hostility towards government and their rejection 
of ZANU PF during elections. It would not be an exaggeration for one to surmise that 
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sanctions and ZDERA were passed to reduce Zimbabwe into an ungovernable and poverty 
stricken country so that the population could rise against the ZANU PF government and 
replace it with a more democratic US friendly administration. 
The sanctions have also been viewed as responsible for Zimbabwe's failure to exercise its 
rights to borrow bilaterally and multilaterally, particularly from the World Bank and IMF or 
any such other world lenders linked to the Bretton Woods community. The IMF and the 
World Bank have attached good governance conditions for Zimbabwe to access development 
aid and trade privileges. It is the western notion of good governance that is not particularly 
suited to Zimbabwe that the IMF and WB encourage. To the IMF and WB, land reform from 
the year 2000 onwards was bad governance as it was accompanied by violence, the violation 
of the rule of law and human rights abuses and as such the IMF and WB withheld 
development aid. To the ZANU PF government the land reform programme constituted good 
governance practice as it was addressing colonial injustice.  
According to Bond and Manyanya (2003) IMF and WB denied the Zimbabwean government 
access to credits and loans in 2001. They criticized the Zimbabwean government for 
prioritizing intervention in the DRC at a time the economy was struggling.  They demanded 
that the ZANU PF government first furnish them with details of its engagement in the DRC 
as a precondition for accessing loans. The denial of loans and credits in Zimbabwe has had 
negative ramifications on economic stability, a crucial ingredient for peace and unity.   
Therefore, one can arrive at the conclusion that the West has used its control of the IMF and 
WB to decide Zimbabwe’s economic fate and perhaps its future peace and stability. While 
the West viewed ZDERA and targeted sanctions as restrictive measures, the Zimbabwean 
government argued that they were comprehensive.  The government perceived sanctions to 
be part of a scheme to effect regime change by weakening ZANU PF economically and 
politically.  The issue of sanctions became a matter of semantics depending on one’s political 
persuasion.  The imposition of sanctions heightened tension not only with the West but also 
within Zimbabwe. The MDC and civil society who supported the sanctions were roundly 
criticized by the Zimbabwean government for having called for the imposition of sanctions 
that had the net effect of suffocating the economy. The sanctions did not just hurt the ruling 
elite but also government development programmes, access to finance, trade opportunities, all 
which cascaded down to affect the standard of living of the ordinary people.  
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The unilateral imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by the US and EU was a reflection of 
coloniality of power in practice in Africa. Sanctions were imposed unilaterally without a 
discussion with Mugabe’s regime or continental powers, reflecting that power remained 
reposed in the West despite the end of colonialism. The West defied sentiments from fellow 
African countries while appropriating to itself powers to discipline the Zimbabwe 
government when the rest of the continent pleaded for patience, sympathy and understanding. 
The voices of these countries were not respected in much the same way African voices were 
ignored by whites under colonial rule. The EU and the US regarded their judgment calls on 
Zimbabwe as superior to those of African states, thus dismissing the notion that African 
problems can best be found from Africa or within Africa. By imposing sanctions on 
Zimbabwe the EU and the US instead of quenching the fire in Zimbabwe actually fuelled it as 
the ZANU PF government in pursuit of regime survival dug in and increased repression, thus 
exacerbating the conflict.  
Sanctions have not been the only instrument the West has used to try and unseat the ZANU 
PF government. The West has supported the anti-Mugabe media industry that has gone to 
great lengths to tarnish the image of ZANU PF by broadcasting the dark side of the 
Zimbabwean government.  The Western funded diasporan media and most of the independent 
media whose sources of funding are also external has vilified and demonized Mugabe’s 
government in the new millennium with the objective of generating disaffection towards the 
ZANU PF regime.  Radio stations such as Studio 7 and SW Radio Africa and newspapers 
such as the The Zimbabwean have been at the forefront of carrying stories that denigrate the 
government and expose its undemocratic tendencies and often described its leader an 
authoritarian tyrant (Raftopoulos: 2006). The West sought to turn the population against 
ZANU PF by funding media which in the main carried negative stories about the 
Zimbabwean government. Seeds of division were sown amongst the readership and within 
communities in Zimbabwe as the state media in defence of the ZANU PF regime hit back by 
publishing stories that portrayed Europeans as brutal enslavers and colonizers and the MDC 
as a “sell-out puppet party” and its supporters as enemies of the state and traitors (Saidi and 
Munemo: 2011).  This media war increased tension between pro-regime and anti-regime 
elements which culminated in the erosion of peace, reconciliation and unity gains. 
Although the ZANU PF government has suffered from sanctions imposed on it by western 
powers and spews decolonial rhetoric it has maintained a close relationship with some 
quarters in the global coloniality stable. British businessman Nicholas van Hoogstraten and 
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South African born businessmen John Bredenkamp have helped the Zimbabwe government 
to survive sanctions imposed by the EU and the US. Despite the sanctions ruling elite have 
also been able facilitate business transactions with the West through these individuals. The 
ZANU PF government has also by inadvertence benefited from coloniality by blaming the 
country’s economic woes on the western regime change agenda and not policy failure and 
economic misgovernance.  It has used the regime change agenda to deflect attention from the 
pertinent issues that explain the suffering of millions of Zimbabweans to focus on race. It has 
also used the western regime change agenda to turn to authoritarian means to remain in 
power and accumulate surplus despite growing unpopularity. 
 
It is important to highlight here that notions of puppetry and tyranny are never constant but 
change overtime. These identities are tools of coloniality. The relationship between the 
Zimbabwean government and global coloniality can also be characterized as a “love-and- 
hate” relationship. In the first decade and a half of independence relations were cordial with 
the West. Mugabe was a darling of the West and was seen as a model statesman especially 
after pronouncing the policy of reconciliation in the 1980s although his human rights record 
left a lot to be desired after the gukurahundi war. In the early 1990s Mugabe adopted ESAP 
and was perceived as a puppet of the West by the labour movement that went on to form the 
opposition MDC. However, in the new millennium it is the MDC that is seen as the puppet, 
selling Africa’s freedom and sovereignty under the guise of human rights and democracy 
while Mugabe is seen as a tyrant abusing human rights and oppressing forces of democracy 
despite redressing colonial wrongs by redistributing land to thousands of black farmers at the 
expense of whites. Mugabe’s victory in the July 2013 elections has been followed by moves 
towards re-engagement with the West which may be the beginning of puppetry. Whether one 
is a puppet or a tyrant, the ultimate goal it appears is that one has to obtain the approval of the 
West. This situation allows coloniality to survive and this does not bode well for peace and 
development in Zimbabwe. 
7.5 IN SEARCH OF REGIME PERSISTENCE 
A retired army officer in the Midlands Province explains the crisis in Zimbabwe as a result of 
the continuation of the nationalist struggle against capitalist imperialism working in cahoots 
with local opposition agents (Interview with a retired ZNA officer : 12/5/2015). He argues 
that in the face of concerted efforts by the domestic opposition and external actors to oust 
Mugabe from power the ZANU PF government became increasingly authoritarian in order to 
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survive regime change.  It roped in the security sector in the economic and political 
governance of the country. The support of the security forces was secured when the 
government offered them those important means of production like farms and mines. They 
became an important interest group in the political and economic governance of the country. 
A study of the political-military alliance in Zimbabwe by Muzondidya (2009b) reveals that a 
symbiotic relationship exists between the military and the ZANU PF.  Trying to remove 
ZANU PF from power directly threatens the military; they are one. The army has been quick 
to rush to ZANU PF’s aid thus ensuring the regime’s continued stay in power because 
removing ZANU PF from power is likely to bring new political structures which would have 
a destabilizing effect on the security sectors political and economic power as well as personal 
security.  
The security sector has intervened in electoral processes from the year 2000 onwards. War 
veterans - a para-military wing in Zimbabwe’s security circles - would often threaten the 
population with war in the event of an MDC electoral victory (ibid). Security chiefs also 
declared that their units would not cooperate with or salute a presidential candidate with 
questionable liberation war credentials (Makumbe, 2003:39). These declarations were tacitly 
aimed at Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC.  The threats of war from veterans of the liberation 
struggle sent fear across the population while the rejection of persons without liberation war 
credential by the service chiefs annoyed the opposition and led to a decline in trust and 
confidence in the military, thus compromising cordial civil-military relations that are critical 
for national peace and stability.  
To safeguard ZANU PF’s position the security forces terrorized civilians, committed gross 
human rights violations, and were deployed to infiltrate and disrupt the opposition. In some 
cases, tactics from the guerrilla war such as re-education camps, propaganda bombardment, 
and all-night pungwes were revived (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006, Sachikonye, 2011).  Security 
structures were also mobilized by the ZANU PF to campaign and organize elections. 
Members of the security structures were deployed to run the Electoral Supervisory 
Commission, while war veterans were recruited to work as militias during elections. A 
National Command Centre was established by the government and became the nerve-centre 
from where elections were run. It was manned by personnel from the Zimbabwe National 
Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police and Central Intelligence 
Organization (Muzondidya: 2009b).  
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It has been highlighted that after the year 2000 state sponsored terror was unleashed on the 
populace just like the colonial government had; it was therefore a case of repetition without 
difference.  The difference was that the violence that the ZANU PF government unleashed on 
the populace in pursuit of regime survival was a reaction to neo-colonial violence. The 
Zimbabwe government was convinced that colonialism had not died but just changed form; it 
saw the MDC as a front for the West to retake control of Zimbabwe. This was unlike the 
colonial violence that targeted nationalist agitators calling for independence.  
While the army took care of the situation for the government in the countryside, in urban 
areas the police increasingly used POSA to curtail the people’s freedoms and to blunt the 
activities of opposition groups. Under POSA, civil society meetings were categorized as 
political gatherings making it difficult for civil society to make a big impact on the way 
people voted. It became difficult to campaign for the opposition owing to the subjective 
interpretation of the law by partisan security forces. Opposition and civil society often defied 
POSA leading to the brutal crushing of demonstrations by security units (Raftopoulos: 2006, 
Muzondidya: 2009b).  
In 2005, the Zimbabwean government with the assistance of the security units launched 
Operation Murambatsvina/Restore Order (2005) to destroy slum dwellings and restore the 
social order. According to Grebe (2009:3) Murambatsvina was an ingenious plan by the 
government to hit at the heart of the opposition vote by disrupting its urban supporter base. 
The government destroyed illegal housing structures thought to shelter urbanites largely 
regarded to be against the government. Over 700 000 people were displaced from urban 
centres which affected their abilities to vote in their constituencies, thus compromising the 
opposition vote (ibid). The violent destruction of homes and displacement of people earned 
the government resentment and opposition from urbanites who saw it as insensitive to the 
plight of the urban poor. 
This prompted the late Elphias Mukonoweshuro, formerly a professor of politics at the 
University of Zimbabwe and former Minister of Public Service under the GNU, to comment: 
“this is no ordinary African dictatorship. It is a very strange regime which uses … armed 
military units against civilians” (Bond and Manyanya, 2003:257). It should be noted that the 
use of security units against the masses as an instrument of regime survival in Zimbabwe 
predates independence. Ian Smith’s white minority regime and Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia government turned to the military in pursuit of regime survival.  This vindicates 
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Fanon (1968) who argues that repetition without change accompanied political transition with 
the end of colonialism. The withdrawal of the colonial state and its replacement with black 
political and military leaders did not alter the way the politicians and the military treated the 
masses.  
It should be emphasized that the authoritarian rule and violence the Zimbabwean people had 
to endure in the crisis years was not all together repression for the sake of regime persistence. 
The logic of the violence was also a consequence of the coloniality of power. Hegemonic 
global capitalist powers disenchanted by ZANU PF’s rule and defiance of the global order 
put pressure on Harare, which in turn responded by activating totalitarian regime survival 
mechanisms that pushed back peace, reconciliation and development.  
In true Gramscian style, to survive regime change, ZANU PF did not just rely on coercion but 
also sought the consent of the populace. Through the indigenization and black empowerment 
programmes that included land redistribution ZANU PF obtained support from the wide cross 
section of blacks who had suffered marginalization in an economy dominated by the whites. 
Among the main beneficiaries of the land reform were landless peasants, war veterans and 
state security personnel and ZANU PF supporters. The ruling party obtained a significant 
number of votes from these grateful beneficiaries in the 2000, 2002 and 2005 elections 
enabling it to retain power. Because indigenization and black empowerment programmes 
were largely partisan they became a new source conflict as they marginalized those who were 
not affiliated to ZANU PF.  
Strategic appointments were a made in the judiciary. Independent judges such as Justices 
McNally, Blackie and Ibrahim were sidelined on allegations of being unpatriotic, harbouring 
political agendas and siding with the commercial farmers. They were replaced with those 
more acceptable to the regime such as Godfrey Chidyausiku, a former ZANU PF deputy 
minister who was appointed Chief Justice. He had a record of chairing several politically 
sensitive commissions and ruling in favour of the ruling party. To Ruswa (2009:8), this 
constituted what has come to be known as the “Zanunisation” of the judiciary. The new 
judges began to pass pro-government rulings and even reversed the judgements made in the 
year 2000 that had declared farm invasions illegal. As a result of questionable judicial 
appointments and the lack of judicial impartiality political tensions and conflict increased in 
Zimbabwe. It is noteworthy that the employment by the ZANU PF government of Gramscian 
strategies to survive regime change is symptomatic of coloniality and repetition without 
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change as the Rhodesian engaged in the same to attempts to block Zimbabwe’s 
independence.  
In sustaining itself in power ZANU PF also used anti-imperialist nationalist rhetoric.  Bond 
and Manyanya (2003:40) argue that ZANU PF reacted to the threat of the MDC and the 
British by reviving its dormant leftist rhetoric which was used to displace the Zimbabwean 
crisis to an international level which enabled Mugabe to project himself as the champion of 
African and Third World Rights. Mugabe’s rhetoric touched on emotive issues that appealed 
to the developing world such as projecting land as an historic injustice, neo-colonialism as an 
ongoing legacy which needs to be dealt with, economic exploitation as a major problem on 
the African continent and race as a problem which remains unaddressed in Zimbabwe  
(Raftopoulos:2006).  
A leading academic and publisher is however of the opinion that ZANU PF’s castigation of 
the West and white settlers is not because it is bitter with West’s exploitation of the 
developing world but is actually bitterness over the Zimbabwean leadership’s exclusion from 
the Western capitalist feeding trough (Interview : 4/9/2015). An MDC-T senior official 
concurs that the crisis that Zimbabwe has had to endure since 2000 is a consequence of the 
ZANU PF government foisting its bilateral fight with London on Zimbabwe (Interview : 
3/9/2015). ZANU PF’s nationalist and anti-imperialist rhetoric with race as a key trope 
divided Zimbabwean society on the basis of race and ideology. Although this served well the 
regime’s stay in power, it did not provide a good basis on which to foster peace, 
reconciliation and national unity 
7.6 MARCH 2008 HARMONISED ELECTIONS AND THE JUNE PRESIDENTIAL 
RUN-OFF ELECTIONS 
In the parliamentary elections held in the year 2005 the MDC once again mounted a strong 
challenge despite government efforts to curtail its activities. Like in the year 2000 and the 
year 2002 election violence, intimidation and allegations of rigging led to a disputed election. 
The MDC appealed to the international community, particularly the EU and US not to 
recognize ZANU PF’s victory. The MDC was roundly criticized by SADC states and other 
African countries for turning to the West for solutions instead of seeking answers from within 
the continent.  It was because of the persistence of the coloniality of imagination that the 
MDC thought that its problems could better be resolved by extra-continental powers whose 
understanding of the context of African problems were not deep as that of African states. The 
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MDC saw the West as ontologically denser and epistemologically better endowed to deal 
with African problems.  The MDC decision of turning to the West while shunning African 
states incensed African leaders. They sympathized with Mugabe who at many forums had 
often argued that the MDC was a puppet of the West. As a consequence of the MDC’s 
preference of the West to resolve African problems and Africa’s disdain for parties inclined 
towards the West, the resolution of the Zimbabwean conflict was pushed back by several 
years. 
Although ZANU PF triumphed in the 2005 elections, it was unable to overcome economic 
and political problems that continued to afflict the country. Disenchantment with ZANU PF 
grew as a result of the failure to deal with the challenges facing the country. As ZANU PF’s 
popularity waned that of the MDC waxed. According to Haggard and Kaufman (1997:226) 
economic crises undermine the authoritarian bargains forged between rulers and key socio-
political constituents and expose rulers to defection from within the business sector and 
protest from below. When the economic crunch began to bite a significant proportion of the 
business community abandoned ZANU PF and shifted its allegiance to the MDC which was 
seen as a progressive force seeking to cure the cancer of corruption and economic 
mismanagement that characterized ZANU PF’s rule.  With the backing not only of the 
business community but also the support of white capital and western countries and an 
impoverished  population living under the world’s highest inflation that hit 89 sextillion 
percent in mid-November 2008, the MDC remained a serious threat to ZANU PF’s 
hegemony (Fournier and Whittall , 2009). It should be highlighted that in the year 2005 the 
MDC split into two formations. The larger one, the MDC-T, was led Morgan Tsvangirai and 
Tendai Biti as president and Secretary General respectively while the smaller one that 
retained the name MDC was led by Arthur Mutambara as president and Welshman Ncube as 
secretary general. 
On 11 March 2007, the MDC-T and civil society leaders held an unsanctioned prayer 
meeting.  The gathering was disbanded by the police who arrested and assaulted opposition 
civic activists and political leaders, who included MDC-T President, Morgan Tsvangirai. The 
arrest and assault of Tsvangirai ignited strong international revulsion which compelled the 
SADC leadership to convene an emergency Summit in Dar-es Salaam on 29 March 2007 
(Munemo: 2012b). Sensing that conflict might breakout the SADC summit called for 
negotiations between Zimbabwe’s conflicting parties with South African president Thabo 
Mbeki as mediator. The talks forced ZANU PF to push through Constitutional Amendment 
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No 18, which allowed for presidential and parliamentary elections to take place concurrently 
(Raftopoulos, 2013:9).  
The March 29 2008 elections, also called harmonized elections, were held after reforms were 
made to the Electoral Act. Some of electoral laws were aligned to the 2005 SADC Principles 
and Guidelines governing democratic elections. The adoption of some the principles and 
guidelines went a long way in leveling an electoral playing field tilted in favour of the ruling 
party. This gave the opposition space to campaign and organize. It got space to sell its 
manifesto on state controlled radio and television, something which hitherto had been 
unheard off. The police often accused of being partisan observed neutrality. They did not, 
like in previous elections, invoke sections of POSA to frustrate opposition campaigns. They 
allowed the opposition to freely hold rallies, meetings and distribute pamphlets and as a result 
the opposition was able to make inroads into ZANU PF strongholds (Munemo: 2012b).  
Although the atmosphere was tense on polling day people were allowed to vote unhindered. 
There were few and isolated incidences of violence. These did not however affect the 
outcome of the elections in which the opposition for the first time since independence gained 
control of the lower house and drastically reduced ZANU PF's control of the Upper House. In 
the 210 Lower House the MDC-T won 101 seats, ZANU PF 99 seats, MDC 9 seats while 
Jonathan Moyo an independent candidate won the remaining seat. In the Upper House ZANU 
PF won 30 seats, MDC-T 24 seats and MDC 6 seats. 
The announcement of presidential election results was delayed by six weeks during which 
time political tensions between ZANU PF and the MDCs soared. The MDC-T was accused 
by ZANU PF of prematurely declaring itself winner of the elections and of extending an 
invitation to whites to reoccupy lost land as part of efforts to recolonize Zimbabwe by the 
British. The MDC-T accused ZANU PF of withholding results for the purposes of rigging.  It 
also blamed ZANU PF for launching a brutal campaign of violence against those it suspected 
of having voted against it.  This triggered massive violence between supporters of MDC-T 
and ZANU PF. 
When the results were finally announced by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission the MDC-
T candidate Morgan Tsvangirai had obtained 47% of the vote while Robert Mugabe of 
ZANU PF had 42% of the vote, and an independent candidate, Simba Makoni, who had 
broken ranks with ZANU PF got 8% of the vote. ZANU PF’s loss was a consequence of it 
having grown unpopular because of policy failures, corruption, economic mismanagement 
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and the failure to provide development which had led to widespread poverty, suffering and 
loss of livelihoods. Equally important in ZANU PF’s loss was the West’s economic squeeze 
on Harare. The ZANU PF government was unable to prevent a protest vote by the population 
disgruntled by socio-economic hardships. The masses had turned against the government and 
voted for the pro-West opposition in anticipation of a better future.  The socio-economic 
crisis also handicapped the ruling party’s ability to keep its system of patronage well oiled to 
thwart a Tsvangirai victory.   
Tsvangirai’s election victory was not enough to avoid a run-off election. Zimbabwe’s 
electoral laws required that one obtains at least 50% plus one vote to be declared outright 
winner in presidential polls. June 27 was set as the day of the presidential run-off election.  In 
the run up to the election there was an escalation of violence. The state security services and 
the entire ZANU PF structure were mobilized to overturn the result (Munemo: 2012b). 
Between April 4 and June 20, ZANU PF supporters launched Operation Makavoterapapi 
(Operation where did you put your vote?). The strategy was designed to use violence to 
dismantle MDC-T party structures ahead of the elections. The paradigm of violence was so 
ingrained in the psyche of the Zimbabwean rulers such that they could not fathom staying in 
power without resorting to violence. Mugabe had even boasted in the year 2000 that he had 
“degrees in violence” (Blair: 2002).  
ZANU PF youths and militias harassed, murdered, abducted and tortured the opposition in 
the terror and intimidation campaign (Muzondidya, 2009b:6). President Mugabe appeared on 
television boldly declaring that the “bullet was mightier than the pen”. Mugabe insinuated 
that the MDC would not be allowed to rule the country in the event that it would win the 
election. The statement discouraged peace-loving Zimbabweans from voting for the 
opposition. Apparently Zimbabweans who did not want to be revisited by the horrors of the 
liberation war and the violence experienced in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces in 
the 1980s may also have been disaffected by this. To ZANU PF, the right to rule it appeared 
was derived from the ability to muster and use force, the “gun” rather than the ability to 
persuade, convince and obtain consent, “the pen”. The Cartesian concept of “I think therefore 
I am- the pen” was replaced by the paradigm of war informed “I conquer therefore I am – the 
gun.” ZANU PF employed violence because it perceived subjects that fought the liberation 
war as politically and ontologically denser beings entitled to rule Zimbabwe than those 
subjects that did not participate in the war of liberation who to it belong to the zone of non-
being and therefore not entitled to rule Zimbabwe.   
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The violence unleashed by ZANU PF was in its brutality comparable to the 1980s violence in 
Matabeleland and the Midlands. Unlike the 1980s conflagration, violence after the year 2000 
did not take ethnic lines; it was largely racial, political, ideological and electoral. In the year 
2008 the crescendo of this new wave of political violence was hit. The violence disrupted 
social life leading to internal displacement, uncertainty and untold suffering.  Against the 
backdrop of a state sponsored campaign of violence on his supporters Morgan Tsvangirai of 
the MDC pulled out of the run-off election a few days before polls after his party indicated 
that over 400 people had been murdered ( Reliefweb, 30 July 2013). The Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission refused to accept his withdrawal but the MDC-T leader remained adamant.  
Tsvangirai's withdrawal from the presidential run-off election worked in ZANU PFs favour. 
Mugabe emerged resoundingly victorious with 85% of the vote (Munemo: 2012b). ZANU 
PF’s “victory” in the presidential elections was obtained in a fashion akin to colonial times 
where colonial authorities would use violence and intimidation to obtain a result that pleased 
the regime in power as was the case with Muzorewa’s victory in the 1979 elections.   
The election was seen as bogus and a sham by the international community while SADC saw 
the election as inconclusive. In the face of international hostility, a crumbling economy at 
home and the refusal by SADC and the AU to endorse the elections Mugabe was forced to 
negotiate a power sharing arrangement with the opposition MDC formations in a bid to end 
the crisis in Zimbabwe.   
Below is a diagram reflecting the crisis situation in Zimbabwe that necessitated negotiations 
between the MDC formations and ZANU PF; 
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FIGURE 1 - SOURCE (MAKOCHEKANWA AND KWARAMBA: 2009) 
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7.7 THE GPA AND ITS CRITICISM 
According to Booth (2000) protracted regime crisis increases the likelihood of a negotiated 
settlement and major regime transformation with new political rules, redistributed benefits, 
and the inclusion of both the challengers and key old-regime actors.  The prolonged crisis in 
Zimbabwe necessitated negotiations for a power sharing government with the intention of 
creating a power sharing government that would include both the incumbent rulers and the 
opposition.  
South African president Thabo Mbeki as mediator on behalf of SADC convened the talks. He 
sought to avert the possibility of the socio-economic and political crisis degenerating into a 
war situation. He viewed the creation of a transitional power sharing government of national 
unity as a solution to the crisis. Mbeki also had personal motivations for pushing for a peace 
agreement and the establishment of a unity government in Zimbabwe. According to 
(Matyszak, 2010:94) Mbeki’s own position as President of South Africa was threatened by 
Jacob Zuma and his team who were unhappy with his running of the country. He thus wished 
to deflect attention from himself and salvage his Presidency. As a decolonial pan-Africanist 
averse to Western interference in African affairs Mbeki saw in the establishment of a unity 
government an opportunity to undercut Western capitalist powers  that were pushing for the 
removal of the anti-West ZANU PF regime. He sought to replace it with a pan African 
government unlikely to safeguard the continuation of colonial patterns of power that 
permitted the West to dominate and exploit Zimbabwe.  
It was in the interests of SADC to resolve the crisis because both illegal and legal 
Zimbabwean migrants fleeing the crisis were a burden on SADC states as they demanded 
social services from countries hosting them. The poor performance of the Zimbabwean 
economy also affected trade and investment. It was exigent for the crisis in Zimbabwe to be 
resolved as it had created divisions in SADC over its resolution. These differences were 
threatening not only southern Africa’s regional economic and political stability but also the 
political and economic interests of global powers such as the US and Britain. SADC thus 
found it extremely important for a political deal to be worked out in Zimbabwe before global 
political powers the US and Britain stepped in to resolve the crisis in a way that served 
western interests.   
Both the MDCs and ZANU PF agreed to talks as they were tired of the long drawn conflict 
spanning almost a decade that had virtually culminated in a stalemate. ZANU PF on the one 
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hand had structural power as coercive instruments of state power were under its control. The 
MDCs on the other hand had situational power as it could heavily influence the economic 
trajectory of the country and international opinion.  They had the international connections 
that could help improve the economic and political climate or to worsen it as well as the 
sympathy of a population enduring socio-economic and political hardships. Although the two 
MDC formations enjoyed situational power they desired talks for they lacked structural 
power, the control of the security apparatus, the media and other key state institutions 
important for state control. They had also failed to acquire power through elections and thus 
saw a GNU as an avenue by which to get into government. The situation almost resembled 
the state of affairs in the late 1970s which compelled the white dominated Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia government to negotiate with the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front had situational 
power, it could choose to escalate the war or terminate it while Muzorewa with state 
institutions at his disposal had structural power. These dynamics had forced them to agree to 
the Lancaster House Talks. 
ZANU PF also agreed to negotiations with the MDCs as it saw an opportunity to block 
regime change machinations through the creation of a GNU. To ZANU PF a GNU would 
save it from the embarrassment of electoral “defeat” and would also allow it to reorganize 
itself and prepare for the next election. ZANU PF further agreed to talks as was finding it 
virtually impossible to govern without the MDCs whose inclusion it direly needed to obtain 
legitimacy and attract economic support. ZANU PF was aware that attempts to establish a 
government without the MDCs would be suicidal given the precarious state of the economy 
and its eroded legitimacy.   For the MDCs, the creation of a GNU would provide an 
opportunity to get into the corridors of power and institute key reforms to democratize the 
country and provide it with space to erode ZANU PF’s power and perhaps unseat Mugabe. 
One cannot ignore the fact that besides political motives for agreeing to talks moral issues 
may also have influenced the decisions of the MDCs and ZANU PF to engage in dialogue. 
This was because the Zimbabwean people were experiencing untold hardships that included a 
cholera epidemic, rampant poverty, lack of service delivery, a collapsed education system, 
poor health care, amongst a myriad of development problems.  
Talks began at the end of July 2008 with representatives of ZANU PF, MDC-T and MDC 
meeting in South Africa. From the onset the EU and the US put pressure on Mbeki to produce 
a result designed to lead to a transfer of power from ZANU PF to the MDC. Raftopoulos 
(2013a:xxi)  buttresses this point when he cites Hoekman as noting that “western 
231 
 
governments were only agreeable to the MDC-T joining the Inclusive Government on 
condition that ZANU PF was serious about genuine power sharing, that there were sufficient 
guarantees to ensure transition and that Mugabe’s exit was ensured.” Mbeki was however not 
intimidated by the West, he made it clear to the US and Britain that he would use the African 
solutions to African problems paradigm to try and resolve the Zimbabwean crisis. He 
reiterated that it was up to the people of Zimbabwe to find solutions to their problems and not 
the business of foreigners.  
After more than six weeks of negotiation characterized by “deadlocks, walkouts, harsh 
exchanges, delays, continuing violence, raised hopes, false expectations and angry words” 
(Bloomfield et al, 1988:61), the talks finally culminated in the signing of the 15 September 
2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) which created a power sharing government of 
national unity mandated to heal and reconcile the strife torn and crisis ridden state.  
In the talks, it was also agreed that a new constitution would be drafted, democratic 
conditions would be created and a roadmap for free and fair undisputed elections would be 
constructed. Provisions were also made in the GPA for the establishment of an Organ on 
National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration and three commissions to promote peace 
and unity. The other salient provisions of the GPA were that the government structure would 
change to allow for the sharing of Executive Authority between the President, Cabinet and 
the office of Prime Minister that was to be created.  The President (Mugabe) would however 
remain the chair of the Cabinet while the Prime Minister (Tsvangirai) was to chair a new 
organ known as the Council of Ministers. The two vice presidents from ZANU PF were to be 
retained but two new posts of deputy prime minister were to be created with each one to be 
filled by each of the MDC formations. There were to be 31 ministerial posts in terms of the 
GPA, 15 from ZANU PF, 13 from MDC-T and 3 from MDC.  With regards to deputy 
ministers ZANU PF got (8), MDC-T (6) and MDC (1). This arrangement was for the first 
time in Zimbabwe’s history going to result in a party other than ZANU PF taking numerical 
control of Cabinet (Eppel: 2009).   
 Mugabe was to remain as both head of state and government.  Tsvangirai was to deputize 
Mugabe in the Cabinet and his role was to evaluate and adopt all government policies and the 
consequential programmes. Tsvangirai was however to chair the soon to be created Council 
of Ministers responsible for the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet and 
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ensure that the policies so formulated were implemented by the entirety of government 
(Eppel and Raftopoulos, 2008). Below is the structure of the power sharing arrangement; 
 
FIGURE 2 –POWER SHARING DEAL- SOURCE: BBC, 15 SEPTEMEBR 2008  
In general, the GPA contained details on problems afflicting Zimbabwe that required 
resolution. These problems concerned land acquisition; sanctions; the need to promote 
national healing; the need to have respect for the rule of law; free political activity; freedom 
of assembly and association; the need to depoliticize traditional leaders; the need to 
depoliticize national youth training; non interference in humanitarian assistance; security of 
persons and prevention of violence; freedom of expression and communication including the 
media; and importantly a framework for a new government (Eppel, 2009:10-11). The 
implementation of the Agreement was to be monitored by a Joint Monitoring and 
Implementation Committee (JOMIC) composed of four senior members from ZANU PF and 
four from each of the MDC formations (Eppel and Raftopoulos, 2008). SADC and the AU 
were to be the guarantor of the GPA.  
The GPA has been criticized as a product of a flawed conflict resolution mechanism known 
as quiet diplomacy.  Badza (2009:7) refers to quiet diplomacy “as the negotiation strategy 
applied by the mediator who avoids applying pressure directly and openly, on one or more of 
the critical parties to a conflict even when and if it is ethically necessary”. Quiet diplomacy 
has its origins in the Cold War era and is foreign to Zimbabwe. The adoption of quiet 
diplomacy as a conflict resolution strategy in Zimbabwe reflected the persistence of colonial 
influences with regards to methodologies for conflict resolution. It also displayed that Africa 
suffers from an epistemic crisis where its citizens have put aside their intellectual possessions 
and adopted colonizers’ forms of thought while discarding indigenous modes of conflict 
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resolution that focus on community health and restoration in favour of western notions of 
resolving conflict which are alien to their culture.  
Mbeki may have opted for quiet diplomacy because he feared that Mugabe may have gone 
ballistic had he been publicly criticised. Besides, he elected to use quiet diplomacy because 
he had a soft spot for Robert Mugabe who he regarded as a liberation icon and a champion of 
the Third World in the fight against neo-colonial domination. In line with the principles of 
quiet diplomacy Thabo Mbeki shied away from using the “stick” and avoided public criticism 
of the parties to the conflict. His quiet diplomacy scored minimal success because ZANU PF 
was able to manipulate weaknesses in this conflict resolution method to resist fundamental 
changes to the status quo.  It resulted in the escalation and extension of the Zimbabwe crisis 
as well as the violent 2008 elections and the flawed GPA which have not fostered sustainable 
peace, reconciliation and unity.   
Raftopoulos (2013b:4) is of the opinion that Mbeki also failed to secure a solid agreement 
that would have led to sustainable peace in Zimbabwe because South Africa had to balance 
its ambitions of being a continental leader while at the same time maintaining western 
support. Perhaps had Mbeki abandoned the urge to please the West and adopted pan-African 
solutions to the Zimbabwean crisis untainted by the coloniality of knowledge and power a 
more durable solution would have been found.  
Colonialism may have ended but its effects have lingered in the subconscious of the ex-
colonized people whose judgment is haunted and clouded by colonial experiences. Mbeki and 
his SADC mediation team sought to resolve the Zimbabwean impasse from the perspective of 
a people that feared the influence and spread of what they perceived to be western 
imperialism in a region that had suffered greatly from capitalist colonialism for centuries. The 
mediator was thinking from the “border” but still psychologically haunted by bad memories 
of colonial rule that lingered in his psyche despite the end of colonialism. The middle-of-the-
road solutions he proffered were tempered by this fear, thus resulting in a document that fell 
short of fostering sustainable peace.  
A notable weakness of the GPA was that it was undemocratic as it was reached without mass 
consultation. As such it did not reflect the will of the electorate who did not vote for 
government of national unity but a single government. It was not a product of popular mass 
involvement but rather the product of a bourgeoisie political elite working with SADC to 
foist a unity government on the people. It also sidelined civil society, excluded other political 
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players leaving the future of Zimbabwe to be decided by three political parties yet Zimbabwe 
is a diverse country whose desires and aspirations cannot be encapsulated in the philosophies 
of three political formations. A former co-Minister of National Healing and Reconciliation 
concurs that there was nothing global or holistic and perhaps even national about the GPA. It 
was to her merely an inter-party agreement masked as a national accord (Interview, 
17/9/2015).  
The GPA lacked legitimacy and this crisis of legitimacy drove away investment, increased 
the country’s risk factor, took away the sovereignty of the people and gave it to the 
politicians, therefore inviting distrust and socio-economic problems that have reversed 
Zimbabwe’s development goals. Masunungure (2009:5) sees the crisis of legitimacy in 
Zimbabwe as having to do with right to rule on one hand and, on the other, a feeling by the 
governed that they had an obligation to obey their rulers. The GPA could not therefore be a 
solid foundation upon which peace could be fostered in Zimbabwe. It made durable peace 
virtually difficult to achieve.   
Another weakness of the talks was that the position of President was non-negotiable. ZANU 
PF insisted that Mugabe would remain as the head of the new government arguing that he had 
“won” the June presidential run-off elections and would not brook anything contrary to that. 
Aware that Mugabe held most of the cards but desperate to get into government, the MDC 
formations yielded to ZANU PFs demands and a flawed agreement that preserved most of 
ZANU PF’s power. It was perhaps because the MDCs wanted to enter the corridors of power 
and access financial benefits that accrue from ascending political office.  
The bulk of critics of the GPA interviewed argued that it blocked winners of elections while 
rewarding losers with a place in government yet violence and undemocratic means had been 
employed to remain in power. They argue that this decision to reward losers at the expense of 
winners set a bad precedent for democracy on the African continent because election losers 
would see violence as a means by which to reclaim power. To highlight this, the GPA gave 
ZANU PF a place in government yet it was apparent that ZANU PF had “lost” the election 
after the first round of voting and had only been able to remain in power after employing 
violence in the presidential run-off elections.   
Although Mbeki was praised for managing to get the leaders of the three main parties in 
Zimbabwe to append their signatures to a unity government deal he was criticised for trying 
to get parties with different ideologies and philosophies to share power.  According to 
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Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013: 233) the GPA was faced with the challenge of how to “synthesize 
the radical nationalist position of ZANU-PF premised on uncompromising socialist oriented 
redistributive project with the equally radical neoliberal position of MDC-T premised on 
democratization and human rights discourse.” Critics saw trying to get ZANU PF and the 
MDCs to work together as similar to trying to mix oil and water.  It was almost impossible to 
bridge the wide gulf of differences between the parties to the Agreement.  
Mugabe reveals this in an interview with The Sunday Mail on the differences between the 
parties to the GPA. 
One might think they [MDCs] want systems far much better than our own, more 
aggressive, more resolute, more revolutionary. But no, it’s more negative. They want us 
to go back to a system where there is great reliance on foreign investment, foreign 
support and on foreign advisers….really they are for whites being the main players of 
our political system…they rely more on the views of the west. We rely on our views.  
(The Sunday Mail, 19-25 February 2012) 
Pamela Machakanja (2010) scrutinises the GPA document and exposes its lack of 
commitment. She reveals that the GPA document does not in any way make reference to 
justice and reconciliation except in the body text and uses non committal phrases such as the 
‘the government will ensure…’ … ‘the state will strive…’ .  Signatures were appended to the 
agreement purporting to signify a commitment towards peace but there was in reality little 
sincerity behind the signatures. Mugabe had learnt quite well from his dealings with the white 
colonial government of the 1970s that signatures could be put to paper but without 
fundamentally changing the status quo, just like the Lancaster Agreement had shown. He 
appended his signature to the GPA document but did little to adhere to the agreement. The 
refusal by ZANU PF to fulfil some of the provisions of the GPA vindicated this lack of 
commitment. 
Article VII of the GPA provided for the creation an Organ on National Healing, 
Reconciliation and Integration. An analysis of this article reveals that reconciliation and 
healing were going to be structural and elitist at the expense of a mass and victim centred 
psycho-social and spiritual healing and reconciliation process. Instead of the GPA providing 
a comprehensive healing and reconciliation framework that covers Zimbabwe’s multi-layered 
conflict periods it failed to provide clarity on the conflict periods that the future government 
had to work with. It also failed to develop a template for the establishment of a truth and 
justice commission to promote peace and reconciliation. 
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Another fundamental weakness of the GPA was that it never got into the mechanics of how 
power was to be shared and this became the source of conflict that bedevilled the GNU. 
Thabo Mbeki’s mediation team did not delve into the business of sharing out cabinet posts to 
the GPA parties arguing that it was the business of the GNU. Immediately after signing the 
GPA, ZANU PF and the MDCs failed to agree on ministerial allocations. Mugabe allocated 
to ZANU PF coercive ministries while the MDCs were given social service and delivery 
ministries. The MDCs objected to this resulting in delays in the formation of the GNU and 
procrastination in addressing the crisis engulfing the country.  The GPA’s failure to provide a 
framework for institutional reforms also resulted in schism within the GNU as ZANU PF 
refused to accede to any reforms that threatened its power.  
The GPA was vague on the relationship and powers of the prime minister and president 
especially regarding the sharing of powers within the executive. Various sections of the 
document stated that the president would make decisions in consultation with the prime 
minister but it was not made clear in the document whether consultation meant merely 
informing the prime minister or reaching consensus with the prime minister. Besides being 
unclear on the powers of the executive, the GPA also failed to strike a balance of power 
between the MDCs and ZANU PF, an illusion of power sharing was created as the prime 
minister’s powers were just cosmetic. The president’s executive authority was left intact; as a 
matter of fact it was scantly checked. He remained the Head of State, Government and 
Commander in Chief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces with power to appoint senior 
government officials, declare war and proclaim and end martial law (Global Political 
Agreement, 2008).  Mugabe later declared at his birthday celebrations in March 2009 ; “I am 
still in control and hold executive authority so nothing much has changed” (Matyszak, 
2010:103) .The fact that most power was retained by ZANU PF and institutions that it 
controlled cast a dark shadow on the prospects for peace and unity because the institutions 
that ZANU PF was left controlling were the very same institutions that had been responsible 
for democratic deficits, violence, repression and human rights violations. Matyszak (2010) 
lambasts the MDCs for entering into an agreement (GPA) with ZANU PF that did not offer 
prospects of the restoration of democracy and the rule of law, components crucial to peace, 
unity and stability.  
To a greater extent and with regards to where the substance of power resided, the GPA was 
not fundamentally different from the 3 March 1978 Internal Settlement and the 1987 Unity 
Accord that left incumbent powers dominating the new political arrangements. The GPA left 
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ZANU PF with control over the levers of state power while surrendering to the MDCs a 
mirage of power.  Similarly the Internal Settlement left the white minority in control of key 
institutions while giving Muzorewa the shadow of power. Like the moderate African 
nationalist leaders that signed the 3 March Peace Agreement the MDCs leadership was not 
fighting for the substance of power, but wanted access and space at the feeding trough as this 
was to be vindicated by corruption cases involving MDCs officials in the inclusive 
government. It is thus within the domain of the coloniality of power that we should 
understand the MDCs consent to an unbalanced power- sharing unity government. 
It should be highlighted that the GPA like the 1987 Unity Accord was a product of coercion 
as MDC-supporters suffered violence at the hands of ZANU PF supporters and state 
sponsored militia groups as the negotiations were on-going. State security forces arrested and 
brought before the courts MDC officials. Apparently the idea was to pressure the MDC into 
agreeing to a settlement that left ZANU PF in a dominant position. 
Ultimately not only was the GPA a product of coercion but also of coloniality; on the one 
hand it was a consequence of a Western diplomatic pressure on the SADC region as well as a 
capitalist political and economic squeeze on the ZANU PF government that was forced to 
accept a power-sharing government of national unity as a mode of surviving regime change.  
On the other hand it was a result of Western support to pro-democratic parties that espoused 
the neo-liberal philosophy of governance that was attractive to the West. The West’ 
endeavour to propel the opposition into power was neutralized by anti-imperialist neo-
colonial pan -Africanist forces. 
7.8 THE 2009-2013: GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY - SLEEPING WITH 
THE ENEMY 
A power sharing government is generally formed when the ruling party's confidence and 
legitimacy are severely weakened although it remains strong enough to exercise control over 
the most important institutions. ZANU PF was able to secure the Global Political Agreement 
because it had the capacity to retain control of key state institutions although confidence in it 
had plummeted to an all time low. 
Although the GPA was signed in September 2008, the establishment of a Government of 
National Unity did not follow immediately after owing to disagreement over the allocation of 
ministerial and other senior government posts, namely; Reserve Bank Governor, 
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Ambassadors, Attorney General and Permanent Secretaries. ZANU PF insisted on the control 
of the key hard power state ministries such as defence, home affairs, media and state security 
while offering the MDCs low key soft power social service and delivery ministries. As the 
parties haggled over the allocation of posts socio-economic woes mounted. By the end of 
2008 the Zimbabwean currency was virtually useless and a cholera epidemic had killed over 
a thousand people.  
The GNU was only formed on 13 February 2009 when ZANU PF acceded to SADC’s 
request to co-share the Ministry of Home Affairs and following the passing of Constitutional 
Amendment No. 19 of 2009 that allowed the GPA to be legislated. To Eppel (2009), the 
formation of a GNU was controversial because ZANU PF had not since the signing of the 
GPA relented on its abuse of coercive power evidenced by the continuing abduction and 
torture of people perceived to be MDC-T. The MDC formations managed to coax ZANU PF 
into sharing ministerial posts but they had to work with a state bureaucracy that was largely 
pro-ZANU PF in the top echelons. Because the GPA did not robustly demand institutional 
reforms and bureaucratic change attempts by MDCS’ ministers to implement ministerial 
programmes were frequently frustrated by these ZANU PF appointed bureaucrats.  
Since the GPA did not lead to a shift in the centre of political power ZANU PF was able to 
resist reforms to the media, security, Electoral Act and judiciary which would have whittled 
down its power in the unity government.  The MDCs had anticipated that institutional 
reforms would limit the powers of President Mugabe and broaden democratic space. Since 
this was not realized, ZANU PF was thus able to maintain its stranglehold on the country. For 
instance, ZANU PF made piecemeal reforms to the media and totally refused security sector 
reform, yet the media and security sector had been identified as two of the key institutions 
responsible for violence. Although demands for an overhaul of security personnel were 
difficult the MDCs could have insisted on reforms at the management level of the security 
forces (Interview with a senior MDC-T official: 3/9/2015). One can draw parallels between 
the absence of security sector reform in the unity government created after the 1978 Internal 
Settlement and the refusal by ZANU PF to reform the security sector under the 2009-2013 
GNU.  
By February doubts had already arisen over the sincerity of the signatories to the GPA to 
resolve Zimbabwe’s problems. For instance, violence on supporters of the MDC formations 
continued, contempt for the rule of law and abductions of opposition supporters persisted 
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while the arrest of Roy Bennett, MDC-T’s white nominee for Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
on the day on which Cabinet was sworn in was the icing on the cake. This reflected that little 
had changed in the state power structure despite the GPA and the formation of an inclusive 
government as ZANU PF had maintained control of levers of state power enabling it to 
maintain its authoritarian grip over the country. One can draw parallels to the above with 
continuation of violence on the peasant population and continued incarceration of nationalist 
leaders despite the 1978 Internal Settlement. Colonial situations were thus replicated in 
Zimbabwe although the political players and dynamics had changed in the post-independence 
period. 
Political polarization, suspicion and mistrust pervaded the GNU. The parties to the unity 
government refused to co-operate with each other. The result was that parallel governments 
were created within the GNU. ZANU PF ministers would refuse to take instructions from 
Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai who was charged with the day to day running of 
government. On one occasion Tsvangirai issued a directive to Webster Shamu, the 
information minister during the inclusive government, that the latter refused to follow 
claiming that only the president had the powers to issue directives (Matyszak: 2010). Under 
the GNU security chiefs also stuck to their pre-GPA declaration that they would not salute 
anyone without liberation credentials (Tsvangirai). The lack of executive authority and 
powerlessness of Tsvangirai was starkly exposed.  This lack of power on the part of 
Tsvangirai was also revealed by a survey carried out by the Mass Public and Opinion Trust, a 
civil society think tank in August 2012 that reported that 76% of the citizens in a sample size 
of 1,002 adults, believed that the president (Mugabe) exercised real executive power while 
Tsvangirai did not.  He was no more than a lame duck prime minister (CISOMM, 2011:51). 
Drawing a leaf from Fanon’s (1968) observations, one can note that the 2008 GPA like the 
1978 Internal Settlement, the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement, and the 1987 Unity Accord 
was accompanied by political transitions but did not culminate in fundamental transformation 
of the socio-economic and political order.  The asymmetrical state power structure that 
privileged ZANU PF and facilitated its dominance remained intact in spite of the signing of 
the GPA and the creation of the GNU.  Most power under the GNU was located in the ZANU 
PF politburo that continued to chart and influence the political and developmental trajectory 
of the country. In the state power structure everything was considered from the point of view 
of the politics of constitution of a politically hierachized system. ZANU PF would 
unilaterally make decisions in spite of the presence of the MDCs. ZANU PF’s ontology as a 
240 
 
political party remained heavier than that of MDCs.  Key state institutions would take 
instructions from ZANU PF but would decline instructions from MDC government officials. 
The power structure that survived political transition it can be argued was responsible for 
blocking peace, unity and development in Zimbabwe.  
Although Mugabe was a strongman fully in charge at home, the coloniality of power ensured 
that his powers would be of no consequence at the global level. His anti-imperialist rhetoric 
directed at British and US made him a hero amongst the oppressed people of the Third World 
but he could not sway the hegemonic West that maintained sanctions on his regime. SADC 
and the AU pleaded with the West to lift sanctions but the West remained adamant insisting 
on fundamental reforms before any such consideration. The issue of sanctions was a source 
of friction and remained contentious throughout the life of the GNU. It stood in the way of 
possible co-operation between the MDCs and ZANU PF. The former continued to blame the 
MDC for the persistence of the sanctions and used this as an alibi to reject institutional 
reforms while the MDC demanded democratization of the country as a pathway to sanctions 
removal.  Reforms without the lifting of sanctions were seen by ZANU PF as likely to 
weaken Mugabe’s grip on power and result in regime change.  
By maintaining sanctions on Zimbabwe against African advice, the West within the bounds 
of coloniality of power and knowledge assumed that its take on the Zimbabwean situation 
and approaches towards resolving the crisis were superior to those offered by SADC, AU and 
parties in the inclusive government. Misled by its epistemic arrogance the West saw its 
conflict resolution epistemology as superior to that of other players. It doubted the 
effectiveness of perspectives from the subaltern side of colonial difference on how to pursue 
peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe.  It wrongly assumed that democracy, respect for 
human rights and the rule of law, the writing of a new constitution and elections were the 
panacea to Zimbabwe’s problems. The Zimbabwe problem is far more complex than that and 
requires analysis from both sides of colonial difference.    
SADC and the Zimbabwe government have argued at various forums that imperialism and 
neo-colonial agendas tremendously contribute to the Zimbabwean crisis but these 
explanations have been frowned upon by the imperial hegemonic West that locates 
Zimbabwe’s problem as coming from within, particularly the person of President Robert 
Mugabe, corruption and other related internal structural weaknesses common to developing 
countries. The West, to Nyakudya (2013:199), could have provided the GNU with breathing 
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space by lifting sanctions, but by maintaining sanctions on Zimbabwe the West blocked 
pathways towards peace as they gave ZANU PF an excuse to resist reforms likely to produce 
an environment conducive for peace. The West’s attitude was shaped by conceptualizing 
power from Cartesian perspective that sees it as something linear. Within the African 
governance philosophy leaders traditionally perceive power as relational.  They do not see 
themselves as omnipotent and all knowing. They consult widely; they do not view others as 
inferior and subaltern. Everyone gets an opportunity to contribute to peace, governance and 
development of society. 
The GNU barely resolved the conflict over land in Zimbabwe. It was agreed in Article V of 
the GPA that land reform was reversible.  The inclusive government was charged with 
conducting a transparent non partisan comprehensive land audit that the British government 
was to be asked to fund. The British utterly refused to fund the programme. The ZANU PF 
elite that had benefitted tremendously from the chaotic land reform by acquiring several 
farms frustrated calls for a land audit. Because land was a resource through which ZANU PF 
obtained votes it blocked any reforms to land that it did not control as it threatened its power 
base. As a result, the conflict over land which had triggered the Zimbabwe crisis that had 
reversed development gains remained unresolved. The future of peace in Zimbabwe remains 
dark as a consequence of this failure to address the land question.   
The violence of 2008 was characterized by rape, beatings, murders, torture, maimed figures 
and a huge number of internally displaced people. Communities and relatives had turned 
against each other along partisan and ideological identities. Many livelihoods were lost due to 
the widespread destruction of property and the uneconomic environment that prevailed in the 
wake of the violence (Munemo, 2012b). Against this backdrop Article VII of the GPA made 
provisions for the creation of the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration 
(ONHRI) to deal with the post-electoral civil strife and healing, reconciliation and 
integration.   
ONHRI was created in 2009 and was constituted by three ministers from each of the parties 
in the power-sharing government.  The idea was not only to achieve equitable representation 
of the three main political parties but also to make the Organ effective and acceptable to a 
wide cross section of the population.  The mandate of the ONHRI as contained in Article 7, 
Section 1, Subsection (c) of the GPA was to  
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…study the physical, including emotional, social and mental trauma afflicting most 
Zimbabweans with the view to addressing it and to promote programs to 
compassionately address the economic and social needs of victims of political violence 
and related maladies (Global Political Agreement, 2008) 
Instead of fulfilling its mandate as stated above ONHRI was consumed by analysing the 
drivers of conflict in Zimbabwe and insisting on “letting bygones be bygones” while ignoring 
the need for justice, the acknowledgement of past wrongs and the creation of a truth telling 
commission. As a consequence of prioritizing peripheral issues obstacles were placed on the 
path of a successful national healing and reconciliation process.      
On the whole, ONHRI’s work was made difficult by the fact that it was set in the context of a 
transitional power sharing arrangement characterised by political polarisation. Since national 
healing and reconciliation was entrusted to parties that were central to the conflict their 
disagreements in the power sharing arrangement spilled over into ONHRI hampering its 
functions and effectiveness.  The situation was worsened by the fact that ONHRI’s leadership 
was chosen on partisan bases allowing party interests to interfere with peace building. 
Political parties represented in ONHRI refused to accept blame for the 2008 violence as they 
saw this as likely to diminish their support.   As a result of this the parties to the GNU agreed 
that ONHRI’s work would only consider the post-GNU period. This decision to be amnesiac 
is similar to the decision reached after the liberation war where former belligerents agreed to 
let “bygones be bygones”.  
Article VI of the GPA stated that the GNU would have to draft a new constitution that would 
pave the way for elections.  Despite working in a difficult environment characterized by 
polarization, a shortage of resources, a short time frame and state sanctioned violence and 
intimidation, a new constitution was agreed to in a referendum on 16 March 2013. The 
document was however dismissed by civil society groups led by the National Constitutional 
Assembly, a strong voice in civil society circles that argued that the constitution making 
process was dominated by the three parties in the inclusive government and thus inclined to 
reflect and serve the interests of its makers. A new constitution was produced for Zimbabwe 
but a new constitutional order was not. The government continued to flout the principles of 
constitutionalism in spite of the enactment of a new constitution.  There was no change in the 
governance attitude as ZANU PF refused to democratize institutions and relent on repression. 
Despite the criticism, the making of the 2013 constitution of Zimbabwe was one notable 
achievement of the GNU. The GPA also made provisions for the establishment of a Human 
Rights Commission as one way of promoting peace. Despite the GNU having been formed in 
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February 2009 it was only in March 2010 that the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission was 
appointed. There were high expectations that the Commission would unravel and publicise 
cases of human rights violations of the past that explained recurrent conflicts in Zimbabwean 
society but hopes were dashed when the commission was only mandated to investigate cases 
of human rights abuses committed in the post-2008 electoral violence period. No more than 
two years into his job the Chairperson of the ZHRC Professor Reginald Austin resigned from 
his post in frustration citing the lack of funds and state support.  
Complaints by the MDC over ZANU PF’s unilateral decision making and failure to adhere to 
the GPA were ineffectually dealt with by Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee 
(JOMIC).  ZANU PF perceived the organ as meddling and thus treated it with disdain and 
disregarded its advice. Attempts by JOMIC to rope in SADC to put pressure on ZANU PF to 
adhere to the terms of the GPA were in vain. Mugabe threatened to withdraw from SADC 
and even insulted South Africa’s international relations adviser, Lindiwe Zulu, calling her a 
“street woman”  when he thought that the South African mediator was overstepping her 
mandate ( Newsday, 6 July 2013). 
During the life of the GNU, Zimbabwe moved from a crisis situation to one of unstable 
peace. Michael Lund (2009:13) refers to unstable peace as “a situation in which tension and 
suspicion among parties run high, but violence is either absent or only sporadic…the parties 
perceive one another as enemies”. There was little mutual co-operation and understanding in 
the GNU. Political polarization that had characterized the pre-GPA period persisted. 
Incidences of violence continued to be recorded across the country especially during the 
constitution making period.  
The GNU eased political tensions which hitherto had been at fever pitch, abated the 
economic slide and averted the possibility of civil strife. There was an improvement in the 
economy especially after the introduction of the multi-currency system with the US dollar as 
the main note of tender. The economy was stabilized and the runaway inflation of 2008 
brought down to single digit figures. Positive economic growth was recorded during the life 
of the GNU with improvements in health, education and food security (CISOMM: 2011).  
Although there was a transition from crisis to a semblance of normalcy evidenced by a 
decline in violence, an improvement in the economy and the standard of living of the 
majority especially in urban areas the socio-economic and political problems refused to go 
away. The common ground, mutual co-operation and understanding that the GNU had sought 
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were not achieved. There was consistent haggling and bickering in the GNU since parties had 
seen the power sharing arrangement as an opportunity to reorganize in preparation for the 
next election.   
It has been noted in this section that the GNU was an uneasy power sharing arrangement, the 
parties in it hardly saw eye to eye as they carried different ideologies and philosophies. The 
MDC formations saw themselves as progressive democrats arguing for a rational 
development and governance approach related to global trends and economic and democratic 
best practice while ZANU PF pursued a radical neo-nationalist development and governance 
paradigm based on correcting colonial injustices. These divergences filtered down to party 
structures and the population in general, thus further compounding challenges to the 
achievement of peace, unity and reconciliation.  
7.9 THE 2013 ELECTION AND THE END OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL 
UNITY  
The 2008 GPA gave the GNU a life span of a maximum five years. This meant that elections 
were due in 2013. The MDC formations were however uncomfortable with elections being 
held before fundamental reforms. They cited piecemeal changes to the Electoral Act, 
cosmetic media reforms and the absence of security sector reform as inadequate to provide a 
free and fair election. ZANU PF was eager for an election in spite of the absence of reforms, 
arguing that the marriage of convenience had outlived its mandate.  
A Supreme Court application by Jealous Mawarire, an ordinary citizen demanding that the 
President sets a date for elections before July 31 2013 pushed the GNU parties towards 
elections. The Supreme Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the President to 
declare an election date. The President duly complied by announcing 31 July 2013 as the date 
for the elections (The Herald, 13 June 2013). The MDC formations protested to SADC 
arguing that elections before reforms would not lead to free and fair elections. They sought 
SADC support for elections to be delayed until reforms. A June SADC summit held in 
Maputo, Mozambique, encouraged Mugabe to postpone elections by two weeks to allow 
reforms to take place but Mugabe refused. He argued that such action would be 
unconstitutional and a violation of the rule of law.  MDC formations thus found themselves 
frog-marched to an election without reforms.  
The election campaign period was generally peaceful but the MDCs were disturbed by what 
they cited as bias by the Registrar General and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. They 
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accused the Registrar General’s office of concentrating registration activities in ZANU PF 
rural stronghold holds while ignoring to thoroughly carryout registration in urban centres 
considered MDC strongholds.  The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission allegedly staffed by 
people sympathetic to ZANU PF failed to produce an electoral voters roll in time and only 
produced the hardcopy of the voters role two days before the election. The Zimbabwe 
Electoral Commission was accused of working with NIKUV; a private Israeli company 
suspected of helping governments rig elections by manipulating voter’s rolls.  All this raised 
suspicion of rigging on the part of ZANU PF (Zimbabwe Independent, 2 August 2013).  
The polls were conducted in a peaceful atmosphere. When elections results were announced 
ZANU PF had won the parliamentary elections with more than two thirds majority while 
President Mugabe had 61% of the presidential vote.  The MDC formations cried foul, arguing 
that although elections were peaceful they were not free and fair. They accused ZANU PF of 
rigging but SADC and the AU endorsed the elections arguing that despite the elections being 
imperfect they were on the whole a reflection of the will of the majority of the electorate. The 
West declared that although the elections had been peaceful they had not met the bench 
marks of free, fair and credible democratic elections.  The West thus refused to acknowledge 
Mugabe as the winner of elections and to lift sanctions on Mugabe’s regime. After futile 
attempts by the MDC to challenge the results in court Mugabe was sworn in as President, 
signaling the end of the GNU and the beginning of yet another era of ZANU PF governance 
in Zimbabwe but the Zimbabwe conflict remained unresolved. 
7.10 CONCLUSION  
It has been noted in this chapter that the West had a huge role to play in the conflict that 
engulfed Zimbabwe. Its role in the formation and funding of the opposition which sought to 
unseat the Harare regime which had broken ranks with neo-liberalism is apparent. The 
political rivalry between the ZANU PF government and the MDC culminated in dire socio-
economic and political consequences for Zimbabwe. It took the GPA and its child the GNU 
to manage the conflict, end the violence, abate the economic slide and produce a new 
constitution for the people of Zimbabwe.  They were nevertheless unsuccessful in achieving 
durable peace as the persistence of remnants of colonialism and the replication of coloniality 
fanned the coals of conflict and blocked the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in 
Zimbabwe.      
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION: DECOLONIALITY AS A PANACEA FOR PEACE, 
RECONCILIATION AND UNITY  
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This is the concluding chapter of the thesis.  It summarizes arguments advanced throughout 
the chapters that show that Zimbabwe’s peace, unity and reconciliation problems are a 
consequence of the combination of coloniality and repetition without change within the 
context of arrested transitional politics. Finally the chapter advocates for the adoption of 
decoloniality as a plausible solution to Zimbabwe’s peace, reconciliation and development 
problems. 
8.2 KEY FINDINGS 
In general, what this thesis sought to do, in its quest to advance frontiers of knowledge in the 
field of peace and development studies is to interrogate coloniality and its concomitant effect 
on the search for peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe from a 
decolonial epistemic perspective. In line with the first specific objective of the study which 
sought to present coloniality as an analytical framework for understanding the challenges of 
peace, reconciliation, unity and development in Zimbabwe. The thesis demonstrated that 
global capitalist powers have been the common denominator not only in conflicts that 
engulfed Zimbabwe but also in failed attempts to foster peace and reconciliation. The thesis 
argued that the asymmetrical world order that privileges the North while marginalizing and 
oppressing the South is responsible for the absence of peace, unity and development in 
Zimbabwe. It was shown that power remains reposed amongst the more developed white race 
and global capitalist powers while less developed countries inhabited by the darker races are 
marginalized and denied opportunities for growth and development. What was also 
highlighted as problematic in the quest for peace, unity and reconciliation was the overlap of 
colonial patterns of power into the post-independence period. It exposed how the Global 
North created structures of power that allowed it to become hegemonic and how these 
structures of power continue to impinge on subalternized parts of the world through the 
colonial matrix of power produced by Western modernity. The thesis demonstrated that 
Zimbabwe has not escaped these matrices of power but has remained ensnared by them. That 
explains why despite the celebration of independence Zimbabwe has remained politically, 
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culturally, economically and epistemologically under the influence of the Global North and in 
particular the former colonizer and the white race that retained control of the various modes 
of production and dominance of the political economy.  
The thesis demonstrated how the control of power also overlaps into the domain of 
knowledge and being.  European epistemologies have displaced or dominated knowledges 
produced in the South with the effect of retarding growth and the development of solutions to 
African problems.  Knowledges of the subalternized have been deemed less important and 
this has militated against finding solutions to conflict and violence.  The epistemological 
dominance of European and white settlers culminated in the employment of deficient 
decolonization strategies and peace and reconciliation methodologies. Such strategies and 
methodologies were epistemologically mired in coloniality and thus inadequate to resolve 
problems arising from rebellion against coloniality. 
The study examined the notion of being and its relationship with power. The perception that 
the white race is superior to the darker races has persisted in much of the world despite 
decolonization in most parts of the globe. The racially structured global society dominated by 
the white race has been responsible for conflict and underdevelopment in the darker parts of 
the world such as Zimbabwe.  Zimbabwe was colonized by the British that ascribed 
inferiority to the Africans while appropriating superiority to whites. They created a 
classificatory system based on race that has structured society and placed the whites above 
Africans, thus justifying violence on those they subalternized. It explained how the African’s 
ontology was devalued and his being dehumanized and thus exposing the African to violence. 
Furthermore, devalued ontology of the darker races explained the absence of commitment by 
the global community towards finding lasting solutions to Zimbabwe’s peace problems. The 
white race’s perception of self as superior while ascribing inferiority to darker races 
negatively affected the resolution of conflict in Zimbabwe. The treatment of darker races as 
lesser beings by the white race was exposed by the study as a source of conflict that retarded 
the search for peace, reconciliation and unity. 
In tandem with the second specific objective which aimed at examining the four peace 
agreements signed in Zimbabwe between 1978 and 2008. The thesis analyzed the four peace 
agreements signed in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008. It explained why in spite 
of four peace agreements having been signed between during this period to end conflict, 
foster reconciliation and nation building, Zimbabwe remained a very divided and polarized 
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country characterised by intra-racial, inter-racial, ethnic, ideological, and partisan conflict. It 
argued that the politics of peace agreements, reconciliation and unity governments should not 
be understood in terms of what is superficial and glaringly visible but should be informed by 
an understanding of the hidden and invisible colonial matrix of power. The conflicts that 
engulf Zimbabwe in the post independence era are complex with roots embedded in the 
persistence of colonial patterns of power that survived the formal end of colonialism.  
The study exposed the role of capitalist Europe and America in blocking full decolonization 
in Zimbabwe. Their control of the global political and economic system enabled them to pull 
the puppet strings of the negotiations that led to the 3rd March 1978 Internal Settlement and 
1979 Lancaster House Agreement. They were essentially concerned with the protection of 
white and foreign economic and political interests more than the fulfilment of the aspirations 
of the majority black population. The Internal Settlement enabled the African nationalist 
Muzorewa to replace Ian Smith of the Rhodesia Front as Prime Minister of Rhodesia. 
Although there was transition there was no transformation of the white colonial regime.  
The 1979 Lancaster House Agreement allowed political transition from white minority rule to 
black majority rule but it was not accompanied by any transformation in economic and 
property relations. The agreement paved the way for elections which ushered in a new black 
government led by Robert Mugabe. However, there was little change in the socio-economic 
status quo. This situation did not bode well for the future of peace, reconciliation and unity in 
Zimbabwe. 
The disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980s that culminated in the 22 
December 1987 Unity Accord and the 15 September 2008 GPA were also tremendously 
influenced by coloniality. This study examined the origins of the 1980s gukurahundi violence 
and discovered that the much lampooned conspiracy argument has much substance if 
advanced from a decolonial perspective. The invisible hand of the former colonizers and 
global capitalist forces shaped political and economic processes during these periods.   The 
1987 Unity Accord brought about transition as ZANU PF and Patriotic Front Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union (PF ZAPU) resolved to end violence, merge and rule together in a 
government of national unity. There was however, no transformation in the way the country 
was governed as PF ZAPU was essentially absorbed by ZANU PF which hardly altered its 
modus operandi.  Pre- Unity Accord socio-economic and political grievances of the 
Matabeleland and Midlands provinces were not addressed.  
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With regard to the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA), it ended post-election violence 
and facilitated transition by paving the way for the formation of a coalition government but 
transformation was not achieved. The socio-economic problems refused to go away and 
political polarization persisted. ZANU PF retained control of the levers of power and little 
was done to address the socio-economic crisis that engulfed the country.   
It was noted in the study that central in the four peace agreements that failed to foster peace, 
reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe between the years 1978 and 2008 was that of 
exclusion, a feature embedded in coloniality.  They were exclusionary as they left out some 
state and non-state actors. Civil society organizations and small political parties did not 
participate in the peace agreements, unity governments and reconciliation processes. Those in 
power chose players they wanted to negotiate with in the search for peace. It should be 
highlighted that the culture of exclusion is informed by the philosophy of coloniality that 
embraces hierachization and classification according to the perceived ontological value. 
Those that were included in the talks were seen as ontologically dense enough to warrant a 
seat at the negotiation table.   In addition the four agreements were by and large elite pacts 
that put the interest of personalities ahead of those of the masses and therefore brought 
transition without transformation. The negotiations were also characterized by win/lose 
scenarios rather than a genuine concern to find common ground for the sake of peace, unity 
and development. As a result the four agreements were resented by significant sections of the 
population who never supported them but instead worked against them.  
The thesis revealed that the state has also been an important constant factor in Zimbabwe’s 
search for peace, reconciliation and unity.  This is despite the fact that the state has been a 
perpetrator of violence and have rewarded people accused of human rights violations with top 
government posts. It has dominated peace and reconciliation processes and has framed them 
in its interest.  Attempts to inaugurate processes that seek to exclude or accord the state a less 
prominent role in peace and reconciliation have been frustrated by the state and this is likely 
to continue unless there is a change in the power dynamics and mindset of the 
state.(Interview with an international relations expert : 7/9/2015). 
Fundamentally, what these peace agreements sought to achieve did not come to pass. In the 
end the peace agreements did not translate to peace, unity governments failed to unite; 
reconciliation processes did not result in harmonious, mutually beneficial co-existence and 
development. Transitions were witnessed with the creation of unity governments but the 
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underlying causes of the conflict that could have led to transformation were hardly addressed. 
In most cases there were no fundamental changes in the character of governance and practice 
of politics. The peace agreements ignored the need to uplift various groups in society 
resulting in the compartmentalization of society and divisions that spring from it.  They 
contradicted Fanon (1968) who argues that reconciliation and nation building can only be 
achieved through the upward thrust of the people and under their leadership.  
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013b) succinctly envelopes in coloniality the challenges the various 
modalities of achieving peace and reconciliation have encountered in Zimbabwe. He writes;  
Zimbabwe’s reconciliation efforts have proven to be minimalist and inadequate against 
the backdrop of  incomplete decolonization,  the unresolved colonially induced economic 
inequalities, incomplete nation building, contested state -making and resilient ethnic 
tensions informed by a combination of pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial 
experiences (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013b:189).   
The study also revealed that the quest for peace, reconciliation and unity has not been 
successful because of structural top-down processes that were pervaded by political 
expediency at the cost of genuine commitment to end violence and achieve sustainable peace.  
Justice, a fundamental element of any peace and reconciliation process, was ignored in all 
four agreements. Peace and reconciliation processes were also dominated by the elite that 
ignored the views of the subalternized and marginalized people. Unity governments that were 
established after peace agreements were signed also contributed to the failure because they 
neglected the need to legislate the creation of commissions to deal with peace, reconciliation, 
and unity after violent conflict. Ultimately the thesis revealed that peace and development are 
structurally interlocked. The absence of peace in Zimbabwe retarded development in as much 
as the absence of development has been responsible for conflicts and the failure to foster 
peace, unity and reconciliation.   
 
The study in fulfilment of the third specific objective which sought to identify colonial 
factors that are barriers to sustainable  peace, reconciliation, unity and development in 
Zimbabwe the thesis exposed how the control of power, knowledge and being by the 
hegemonic global capitalist North had detrimental effects on the quest to achieve sustainable 
peace and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. Euro-American powers used their control of the 
global political economy to block complete decolonization and to pursue a neo-colonial 
agenda in Zimbabwe with the effect of negating the search for peace, unity and 
reconciliation. The US and European dominated global political and capitalist system and 
251 
 
controlled multilateral institutions such as the IMF and WB have resulted in the unfair 
treatment of the ex-colonized world and creation of conditions that encourage conflicts and 
hamper resolution of conflicts. 
The thesis argued that the challenges to reconciliation and the problems of peace, unity and 
development in Zimbabwe are also explained by Fanon’s (1968) coloniality related notion of 
repetition without change within the context of arrested transitional politics.  Global 
capitalism blocked transformation through employing its power to weaken political and 
economic structures that could enable transformational processes to accompany political 
transition. Global imperialist and capitalist forces with vested interests in Zimbabwe’s 
political economy also interfered with peace processes with the effect of blocking the 
achievement of durable peace. They have refused to unhook colonial tentacles of power that 
have been responsible for underdevelopment and conflict in Zimbabwe.  
The study exposed how remnants of colonialism have been the sources of conflicts that have 
retarded the development process since independence in 1980. These residual effects of 
colonialism have not only blocked various endeavours to achieve peace, unity and 
reconciliation but have been behind conflicts that have engulfed the country. There was not 
any fundamental break between the colonial period and the post independence period. 
Structures of power remained essentially the same politically, socially and economically and 
problems of tribalism, regionalism, racism and other drivers of conflict emerging from 
coloniality persisted. This absence of change created instability and left the country 
vulnerable to violence and conflict. 
The thesis highlighted how the inheritance of colonial modus operandi did not offer a solid 
foundation upon which peace and stability could be engendered because the new rulers 
reproduced coloniality.  Although having fought hard to end colonialism the new rulers 
exhibited colonial tendencies and behaviours that blocked paths to peace and sowed seeds for 
conflict. They opposed the repressive colonial system steeped in coloniality but ended up 
becoming what they were fighting against (oppressors). They mutated and took the form of 
the colonial regime and this negatively affected post independence nation building. The 
reproduction of the former colonizer’s modus operandi in the post-independence era 
hampered development, a pre-requisite for peace, reconciliation and unity.  
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The fourth specific objective of the thesis which aimed at making recommendations for 
moving Zimbabwe towards, peace, reconciliation, unity and development is addressed in 
section 8.3 which discusses the implications of the findings. 
8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS TOWARDS A DECOLONIZED SEARCH FOR PEACE, 
RECONCILIATION AND UNITY IN ZIMBABWE 
The thesis has argued that peace, unity, reconciliation and development can only be achieved 
by a comprehensive peace and reconciliation process that acknowledges the importance of 
coloniality as a source of conflict in Zimbabwe. In light of the challenges to peace, 
reconciliation and unity presented by coloniality, the thesis advocates for the need to adopt 
decoloniality as a panacea to conflict and as an important ingredient to achieve peace, 
reconciliation, unity and development. Decoloniality is a unifying philosophy that 
acknowledges and respects the humanity of others as opposed to the hierachizing and divisive 
philosophies bequeathed by colonialism that doubt the humanity of others.  It confronts 
injustice and seeks to restore the ontological density of the dehumanized darker subalternized 
races experiencing hellish existential conditions under coloniality.   
The study proposes that there is need to destroy what Maldonado-Torres (2008) refers to as 
the complicit structures of the global capitalist system and decolonize Zimbabwe’s political 
economy. This is critical for the achievement of peace and development and this can only be 
possible if Zimbabwe disentangles itself from the colonial matrix of power operating at the 
local level before destroying it by seeking to transform the modern/colonial capitalist world-
system.  One way of achieving this is through exploring other alternatives to the 
modern/colonial world. This prompts Mignolo (2007) to call for a world in which many 
worlds can exist as opposed to the notion of a universal Euro-American dominated world we 
currently live in.  In one of these worlds the exploited and marginalized Zimbabweans can 
come to understand their own situations and realities and come up with development 
strategies and programmes that are sensitive to their context.   
An important contribution the study makes is an illumination of Zimbabwe’s peace and 
development problems from a decoloniality epistemic perspective. The thesis recommends 
that this new twist to the discourse of peace, reconciliation, unity and development be 
employed by conflict managers and peace builders so that they can rethink on the 
fundamental drivers of conflict in Zimbabwe and review peace and reconciliation theories 
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and methodologies that they have been using. Only then can they develop modes of conflict 
resolution and search for peace, reconciliation and development embedded in decoloniality.   
This thesis advocates for a shift in the geography of reason, a relook into the geo-political and 
body-political location of the subject that speaks the development of a new locus of 
enunciation for African scholars, development practitioners, conflict managers and peace 
builders away from the decadent Universalist neo-liberal canon that has failed to resolve 
problems of conflict, violence and underdevelopment in Zimbabwe.  This can be achieved by 
decolonizing the mind, for it is in the mind that decolonial struggles are first won. Freeing the 
mind allows for the development of strategies of circumventing coloniality by creating a new 
political order uncontaminated by coloniality. The other way is by studying the absence of 
peace, reconciliation and unity from a decolonial epistemic perspective to unmask coloniality 
of knowledge, power and being as drivers of conflict. The thesis goads people of the ex-
colonized world to embrace decoloniality and its constitutive elements that include; border 
thinking, transmodernity, diversality, pluriversality and delinking. 
8.3 GENERAL CONCLUSION  
It has thus been demonstrated in the thesis that the colonial matrix of power has been a source 
of conflict in Zimbabwe as well as a bulwark in the search for peace, reconciliation and 
development. It has brought to the fore the contribution of coloniality to conflict and the 
challenges of achieving peace, unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. The thesis revealed 
how the four peace agreements  be-saddled by a plethora of problems rooted in coloniality 
offered minimalist solutions to problems confronting Zimbabwe,  rendering it unable to foster 
sustainable peace and unity. Global capitalist and imperialist forces involvement in 
Zimbabwean conflicts resulted in imperfect settlements as they sought to produce agreements 
that safeguarded their interests.  The study explored and established that Zimbabwe’s peace 
and reconciliation challenges, while explained by various factors, are fundamentally a 
consequence of colonial forms of domination that survived the end of colonial rule that 
continue to negatively impact on Zimbabwe’s economy, politics and society. It has been 
noted in this thesis that it is because of the colonial past, the continuation of colonial 
situations and their reincarnation under a different political dispensation that Zimbabwe 
experienced conflict. It is also exposed in the study that conflict resolution mechanisms 
resembling colonial modes of ending conflict via violence resulted in the failure to create a 
stable social, political and economic order Zimbabwe requires to surmount its development 
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challenges. The thesis surmises that the best hope for the achievement of sustainable peace, 
unity and reconciliation in Zimbabwe lies in dismantling the colonial matrix of power by 
embracing decoloniality. 
This thinking is buttressed by a renowned Zimbabwean academic who opines that as long as 
classes exist in Zimbabwe in particular and global society at large peace, unity and 
reconciliation will remain a pipe dream because class interests drive conflict. This perception 
of the challenges to peace is aligned to decolonial thinking that locates conflict in the global 
and local hierachization and stratification of peoples. (Interview with a leading academic and 
publisher : 4/9/2015). Perhaps for Zimbabwe to achieve peace, reconciliation and unity, the 
Cartesian “I think therefore I am” could be replaced by the African idea of “I relate therefore 
I am” which is informed by decolonial ubuntu/hunhu philosophy. Within the ubuntu 
philosophy the Zulus would say "Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu", which means that a person 
is a person through other persons.  The ubuntu/hunhu philosophy allows for rediscovery and 
strengthening of the lost African relational structure that focuses on parity and restoration in 
realms that include power, knowledge and being as opposed to modes of pursuing peace 
produced by modernity that emphasize retribution. 
Ubuntuism/hunhuism is an indigenous African philosophy that gives an understanding of us 
as human beings in relation with the rest of the world. According to the philosophy there 
exists a common bond between us all and it is through this connection, through our 
interaction with our fellow human beings, that we discover our own human qualities. 
Ubuntu/hunhuism embodies all those virtues that sustain harmony and the spirit of sharing 
and cohesion among the members of a society (Samkange and Samkange, 1980; Manda, 
2009). It is therefore imperative for ubuntuism/hunhuism to be adopted as decolonial African 
philosophy in the search for peace, reconciliation and unity in Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix I - Political Map of Zimbabwe    
 
Source: (www.ezilon.com) 
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Appendix II - Agreement of Unity between The Zimbabwe African National Union 
(Patriotic Front) and Patriotic Front (ZAPU) 
PREAMBLE 
Conscious of the historical links between Zanu PF and PF Zapu in the struggle for national 
independence and democracy through the strategy of the Armed Struggle and their alliance 
under the banner of the Patriotic Front; 
Cognisant of the fact that the two Parties jointly command the support of the overwhelming 
majority of the people of Zimbabwe as evidenced by the General Election results of 1980 and 
1985 respectively; 
Notwithstanding that Zanu PF commands a greater percentage of the said overwhelming 
majority of the people of Zimbabwe; 
Desirous to unite our nation; establish peace, law and order and to guarantee social and 
economic development and political stability; 
Determined to eliminate and end the insecurity and violence caused by dissidents in 
Matabeleland; 
Convinced that national unity, political stability, peace, law and order, social and economic 
development can only be achieved to their fullest under conditions of peace and the unity 
primarily of Zanu PF and PF Zapu; 
We, the two leaders of Zanu PF and PF Zapu, that is to say Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe, 
First Secretary and President of Zanu PF, and Comrade Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo, President 
of PF Zapu, assisted by a Sub-Committee of equal members of Zanu PF and PF Zapu, held 
ten meetings to discuss the possible unity of our two parties as follows. 
Consequent upon these meetings and paying due regard to all the principal issues raised 
thereat, we have agreed as follows: – 
1st Meeting: 2nd October, 1985: Parliament Buildings 
2nd Meeting: 28th November, 1985: Parliament Buildings 
3rd Meeting: 4th April, 1986: Parliament Buildings 
4th Meeting: 22nd July 1986: Parliament Buildings 
5th Meeting: 29th December, 1986: Parliament Buildings 
6th Meeting: 25th February, 1987: Parliament Buildings 
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7th Meeting: 3rd August, 1987: Parliament Buildings 
8th Meeting: 10th August, 1987: Parliament Buildings 
9th Meeting: 23rd October, 1987: Parliament Buildings 
10th Meeting: 10th December, 1987: Parliament Buildings 
 THE AGREEMENT 
1. That Zanu PF and PF Zapu have irrevocably committed themselves to unite under one 
political Party; 
2. That the unity of the two political Parties shall be achieved under the name Zimbabwe 
African National Union (Patriotic Front) in short Zanu PF ; 
3. That Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe shall be the First Secretary and President of Zanu 
PF ; 
4. That Zanu PF shall have two Second Secretaries and Vice Presidents who shall be 
appointed by the First Secretary and President of the Party; 
5. That Zanu PF shall seek to establish a socialist society in Zimbabwe on the guidance of 
Marxist-Leninist principles; 
6. That Zanu PF shall seek to establish a ONE-PARTY STATE in Zimbabwe; 
7. That the leadership of Zanu PF shall abide by the Leadership Code; 
8. That the existing structures of Zanu PF and PF Zapu shall be merged in accordance with 
the letter and spirit of this Agreement; 
9. That both parties shall, in the interim, take immediate vigorous steps to eliminate and end 
the insecurity and violence prevalent in Matabeleland. 
10. That Zanu PF and PF Zapu shall convene their respective Congresses to give effect to this 
Agreement within the shortest possible time; 
11. That, in the interim, Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe is vested with full powers to 
prepare for the implementation of this Agreement and to act in the name and authority of 
Zanu PF. 
Signed……. 
SOURCE: (Newsday, 7 August 2014) 
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Appendix III - Agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic 
Front (ZANU-PF) and the two Movements for Democratic Change (MDC) 
formations, on resolving the challenges facing Zimbabwe 
 
Preamble 
We, the Parties to this Agreement; 
CONCERNED about the recent challenges that we have faced as a country and the multiple 
threats to the wellbeing of our people and, therefore, determined to resolve these 
permanently. 
CONSIDERING our shared determination to uphold, defend and sustain Zimbabwe's 
sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity, as a respected member of 
the international community, a nation where all citizens respect and, therefore, enjoy equal 
protection of the law and have equal opportunity to compete and prosper in all spheres of life. 
ACKNOWLEDGING the sacrifices made by thousands of Zimbabwe's gallant sons and 
daughters in the fight against colonialism and racial discrimination and determined to accept, 
cherish and recognise the significance of the Liberation Struggle as the foundation of our 
sovereign independence, freedoms and human rights. 
DEDICATING ourselves to putting an end to the polarisation, divisions, conflict and 
intolerance that has characterised Zimbabwean politics and society in recent times. 
COMMITTING ourselves to putting our people and our country first by arresting the fall in 
living standards and reversing the decline of our economy. 
EMPHASISING our shared commitment to re-orient our attitudes towards respect for the 
Constitution and all national laws, the rule of law, observance of Zimbabwe's national 
institutions, symbols and national events. 
RESPECTING the rights of all Zimbabweans regardless of political affiliation to benefit from 
and participate in all national programmes and events freely without let or hindrance. 
RECOGNISING, accepting and acknowledging that the values of justice, fairness, openness, 
tolerance, equality, non-discrimination and respect of all persons without regard to race, 
class, gender, ethnicity, language, religion, political opinion, place of origin or birth are the 
bedrock of our democracy and good governance. 
DETERMINED to build a society free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, 
corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, dignity and equality. 
RECOGNISING and accepting that the Land Question has been at the core of the 
contestation in Zimbabwe and acknowledging the centrality of issues relating to the rule of 
law, respect for human rights, democracy and governance. 
COMMITTED  to act in a manner that demonstrates loyalty to Zimbabwe, patriotism and 
commitment to Zimbabwe's national purpose, core values, interests and aspirations. 
DETERMINED  to act in a manner that demonstrates respect for the democratic values of 
justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, equality, respect of all persons and human rights. 
SUBMITTING ourselves to the mandate of the Extraordinary Summit of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) held in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of 
Tanzania, on 29th March 2007 and endorsed in Lusaka on 12th April 2008 and in the AU 
Summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt from 30th June to 1 July 2008.  
RECOGNlSlNG the centrality and importance of African institutions in dealing with African 
problems, we agreed to seek solutions to our differences, challenges and problems through 
dialogue. 
ACKNOWLEDGING that pursuant to the Dar-es-Salaam SADC resolution, the Parties 
negotiated and agreed on a draft Constitution, initialed by the Parties on 30 September 2007, 
and further agreed and co-sponsored the enactment of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 
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Amendment Number 18 Act, amendments to the Electoral Act, the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission Act, Public Order and Security Act, Access to Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act and Broadcasting Services Act. 
APPRECIATING the historical obligation and need to reach a solution that will allow us to 
put Zimbabwe first and give the people a genuine chance of rebuilding and reconstructing 
their livelihoods.  
PURSUANT to the common desire of working together, the Parties agreed to and executed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on 21 July 2008, attached hereto as Annexure "A". Now 
therefore agree as follows: 
 
ARTICLE I - DEFINITIONS 
Definitions The "Agreement" shall mean this written Agreement signed by the 
representatives of ZANU-PF and the MDC, in its two formations ("the Parties") in fulfillment 
of the material mandate handed down by the SADC Extraordinary Summit an 29th March 
2007 and endorsed by SADC in Lusaka, Zambia and adopted by the African Union Summit 
in Sharm El- Sheikh, Egypt. The "Parties" shall mean ZANU-PF, the two MDC formations 
led by Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara respectively. The "Government" or "New 
Government" means the new Government to be set up in terms of this Agreement. 
 
ARTICLE II DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT 
2. Declaration of Commitment  
The Parties hereby declare and agree to work together to create a genuine, viable,  permanent, 
sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwe situation and in particular to 
implement the following agreement with the aims of resolving once and for all the current 
political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country. 
 
ARTICLE III RESTORATION OF ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH 
3. Economic recovery 
3.1 The Parties agree: 
(a) to give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe. The 
Government will lead the process of developing and implementing an economic recovery 
strategy and plan. To that end, the parties are committed to working together on a full and 
comprehensive economic programme to resuscitate Zimbabwe's economy, which will 
urgently address the issues of production, food security, poverty and unemployment and the 
challenges of high inflation, interest rates and the exchange rate. 
(b) to create conditions that would ensure that the 2008/2009 agricultural season is 
productive. 
(c) to establish a National Economic Council, composed of representatives of the Parties and 
of the 
following sectors: 
(i) Manufacturing 
(ii) Agriculture 
(iii) Mining 
(iv) Tourism 
(v) Commerce 
(vi) Financial 
(vii) Labour 
(viii) Academia; and 
(ix) Other relevant sectors 
260 
 
(d) that the terms of reference of the Council shall include giving advice to Government, 
formulating economic plans and programmes for approval by government and such other 
functions as are assigned to the Council by the Government. 
(e) to endorse the SADC resolution on the economy. 
 
ARTICLE IV SANCTIONS AND MEASURES 
4. Sanctions and Measures 
4.1 Recognising and acknowledging that some sections of the international community have 
since 2000 imposed various sanctions and measures against Zimbabwe, which have included 
targeted sanctions. 
4.2 The Parties note the present economic and political isolation of Zimbabwe by the United 
Kingdom, European Union, United States of America and other sections of the International 
Community over and around issues of disputed elections, governance and differences over 
the land reform programme. 
4.3 Noting and acknowledging the following sanctions and measures imposed on Zimbabwe:- 
(a) enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act by the United States 
of America Congress which outlaws Zimbabwe's right to access credit from International 
Financial Institutions in which the United States Government is represented or has a stake; 
(b) suspension of Zimbabwe's voting and related rights, suspension of balance of payment 
support, declaration of ineligibility to borrow Fund resources and suspension of technical 
assistance to Zimbabwe by the International Monetary Fund; 
(c) suspension of grants and infrastructural development support to Zimbabwe by The World 
Bank; and 
(d) imposition of targeted travel bans against current Government and some business leaders. 
4.4 Noting that this international isolation has over the years created a negative international 
perception of Zimbabwe and thereby resulting in the further isolation of the country by the 
non-availing of lines of credit to Zimbabwe by some sections of the international community. 
4.5 Recognising the consequent contribution of this isolation to the further decline of the 
economy. 
4.6 Desirous and committed to bringing to an end the fall in the standards of living of our 
people, the Parties hereby agree:- 
(a) to endorse the SADC resolution on sanctions concerning Zimbabwe; 
(b) that all forms of measures and sanctions against Zimbabwe be lifted in order to facilitate a 
sustainable solution to the challenges that are currently facing Zimbabwe; and 
(c) commit themselves to working together in re-engaging the international community with a 
view to bringing to an end the country's international isolation. 
 
ARTICLE V LAND QUESTION 
5. Land Question 
5.1 Recognising that colonial racist land ownership patterns established during the colonial 
conquest of Zimbabwe and largely maintained in the post independence period were not only 
unsustainable, but against the national interest, equity and justice. 
5.2 Noting that in addition to the primary objective of the liberation struggle to win one man 
one vote democracy and justice, the land question, namely the need for the re-distribution of 
land to the majority indigenous people of Zimbabwe was at the core of the liberation struggle. 
5.3 Accepting the inevitability and desirability of a comprehensive land reform programme in 
Zimbabwe that redresses the issues of historical imbalances and injustices in order to address 
the issues of equity, productivity, and justice. 
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5.4 While differing on the methodology of acquisition and redistribution the parties 
acknowledge that compulsory acquisition and redistribution of land has taken place under a 
land reform programme undertaken since 2000. 
5.5 Accepting the irreversibility of the said land acquisitions and redistribution. 
5.6 Noting that in the current Constitution of Zimbabwe and further in the Draft Constitution 
agreed to by the parties the primary obligation of compensating former land owners for land 
acquired rests on the former colonial power. 
5.7 Further recognising the need to ensure that all land is used productively in the interests of 
all the people of Zimbabwe. 
5.8 Recognising the need for women's access and control over land in their own right as equal 
citizens. 
5.9 The Parties hereby agree to: 
(a) conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit, during the tenure of the 
Seventh Parliament of Zimbabwe, for the purpose of establishing accountability and 
eliminating multiple farm ownerships. 
(b) ensure that all Zimbabweans who are eligible to be allocated land and who apply for it 
shall be considered for allocation of land irrespective of race, gender, religion, ethnicity or 
political affiliation; 
(c) ensure security of tenure to all land holders. 
(d) call upon the United Kingdom government to accept the primary responsibility to pay 
compensation for land acquired from former land owners for resettlement; 
(e) work together to secure international support and finance for the land reform programme 
in terms of compensation for the former land owners and support for new farmers; and 
(f) work together for the restoration of full productivity on all agricultural land. 
 
ARTICLE VI CONSTITUTION 
6. Constitution 
Acknowledging that it is the fundamental right and duty of the Zimbabwean people to make a 
constitution by themselves and for themselves; Aware that the process of making this 
constitution must be owned and driven by the people and must be inclusive and democratic; 
Recognising that the current Constitution of Zimbabwe made at the Lancaster House 
Conference, London (1979) was primarily to transfer power from the colonial authority to the 
people of Zimbabwe; Acknowledging the draft Constitution that the Parties signed and 
agreed to in Kariba on the 30th of September 2007, annexed hereto as Annexure "B"; 
Determined to create conditions for our people to write a constitution for themselves; and 
Mindful of the need to ensure that the new Constitution deepens our democratic values and 
principles and the protection of the equality of all citizens, particularly the enhancement of 
full citizenship and equality of women. 
6.1 The Parties hereby agree: 
(a) that they shall set up a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives of the 
Parties whose terms of reference shall be as follows: 
(i) to set up such subcommittees chaired by a member of Parliament and composed of 
members of Parliament and representatives of Civil Society as may be necessary to assist the 
Select Committee in performing its mandate herein; 
(ii) to hold such public hearings and such consultations as it may deem necessary in the 
process of public consultation over the making of a new constitution for Zimbabwe; 
(iii) to convene an All Stakeholders Conference to consult stakeholders on their 
representation in the sub-committees referred to above and such related matters as may assist 
the committee in its work; 
(iv) to table its draft Constitution to a 2nd All Stakeholders Conference; and 
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(v) to report to Parliament on its recommendations over the content of a New Constitution for 
Zimbabwe 
(b) That the draft Constitution recommended by the Select Committee shall be submitted to a 
referendum; 
(c) that, in implementing the above, the following time frames shall apply: 
(i) the Select Committee shall be set up within two months of inception of a new government; 
(ii) the convening of the first All Stakeholders Conference shall be within 3 months of the 
date of the appointment of the Select Committee; 
(iii) the public consultation process shall be completed no later than 
4 months of the date of the first All Stakeholders Conference; 
(iv) the draft Constitution shall be tabled within 3 months of completion of the public 
consultation process to a second All Stakeholders Conference; 
(v) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled before Parliament 
within 1 month of the second All Stakeholders Conference; 
(vi) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be debated in Parliament and 
the debate concluded within one month; 
(vii) the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the holding of a 
referendum; 
(viii) a referendum on the new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of the 
conclusion of the debate; 
(ix) in the event of the draft Constitution being approved in the referendum it shall be gazette 
within 1 month of the date of the referendum; and 
(x) the draft Constitution shall be introduced in Parliament no later than 1 month after the 
expiration of the period of 30 days from the date of its gazetting. 
 
ARTICLE VII PROMOTION OF EQUALITY, NATIONAL HEALING, COHESION 
AND UNITY 
7. Equality, National Healing, Cohesion and Unity 
7.1 The Parties hereby agree that the new Government: 
a) will ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and 
will work 
towards equal access to development for all; 
b) will ensure equal and fair development of all regions of the country and in particular to 
correct 
historical imbalances in the development of regions; 
c) shall give consideration to the setting up of a mechanism to properly advise on what 
measures might be 
necessary and practicable to achieve national healing, cohesion and unity in respect of 
victims of pre and post independence political conflicts; and 
d) will strive to create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that 
all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, 
place of origin or political affiliation. 
e) will formulate policies and put measures in place to attract the return and repatriation of all 
Zimbabweans in the Diaspora and in particular will work towards the return of all skilled 
personnel. 
 
ARTICLE VIII RESPECT FOR NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND EVENTS 
8. Respect for National Institutions and Events 
8.1 In the interests of forging a common vision for our country, the Parties hereby agree:- 
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(a) on the necessity of all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political 
affiliation and religion to respect and observe Zimbabwe's national institutions, symbols, 
national programmes and events; and 
(b) that all Zimbabweans regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation and religion 
have the right to benefit from and participate in all national programmes and events without 
let or hindrance. 
 
ARTICLE IX EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE 
9. External Interference 
9.1 The Parties reaffirm the principle of the United Nations Charter on non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member countries. 
9.2 The Parties hereby agree:- 
(a) that the responsibility of effecting change of government in Zimbabwe vests exclusively 
on and is the sole prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe through peaceful, democratic and 
constitutional means; 
(b) to reject any unlawful, violent, undemocratic and unconstitutional means of changing 
governments; and 
(c) that no outsiders have a right to call or campaign for regime change in Zimbabwe. 
 
ARTICLE X FREE POLITICAL ACTIVITY 
10. Free political activity 
Recognising that the right to canvass and freely mobilise for political support is the 
cornerstone of any multiparty democratic system, the Parties have agreed that there should be 
free political activity throughout Zimbabwe within the ambit of the law in which all political 
parties are able to propagate their views and canvass 
for support, free of harassment and intimidation. 
 
ARTICLE XI RULE OF LAW, RESPECT FOR THE CONSTITUTION AND OTHER 
LAWS 
11. Rule of law, respect for the Constitution and other laws 
11.1 The Parties hereby agree that it is the duty of all political parties and individuals to: 
(a) respect and uphold the Constitution and other laws of the land; 
(b) adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law. 
 
ARTICLE XII FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 
12. Freedoms of Assembly and Association 
12.1 Recognising the importance of the freedoms of assembly and association in a multi-
party democracy and noting that public meetings have to be conducted in a free, peaceful and 
democratic manner in accordance with the law, the Parties have agreed:- 
(a) to work together in a manner which guarantees the full implementation and realisation of 
the right to freedom of association and assembly; and 
(b) that the Government shall undertake training programmes, workshops and meetings for 
the police and other enforcement agencies directed at the appreciation of the right of freedom 
of assembly and association and the proper interpretation, understanding and application of 
the provisions of security legislation. 
 
ARTICLE XIII STATE ORGANS AND INSTITUTIONS 
13. State organs and institutions 
13.1 State organs and institutions do not belong to any political party and should be impartial 
in the discharge of their duties. 
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13.2 For the purposes of ensuring that all state organs and institutions perform their duties 
ethically and professionally in conformity with the principles and requirements of a multi-
party democratic system in which all parties are treated equally, the Parties have agreed that 
the following steps be taken:- 
(a) that there be inclusion in the training curriculum of members of the uniformed forces of 
the subjects on human rights, international humanitarian law and statute law so that there is 
greater understanding and full appreciation of their roles and duties in a multi-party 
democratic system; 
(b) ensuring that all state organs and institutions strictly observe the principles of the Rule of 
Law and remain non-partisan and impartial; 
(c) laws and regulations governing state organs and institutions are strictly adhered to and 
those violating them be penalised without fear or favour; and 
(d) recruitment policies and practices be conducted in a manner that ensures that no political 
or other form of favouritism is practised. 
 
ARTICLE XIV TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
14. Traditional Leaders 
14.1 Recognising and acknowledging that traditional leaders are community leaders with 
equal responsibilities and obligations to all members of their communities regardless of age, 
gender, ethnicity, race, religion and political affiliation, the Parties hereby agree to:- 
(a) commit themselves to ensuring the political neutrality of traditional leaders; and 
(b) call upon traditional leaders not to engage in partisan political activities at national level 
as well as in their communities. 
 
ARTICLE XV NATIONAL YOUTH TRAINING PROGRAMME 
15. National Youth Training Programme 
Recognising the desirability of a national youth training programme which inculcates the 
values of patriotism, discipline, tolerance, non- violence, openness, democracy, equality, 
justice and respect. Determined to ensure that the National Youth Training Programme raises 
awareness of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, engenders a spirit of community service, skills 
development and a commitment to the development of Zimbabwe 
15.1 The Parties hereby agree that:- 
(a) all youths regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, religion and political affiliation are eligible 
to participate in national youth training programmes; 
(b) the National Youth Training Programme must be run in a non- partisan manner and shall 
not include partisan political material advancing the cause of any political party; and 
(c) while recognising that youths undergoing training at national youth training centres have a 
right to hold political opinions, they shall not, during the period of their training, collectively 
and as part of a 
scheme of the training centre be used or deployed for partisan political work. 
 
ARTICLE XVI HUMANITARIAN AND FOOD ASSISTANCE 
16. Humanitarian and food assistance 
16.1 In times of need, every Zimbabwean regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, political 
affiliation and religion is entitled to request and receive humanitarian and food assistance 
from the State. 
16.2 It is the primary responsibility of the State to ensure that every Zimbabwean who needs 
humanitarian and food assistance receives it. 
16.3 Non-Governmental Organisations involved in giving humanitarian and food assistance 
shall do so without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political 
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affiliation and religion and in doing so, shall not promote or advance the interests of any 
political party or cause. 
16.4 In this regard the Parties hereby agree: 
(a) that in the fulfillment of its obligations above, the Government and all State Institutions 
and quasi State Institutions shall render humanitarian and food assistance without 
discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation or religion; 
(b) that humanitarian interventions rendered by Non-Governmental Organisations, shall be 
provided without discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnicity, gender, political affiliation 
and religion. 
(c) that all displaced persons shall be entitled to humanitarian and food assistance to enable 
them to return and settle in their original homes and that social welfare organisations shall be 
allowed to render such assistance as might be required. 
(d) that all NGO's rendering humanitarian and food assistance must operate within the 
confines of the laws of Zimbabwe. 
 
ARTICLE XVII LEGISLATIVE AGENDA PRIORITIES 
17. Legislative agenda 
17.1 The Parties hereby agree that: 
(a) the legislative agenda will be prioritized in order to reflect the letter and spirit of this 
agreement; 
(b) the Government will discuss and agree on further legislative measures which may become 
necessary to implement the Government's agreed policies and in particular, with a view to 
entrenching democratic values and practices. 
 
ARTICLE XVIII SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 
18. Security of persons and prevention of violence 
18.1 Noting the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors, Non-State actors and 
others in order to resolve political differences and achieve political ends. 
18.2 Gravely concerned by the displacement of scores of people after the election of March 
29, 2008 as a result of politically motivated violence. 
18.3 Recognising that violence dehumanises and engenders feelings of hatred and 
polarisation within the country. 
18.4 Further recognising that violence undermines our collective independence as a people 
and our capacity to exercise our free will in making political choices. 
18.5 The Parties hereby agree: 
(a) to promote the values and practices of tolerance, respect, non- violence and dialogue as 
means of resolving political differences; 
(b) to renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under whatever name 
called, as a means of attaining political ends; 
(c) that the Government shall apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing 
all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book; 
(d) that all political parties, other organisations and their leaders shall commit themselves to 
do everything to stop and prevent all forms of political violence, including by non-State 
actors and shall 
consistently appeal to their members to desist from violence; 
(e) to take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions they control are 
not engaged in the perpetration of violence. 
(f) that all civil society organisations of whatever description whether affiliated to a political 
party or not shall not promote or advocate for or use violence or any other form of 
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intimidation or coercion to canvass or mobilise for or oppose any political party or to achieve 
any political end; 
(g) to work together to ensure the security of all persons and property; 
(h) to work together to ensure the safety of any displaced persons, their safe return home and 
their enjoyment of the full protection of the law. 
(i) to refrain from using abusive language that may incite hostility, political intolerance and 
ethnic hatred or unfairly undermine each other. 
(j) that while having due regard to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and the principles of the 
rule of law, the prosecuting authorities will expedite the determination as to whether or not 
there is sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution or keeping on remand of all persons 
accused of politically related 
offences arising out of or connected with the March and June 2008 elections. 
 
ARTICLE XIX FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND COMMUNICATION 
19. Freedom of Expression and Communication 
Recognising the importance of the right to freedom of expression and the role of the media in 
a multi-party 
democracy. Noting that while the provisions of the Broadcasting Services Act permit the 
issuance of licences, no licences other than to the public broadcaster have been issued. Aware 
of the emergence of foreign based radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe, some of which 
are funded by foreign governments. Concerned that the failure to issue licences under the 
Broadcasting Services Act to alternative broadcasters might have given rise to external radio 
stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe. Further concerned that foreign government funded 
external radio stations broadcasting into Zimbabwe are not in Zimbabwe's national interest. 
Desirous of ensuring the opening up of the air waves and ensuring the operation of as many 
media houses as possible. 
19.1 The Parties hereby agree:- 
(a) that the government shall ensure the immediate processing by the appropriate authorities 
of all applications for re-registration and registration in terms of both the Broadcasting 
Services Act as well as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act; 
(b) all Zimbabwean nationals including those currently working for or running external radio 
stations be encouraged to make applications for broadcasting licences, in Zimbabwe, in terms 
of the law; 
(c) that in recognition of the open media environment anticipated by this Agreement, the 
Parties 
hereby:- 
(i) call upon the governments that are hosting and/or funding external radio stations 
broadcasting into Zimbabwe to cease such hosting and funding; and 
(ii) encourage the Zimbabweans running or working for external radio stations broadcasting 
into Zimbabwe to return to Zimbabwe; and 
(d) that steps be taken to ensure that the public media provides balanced and fair coverage to 
all political parties for their legitimate political activities. 
(e) that the public and private media shall refrain from using abusive language that may incite 
hostility, political intolerance and ethnic hatred or that unfairly undermines political parties 
and other organisations. To this end, the inclusive government shall ensure that appropriate 
measures are taken to achieve this objective. 
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ARTICLE XX FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW GOVERNMENT 
20. Framework for a new Government 
Acknowledging that we have an obligation to establish a framework of working together in 
an inclusive government; Accepting that the formation of such a government will have to be 
approached with great sensitivity, flexibility and willingness to compromise; 
Recognising that the formation of such a Government would demonstrate the respect of the 
Parties for the deeply-felt and immediate hopes and aspirations of the millions of our people. 
Determined to carry out sustained work to create the conditions for returning our country to 
stability and prosperity; Acknowledging the need for gender parity, particularly the need to 
appoint women to strategic Cabinet posts; 
20.1 The Parties hereby agree that: 
20.1.1 Executive Powers and Authority 
The Executive Authority of the Inclusive Government shall vest in, and be shared among the 
President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, as provided for in this Constitution and 
legislation. The President of the Republic shall exercise executive authority subject to the 
Constitution and the law. The Prime Minister of the Republic shall exercise executive 
authority subject to the Constitution and the law. The Cabinet of the Republic shall exercise 
executive authority subject to the Constitution and the law. In the exercise of executive 
authority, the President, Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime 
Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers must have regard to the principles and spirit 
underlying the formation 
of the Inclusive Government and accordingly act in a manner that seeks to promote cohesion 
both inside and outside government. 
20.1.2 The Cabinet 
(a) shall have the responsibility to evaluate and adopt all government policies and the 
consequential programmes; 
(b) shall, subject to approval by Parliament, allocate the financial resources for the 
implementation of such policies and programmes; 
(c) shall have the responsibility to prepare and present to Parliament, all such legislation and 
other instruments as may be necessary to implement the policies and programmes of the 
National Executive; 
(d) shall, except where the Constitution requires ratification by Parliament, or action by the 
President, approve all international agreements; 
(e) shall ensure that the state organs, including the Ministries and Departments, have 
sufficient financial and other resources and appropriate operational capacity to carry out their 
functions effectively; and 
(f) shall take decisions by consensus, and take collective responsibility for all Cabinet 
decisions, including those originally initiated individually by any member of Cabinet. 
(g) The President and the Prime Minister will agree on the allocation of Ministries between 
them for the purpose of day-to-day supervision. 
20.1.3 The President 
(a) chairs Cabinet; 
(b) exercises executive authority; 
(c) shall exercise his/her powers subject to the provisions of the Constitution; 
(d) can, subject to the Constitution, declare war and make peace; 
(e) can, subject to the Constitution, proclaim and terminate martial law; 
(f) confers honours and precedence, on the advice of Cabinet; 
(g) grants pardons, respites, substitutes less severe punishment and suspends or remits 
sentences, on the advice of Cabinet; 
(h) chairs the National Security Council; 
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(i) formally appoints the Vice Presidents; 
(j) shall, pursuant to this Agreement, appoint the Prime Minister pending the enactment of the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment no.19 as agreed by the Parties; 
(k) formally appoints Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers and Deputy Ministers in accordance 
with this agreement; 
(l) after consultation with the Vice Presidents, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime 
Ministers, allocates Ministerial portfolios in accordance with this Agreement; 
(m) accredits, receives and recognizes diplomatic agents and consular officers; 
(n) appoints independent Constitutional Commissions in terms of the Constitution; 
(o) appoints service/executive Commissions in terms of the Constitution and in consultation 
with the Prime Minister; 
(p) in consultation with the Prime Minister, makes key appointments the President is required 
to make under and in terms of the Constitution or any Act of Parliament; 
(q) may, acting in consultation with the Prime Minister, dissolve Parliament; 
(r) must be kept fully informed by the Prime Minister on the general conduct of the 
government business and; 
(s) shall be furnished with such information as he/she may request in respect of any particular 
matter relating to the government, and may advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet in this 
regard. 
20.1.4 The Prime Minister 
(a) chairs the Council of Ministers and is the Deputy Chairperson of Cabinet; 
(b) exercises executive authority; 
(c) shall oversee the formulation of government policies by the Cabinet; 
(d) shall ensure that the policies so formulated are implemented by the entirety of 
government; 
(e) shall ensure that the Ministers develop appropriate implementation plans to give effect to 
the policies decided by Cabinet: in this regard, the Ministers will report to the Prime Minister 
on all issues relating to the implementation of such policies and plans; 
(f) shall ensure that the legislation necessary to enable the government to carry out its 
functions is in place: in this regard, he/ she shall have the responsibility to discharge the 
functions of the Leader of Government Business in Parliament; 
(g) shall be a member of the National Security Council; 
(h) may be assigned such additional functions as are necessary further to enhance the work of 
the Inclusive Government; 
(i) shall, to ensure the effective execution of these tasks, be assisted by Deputy Prime 
Ministers; and 
(j) shall report regularly to the President and Parliament. 
20.1.5 Council of Ministers 
To ensure that the Prime Minister properly discharges his responsibility to oversee the 
implementation of the work of government, there shall be a Council of Ministers consisting 
of all the Cabinet Ministers, chaired by the Prime Minister, whose functions shall be: 
(a) to assess the implementation of Cabinet decisions; 
(b) to assist the Prime Minister to attend to matters of coordination in the government; 
(c) to enable the Prime Minister to receive briefings from the Cabinet Committees; 
(d) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters of implementation of Cabinet decisions; 
(e) to receive and consider reports from the Committee responsible for the periodic review 
mechanism; and 
(f) to make progress reports to Cabinet on matters related to the periodic review mechanism. 
20.1.6 Composition of the Executive 
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(1) There shall be a President, which Office shall continue to be occupied by President Robert 
Gabriel Mugabe. 
(2) There shall be two (2) Vice Presidents, who will be nominated by the President and/or 
Zanu-PF. 
(3) There shall be a Prime Minister, which Office shall be occupied by Mr Morgan 
Tsvangirai. 
(4) There shall be two (2) Deputy Prime Ministers, one (1) from MDC-T and one (1) from the 
MDC-M. 
(5) There shall be thirty-one (31) Ministers, with fifteen (15) nominated by ZANU PF, 
thirteen (13) by MDC-T and three (3) by MDC-M. Of the 31 Ministers, three (3) one each per 
Party, may be appointed from outside the members of Parliament. The three (3) Ministers so 
appointed shall become members of the House of Assembly 
and shall have the right to sit, speak and debate in Parliament, but shall not be entitled to 
vote. 
(6) There shall be fifteen (15) Deputy Ministers, with (eight) 8 nominated by ZANU PF, six 
(6) by MDC-T and one (1) by MDC-M. 
(7) Ministers and Deputy Ministers may be relieved of their duties only after consultation 
among the leaders of all the political parties participating in the Inclusive Government. 
20.1.7 Senate 
(a) The President shall, in his discretion, appoint five (5) persons to the existing positions of 
Presidential senatorial appointments. 
(b) There shall be created an additional nine (9) appointed senatorial posts, which shall be 
filled by persons appointed by the President, of whom, 3 will be nominated by ZANU-PF, 3 
by MDC-T and 3 by MDC-M. 
20.1.8 Filling of vacancies 
(a)In the event of any vacancy arising in respect of posts referred to in clauses 20.1.6 and 
20.1.7(b) above, such vacancy shall be filled by a nominee of the Party which held that 
position prior to the vacancy arising. 
 
ARTICLE XXI ELECTORAL VACANCIES 
21. Electoral Vacancies 
Aware of the divisive and often times confrontational nature of elections and by elections; 
Noting the need to allow this agreement to take root amongst the parties and people of 
Zimbabwe; and Cognisant of the need to give our people some breathing space and a healing 
period; 
21.1 The Parties hereby agree that for a period of 12 months from the date of signing of this 
agreement, should any electoral vacancy arise in respect of a local authority or parliamentary 
seat, for whatever reason, only the party holding that seat prior to the vacancy occurring shall 
be entitled to nominate and field a candidate to fill the seat subject to that party complying 
with the rules governing its internal democracy. 
 
ARTICLE XXII IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS 
22. Implementation mechanisms 
22.1 To ensure full and proper implementation of the letter and spirit of this Agreement, the 
Parties hereby constitute a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee ("JOMIC") to be 
composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF and four senior members from each of the 
two MDC Formations. Gender consideration must be taken into account in relation to the 
composition of JOMIC. 
22.2 The committee shall be co-chaired by persons from the Parties. 
22.3 The committee shall have the following functions:- 
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(a) to ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this Agreement; 
(b) to assess the implementation of this Agreement from time to time and consider steps 
which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of this Agreement 
in its entirety; 
(c) to receive reports and complaints in respect of any issue related to the implementation, 
enforcement and execution of this Agreement; 
(d) to serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual trust and 
understanding between the parties; and 
(e) to promote continuing dialogue between the Parties. 
22.4 JOMIC shall be the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring 
of this Agreement and to that end, the Parties hereby undertake to channel all complaints, 
grievances, concerns and issues relating to compliance with this Agreement through JOMIC 
and to refrain from any conduct which might undermine the spirit of co-operation necessary 
for the fulfillment of this Agreement. 
22.5 The new Government shall ensure that steps are taken to make the security forces 
conversant with the Constitution of Zimbabwe and other laws of Zimbabwe including laws 
relating to public order and security. 
22.6 The implementation of this agreement shall be guaranteed and underwritten by the 
Facilitator, SADC and the AU. 
22.7 The Parties and the new Government shall seek the support and assistance of SADC and 
the AU in mobilizing the international community to support the new Government's 
economic recovery plans and programmes together with the lifting of sanctions taken against 
Zimbabwe and some of its leaders. 
22.8 The Parties agree that they shall cause Parliament to amend any legislation to the extent 
necessary to bring this agreement into full force. 
 
ARTICLE XXIII PERIODIC REVIEW MECHANISM 
23. Periodic review mechanism 
23.1 Having regard to the Objectives and Priorities of the New Government as set out in this 
Agreement, the Parties hereby agree that: 
(a) they shall constitute a committee composed of 2 representatives each to review on an 
annual basis progress on the implementation and achievement of the priorities and objectives 
set out in this Agreement, namely: Economic (restoration of economic stability and growth, 
sanctions, land question) Political (new constitution, promotion of equality, national healing 
and cohesion and unity, external interference, free political activity, rule of law, state organs 
and institutions, legislative agenda and priorities) Security (security of persons and 
prevention of violence) and Communication (media and external radio stations); and 
(b) The committee shall make recommendations to the Parties and the new government on 
any matters relating to this Agreement, more particularly on measures and programmes that 
may be necessary to take and make to realise full implementation of this Agreement. 
(c) This Agreement and the relationship agreed to hereunder will be reviewed at the 
conclusion of the constitution-making process. 
23.2 The Parties will continually review the effectiveness and any other matter relating to the 
functioning of the Inclusive Government established by the Constitution in consultation with 
the Guarantors. 
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ARTICLE XXIV INTERIM CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 
24. Interim Constitutional amendments 
The Parties hereby agree: 
24.1 that the constitutional amendments which are necessary for the implementation of this 
agreement shall be passed by parliament and assented to by the President as Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment Act No 19. The Parties undertake to unconditionally support the 
enactment of the said Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 
No 19; 24.2 to include in Constitutional Amendment No19 the provisions contained in 
Chapters 4 and 13, and section 121 of the draft Constitution that the Parties executed at 
Kariba on 30 September 2007 (Kariba draft). 
 
ARTICLE XXV COMMENCEMENT 
25. Commencement This Agreement shall enter into force upon its signature by the Parties. 
In WITNESS WHEREOF the Parties have signed this Agreement in the English language, in 
six identical copies, all texts being equally authentic: 
Done at Harare on this 15 day of September, 2008 
ROBERT G MUGABE PRESIDENT, ZANU-PF 
MORGAN R TSVANGIRAI PRESIDENT, MDC 
ARTHUR G 0 MUTAMBARA PRESIDENT, MDC 
In WITNESS THEREOF the Facilitator: THABO MBEKI SADC FACILITATOR 
THE 15 SEPTEMBER 2008 GLOBAL POLITICAL AGREEMENT  
SOURCE (GOVERNMENT OF ZIMBABWE) 
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APPENDIX IV – Sample of questions that guided the unstructured interviews 
My name is Douglas Munemo. I am a student at UNISA in Development Studies. I am 
carrying out research on ‘The Search for Peace, Reconciliation and Unity in Zimbabwe: From 
the 1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement’.  May you please help 
me by answering questions below. Your responses will be used for no other purpose apart 
from academic purposes only. You are assured of the confidentiality of your responses and 
you will remain anonymous. 
 
1. Why in spite of the four peace agreements, unity governments and reconciliation 
processes between the years 1978 and 2008 have peace, unity and reconciliation not 
been achieved in Zimbabwe. 
 
2.  How have the continuation of colonial forms of domination that define power, 
economy, identity, being and knowledge that survived the end of formal colonialism – 
affected the quest for  peace, unity and reconciliation in  
 
 
 
3. What fundamentally is the Zimbabwean problem  
 
Thank you. 
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APPENDIX V - Sample Introduction Letter From The Employer1 
3 December, 2014  
 
To Whom It May Concern:  
 
I am writing to introduce Mr. Douglas Munemo, who is a lecturer in the Department of 
Development Studies at the Midlands State University, Zimbabwe.  Mr. Munemo is reading 
for a PhD in Development Studies at the University of South Africa (UNISA). His research 
topic area is on The Search for Peace, Unity and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe: From the  
1978 Internal Settlement to the 2008 Global Political Agreement. To enable him undertake 
this study, Mr. Munemo requires access to relevant public organizations/institutions and 
officials in Zimbabwe.  
The Department would like to ask for your cooperation and support during Mr. Munemo’s 
research. I should be very grateful if you could facilitate his work and help him in any way 
possible.  
 
Yours sincerely,  
 
Dr. J. Matunhu  
Chairperson of the Department of Development Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The original letter used during the field work had the official logo of the institution  
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APPENDIX VI - Sample Introduction Letter From The Researcher2 
8 December, 2014 
________________________   
________________________  
Dear Sir/Madam,  
Ref: Request for Interviews  
I am writing this letter to request your permission to conduct face-to-face interviews with 
you. I am a Doctoral (PhD) candidate of Development in the Development Studies 
Department, University of South Africa. I am conducting a research on “The Search for 
Peace, Unity and Reconciliation in Zimbabwe, 1978- 2012”.  In light of this, I have few 
questions that I would like to ask in order to test the assumption of the study and/or answer 
the research questions.  
I would like to further emphasize the importance of this research in trying to understanding 
the challenges of peace, reconciliation and national unity. This study would, no doubt, serve 
as a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding and developing strategies to 
foster peace and sustainable development in Zimbabwe. I would therefore, be much grateful 
if my request is given the best of your favorable consideration. You will find attached an 
introductory letter from my University and interview schedules for your perusal and 
consideration.  
Thanking you in anticipation of your favourable cooperation. I can be contacted through the 
following mobile number; 0779 483 041 
Yours sincerely,  
Douglas Munemo. 
 
 
                                                          
2 The original letter used during the field work had the official logo of the Institution the researcher was 
attached   
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APPENDIX VII - Table Showing Documents Analysed 
CATEGORY  DOCUMENTS 
1  Published Books 
2 Journal Articles 
3 Newspapers 
4 Magazines 
5 Reports 
6 Peace Agreements 
7 Unpublished Theses 
8 Online Materials 
9 Research papers 
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APPENDIX VIII - Table: Showing the study population, sample, sampling and research 
method 
Population  Target 
Population  
Sampling 
procedure  
Sample Method/technique  Date  
Harare    Local resident  Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
14/3/2015. 
Harare Academic and 
publisher 
Purposive  1 Unstructured 
interview 
4/9/2015 
Harare  International 
relations expert 
Purposive  1 Unstructured 
interview 
7/9/2015 
Harare Media 
practitioner and 
ZANU PF party 
official 
Purposive  1 Unstructured 
interview 
10/9/2015 
 
Harare former co-
national healing 
and 
reconciliation 
minister 
Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
17/9/2015 
Harare  Media 
practitioner  
Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
7/9/2015 
Harare NGO 
programme 
officer 
Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
28/8/2015 
Harare  Senior MDC–T 
Official  
Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
3/9/2015 
Gweru  Retired ZNA 
officer  
Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
12/5/2015 
Gweru  Retired ZANU 
PF  ex-
government 
minister 
Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
14/9/2015 
Bulawayo  Former ZIPRA 
guerrilla  
Purposive 1 Unstructured 
interview 
22/9/2015 
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APPENDIX IX - CHRONICLE OF EVENTS 1830s – 2013 
1830s Ndebele people fleeing Zulu violence and Boer migration in present-
day South Africa move north and settle in what becomes known as 
Matabeleland. 
1888    Cecil John Rhodes obtains the Rudd concession from the Ndebele king 
   Lobengula 
1889   Rhodes establishes the British South Africa company (BSAC)  
   Incorporated under Royal Charter 
1890   occupation of Mashonaland by the BSAC Pioneer Company 
1893   BSAC forces invade Matabeleland and destroy the Ndebele state 
1895   Mashonaland and Matabeleland renamed Rhodesia 
1896-97  Ndebele –Shona uprisings crushed 
1897   Country renamed Southern Rhodesia 
1923    Southern Rhodesia becomes a self-governing British colony 
1930   Land Apportionment Act divides Rhodesia into African and European  
   Areas 
1934   The first African National Congress (ANC) formed in Bulawayo  
1948    First general strike by African workers  
1951   1951 Land Husbandry Act forces African farmers to destock 
1953   Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland formed 
1960   National Democratic Party (NDP) founded to replace ANC 
   Law and Order Maintenance Amendment Act passed 
1961   Africans reject new constitutional proposal, NDP banned replaced by
   ZAPU under Joshua Nkomo 
1962   Rhodesia Front party under Ian Smith wins election 
1963   ZAPU splits, ZANU formed under Ndabaningi Sithole.  
1964   ZAPU and ZANU banned after clashes. Nkomo forms the  
   Peoples Caretaker Council 
1965    ZIPRA forces enter the country in May   
UDI- Unilateral Declaration of Independence declared by Ian Smith on 
11 November 
 Harold Wilson, British Prime Minister, declares UDI illegal 
(henceforth known as IDI) and an act of rebellion on. 
UN Security Council Resolution declares UDI illegal and calls on 
Britain to end the rebellion. 
1966   Smith and Wilson meet on the HMS Tiger 
Britain applies selective sanction on Rhodesia  
Seven ZANLA guerrillas die in a battle at Chinhoyi 
1968    Smith and Wilson meet on the HMS Fearless 
1970   Rhodesia becomes a Republic 
The African National Council is set up as a temporary non-political 
body under Bishop Abel Muzorewa.   
1971   FROLIZI is formed 
1972   ANC under Abel Muzorewa is formed 
   ZANLA begins military offensive in the north-east section of the  
   Country  
1974 By the Lusaka Agreement the leaders of ZANU, ZAPU, ANC and 
FROLIZI agreed to unite in the African National Council with 
Muzorewa as President 
 Smith and Muzorewa sign an agreement in private 
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1976 The Patriotic Front Agreement is signed 
 Kissinger Agreement 
   The Geneva Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe  
1977   Anglo-American proposals  
1978 3 March Internal Settlement between Smith moderate internal African 
nationalist leaders    
8 March ministerial council of interim government composed of black 
and white ministers created. 
April 28 dismissal of Byron Hove (UANC- appointed Co-Minister of 
 Justice, Law and Order) 
3 September: An Air Rhodesia Viscount civilian aircraft shot down by 
ZIPRA. 
1979    12 Feb ZIPRA shoot down another Viscount aircraft.     
April Muzorewa of the ANC wins elections boycotted by the PF  
   10 September Lancaster House Constitutional Conference begins. 
October - An impasse over land reform emerges at Lancaster House. 
The United States seeks to break the deadlock. 
21 December - Lancaster House talks end with a constitution, 
including a sunset clause’ that precludes any changes to the 
constitution for 10 years. Land resettlement set up on a ‘willing buyer- 
willing seller’ basis. 
1980  4 March - ZANU won the elections for a new black government 
 18 April - Zimbabwe Independence Day 
 Mugabe sworn in as first Prime Minister includes Zapu leader Joshua 
Nkomo in his cabinet. 
Sporadic outbursts of violence in the vicinity of Guerrilla Assembly 
Points (APs) all over the country. State of Emergency, in place since 
1965, renewed: it is further renewed every six months until July 1990. 
Prime Minister Mugabe enters into an agreement with North Korea for 
the training and arming of a brigade of the Zimbabwe defence forces. 
Late in the year there is a battle between ZIPRA and ZANLA 
Guerrillas, moved from rural Assembly Points to Entumbane near 
Bulawayo.  
1981  Early in the year there is a second, major outbreak of violence at 
Entumbane which spills over to Ntabazinduna and Connemara in the 
Midlands. More than 300 die. The Dumbutshena Report is 
commissioned by the government to investigate events surrounding the 
Entumbane uprising: to date its findings have been suppressed.  
Inkomo Army Barracks are sabotaged by South African agents 
destroying $50 million in ammunition and equipment.North Korean 
instructors arrive to begin training the "5 Brigade". South African 
agents sabotage ZANU-PF headquarters, killing 7. 
1982  Discovery of arm caches on ZAPU owned propertiesZAPU Ministers 
removed from government. Ex-ZIPRAS defect in large numbers. 
Dissident problem begins. North Korean-trained Fifth Brigade 
deployed to crush the insurgency in the Midlands and Matabeleland 
provinces. Government forces are accused of killing thousands of 
civilians over next few years. 
1983  Nkomo is placed under house arrest and flees to Botswana. 
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1984  Chihambakwe Commission of Inquiry is set up to investigate atrocities 
in Matabeleland.  
1985  It is announced the Chihambakwe Commission's report will not be 
made public.  
1987 White reserved seats abolished 
 In April Unity Talks between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF begin 
 22 December Unity Accord signed between PF ZAPU and ZANU PF 
 The Zimbabwe government changes the constitution and Mugabe 
becomes Executive President 
1988  An Amnesty is announced for all dissidents which is later extended to 
include all members of the army who committed offences before the 
Unity Accord. 
1989  Formation of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) with Edgar 
Tekere as leader 
1990 The Zimbabwean government passes the Land Acquisition Act, 
changing the Zimbabwean constitution. This granted the government 
more power to redistribute land. 
1996 End of the first phase of Zimbabwe land reform. £3 - £3.5m unspent 
(depending on accounts) 
Presidential elections held in Zimbabwe. Land reform is a key issue 
during the campaign. 
1997 veterans of the liberation war awarded hefty payout gratutities 
 The Zimbabwe dollar plunges to an all time low against the US$ 
 New prime minister Tony Blair meets President Mugabe at the  
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. Blair downplays 
Britain’s responsibility for past, infuriating President Mugabe. 
1998 Zimbabwe enters the DRC war 
An economic crisis marked by high interest rates and inflation 
provokes riots and increasing support for the Zimbabwean Congress of 
Trade Unions led by Morgan Tsvangirai. 
1999 The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) is formed 
and Tsvangirai is appointed leader in 1999. 
2000  Zimbabweans reject a new constitution in a referendum 
Landless peasants and War Veterans invade mainly white owned farms 
2001 Finance Minister Simba Makoni publicly acknowledges economic 
crisis. Western donors - including the World Bank and the IMF -cut 
aid because of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme. 
2002 Mugabe wins election against Tsvangirai. Observers condemn the poll 
as flawed and unfair. European Union imposes sanctions on 
Zimbabwe. 
Zimbabwe suspended from Commonwealth 
2003  Zimbabwe pulls out of Commonwealth after organisation decides to 
extend suspension of country indefinitely. 
2005  May-July - Tens of thousands of shanty dwellings and illegal street 
stalls are destroyed as part of a "clean-up" programme. The UN 
estimates that the drive has left about 700,000 people homeless. 
The opposition MDC splits over its poll boycott decision 
ZANU-PF wins parliamentary election, giving it the majority it needs 
to change the constitution. 
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2007  June - Ruling ZANU-PF and opposition MDC hold preliminary talks 
in South Africa. 
2008 March: ZANU PF loses an inconclusive presidential election to 
the MDC-T 
 June: Mugabe wins a landslide victory in the presidential runoff 
election boycotted by Morgan Tsvangirai. 
July 21 - ZANU-PF and both groups of the MDC signed a MOU  
outlining a framework for talks on 21 July 
July 25 - GPA talks officially begin 
August 10 – reports of deadlock in the talks filter across the country 
11 September - A final deal is reached on 11 September 2008, 
providing for Mugabe to remain President while Tsvangirai would 
become Prime Minister. 
 15- September: the Global Political Agreement on the challenges 
facing Zimbabwe is signed between the two MDC formations and 
ZANU PF 
Annual inflation rate hits new high of 231 million% according to 
official figures. 
2009 February: A government of national unity between ZANU PF and the 
two MDC formations led by Mugabe is established. 
Tsvangirai is sworn in as prime minister by Mugabe. 
   June - Constitutional review begins. 
One year after power-sharing deal, progress is slow. MDC continues to 
allege persecution and violence against members. 
2013 March - New constitution approved by an overwhelming majority in a 
referendum. Future presidents will be limited to two five-year terms 
July 31: the GNU ends as ZANU PF wins with the elections by a 
landslide. 
 Sources for the chronicle of events: 
Banana, C.S. 1989. Turmoil and Tenacity. (CCJP and LRF), 1997. Breaking the Silence, Building 
True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands, 1980-1989, Harare: 
CCJP and LRF. Flower, K. 1987. Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record Rhodesia into 
Zimbabwe 1964 to 198.1 All Party Parliamentary Group 2009 Land in Zimbabwe: Past Mistakes, 
Future Prospects. Kandiah, M and Onslow, S. 2005 Britain and Rhodesia: The Road to Settlement 
London :The Institute of Contemporary British History. Timeline-A Look at Robert Mugabe's 30 
Years in Power, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia: Chronological Table of Events, Zimbabwe Rhodesian 
Information Office. Chronology of Events, The Foreign Office. Papers of Sir John Biggs Davison, 
House of Lords Records Office, BD/1/424 Rhodesia 1979.Zimbabwe profile - Timeline - BBC News 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113618 Accessed 18 April 2016. Zimbabwe profile – Timeline 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14113618 Accessed 17 April 2016 
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